

## THE STATE IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES: TANZANIA\*

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WITH the recent work of Samir Amin and others, Marxist understanding of African economies has begun to progress; political analysis has lagged far behind however. For too long the ground has been ceded, by default, to the ideologues of establishment political science and to their various permutations on the themes of "political modernization" and "one-party states". This comment applies not merely to "radical Africana" of course. A similar short-fall in radicalism's scientific understanding of the political can be noted with reference to Asia and Latin America as well. The problem of "the state" as it presents itself in the context of "underdevelopment" has been undertheorized and little researched. The present essay seeks to contribute to a further discussion of this issue.

Needless to say, it does not do so in a complete vacuum. Most notably, Hamza Alavi has recently provided an important starting point for analysis of "the state in post-colonial societies", premissing his argument

"on the historical specificity of post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from structural changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignment of classes and by the superstructures of political and administrative institutions which were established in that context, and secondly from radical re-alignments of class forces which have been brought about in the post-colonial situation."<sup>1</sup>

In general, the propositions developed by Alavi in his analysis of Pakistan and Bangla Desh prove most illuminating when applied to the Tanzanian experience—as will be seen in the following pages. At the

\* This paper was originally presented in the "Views from the Left" Lecture Series, Toronto, Canada, February 1974. For an overview of the Tanzanian situation which spells out both the country's achievements and its continuing contradictions in much more detail than has been possible here, the interested reader may wish to refer to the author's "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania", in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York and London, 1973), Ch. 6. The present paper is, in effect, a theoretical extension of that earlier essay. There are also the various materials collected in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania: Politics and Policies*, two volumes (Nairobi, Kenya, 1972 and 1973).

same time, such a comparison suggests certain qualifications and extensions of his argument which are here discussed tentatively, and fully in the spirit of Alavi's conclusion that "comparative and critical studies are needed before we can hope to arrive at a general theory of the State in post-colonial societies".

There are certain dangers in focusing upon Tanzania to make such points—a possible confusion of the particular for the general for example, a danger which may be intensified with respect to Tanzania because of that country's somewhat atypical post-colonial pattern of development. But there is a compensating advantage of some significance: discussion of the Tanzanian case provides the opportunity to work with an analytical literature of a very high order, a literature which is not widely enough known outside East Africa. Specifically, the past few years have seen the emergence, around the journal *Majimaji*, of an important school of Tanzanian critics of that country's "socialism".<sup>2</sup> The body of work which these writers have begun to produce is rooted in the Marxist tradition and it has provided a stimulating domestic counter-weight to the formulations of President Nyerere, in terms of whose approach to Tanzania much previous analysis has been conducted. As a result, a discussion of "the state" with reference to Tanzanian experience can serve not only as an invitation to others to undertake similar inquiries in a variety of African settings, but also as an opportunity to discuss critically this "*Majimaji* school" of socialist theorists.

## I The State in Post-Colonial Societies

There are three points which define the crucial significance of the state in post-colonial societies—two of which can be drawn directly from Alavi. For the first, we may quote at length:

"The bourgeois revolution in the colony in so far as that consists of the establishment of a bourgeois state and the attendant legal and institutional framework, is an event which takes place with the imposition of colonial rule by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. In carrying out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution in the colony, however, the metropolitan bourgeoisie has to accomplish an additional task which was specific to the colonial situation. Its task in the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally, it had to create a state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said that the "superstructure" in the colony is therefore, "over-developed" in relation to the "structure" in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of independence. The colonial state is therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable them through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes. The post-colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and **controlled**."<sup>3</sup>

Much about this formulation is exemplary — and immediately illuminates the historical basis of the situation in East Africa.

A second, complementary, point also can be drawn from Alavi, for the state's prominent place in post-colonial society is rooted not only in the colonial legacy, but also in the contemporary production process. "The apparatus of the state, furthermore assume(s) also a new and relatively autonomous *economic* role, which is not paralleled in the classical bourgeois state. The state in the post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development". Since these two features both characterize the East African situation, they also serve there, in Alavi's words, to "differentiate the post-colonial State fundamentally from the state as analysed in classical marxist theory".<sup>4</sup>

There is a third feature, about which Alavi says little. In advanced capitalist countries the state is the "dominant classes' political power centre" and, in this respect, comes to have an important ideological function. For in fact it symbolizes the unity of the social formation, seeming to transcend any narrow class or sectional interest and thus helping to legitimize the *status quo*. It is for this reason that Poulantzas has conceived the state as being "not a class construct but rather the state of a society divided into classes", a fact which does not negate the further reality that such a capitalist state "aims precisely at the political disorganization of the dominated classes".<sup>5</sup> But the state's function of providing an ideological cement for the capitalist system is one which has evolved slowly and surely in the imperial centres, in step with the latter's economic transformation. In post-colonial societies, on the other hand, and particularly in Africa, this hegemonic position *must be created*, and created within territorial boundaries which often appear as quite artificial entities once the powerful force of direct colonial fiat has been removed. Peripheral capitalism, like advanced capitalism, requires territorial unity and legitimacy and the post-colonial state's centrality to the process of *creating* these conditions (like its centrality in "promoting economic development") further reinforces Alavi's point about that state's importance. Indeed, when viewed from a Marxist perspective, this is what all the fashionable discussion of "nation-building" in development literature is all about!<sup>6</sup>

These three points, taken together, help define the centrality of the state in the post-colonial social formation. And this centrality, in turn, is sufficient to suggest the importance of *those who staff the state apparatus* within such a formation. In Alavi's terms, the latter are members of "the military-bureaucratic oligarchy", who thus come to play a semi-autonomous role in the situation created by the lifting of direct metropolitan control. The nature and extent of this autonomy--of the state

and of those who staff it—from the determinations of other classes more directly rooted in the production process (Alavi identifies these as "the indigenous bourgeoisie, the Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie, and the landed classes") is more controversial. And it must be admitted that Alavi's answer to this question is not entirely clear.

He does suggest that the "oligarchy" acts "on behalf of [all three propertied classes] to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production". Moreover, this would seem to be the premise which underpins one of his explanations of the oligarchy's position:

"... a new convergence of interests of the three competing propertied classes, under Metropolitan patronage, allows a bureaucratic military oligarchy to mediate their competing but no longer contradictory interests and demands. By that token it acquires a relatively autonomous role and is not simply the instrument of any one of the three classes."

But what is being claimed here? Does this autonomy arise because these classes balance each other off, thus providing openings for the exercise of leverage by the "oligarchy" in their own interests, or is some different concept at play? In fact, other of Alavi's observations cast doubt on his own use of the term "convergence". Thus he notes on the one hand that "such a relatively autonomous role of the state apparatus is of special importance to the neo-colonialist bourgeoisies because it is by virtue of this fact that they are able to pursue their class interests in the post-colonial societies". Compare this subservient status with the oligarchy's relationship to the "weak indigenous bourgeoisies": here it is the latter who "find themselves enmeshed in bureaucratic controls by which those at the top of the hierarchy of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state are able to maintain and even extend their dominant power in society. . . ." Nor is it merely the notion of "convergence" which is called into question by the existence of such gross imbalances between the three classes. What of Alavi's other explanation of the oligarchy's autonomy: its ability to "mediate . . . between competing interests"? "Mediation" scarcely summarizes the oligarchy's drive to "extend their dominant power in society" at the expense of the indigenous bourgeoisie, though this is the situation just described by Alavi. And what, in any case, is the nature of the oligarchy's distinctive interest which any "autonomy" it may win permits it to advance and defend?

East African experience reinforces the importance of these and related questions, in part because the imbalances between the three classes is even more striking there than in South Asia. In fact, the two indigenous classes to which Alavi refers—"the landed classes" and "the indigenous bourgeoisie"<sup>v</sup>—are very much less prominent. This is true, in part,

because of the nature of pre-colonial African society. Historically, the colonial state in East Africa became "overdeveloped" not so much in response to a need to "subordinate the native social classes" as a need to subordinate pre-capitalist, generally non-feudal, social formations to the imperatives of colonial capitalism. As a result, there is no equivalent, even today, to "the landed class"; rather, we find a pre-capitalist agriculture which is moving, under the pressures of commercialization, directly towards capitalist relations of production with scarcely any quasi-feudal stopovers along the way.<sup>7</sup> Nor has the "indigenous bourgeoisie" developed even to the degree described by Alavi for Pakistan and Bangla Desh. Primarily confined to retail trade and services, it has been mainly comprised of "Asians" (Indians) rather than Africans, and this fact too has weakened such a class's ability to defend its stake in the system.

At one level, this greater weakness of the indigenous classes might seem to strengthen the positions of those who directly control the state apparatus—Alavi's oligarchy. But, as we have seen, Alavi also emphasized the importance to the latter's power of its ability to mediate *competing* interests. It has therefore appeared to some observers that, under East African circumstances (with weak indigenous classes), the oligarchy falls much more directly under the thumb of the "Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie"—the transnational corporations—whose influence may now seem even more imbalanced and unalloyed there than in the case studied by Alavi. In consequence, certain theorists (like Fanon) have presented the new oligarchies as mere transmission belts for these transnationals: "the national middle-class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary".<sup>8</sup> And Issa Shivji, of whom we shall say more later, was similarly tempted in his first essay on Tanzania to conclude that the real "socio-economic base" of those elements who directly control the state lies "in the international bourgeoisie!"<sup>9</sup>

There is, of course, much truth in such an emphasis, but it remains an overstatement. True, Alavi's attempt to premiss an explanation of the relative "autonomy" of those elements which cluster around the state upon the nature of the interplay of other classes in post-colonial society is not entirely convincing, particularly with reference to East Africa. But some measure of autonomy does remain to those elements nonetheless—an autonomy rooted in the centrality of the state in these societies which Alavi's other arguments, cited earlier, do in fact help to illuminate. Indeed, some analysts would strengthen the point by extending the argument concerning the nature of the state's stake in the production process beyond Alavi's rather bland statement that it deploys surpluses "in the name of promoting economic development". Rather, they suggest that the strategic position which the state occupies *vis-à-vis* the economy, including the privileged access to the surplus which is thus

available to the oligarchy, defines the latter's interest as being that of a *class*. Perhaps this is what Poulantzas has in mind when he cites "the case of the *state bourgeoisie* in certain developing countries: the bureaucracy may, through the state, establish a specific place for itself in the existing relations of production. But in that case it does not constitute a class by virtue of being the bureaucracy, but by virtue of being an effective class".<sup>10</sup>

Indeed, in East Africa where other indigenous classes are so relatively weak, the positions articulated by Debray in his discussion of the Latin American "petty-bourgeoisie" may seem to such analysts to be quite *à propos*: "it does not possess an infrastructure of economic power before it wins political power. Hence it transforms the state not only into an instrument of political domination, but also into a source of economic power. The state, culmination of social relations of exploitation in capitalist Europe, becomes in a certain sense the instrument of their installation in these countries".<sup>11</sup> Thus the use of the state—through special financing arrangements, training programmes, manipulation of licences and the like—by newly-powerful elements in post-colonial Kenya to parachute themselves into the private sector at the expense of the Asians is instructive in this respect.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, Shivji suggests that *a very similar logic* leads to a somewhat different result in Tanzania merely because of certain features distinctive to the political economy of the latter country. But on the essential similarity of the process he is quite outspoken.<sup>13</sup> At the same time it must be emphasized that there are others, equally convinced of the relative autonomy of the state in many post-colonial African settings, who would draw rather different conclusions. In doing so, such observers have extended the notion of autonomy far beyond anything conceived by Alavi, arguing that it can actually provide the initial lever for mounting *socialist development strategies* in parts of Africa—including Tanzania! We must now turn directly to these various formulations.

## *II Models for Africa*

Implicitly, some crude notion of the "autonomy" of the state lies at the root of modernization theory for example. Much the least interesting of the three broad formulations we shall mention in this section, it is a model which conceives of those who inherit the post-colonial state as "benign elites",—the "new middle class" or "the modernizers". Their role, within the trickle-down process of enlightenment from advanced countries to backward countries, is naturally, to facilitate the "development", the modernization of their "new nation". In addition, there is a left variant of this essentially benign interpretation—an interpretation which, quite uncritically, sees this new stratum as a force for socialism! Of course, this has been the stuff of

much political rhetoric in many centres of "African Socialism", but Green has recently given this argument an academic formulation (albeit with primary reference to Tanzania). Quite aware that "the elite" in many parts of Africa may, in the service of its own self-interest, abuse both its opportunity for service and the trust of the mass of the people, Green nonetheless concludes that, for some unexplained reason, this does not occur in a country like Tanzania. Thus,

"in the case of Tanzania, it would be fair to say that virtually every general and specific issue raised by university critics had been posed (sometimes in even harsher terms) at least six months (and in certain cases up to two years) earlier by members of the 'neo-bourgeois bureaucratic elite' and that almost all were under active study aimed at evaluating alternative operational solutions both at official and political level. There is no reason to suppose this is a totally unique record even if it may well be atypical in degree. Further, the public sector elite has accepted material rewards substantially lower than those in neighbouring states, and than those prevailing in Tanzania five years ago, with no evident general loss of morale or loyalty. To say that shortcomings can be cited and that the elite is still far above average material standards is fair comment; to argue that it has on any broad scale deliberately obstructed or been unable because unwilling to move ahead on the implementation of the Arusha Declaration is much more dubious. There is no logical reason to assume that because technical competence need not be positively related to political commitment it must always be negatively related."<sup>14</sup>

It is interesting that so close an observer of the Tanzanian scene as Green could come to such a conclusion, but it must also be asserted categorically that his remarks—so sweepingly stated—cannot be squared with the findings of most other students of Tanzanian realities.<sup>15</sup>

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the "benign" school are those who perceive in parts of Africa the crystallization of a fully-formed class around the apparatus of the state—a class with an interest quite distinct from and antagonistic to the interests of the mass of the population. Fanon hints at some such formulation, but it has been given its most vigorous scientific statement by Claude Meillassoux in his important "class analysis of the bureaucratic process in Mali".<sup>16</sup> He focuses on "the bureaucrats", defining them as "a body generated by the colonizers to carry out the tasks which could not (or would not) be undertaken by the Europeans themselves". In this capacity they were entrusted with some of the instruments of power, notably with expertise. In other words, education and government (and business) employment are the crucial features.<sup>17</sup> He then argues that in Mali:

"... having been the instrument of the colonial power, and having turned against it to become the mouthpiece of the exploited Malian peasantry, the bureaucracy was gaining (with its access to power) some of the characteristics of a social class: control of the economic infrastructure and use of it as a means of exploitation, control of the means of repression involving a resort to various devices to maintain dominance. Some of its features are original: its opposite class is not yet socially well defined; it

does not own the means of production on a private judicial basis, but controls them on a constitutional basis. There is no room here for a parliamentary system, regulating conflicts between a great number of private owners or corporations. The situation is better controlled through the single-party machine, within which open conflicts can be reduced to inner struggles between hidden factions. Appropriation of **the** economic bases of power cannot come from individual endeavour or entrepreneurship, nor from inheritance. It can come through co-operation by the people in position, or as the bargain lot of a *coup d'état*."

Meillassoux's findings parallel those of Alavi in several respects. There is, for example, the subordination to imperialism of this "class": "Given the economic dependence of the country, the bureaucracy is itself a dependent group, and its origin as an instrument of western interests continues to influence its development. Instead of striving towards a real independence after winning the right to assert itself as political intermediaries with the outside world, the bureaucrats are content to return (with a higher international rank) under the rule of the old master." Furthermore, their position is consolidated in contestation with (weak) indigenous classes: in the Mali case, an aristocracy (formerly slave-holders—a class for which there is no equivalent in East Africa) and a fairly well-developed **trading-class**.<sup>18</sup> However, having gone so far, Meillassoux remains reluctant in the end to call this group a class outright: "it is also crucial that a distinction be made between the class proper and the dependent social elements which are the out-growth of classes, but which may, in specific historical circumstances, assume important historical functions". Others, as we shall see, are prepared to go further in this direction, but for the moment another of Meillassoux' points may be cited. In noting the bureaucracy's attempt "to gain certain positions of control in the modern economy and to eliminate opposition spreading from the Malian historical classes", he comments on their moves "to infiltrate the national economy through the creation of a nationalized economic sector" as follows:

"This was done under the label of 'socialism' which provided them with a convenient ideology to bring the economy under their control, supposedly of course on behalf of the entire population. 'Socialism' permitted them to put the bureaucracy into the position of a managerial board of a kind of State corporation."

This is striking; it is almost identically the analysis that Shivji seeks to document with respect to "Tanzanian socialism"!<sup>19</sup>

It also bears a remarkable resemblance to the analysis by Fitch and Oppenheimer of Ghanaian developments under **Nkrumah**.<sup>20</sup> It is therefore interesting to note that a third model of the role of the oligarchy—he does not, of course, use that term—was articulated by Roger Murray precisely in the context of a brilliant critique of Fitch

and Oppenheimer's position.<sup>21</sup> Murray's is a model which falls somewhere between the polar opposites of the "benign" and the "class" models sketched above, and, like Meillassoux' argument, is of particular interest because it too foreshadows an approach to Tanzanian developments, in this case an approach very different from Shivji's. Murray is well aware of "the sedimenting of new and gross class and power dispositions centring upon the state" in Ghana. Yet he is uneasy with Fitch and Oppenheimer's reduction of the socialist impulse there to the status of "mere manipulation", suggesting that in so arguing the authors lapse into "pseudo-Marxist determinism". A richer, more complex picture of those who inherit the overdeveloped state in the post-colonial period is needed.

What he sees instead is "the accession to state power of unformed classes". Concentrating on the CPP leadership and *cadres*,<sup>22</sup> he notes that

"they were drawn from the *petty bourgeois salariat* (clerks, primary schoolteachers, PWD storekeepers, messengers, etc.)—a mixed stratum which concentrated many of the political and cultural tensions of colonial society. It is precisely the socially ambiguous and unstable character of this stratum which helps us to understand its *relative autonomy and volatility* in the political arena. The CPP 'political' class did not express or reflect a determinate economic class."

Murray is trapped, almost inevitably, by the concreteness, the static and undialectical nature, of terminology here for even categories like "unformed class" or "class-in-formation" remain essentially *teleological*.<sup>23</sup> Thus the "political class" to which he refers might really be best considered a "political 'x'" since any other formulation (including the term "oligarchy") will mean that the relative social autonomy and plasticity of the political class-in-formation is lost to view. Yet this is a result Murray obviously wishes to avoid, as his further conclusion demonstrates:

"The essence of the matter is that the post-colonial state (the 'political kingdom') has simultaneously to be perceived as the actual instrument of mediation and negotiation with external capitalism, and as the possible instrument of a continuing anti-imperialist and socialist revolution. In this setting, the 'relative autonomy' of the ruling 'petty bourgeois' (we can see how unilluminating the category is at this point) stratum becomes a critical issue, whose import has to be examined in its *modus operandi* of state power."<sup>24</sup>

In other words, the autonomy of this "x" is real, very real; in this "uncertain historical moment", its members can attempt to opt for different historical alternatives, alternatives which would actually affect in *different* ways their own positions in the production process.

This is not to abandon class analysis. It is merely to highlight the "social uncertainty and susceptibility to multiple determinations and influences which make the dimension of consciousness so crucial to the

analysis—a dimension consistently underestimated by Fitch and Oppenheimer. The contradictory situation and experience of these typically transitional and partial post-colonial ruling groups is mediated through the transformations, incoherences, oscillations, 'false' and illusory representations and reconciliation at the level of ideology." Thus, in discussing the CPP's left-turn in the early 1960s—a "new articulation of ideology and organization . . . which made socialist Ghana something of a model type in possible postcolonial African development"—Murray mentions as crucial factors not only the economic crisis of the late 1950s but also "the whole trajectory of ideological evolution since the 1940s".<sup>25</sup> Nor is this to underestimate the determinations which encourage such elements—harassed by a "frustrated national bourgeoisie", seduced by the easy lure of "bureaucratic consolidation" and alternately tempted and tormented by imperialism—to entrench themselves as an "oligarchy" of dominant "class". Murray states clearly that there are real limits upon what is "historically possible" under such conditions. But he does at least affirm the possibility, in the realm of *praxis*, of a real struggle over the direction which development should take.

It follows that, if such a struggle is possible, it may take place precisely within this unformed "x", between those of its members who seek to consolidate the neo-colonial set-up and those who are moved, increasingly, to challenge it.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, such a model can then be interpreted as providing a scientific basis for one of Amilcar Cabral's most suggestive metaphors. For Cabral, in identifying the "revolutionary" wing of a crucial class in formation which he dubs the "petty-bourgeoisie" (and which is strikingly similar in many of its characteristics to that "political class" discussed by Murray), states that "this revolutionary petty bourgeoisie is honest; i.e. in spite of all the hostile conditions it remains identified with the fundamental interests of the popular masses. To do this it may have to commit suicide, but it will not lose; by sacrificing itself it can reincarnate itself, but in the condition of workers and peasants."<sup>27</sup> As Murray demonstrates, there were no significant sections of the Ghanaian leadership who could bring themselves, ultimately, to "commit suicide" in this sense. Nor did the CPP, the political expression of that leadership, realize any such possibility, failing as it did even to attempt the effective mobilization of that active popular base which could alone have guaranteed forward momentum in the longer run.<sup>28</sup> What of Tanzania? Clearly, Walter Rodney's application of Cabral to the Tanzanian situation is of interest in this respect:

"(Cabral) considers the petty-bourgeoisie not as a decadent stereotype but as a stratum with various possibilities, and he includes himself. Cabral was concerned with evaluating the 'nationalist capacity' of the petty bourgeoisie as well as their

'revolutionary capacity' in the post-independence phase. He speaks about a 'revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie', meaning that section which has joined the Liberation Struggle and is already carrying it forward in the direction of socialist reconstruction in the liberated zones. In other words, the African petty-bourgeoisie stratum includes Shivji, the other TANU Youth League comrades at the University (of Dar es Salaam) and most of the national leadership in Tanzania—irrespective of political convictions. Sections of the petty-bourgeoisie have broken with their mentors, and individuals within the group have at various times wholly or partially opposed the external or local capitalists."<sup>89</sup>

### *III Socialism and the State in Tanzania*

Turning to Tanzania, we may note at the outset that each of the models sketched in Section II has found its echo in the wide-ranging debate about the nature of Tanzania's "socialism". Thus, the "right-benign" interpretation is seen at its most sophisticated in the writings of Cranford Pratt who eventually gives most bureaucrats and politicians in Tanzania high marks as "developers", despite what to him appear as the unnerving hi-jinks of some few "political ministers" and the occasional dangers of a "doctrinaire determination of policies".<sup>90</sup> We have already taken note of Green's "left-benign" variant. Both wings of this approach present much too oversimplified an account to warrant their further discussion here. Rather, the really significant differences of scientific opinion lie between what are, in effect and broadly speaking, the protagonists of the Meillassoux and of the Murray/Cabral models.

On the one-hand and closer to Meillassoux are "the Majimaji socialists", most notably Issa Shivji, author of two of the most important papers to have emerged from the Tanzanian debate.<sup>91</sup> It is in point to recapitulate his argument concerning the nature of class struggle in post-colonial Tanzania, for it is also a significant statement concerning the nature of the state there. As noted earlier, Shivji's scepticism about the socialist vocation of wielders of state power in Tanzania first found theoretical expression in his attempt to view these elements as quite straightforward agents of the international bourgeoisie. His second paper continues to stress the extent to which such elements service the interests of international capitalism, but he has gone on to develop a much more sophisticated analysis of their own stake in the system.

The class which takes power is, once again, the "petty-bourgeoisie", particularly its "upper level" ("the intelligentsia") identified, rather eclectically, as comprised of "intellectuals, teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, farmers, professionals, higher military and police officers". The inclusion of the (African) "traders" and "farmers" in this class and in the nationalist coalition is not crucial, however:<sup>92</sup> "one of the outstanding features of the petty-bourgeoisie was that they overwhelmingly came from the urban-based occupations, with some education and some knowledge of the outside world".<sup>93</sup> This class

spearheads the struggle against the colonial state. In doing so, their interests merely "coincide with those of the broad masses". The same is true, Shivji states, for the next stage of development—the struggle with the Indian "commercial bourgeoisie". The role of the latter class-cum-ethnic group—which has controlled the intermediate sectors of the economy—is analysed by Shivji with great subtlety; in fact, he has provided the first really convincing class analysis of the Asian community in East Africa to date. On the African side he extends his analysis in a manner which is much more controversial.

For the confrontation which Shivji sees to be taking place between petty-bourgeoisie and commercial bourgeoisie for economic power is complicated by a further development, one which emerges precisely with the accession to state power (at independence) of this petty bourgeoisie:

"In an underdeveloped African country with a *weak petty bourgeoisie*, its ruling section which comes to possess the instrument of the state on the morrow of independence, relatively commands enormous power and is therefore very strong. This was precisely the case in Tanzania. . . . The Tanzanian scene. . . comes closer to the 'Bonapartist' type of situation where the contending classes have weakened themselves thus allowing the 'ruling clique' to cut itself off from its class base and *appear* to raise the state above the class struggle. Of course, it is not that the contending classes had weakened themselves in the independence struggle. But a somewhat similar situation resulted from the fact that the petty bourgeoisie was weak and had not developed deep economic roots. This allowed the 'ruling group' a much freer hand. In other words the control of the state became the single decisive factor. For these and other reasons . . . it is proposed to identify the 'ruling group' as the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. Before the Arusha Declaration, this would comprise mainly those at the top levels of the state apparatus — ministers, high civil servants, high military and police officers and such like. One may also include the high level bureaucrats of the Party and the cooperative movement, because of the important role the latter played in the pre-Arusha class struggles."<sup>14</sup>

Shivji does note that the weakness of the petty-bourgeoisie referred to here "is due to the fact that it is still 'embryonic'; the whole class structure is in *the process of formation*". The same *caveat* is introduced with reference to the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Is it "a class as *distinct* from the petty bourgeoisie"? Not quite. "Suffice to say that the post-independence class struggles (including the Arusha Declaration) were themselves a process leading to the emergence of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. The process may not be complete." But having noted this, Shivji, unlike Murray, does not draw back from his terms. He is unconcerned with the weight of teleology which they bear. As he proceeds with his analysis, classes-in-formation behave, unambiguously, like fully formed classes. And this is the chief weakness of his argument.

For Shivji, in sum, the "historical moment" is by no means "uncertain". On the contrary, he now uses this conception of Tanzania's

class structure—straightforwardly and however much the "structure" may be "in the process of formation"—to explain the history of post-colonial Tanzania: it is the case of "a *non-proletarian* class after coming to political power . . . now trying to wrest an economic base" from the commercial bourgeoisie. Half-measures, like the encouragement of the cooperatives, having failed, "the only alternative, both for further struggle against the commercial bourgeoisie and for further penetration of the economy, was state intervention": "it was thus that the Arusha Declaration was born in 1967". With it, and with the attendant nationalizations, a new stage in the class struggle, à la Shivji, is reached:

"Up until the Arusha Declaration, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' was essentially of the politico-administrative type. Although the state played an important role in the economy it was mostly a regulatory one. With the Arusha Declaration, the state and state institutions (including parastatals) became the dominant actors in the economy. Thus a new and more important wing of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was created. Political power and control over property had now come to rest in the same class."

Socialism as "mere manipulation"<sup>y</sup>—Shivji comes very close to such a position. Nevertheless, he does recognize that there is some difficulty in reconciling this with the Arusha Declaration Leadersliip Code—a code designed to prevent leaders from involving themselves, profitably, in the private sector. Here Shivji's explanation, in order to save his hypothesis, is that "the ideology had gained the upper hand, for even a rhetoric has its own momentum and can have important effects on concrete measures". This would also appear to be his "explanation" for the very real constraints (certainly as compared with other parts of Africa) on elite income and consumption which have been a part of Tanzania's "socialism". In addition, Shivji states, as if to reinforce his general argument, that the Code has often been flouted since its inception. This, in turn, suggests (quite accurately) that there was a "spontaneous" tendency for "leaders" to overlap into the private sector—as in neighbouring Kenya. Yet such a reality seems to contradict Shivji's emphasis. Why didn't the petty-bourgeoisie use the state to facilitate their own movement in upon the Asians on a private basis—again, as in Kenya—rather than publicly and collectively?

Shivji is aware of this problem, of course, and his explanation is of considerable interest:

"In Kenya, there were important sections of the petty bourgeoisie—yeoman farmers and traders, for example—besides the urban-based intelligentsia, who had already developed significant 'independent' roots in the colonial economy. Thus the petty bourgeoisie itself as a class was strong and different sections within it were more or less at par. This considerably reduced the power of the 'ruling clique' irrespective of its immediate possession of the state apparatus and kept it 'tied' to its class base—the petty bourgeoisie."

But this does not convince. Even if the entrepreneurial elements were stronger in transitional Kenya, the difference from Tanzania was not so striking as Shivji suggests and in any case these Kenyan Africans' commercial opponents (European and Asian) were themselves much stronger than any counterparts in Tanzania; thus the relative economic weight of the African entrepreneurs cannot have been that much different. Moreover, it is quite unnecessary to make such subtle distinctions. As noted, it seems obvious that large sections of Shivji's bureaucratic bourgeoisie continue to cast envious glances at their civil servant and political counterparts in Kenya and at the gross (and rewarding) "conflicts of interest" which serve to characterize Kenyan economic and political life. And, being disproportionately drawn from commercialized, cash-cropping rural areas like Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, they do in fact have intimate (familial) connections with a "yeomanry". Unless contested, such a group would have had Tanzania gravitate in the Kenyan direction, a point made by Nyerere himself on more than one occasion.<sup>13</sup> It is difficult, in fact, to avoid the conclusion that the Arusha Declaration package of policies—the opting for collective solutions to the Tanzanian development problem—represented, first and foremost, an initial victory for a *progressive* wing of the petty bourgeoisie (and the announcement of its continuing commitment to the interests of the workers and peasants), rather than some cold-blooded fulfilment of the class interests of that stratum's bureaucratic core.<sup>14</sup>

This difference of opinion requires detailed exploration of a kind that is beyond the scope of the present paper. Suffice to say that for Shivji this kind of "manipulation" also tends to characterize each of the specific arenas of post-Arusha policy-making, while for each such arena it can be shown that this is an oversimplification. Take, for example, the "ujamaa village" programme (designed to promote a Tanzanian brand of agricultural collective), in Shivji's eyes merely a calculated and perfunctory gesture—an expression of "intermittent ideological hostility" to "kulaks"—designed to maintain for the petty bourgeoisie its "popular peasant base". But this was not an immediately popular policy even among much of the peasantry; support for it would have to be created, sometimes in a manner (as in Ismani) which challenged the local dignitaries of the party itself. Nor is it entirely true that this policy was "not basically against the interests of the petty bourgeoisie". The fact that in practice bureaucrats often worked hard to defuse the policy by directing it away from the "advanced" areas (Kilimanjaro and Bukoba mentioned above) and towards more defenceless, backward regions (with many fewer kulaks) testifies to their uneasiness. Nor were the extensive nationalizations of 1967 merely a charade. International capitalism was stung and the conventional wisdom of most civil servants

visibly affronted. In other words, these and other initiatives represented real achievements in a transition towards socialism.<sup>17</sup> That the full potential of these policies' possible contribution to such a transition has not been realized is, of course, also true, a point to which we shall return.

However, there is one crucial area of inquiry which cannot be passed over here and which also sheds considerable light on the issue under discussion. Thus, Shivji argues that the main contradiction in Tanzania is now between the working-class and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and cites the dramatic assertions of Tanzania's working-class in recent years. Indeed, the further investigation of this subject by Shivji's colleague, Henry Mapolu, reveals a level of proletarian action in Tanzania which is virtually unparalleled elsewhere in Africa.<sup>18</sup> As Mapolu writes:

"By any standards the progress made by the working population in Tanzania in the last few years as far as political consciousness is concerned is astounding. To begin with, at no other time in the whole history of this country have strikes and industrial disputes generally been so much a day-to-day affair as has become since 1970. But more important, at no other time have such strikes and disputes been of such a political nature! . . . It has indeed been a veritable revolution for the Tanzanian workers; within a period of three years they have moved from a state of docility, timidity, and above all disunity to one of tremendous bravery, initiative and class solidarity."

Beginning with the downing of tools and with lock-outs, some Tanzanian workers had moved, by 1973, to the stage of actually occupying factories (both state-owned and private) and continuing production on their own. And the issues were not, by and large, of a conventionally consumptionist nature. Disputes concerned, firstly, "the question of humiliation and oppression on their person by managements" and, ultimately, "issues of general mismanagement and sabotage of the country's economy". Predictably, such initiatives began to earn reprisals from the bureaucracy (including police intervention and arrests), thus polarizing the Tanzanian situation to an unprecedented degree.

But where did such a high level of consciousness come from? This too must be explained, especially when one compares this development with experience elsewhere in Africa. Moreover, the Tanzanian working-class is small, even by continental standards, and, in the past, not marked by notably radical leanings.<sup>19</sup> Once again, the conclusion suggests itself that initiatives taken by a certain sector of the leadership — notably by Nyerere and his supporters — played an important role in bringing about this development and in facilitating the emergence of what Shivji calls "the proletarian line". Unlike their Ghanaian counterparts, such a leadership did sense, albeit haltingly, that "the

oppressed" could "alone have provided the conscious support for a socialist path of development"<sup>40</sup> and they therefore sought to create such a base. Initiatives designed to facilitate "workers' participation" (workers' councils) and peasant participation (*ujamaa* and decentralization) reflected this concern, despite the distortion in practice of these programmes by the dead-hand of the bureaucracy.<sup>41</sup> However, most significant in this respect has been *Mwongozo*, the TANU Guidelines of 1971—a crucial document in crystallizing worker consciousness and in legitimizing, even demanding, the unleashing of popular pressures against oligarchical tendencies on the part of wielders of state power ("leaders"). Yet the drive for these measures did not come from below. Even Shivji must come part way to meet that reality.

"In the international situation where capitalism has become a global system and socialism has been established in a large area of the world: where both internally and externally physical and intellectual wars are raging between the capitalist and socialist lines, the world-wide circulation of progressive ideas has become commonplace. It is not surprising therefore that even capitalism and neo-colonialism have to be wrapped up in socialist rhetoric and vocabulary. But more important is the fact that though material *class* forces may not immediately warrant it, a few progressive and revolutionary leaders manage to push through (officially) radical ideas and policies. The adoption of the *Mwongozo* by TANU, with its progressive features, was such an event."

But who are these "few progressive and revolutionary leaders"? As Shivji suggests, they do shape and crystallize, rather than merely reflect, popular consciousness; moreover, they seem to be cutting sharply against the interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It is precisely because Shivji's approach cannot fully illuminate such matters that other analysts have felt some other formulation than his to be necessary in order to explain, in class terms, the "socialist" dimensions of Tanzania's experiment.

Indeed, it is only because it is much too evocative and dismissive a phrase that one avoids applying to Shivji's analysis Murray's epithet: "pseudo-Marxist determinism". Nonetheless, Murray's critique of Fitch and Oppenheimer is in many respects the best approach to Shivji. And Murray's positive formulations can also serve to promise much the most effective alternative approach to Tanzanian reality. In this respect it is worth noting that even the definitional problem (which Murray himself approached somewhat too obliquely) has been faced, quite straightforwardly, by Micheala von Freyhold—working from what is in effect, a closely related viewpoint to that of Murray. Her solution, in a recent paper, is to use the term "nizers" for the "x" in our socio-political equation. As she explains it:

“‘Nizers’ or ‘nizations’ (from Africanization) is a term applied by Tanzanians to refer to that stratum or class which social scientists have called ‘educated elite’,

'labour aristocracy', or 'petty bourgeoisie' — those who took over important administrative and economic positions when colonialism was defeated.

"'Educated elite' is an ideological term bound up with the elitist theories of dubious origin. 'Labour aristocracy' suggests a link between workers and 'nizers' which . . . does not exist. 'Petty bourgeoisie' has a double meaning: it refers to small capitalists on the one hand and all those who look to the bourgeoisie as their model on the other. As long as the educated stratum to which we refer is directly employed by colonialists or a national bourgeoisie it is necessarily a petty bourgeoisie in the second sense. In the absence of such direct employers the educated stratum can choose whether it wants to remain subservient to those by whom it has been created. Since the stratum in question may decide to become a petit bourgeoisie in both senses we would prefer to reserve the term for that particular situation.

"'Nizers' is a precise and dialectical term. It refers firstly to the progressive aspect of Africanization, to the promise that those who take over the power would return this power to the people on whose behalf they took it away from the colonialists.

"It refers secondly to the fact that the 'nizers' have not created the existing economic and social structure but have taken it over, either adapting to it or changing the built-in dependency on imperialism.

"It refers thirdly to the negative possibility that the original promises are not held, that the structure is not changed, that those who have taken the power will usurp it for themselves.

"Which of the connotations of the term 'nizers' will emerge as the decisive one is subject to the still on-going struggle among the nizers and the kind of support the different factions can mobilize among other classes — the workers and the peasants."<sup>41</sup>

It is precisely to this "still on-going struggle among the nizers" that Freyhold traces the socialist impulse in Tanzania: "In 1967 an enlightened political leadership had decided that Tanzania should not turn into a neo-colonial society. The Leadership Code was to cut the links between public office-holders and petty capitalism and nationalisations were to bring foreign capital under control. . . . Both measures were . . . a vital first step." And the direction of further steps also remains, in her eyes, a contested matter. "While the transformation of the nizers is an obvious prerequisite for the promised creation of a socialist society it is obvious that it will not proceed without a protracted struggle within that educated stratum itself. What the progressive parts of Tanzania's nizers envisage as their future is not yet reality. As long as the future is undecided there are still two ways in which one can look at the present educated stratum: as a nascent petty bourgeoisie which will not only be a faithful agent of international capital but which will eventually solidify into a class with petty capitalist connections and orientations or as the precursors of a socialist avantgarde." Of course, the general definitional problem has probably not been laid to rest by Freyhold's coinage, suggestive though it is; nor does she directly address herself to Shivji's prognosis of bureaucratic consolidation *without* "petty capitalist connections". But the emphasis seems to me to be basically correct.<sup>42</sup>

To argue so is not to ignore the contradictions which mitigate, and even undermine, the achievements of Tanzania's progressive "nizers".

Quite the reverse. In the essay cited above (footnote 43), I have stressed the extent to which various pressures—international and domestic—do play upon the system in such a way as to strengthen the least progressive elements in the "present educated stratum" and to "solidify" that stratum into a privileged class. It is quite true, as Shivji has demonstrated in another of his papers, that international capitalism can make adjustments and begin to shape to its own purposes the fact of nationalization. Corporations join with aid agencies and international economic institutions in reactivating "conventional wisdom" and coopting those "oligarchs" who are inclined to be so tempted. In addition, the expansion of the state sector has had the *result* (but, to repeat, not the primary purpose) of expanding the number who are prepared merely to feed off it, in the absence of countervailing *tendencies*.<sup>44</sup> If, unlike Ghana, some more real effort has been made to create a new base for the state among the workers and peasants, the pace of bureaucratic consolidation seems to be outstripping that attempt. In consequence, demobilization of the peasantry becomes the more likely result, while workers find themselves set not merely against the most conservative of managers but against the state itself and the increasingly homogeneous class which defends it.

The negative weight of "objective conditions" has been reinforced by subjective conditions. As Murray's analysis would suggest, ideological contestation in Tanzania has been a creative factor of great importance, with Nyerere's formulations in particular being crucial to facilitating a move to the left. But this ideology of the progressive "nizers" has also been marked by inadequacies which some might like to term "petty bourgeois" in nature: a hostility to Marxism, for example, and the consequent lack of a fully scientific analysis of imperialism and class struggle.<sup>45</sup> And this problem has been compounded by a much too sanguine reliance on existing institutions of the inherited state (Ministries and Cabinets, an untransformed party) which cannot easily be turned to purposes of Socialist construction.<sup>46</sup> As demonstrated in my earlier essay, these factors too have made it difficult for Nyerere and others to consolidate their original initiatives. The results are paradoxical (and not pre-ordained, à la Shivji). The conservative wing of the nizers now threatens to inherit a socialist initiative (and an even more "overdeveloped" state than existed at the moment of independence) in the creation of which it had little hand but which it has sought to warp to its own purposes from the moment of the policy's first being announced. All of which is to approach Shivji's conclusion, though not by Shivji's route:

"This marks the beginning of the political struggle and the rise of the proletarian line. There is bound to be increasing opposition to bureaucratic methods of work and 'management's' dominance, themselves a reflection of the neo-colonial structure of

the economy and the corresponding class structure. The struggles of the workers and peasants against internal and external vested class interests will characterize the subsequent class struggles in Tanzania.<sup>47</sup>

For it is necessary to reaffirm that much about this continuing class struggle has been shaped by the reality of struggle within the stratum of the "nizers"—within the "oligarchy-in-the-making", if you like—during the first post-colonial decade.



The critique of Shivji is also a qualification of Alavi's approach. Apart from points made earlier concerning the important differences in context which East Africa presents, and some of the implications of these differences, it can now be argued that Alavi's approach is too rigid to fully comprehend the uncertainties which define the historical process in the immediate post-colonial period. In Tanzania, his "oligarchies" become such only more slowly and with much more ambiguous results than his model would lead one to expect. At the same time it can be firmly stated that the pressures which moves the situation towards such an unsavoury result as he seeks to theorize are indeed powerful. And, as noted, there is no doubt that these pressures have been, and are continually, making themselves felt upon Tanzania. As a result, "oligarchical" tendencies—the consolidation of Shivji's "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (self-interested and ever more subservient to imperialism)—seem to have been the increasingly obvious result.

Has the further development of this trend altered perspectives on practice in Tanzania? Writing two years ago I felt confident to conclude a survey of Tanzania's efforts at socialist construction in the following terms: "Indigenous radicals will decide their own fates. Yet the fact that almost all have chosen to work within the established structures and upon the regime is no accident."<sup>48</sup> And there is still some significant contestation within the "petty bourgeoisie" and within the established institutions.<sup>49</sup> But where, for example, one could then argue, with some confidence, that the control of working-class organization by party and state had played, despite the costs, a positive role in curbing consumptionism and raising worker consciousness, there is now reason to be more sceptical about the logic of continuing control. Faced with "nizers" more bent than ever upon consolidating their power, independent organization of the working-class may seem an increasingly important goal.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, the time may be approaching when the independent political organization of progressive elements, already a (difficult) priority in most other one-party and military/administrative regimes in Africa, becomes a priority for Tanzania as well. Smash the post-colonial state or use it? But this is really a question which can only

be asked, and answered, by those engaged in significant praxis within Tanzania itself.

## NOTES

1. Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies — Pakistan and Bangladesh" in *New Left Review*, 74 (July–August 1972), pp. 59–81.
2. The most prominent of these is Issa Shivji, author of "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle" in *Cheche*, Special Issue (Dar es Salaam), September 1970, reprinted in L. Cliffe and J. S. Saul (eds.), *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol. 2 (Nairobi, 1973), pp. 304–30; and "Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues" (mimeo, Department of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973). The interesting work of Henry Mapolu (see footnotes 38 and 41 below) and Karim Hirji (footnote 37), among others, can also be cited in this connection.
3. This quotation and others in this section are from Alavi, *op. cit.*, unless otherwise indicated.
4. Alavi may overstate this particular point. Ralph Miliband has recently paraphrased Poulantzas approvingly to the effect that "the political realm is not, in classical Marxism, the mere reflection of the economic realm, and that in relation to the state, the notion of the latter's 'relative autonomy' is central, not only in regard to 'exceptional circumstances', but in *all* circumstances". And Miliband concludes that "in fact, this notion may be taken as the starting point of Marxist political theory". Nonetheless, Alavi's formulation of the concept of autonomy with specific reference to the post-colonial state—his focus on the "overdevelopment" of the inherited colonial state, for example—is a crucial and distinctive one. See Ralph Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State", *New Left Review*, 82 (November–December 1973), p. 85.
5. Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London, 1973), p. 191.
6. It must also be noted, though only in passing, that other attributes of the post-colonial state, and of the elements which control it, can work simultaneously to undermine this very kind of unity. See Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (1967) and John S. Saul, "The Dialectic of Tribe and Class in Kenya and Uganda" (forthcoming). The movement is "direct" but it can also be very slow, with the possibility of many of the newly-created "peasantry" being caught, under African conditions and in the absence of genuine mobilization, in a kind of limbo of underdevelopment. See, generally, John S. Saul and Roger Woods, "African Peasantries" in T. Shanin (ed.), *Peasants and Peasant Societies* (London, 1971), pp. 103–13, and for a striking, if controversial, East African case-study, Colin Leys, "Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society" in *British Journal of Political Science*, I, pp. 307–37.
7. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London, 1967), p. 122.
8. Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle" (*op. cit.*).
9. Poulantzas, *op. cit.*, p. 334.
10. Régis Debray, "Problems of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America", *New Left Review*, 45 (September–October 1967), p. 35.
11. This does, of course, raise some questions—for East Africa—about Alavi's juxtaposition of oligarchy and indigenous bourgeoisie. In Kenya, these two elements—among the Africans—interpenetrated to a significant degree, rather than compete with one another, though the strategic position of the Asian "commercial bour-

- geoisie" might be argued to have affected this pattern on the African side. This is, in any case, an area of inquiry to which we will return in subsequent sections.
13. Shivji, "Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues", op. cit.
  14. R. H. Green, "Economic Independence and Economic Cooperation" in D. P. Ghai (ed.), *Economic Independence in Africa* (Nairobi, 1973), p. 85. In fact Green's error lies in vastly *over-estimating* the progressive attributes of the Tanzanian situation—even as Shivji, in his turn, underestimates them (see below).
  15. For summaries of such findings see John S. Saul, "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania" in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York, 1973); Ch. 6, and Uchumi Editorial Board, *Towards Socialist Planning*, Tanzanian Studies No. 1 (Dar es Salaam, 1972).
  16. C. Meillassom, "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali", *The Journal of Development Studies* (January 1970).
  17. Interestingly, Meillassoux makes no distinction between party and administration in his analysis: "In this situation the only people able to take responsibility and power upon themselves were those with literate, administrative and managerial capabilities, equally necessary to handle a political party or to govern a State."
  18. Thus "if the conflict with local business was a consequence of the necessity of the bureaucracy to provide itself with an economic base, the fight against the aristocratic class was a more direct competition for political power" (Meillassoux, p. 106).
  19. It is worth noting that these extensions of the argument differ from Fanon's conclusion to what is otherwise a somewhat similar analysis, for Fanon seems to imply that such elements will infiltrate the national economy by moving in on the trading sector as *entrepreneurs*—viz., the very definition of this class as "an intellectual élite engaged in trade". Here is a very significant difference of opinion, as we shall see in examining Shivji's work more closely in Section III.
  20. R. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion* (New York, 1966).
  21. Roger Murray, "Second Thoughts on Ghana", *New Left Review*, 42 (March–April, 1967).
  22. It should be noted that Murray tends to talk only of the members of the ruling political party when he discusses those who inherit the state; he does not really deal with the bureaucracy's role in all of this, despite his recognizing the need for "an appraisal of the politico-administrative role and weight of the *civil service* within the state apparatus". However, his characterization of the "autonomy and plasticity" of "the political class" would seem also to apply to the bureaucracy; under such circumstances they seem equally to be elements whose "partial and 'transitional' character . . . expresses itself in its absence of a determinate class standpoint grounded upon its site in the process of production". Interestingly, Meillassom, from his different perspective, makes little distinction between bureaucrat and politician in identifying the state-based dominants in Mali (cf. footnote 17, above). This is also Shivji's approach; in Tanzania the civil service and political hierarchies interpenetrate and he is prepared to view members of both as candidates for his categories of "petty bourgeoisie" and "bureaucratic bourgeoisie".
  23. On the problem of developing terms adequate to the task of dialectical analysis of real historical processes, see Bertil Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society* (Cambridge, 1971), especially Part I.
  24. As Murray continues: "Socially, then, the picture we have is of a petty bourgeois group projected into the power vacuum caused by the lack of objective maturation of a nationalist capitalist class and the subjective errors of aspirant bourgeois politicians."
  25. Thus, "the whole Nkrumahist ideological complex was undergoing profound

mutation in the 1960s. This process has two particularly striking features: the attempt to transcend the 'African Socialism' current of thought in favour of a more universal and scientific theory; and the related effort to institutionalize and accelerate the formation of an *ideological vanguard* of cadres who might then strive to make ideology a mass force (Winneba). This development, marked as it was by bizarre juxtapositions and unresolved contradictions, nevertheless acquires considerable significance. . . . All of which is not to deny that it was a "misconceived, contradictory 'socialism' " which emerged, characterized by (among other things) "the loss of any *integral commanding strategy*" (Murray, *ibid.*).

26. Actually this struggle can even be seen to take place *within* the individual members of this unformed "x" as they struggle with the "bizarre juxtapositions and unresolved contradictions" in their own lives, a reality which was dramatized for me during seven years of work with young recruits to the "petty bourgeoisie" at the University of Dar es Salaam.
27. Amílcar Cabral, "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea" in his *Revolution in Guinea* (London, 1969), p. 59; the point is elaborated upon in his excellent essay "The Weapon of Theory" in the same volume.
28. Thus Murray (*op. cit.*) states that the "implicit positive model" offered by Fitch and Oppenheimer is "that of a political party which made the situation and demands of the most oppressed classes (urban and rural proletariat, sharecroppers, indebted tenant farmers) the absolute 'moral imperative' of its organization and action. This class-based party, acting for and through the oppressed but potentially revolutionary strata of society, could alone have provided the conscious support for a socialist path of development — with all its costs and risks." But he concludes of Ghana that "instead, the CPP demobilized these 'potential' forces".
29. Walter Rodney, "Some Implications of the Question of Disengagement from Imperialism" in *Majimaji* (Dar es Salaam, 1971), and reprinted in Cliffe and Saul, *op. cit.*, volume II. The explicit reference to Shivji arises from the fact that Rodney is here reviewing the first of Shivji's two papers cited in footnote 2, above.
30. See, among other of his articles, Pratt's "The Cabinet and Presidential Leadership in Tanzania: 1960–66" in M. Lofchie (ed.), *The State of the Nations* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971) and reprinted in Cliffe and Saul, *ibid.*, volume II.
31. See footnote 2, above; succeeding quotations are from the second of Shivji's two papers, unless otherwise indicated.
32. Not crucial, but there is an ambiguity in the term "petty bourgeoisie" which is revealed here, one to which we will return in discussing Freyhold's attempt to conceptualize Tanzania's class structure.
33. Shivji gives no numerical basis to his argument, but I have elsewhere cited Resnick's argument that "out of 350,000 persons employed in wage and salaried jobs in 1968, only 44,000 fall into the 'privileged' class, . . . that is, are in occupations classified as 'high- and middle-level' by manpower definitions". See I. N. Resnick, "Class, Foreign Trade and Socialist Transformation in Tanzania", paper presented to the Economics Research Bureau Seminar, University of Dar es Salaam (mimeo, 1972).
34. As noted above (footnote 22), Shivji makes little distinction between party and civil service; nor do his critics who adhere, in effect, to the Murray line of analysis — although the latter might argue that rather more representatives of this progressive petty-bourgeoisie are to be found in the party (which has, however, a tendency to become itself bureaucratized).
35. Thus Nyerere has argued that "some Tanzanian leaders criticized the Arusha Declaration" because "they wished to use positions of power for private gain" and "almost the only way in which Africans could get capital to become landlords or capitalists was by virtue of their office or their seniority in the public service"; see

his "Introduction" to J. K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (Nairobi, London, New York, 1968).

36. Such a conclusion with reference to the Tanzanian case, paralleling Murray's critique of Fitch and Oppenheimer's handling of Ghanaian developments, also raises some retrospective doubts about Meillassoux's discussion of Mali. Was the socialist assertion there as straightforwardly manipulative as Meillassoux suggests?
37. Shivji's model has been applied, with interesting results, to the educational sphere by Karim Hirji in his essay "School Education and Underdevelopment in Tanzania", *Majimaji*, 12 (September 1973). More alert to the ideological dimensions of Tanzanian development and very insightful, Hirji's analysis suffers, nonetheless, from some of the same rigidities as Shivji's. I intend to discuss his argument in more detail in a monograph on the University of Dar es Salaam, now in preparation.
38. Henry Mapolu, "The Workers' Movement in Tanzania", *Majimaji*, 12 (September 1973). See also Mapolu's "Labour unrest: irresponsibility or worker revolution", *Jenga* (Dar es Salaam), 12 (1972) and Nick Asili, "Strikes in Tanzania", *Majimaji*, 4 (September 1971).
39. For a subtle account which highlights the dialectic established in Tanzania between a committed section of the leadership and a working-class with steadily rising consciousness, see M. A. Bienefeld, "Workers, Unions and Development in Tanzania", paper delivered to a conference on "Trade Unions and the Working-Class in Africa", Toronto, 1973. Even NUTA, the official trade union ("that moribund organization", in Bienefeld's words) is seen to have played a role in this respect: "For its creation did forestall the creation of the self-centred, competitive unions, whose function and mentality is so well suited to the kind of interest group politics which the most powerful interests in an open economy find congenial, and who are so easily moulded into the business unions whose existence is defined by the capitalist economy. . . . (T)he worker was freed from the mesmerising spectacle of the perpetual competition for leadership by men who fight with promises for the spoils of office, while . . . the very bureaucratic nature of NUTA made it possible for the workers' allegiance to be transferred to the government more permanently."
40. Cf. footnote 28. Nyerere very early sounded the themes which were later to find expression in Mwongozo; thus, in 1967, he "called on the people of Tanzania to have great confidence in themselves and safeguard the nation's hard-won freedom. He warned the people against pinning all their hopes on the leadership who are apt to sell the people's freedom to meet their lusts. Mwalimu (i.e., Nyerere) warned that the people should not allow their freedom to be pawned as most of the leaders were purchasable" (*The Nationalist*, 5 September 1967).
41. On the very real and disturbing distortions in practice, however, see the striking analyses of Henry Mapolu, "The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania", Economics Research Bureau Paper 72.1 (Dar es Salaam, 1972) and Phil Raikes, "Ujamaa Vijijini and Rural Socialist Development", paper delivered to the East African Universities Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December 1973.
42. M. von Freyhold, "The Workers and the Nizers" (mimeo, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973). At the same time, it is also worth noting (as I am reminded by John Loxley) that in its popular usage the term "nizers" is generally applied by workers and peasants in a pejorative sense!
43. Indeed, it is quite close, in certain respects, to my account of the emergence of Tanzanian socialism in "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania", op. cit. There, however, the prognosis of bureaucratic consolidation without petty capitalist connections is explored and one all too possible post-"socialist" system characterized as "the creation of a vicious circle within which a petty bourgeoisie,

on balance still relatively untransformed, demobilizes and **instrumentalizes** the mass of the population and guarantees, at best, a stagnant quasi-state capitalism, thereby checking further progress" (p. 298).

44. This is all the more likely to be the case precisely because this expansion of state activities into the economic sphere does expand the contact of the **nizers** with international corporations through management contracts, etc. and international economic agencies which are among the most co-optative of imperialism's many mechanisms.
45. Unfortunately, this tends (as again argued in my earlier paper) towards the same result as Murray noted in Ghana: "the loss of any integral commanding strategy".
46. This is the strongest point made in Haroub Othman, "The State in Tanzania: Who Controls It and Whose Interests does it Serve" (mimeo, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, n.d.), Shivji, *op. cit.*, p. 107. Furthermore, if such a polarization of classes is indeed taking place in Tanzania, it can be predicted that an increased emphasis upon the repressive functions of the state will also serve to enhance that state's prominence in post-colonial Tanzania!
48. Saul, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
49. An example is the passage of a quite progressive income tax bill in late 1973. Originally rejected by Parliament, it was passed without dissent by the same Parliament when it was reconvened for the purpose by an irate President Nyerere. The latter stated that "I am not prepared to accept that a Bill beneficial to the majority, should be rejected simply because it is not liked by a minority. If we agree to this, we will be setting a dangerous precedent whereby an entrenched minority can prevent measures aimed at promoting ujamaa from being taken. I reject this vehemently in the name of Tanu" (The Daily News, Tanzania, 29 November 1973). Paradoxically, this incident reveals both some of the strength and some of the weakness of the President's role in trying to lead a socialist transition. Moreover, the President's response to worker unrest has been rather more equivocal.
50. The place of popular forces in the Tanzanian socialist equation, although it has been somewhat slighted in this essay, has been discussed further in "African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania". Moreover, the possible role of the "peasants" in defining Tanzania's future raises even more complex questions than does the case of the workers. The range of variation of "peasantries" across so large and diverse a country is vast in any case, and expressions of peasant consciousness have not been so dramatic as those of the workers. But it seems likely that the experience of "nizer-socialism" has had some positive impact upon consciousness—and upon the future (despite the fact that bureaucratization, and World Bank "assistance", has undermined many officially-sponsored programmes). For a suggestive case-study see Adhu Awiti, *Class Struggle in Rural Society in Tanzania (Majimaji*, 7, October 1972) and, for a broader overview, my "African Peasantries and Revolutionary Change" in *Review of African Political Economy*, I, 1 (1974), especially Section V, "Tanzania".