

## VARIETIES OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM

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### I

PRESIDENT NKRUMAH of Ghana has recently reaffirmed that "there is only one Socialism—scientific Socialism"<sup>1</sup> and that "our Socialist ideology, Nkrumaism, is the application of the principles of scientific Socialism to our African social milieu".<sup>2</sup> At the other extreme the recent Kenya Government White Paper on "African Socialism" states: "In the phrase 'African Socialism', the word 'African' is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted. It is meant to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in characteristics."<sup>3</sup> Between these two positions is a motley assembly of "national" "Socialisms"—"Arab", "Algerian", "Senegalese", "Malagasy", "Neo-Destour"—as well as "traditional African Socialism", "pragmatic Socialism", "empirical Socialism"<sup>7</sup>, and, in Eastern Nigeria, even (as an alternative to something called "catastrophe-Socialism") "Fabian Socialism".<sup>4</sup> There are few African states whose leaders have resisted the temptation of insinuating "Socialism" into their political rhetoric, even while their actual politics are strikingly similar to those pursued by countries like Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, whose leaders are unabashed both in espousing and following "free enterprise". What President Sékou Touré of Guinea has described as "Socialism for the sake of Socialism"<sup>5</sup> is very much the fashion in Africa today.

In order to discover or establish some meaningful pattern amidst this bewildering variety, it is best to begin with a quick glance at the common problems and concerns of Africa, especially tropical Africa. African leaders are determined, in the first place, to create and foster "national unity" within the framework of a modern and efficient state. The present heterogeneous and "multi-tribal" character of African societies reflects the circumstances of Africa's colonization and partition, managed without regard to either the interests or the natural divisions and institutions of its peoples. The administrative and political infra-structure devised by colonial powers so as effectively and economically to govern colonies was "feudal", both in its basic principles and organization, as well as in its assimilation and amplification of the pre-colonial feudal patterns of authority. The colonial "state" inherited by the new African leaders is essentially no more than an administrative convenience and a legal fiction. Their

concern therefore is to "modernize" it, to "democratize" its structure and procedures, and above all to make it an efficient instrument, for purposes both of nation-building and of "national development"; to do and achieve all this, *without* forfeiting at the same time their own authority at the hands of changes and forces they have themselves inaugurated.

African leaders are concerned, secondly, with promoting rapid economic development within their countries, all of them underdeveloped, and most of them economically backward to a degree. The physiognomy and anatomy of their underdevelopment and poverty are only too well recorded. But here, again, most African leaders, while concerned to improve their people's living standards, are concerned no less to make sure that the economic and social changes, with their political concomitants, which they themselves engineer, should not undermine or endanger their own pre-eminence, politically and often economically, within their countries. And when they talk of "Socialism" the African leaders mean economic development; many of them use "development" and "Socialism" interchangeably. That there is a "capitalist" as well as a "Socialist" way of development receives but little recognition in their rhetoric; most African leaders appear to acknowledge only the "Socialist" way.

Some African leaders who refer to "capitalism" if only to dismiss it, reveal, nevertheless, certain significant presuppositions as to its nature. In his autobiography, Nkrumah stated that capitalism was "too complicated a system for a newly independent nation. Hence the need for a socialistic society".<sup>4</sup> More recently he has argued that "the presuppositions and purposes of capitalism are contrary to those of African society. Capitalism would be a betrayal of the personality and conscience of Africa."<sup>5</sup> More concretely: "With little or no investment capital of our own, with a very small core of technical men (both the handiwork of decades of colonialism), we have to point out to our people that the fastest rate of development accompanied with a humane distribution of the largesse of progress could be achieved only by following the socialist path of development".<sup>8</sup> President Dacko of the Central African Republic states: "There is no African capitalism. . . . Thus, by the very force of things, we are proceeding toward a socialist economy, with the state more and more forced to intervene."<sup>9</sup> And the former Mali Minister of planning and rural economy, Seydou Kouyate, crisply states: "You cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital".<sup>10</sup> More recently, Mr. Kouyate said that the underdeveloped countries could not follow the capitalist road "for evident reasons: slowness of capital formation, subordination of the general interest, and the collective well-being to profits realized by individuals. . . ." <sup>11</sup>

Senegal's Mamadou Dia and Senghor provide interesting variations on this theme. Dia notes that "there is naturally, in the mind of prole-

tarian nations, complete identification between capitalism and colonialism, between the political system and the economic system". Hence the rejection of capitalism by "the most conscious leaders".<sup>12</sup> Later he speaks of "the weaknesses of the capitalist camp, the impotence of its methods, the senility of its institutions. Its solutions cannot satisfy us".<sup>13</sup> Senghor, after noting the "paradox" that "at least in the Soviet Union" the building of socialism "increasingly resembles capitalistic growth in the United States, the American way of life," adds: "Nevertheless, we shall not be won over to a régime of liberal capitalism and free enterprise. We cannot close our eyes to segregation, although the Federal Government combats it, nor can we accept material success as a way of life."<sup>14</sup> As his indictment of capitalism runs no higher, one might suppose that Senghor would transfer his allegiance to "liberal capitalism", once the United States has solved its race problem? Both Senghor and Dia, incidentally, claim that in African societies "money was not King" and reproach capitalism for its "selfishness" and "materialism".<sup>15</sup> The point is that this ambiguity about the "unsuitability" of capitalism for Africa—the unwillingness either to acknowledge it as a possible way of development or to argue its inadequacies in the African context—is symptomatic, particularly among those African leaders whose economic policies have entailed minimal restructuring of colonial economic institutions, and who are only too anxious to create economic and above all political conditions to enable "free enterprise" to function unimpeded. They use the rhetoric of "Socialism", not as a guide to their actual policies and objectives, but as an ideological scaffold, among other devices, for their monopoly of political power.

The African leaders are preoccupied, thirdly, with political stability, which naturally enough they regard as synonymous with their own control of political power within their countries. Both these calculations have helped crystallize into the single-party political system, which operates in almost all African countries, all those forces and trends which during the course of decolonization—both in those countries where colonial powers were forced to grant political independence by the mounting and irresistible pressures of mass nationalist movements, and in those, including most French-speaking countries, where "partial" decolonization occurred as a deliberate policy of the colonial powers—were converging upon, and helped to consolidate, a small indigenous political *élite*. On the other hand, by the very terms of the colonial situation, this *élite* was able to establish for itself a broad-based nation-wide authority and legitimacy. This was especially true of those African countries whose leaders, during the protracted struggle for national independence, were able to organize mass political parties like the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) in the Gold Coast, the *Parti De'mocratique de Guinée* (P.D.G.) in Guinea, or the Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.) in

Tanganyika. Very often, they were only "national" organizations in their countries; they created, or drew into their political orbit, existing, allied mass organizations—trade unions, women's, youth, students' organizations, etc.; they steadily displaced or absorbed, at the national level, "voluntary associations", assuming, in addition to their usual political activities, a wide range of "non-political" activities, particularly at the level of the village or the small town. They became, in short, all-encompassing national movements; and the broadening of their base and of their charisma developed *pari passu* with the concentration of their leadership at the top. Although to a lesser degree, and often through the "intervention" of the colonial power, this happened even in those territories where nationalism was prevented from assuming the dimensions of a mass movement.

After independence, this political or nationalist *élite* becomes the new ruling class, and inevitably it reconverts to its own **advantage**—to consolidate, enlarge and legitimize its monopoly of political power—the charisma and authority which it acquired through its direction of the nationalist struggle. It is anxious, of course, to modernize the political and economic institutions of the country, but it is even more anxious not only to direct the course, but also to control the consequences, of modernization, especially as—by initiating economic and social changes, and by producing new economic and political differentiations—the process of modernization must add to and complicate still more the divisions and tensions, partly of pre-colonial origin, partly originated by colonialism, which were driven underground but by no means destroyed during the nationalist struggle, with its overriding imperative of "national unity". This is why in many African countries, in the period just before or immediately after independence, there are serious political **convulsions**—often over apparently such trivial issues as whether the country is to have a federal or a unitary constitution—which not only serve to underline the tenuous character of "national unity", but are also a foretaste of the very complex and exacting problems of political engineering which await the new leaders on "the morning after" independence. The new ruling class, which regards itself as the guardian of the "national interest", is thus led into claiming and asserting "the supremacy of political action", "the primacy of politics", "the need for political action and political direction all along the line", and so on. It must not only adumbrate the goals but also chart the course of economic development; it must make sure that trade unions, for example, will play their allocated role in the development effort; it must attempt enough social and economic restructuring to draw the mass of people into this effort, without at the same time either endangering its own supremacy or losing the crucial support of any important social **groups** or classes within the country. For all these reasons it regards the single-party system as the most serviceable

political instrument, as well as finding in it the best possible guarantee of its own political longevity, as also of the considerable economic opportunities and prerequisites of political power. And for the same reasons that it needs the single-party political system, it also needs an "ideology". And "African Socialism" with its train of "national" "Socialisms" is that ideology.

## II

Before taking a look at some of the common themes in the literature of "African Socialism",<sup>16</sup> it will be helpful to glance in passing at its vocabulary.<sup>17</sup> As its ancestry is very mixed, so is its language. As French-speaking Africans were reared in a political culture more prone to theoretical and ideological speculation than the political culture of their English-speaking fellow Africans, most of the literature of African Socialism is not only in French, but bears unmistakable marks of its French origin and orientation. (Nkrumah in his intense interest in ideological problems is unique among English-speaking African leaders.) Ties and contacts between French-speaking Africans and metropolitan French politicians, intellectuals and trade unionists, especially following developments in France and French Africa during and after 1944-5, were both strong and continuous. French-African political parties and trade unions were linked with political parties and trade union movements in France; French Communists in particular were very interested and active in French Africa, especially as after 1945 their powerful political position within France and their participation in several immediately post-war coalitions allowed them greater freedom in the colonies. Within French Africa, they conducted their work in three ways: through the *Groupes d'Études Communistes* (G.E.C.); through the crucial association between the inter-territorial *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (R.D.A.) and the French Communists during 1946-50; and through the Communist-led *Confédération Générale du Travail* (C.G.T.), with which many French-African trade unions were linked. The G.E.C.'s flourished in places such as Dakar, Abidjan and Conakry, where "a restricted number of Africans, under the guidance of French Communists",<sup>18</sup> studied and were familiarized with the vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism.

The association of the R.D.A. with the French Communists produced more tangible results. The experience of and instruction in Communist methods of party organization enabled several territorial branches of the R.D.A., like those in Guinea and Sudan, soon to grow into well-organized and powerful political parties within their own territories. Similarly, the association of some French-African trade unions with the C.G.T. imparted to them a "syndicalist" orientation which proved politically invaluable to a trade-unionist-cum-politician like Sekou Touré in Guinea, especially as the oldest and

best organized trade unions in French Africa were often those of civil servants who, moreover, unlike their counterparts in British Africa, were not debarred from "politics". On the other hand, the French Communists opposed the immediate creation of an African Communist Party—in line with Stalin's views on the subject—although they were anxious to reassure their French-African comrades that this was "no index of a lack of confidence in the African Communists; this is not because Africans are not sufficiently *évolués* and educated to be able to organize a Communist Party. This is simply because such a party would not suit the kind of battle which the Communists have to wage at present in tropical Africa".<sup>19</sup> They linked this with the need for "solidarity between the oppressed colonial peoples and the working classes of France", arguing in effect that Africa's liberation must wait upon France's.<sup>20</sup>

Some African leaders have pointedly contradicted the notion of the "solidarity" of the colonial peoples and the working classes of the colonizing countries, on the ground that the latter were among the beneficiaries of colonial exploitation. "Paradoxically", Sékou Touré has argued, "it is the underdeveloped nations, exporting raw materials and crude products, which contribute an important share of the cost of the social improvements from which workers in the fully developed countries benefit".<sup>21</sup> On the authority of Pierre Moussa, Mamadou Dia notes "the fact that the Western working class—after bitter, violent struggles, of course—turns to its advantage an important part of the profits extracted by the capitalists".<sup>22</sup> Senghor states: "It is a now commonplace fact that the European masses' standard of living has been able to rise only at the expense of the standard of living of the masses in Asia and Africa. The economy of European nations consists fundamentally in selling manufactured products to underdeveloped countries at high prices and buying raw materials from them at the lowest possible cost. . . . In a word, the European proletariat has profited from the colonial system; therefore, it has never really—I mean, effectively—opposed it."<sup>23</sup> Later: "In actual fact, European conquest and colonization benefited not only the capitalistic bourgeoisie, but also the European middle classes and proletariat. It permitted the emigration of "poor whites" to the colonized countries, the conquest of exotic markets, easy sources of raw materials."<sup>24</sup> Nkrumah concluded his *Towards Colonial Freedom* (written in 1945) on an "internationalist" note: "PEOPLES OF THE COLONIES, UNITE: The working men of all countries are behind you".<sup>25</sup> In his most recent book, he provides an interesting variation. "Neo-colonialism, like colonialism," he argues, "is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries."<sup>26</sup> Particularly after 1945 the governments of the colonial powers were forced, by the increasing pressure of European working class movements, to establish "'welfare states' based on high working class living standards and on a State-regulated capital-

ism at home", which necessitated and have been made possible by an intensification of colonialism, especially in its neo-colonialist form; the developed countries have thus succeeded—but temporarily, he warns—in "exporting their internal problem and transferring the conflict between rich and poor from the national to the international stage".<sup>21</sup>

Another French political and intellectual current—in part Emmanuel Mounier's *personnalisme*, in part Teilhard de Chardin's theories—which has contributed to the French-African literature of African Socialism, formed part of "the general body of Latin Catholic political thought". Use of the phrase "African Socialism" itself spread, among other channels, through the West African section of the Catholic-inspired *Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens* (C.F.T.C.), "with Catholic political ideas to the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Tanganyika, where the White Fathers were active participants in political dialogues".<sup>22</sup> The highly stylized "African Socialism" of Senghor is heavily garnished with borrowings from Teilhard de Chardin, whose *The Phenomenon of Man*, he regards as both a continuation of and an improvement upon Engel's *Dialectics of Nature*.<sup>23</sup> "Teilhard's socialization, our socialism is nothing but the *technical and spiritual organization of human society by the intelligence and the heart*."'" Again:

. . . And so, from scientific socialism we have rejected atheism and violence, which are fundamentally contrary to our genius, but we have accepted research and technology, which we have been without because we have neglected them. We have especially developed co-operation, not collectivist but communal. For co-operation, in family, village, tribe, has always been held in honour in Africa, not in its collectivist form as an aggregate of individuals, but in its communal form as con-spiracy, from centre to centre, of hearts. You will recognize this as Teilhard de Chardin's *union*, which makes one mind and one soul.<sup>24</sup>

And Mamadou Dia has declared that "we intend to enrich ourselves with all that we can receive—particularly from Marxism as an analysis of economic realities, and from existentialism as a concept of a new *humanism*".<sup>25</sup>

Of the Marxist elements in the vocabulary of African Socialism, one contrast deserves special notice. African leaders like Nkrumah and Sékou Touré, while presumably familiar with the corpus of Marxist literature, have absorbed Marxism largely on its political and economic side, and especially in its Leninist form. Their writings are full of terms like "the supremacy of the party", "democratic centralism", "the vanguard role of the party", "criticism and self-criticism", "inner-party democracy", etc., with the significant difference that they have reallocated to "the party" (as the embodiment of the people as a whole) many of the functions which in the Leninist scheme belong to the "proletariat" (led by the Communist Party). Occasionally they

have also sought "traditional sanctions" for some of these concepts. Thus Nkrumah has spoken of the "immemorial practice of democratic centralism in Africa".<sup>31</sup> "Self-criticism", according to Fanon, is "an African institution".<sup>32</sup> And the official definition of "Nkrumaism", finalized by the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, refers to "the traditional African belief that the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all".<sup>33</sup> Altogether, those African leaders whose reading and practice of "socialism" are radical have found in Marxism and particularly in the Leninist ideas of party organization what Aimé Césaire has called "a very sure political technic".<sup>34</sup>

African leaders like Senghor, on the other hand, lay far greater stress on the "early" pre-1848 Marx of *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, and are in the main concerned to elaborate upon and refine the philosophical side of Marx, and particularly his concept of "alienation". This subject received major attention from participants in the Dakar colloquium on "African Socialism" in December 1962, most of whom were French-speaking.<sup>37</sup> In a reference to Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*, Senghor notes a "resemblance" between the first thesis and "Negro-African gnosiology".<sup>35</sup> Sékou Touré would regard this as no better than a lot of "metaphysics" with little political relevance or practical value. The Marxism "which served to mobilize the African population", he has noted, "and in particular the working class, and to lead that class to success, has been amputated of those of its characteristics which did not correspond to the African realities". Again:

In Marxism, the principles of organization, democracy, control, etc. . . . everything which is concrete and concerns the organic life of given movements may be perfectly well adapted to present conditions in Africa. *But we should have failed—it is written in advance—if we had shut ourselves up in an abstract philosophy.* I say that philosophy does not interest us. We have concrete needs.<sup>36</sup>

His concern, as Césaire has noted, has been "not so much to make Africa Marxian as to make Marxism African".<sup>38</sup> Senghor, while full of enthusiasm for the early Marx, regards the later Marx—"the revolutionary Marx"—as peculiarly a by-product of nineteenth-century Western Europe and therefore irrelevant to twentieth-century Africa; and is careful to distinguish Leninism (or Soviet Communism), "whose major deviation is Stalinism",<sup>39</sup> from Marxism. Senghor, Touré, and Nkrumah are all concerned to "adapt" Marxism to "African realities", but, whereas the latter two are concerned with Africa's political and economic realities, Senghor is concerned with its philosophical and spiritual realities, which he denominates as *nkgritude*. This has no doubt governed their choice of those characteristics of Marxism which need "amputating", as well as shedding light on their different econ-



omic and political policies. Lenin's theory of imperialism, on the other hand, although in modified forms, has found its way into the political rhetoric and thought of most African leaders.

The English-speaking African leaders, with Nkrumah's significant exception, have mostly concentrated on "traditional African Socialism". There were few direct or close links between political parties and trade unions in Britain and those in British-African colonies. After the war, the Labour Government did take a hand in promoting "responsible" and "non-political" trade-unionism in some African colonies, but with only partial and short-lived success. Some English-speaking Africans, while in England, had sporadic contacts with the Labour Party; far more, with West Indian intellectuals like Padmore who furnished some education in "Democratic Socialism" but, along with some American-Negro intellectuals, even more in "pan-Africanism"; far fewer, with the British Communist Party, which was singularly uninterested in exporting "the revolution" to Africa. There is nevertheless a certain British "cast" about English-speaking African leaders: the recent Kenya Government White Paper on "African Socialism" is impeccably Fabian. In countries of the *Maghreb* and in the Sudan, the impact of the pre-war Arab political and intellectual ferment must be noted.

Since independence, African leaders have visited many foreign capitals and encountered many "models of development". Many of them have visited China, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe (and carefully redressed the balance with a trip to the United States). For the English-speaking African leaders, who, during their struggle for national independence, were inspired by India's example, "Indian Socialism" has had some attractions;<sup>43</sup> as well as, of course, the British (and Scandinavian) "model". In the context of "non-alignment", the Yugoslav model has compelled some attention. The innovations and experiments in Israel, which has rendered substantial economic and technical aid to several African states, have also been acknowledged.

### III

"African Socialism" is a three-fold affirmation. It affirms Africa's "originality", its "distinctiveness", its "personality". It affirms Africa's "independence", ideologically as well as politically. And it affirms Africa's "openmindedness", its rejection of the "tyranny of concepts", and indeed of "ideologies", its adaptability and flexibility, in short its eclecticism. The following examples from the literature of African Socialism are typical:

Let us go abroad to ask for loans and technical skills, not for ideals and ideologies. We must come forward ready to build from our own

resources, energy and sweat the Africa of our own vision and dreams, and not the blueprints of the West or the East."

Our unceasing efforts will be directed towards finding our own ways of development, if we wish our evolution and our emancipation to take place without our personality being thereby altered. *Every time we adopt a solution authentically African in its nature and conception, we shall solve our problems easily, because all those who take part in it will be neither disorientated nor surprised by what they have to achieve; they will realise without difficulty the fashion in which they must work, act or think. Our specific qualities will be used to the full, and in the last analysis we shall accelerate our historical evolution.*"

... we declared that our country would develop on the basis of the concepts and philosophy of Democratic African Socialism. We rejected both Western Capitalism and Eastern Communism and chose for ourselves a policy of positive non-alignment."

"*Ujamaa*", then, or "Familyhood", describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism, which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man."

We have chasen democratic socialism and have turned our backs on capitalism, which depends upon the exploitation of man by man, and on Communism, which ignores liberty and espouses atheism, because we desire an economy which will serve and not be profit-seeking. Only such an economy can seek peace and reconcile justice with liberty."

We stand for a middle course [between Communism and capitalism], for a *democratic socialism*, which goes so far as to integrate spiritual values, a socialism which ties in with the old ethical current of the French Socialists. Historically and culturally we belong to this current. Besides, the French Socialists—from Saint-Simon to the **Léon Blum** of *For All Mankind*—are not so Utopian as they are reputed to be. Insofar as they are idealistic, they fulfill the requirements of the Negro-African soul, the requirements of men of all races and all countries. . . .<sup>48</sup>

I have not hidden the fact that the Malagasy way to development must be socialism. I don't think it possible to entertain any other solution. This socialism will be our own socialism, a practical and human socialism which will live and prosper without preoccupation with great theories which are often outmoded by events. This socialism will be based on work, equality, fraternity, and love for our fatherland in the reawakening of our ancestral socialist traditions."

The overriding theme in this "colloquium" is what may be called "ideological non-alignment", but this serves many political and ideological purposes. Fundamental to its understanding is the bi-polar view of the world, assumed or admitted (if only as a preliminary to

rejecting its "tyranny") by most countries of "the third world", but with the significant emphasis that the cold-war bifurcation of the world is *ideological* as well as military-political: that the "Western *bloc*" is "capitalist" and the "Eastern *bloc*" is "Communist". (The ideological labels more familiar in the West, which distinguishes the "democratic West" from the "totalitarian East", are much less frequently used in Africa—mostly by "right-wing" African democratic socialists".<sup>49</sup> Afro-Asian non-alignment at the international level is a refusal to make political and especially military alliances with either of the two cold-war groupings; internationally, it is the obverse of Afro-Asian nationalism. Because the cold war is viewed as a confrontation at once between "the West" and "the East" *and* between "capitalism" and "communism", there is a general tendency among Afro-Asian States to stretch their "equidistance" from *both* the "Western *bloc*" and the "Eastern *bloc*" to an equidistance from both "capitalism" and "communism". "Socialism" is thus a safe intermediate position and posture of equidistance. This is why the "ideology" of many new states is a compound of "nationalism", "neutralism" and "socialism". On a more dynamic view, however, on which the achievement of "national independence" is only the first stage in a long-drawn-out process of "decolonization", which must mean a complete reconversion of colonial economic and political structures, genuine equidistance will be achieved *only* after *decolonization* is complete. "Non-alignment" on this view, then—in the context of the multifarious "colonial links" of the new states with the former colonial powers (which are also the leading part of the "Western bloc")—must mean an active and systematic disengagement from and repudiation of *Western* economic and political links that *already* exist, as well as refusing and resisting *new* military and political links with *either* "the East" *or* "the West". This distinction between the two views of "non-alignment" is proposed as an important analytical tool in understanding the politics of the new states. It certainly helps explain the different interpretations and policies of countries like, for example, Ghana and Senegal on issues like "socialism", "neo-colonialism", and "pan-Africanism".<sup>51</sup>

"African Socialism" thus, in the first place, is a refusal on the part of the new African states to succumb to that "political neo-colonialism",<sup>52</sup> which by forcing them to choose between "capitalism" and "communism" seeks to reinstate their political domination, which they have but recently shaken off, through "ideological domination". Linked with this is a general image or stereotype of "ideology" as a rigid, inflexible and "closed" system which predetermines and limits in advance the means to use and the courses to follow in achieving its goals. Most African leaders subscribe to a set of common if highly general objectives like "economic development", "raising people's living standards", and so on. Those objectives may be achieved in

many different ways, but they will be best achieved through a flexible, "empirical", or "pragmatic" combination of techniques drawn from different "ideological systems". Hitching their wagon to the star of one particular "ideology" (no matter how spectacular its achievements within its particular setting), they believe, would deny them access to techniques "alien" to that ideology, even though those alien techniques—rather than those ideologically "determined"—might best answer their particular needs. The Kenya White Paper states that "African Socialism as a system can profit from the mistakes of others. Unlike many countries that have eliminated many successful economic mechanisms on narrow ideological grounds, Kenya is free to pick and choose those methods that have been proven in practice and are adaptable to Kenya conditions regardless of the ideologies that others may attach to them".<sup>23</sup> Conversely, by rejecting the disadvantages of a complete acceptance of one particular "ideology", in the field of "ideology" as in that of technology, African states will accept aid freely and equally from all sides and sources—"Eastern" and "Western", "capitalist" and "Communist" alike. African leaders' "rejection of ideology" is thus, at one and the same time, a rejection of inflexibility, supposedly a characteristic of all "ideologies", and an acceptance of diverse techniques of development from all quarters but without ideological strings.

But not the least—if indeed not the foremost—advantage of ideological non-alignment is that of ambiguity and imprecision, which is politically invaluable, especially to a ruling class in search of an ideology that would enable it to promote, direct and mobilize the mass of people for partial modernization, without exposing its own pre-eminence to any unnecessary or unseen major hazards. Even more striking than the sheer volume is the verbosity of so much of the literature of African Socialism. The "material and moral excesses" of "capitalism, which depends upon the exploitation of man by man", are dutifully deplored. But the actual economic and social policies followed by many African "socialist" leaders differ but slightly from the policies followed by those who do not feel themselves in need of the "socialist" label.<sup>24</sup> The great advantage of this elaborate ambiguity, from the point of view of many African leaders, is not only that for the moment it distracts attention from the policies actually followed. It is not even the freedom of manoeuvre, nationally and internationally, which this careful imprecision enables African leaders to enjoy, and some constructively to exercise. It lies above all in the security which a firmer ideological line in favour of either "capitalism" or "communism"—which will oblige them to formulate their economic priorities and policies more sharply and clearly—must endanger, by bringing more clearly into view, and by compelling a closer scrutiny by their peoples, of their own social and economic credentials as a class in societies which, they generally claim, are

"classless". In the meantime, their "socialism" is at best an ill-tempered alloy of good intentions and bad plans.

#### IV

"African realities" in the literature of African Socialism are first and foremost "African traditions". "'Ujamaa', then, or 'Familyhood' ", Nyerere writes, "describes our Socialism. . . . Modern African Socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family unit"." When he talks of "African Socialism", Tom Mboya states, "I refer to those proven codes of conduct in the African-societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity, which characterized our societies, and I refer to the African's thought processes and cosmological ideas, which regard man not as a social means, but as an end and entity in society"." Nkrumah notes that "man is regarded in Africa as primarily a spiritual being, a being endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value. . . . Herein lies the theoretical basis of African communalism." Because of this, "in communalistic societies. socialism is not a revolutionary creed. but a re-statement in contemporary idiom of the principles underlying communalism"." In line with his conviction, however, that there is only one socialism, "scientific socialism", Nkrumah is careful to make the "adaptation" a two-way process. The need, he writes, is "to give a philosophical statement of socialism that will preserve the universally valid principles of the ideology within the context of African history, African traditions and African aspirations. In short, socialism includes the restitution of the egalitarian and humanist principles of traditional African life within the context of a modern technical society serving the welfare needs of all its peoples." Most African leaders stress the existence in African societies of an organic relationship between the individual and his community, and these societies are described as "communal" or "communitary" or "communautocratic"; although it is never fully clear whether they are referring to pre-colonial or present African societies. This organic relationship, as well as the supreme importance in Africa of religion, are widely regarded as the "traditional" foundations of "African Socialism". In practice, they are the basis and source of an ethic of "hard work", "public-spiritedness", and "self-sacrifice" which African leaders continually urge upon their peoples, in their efforts to mobilize the mass of people behind the development effort. Thus Nyerere writes:

"In primitive African society, this question of the limits of responsibility as between the individual and society in which he lives was not very clearly defined. The traditional African community was a small one, and the African could not think of himself apart from that community

in which he lived. He was an individual; he had his wife—or wives—and children, so he belonged to a family. But the family merged into a larger "blood" family, which itself merged into a clan or tribe. Thus he saw himself all the time as a member of a community, but he saw no struggle between his own interests and those of his community, for his community to him was an extension of his family. He might have seen a conflict between himself and another individual member of the same community, but with the community itself, he saw no struggle. He never felt himself to be a cog in a machine. There could not be this all-embracing, all-powerful modern concept of a society which could use a person as a cog. . . . The African is not communistic either in his thinking or in his traditional way of life. He is, if I may borrow the expression—I have heard it used in India—the African is not communistic, he is 'communitary' in thinking and in his way of living. He is not a member of a 'commune,' some artificial unit of human beings; he is a member of a genuine community or a brotherhood."<sup>10</sup>

There are in this type of argument several interesting strands. We are not concerned here to judge the accuracy, for example, of Nyerere's view of "primitive African society", except to note in passing that his description will apply as well to any other "primitive society", non-African as well as African. Much more important is his affirmation that in this society "the limits of responsibility as between the individual and society" in which he lived were "not very clearly defined". That, surely, is a characteristic of "underdeveloped" societies, and a major obstacle to their development. In these societies, "the individual" is yet to "emerge" from the social matrix of which he forms such an organic part. It is precisely because there is as yet no clear-cut line of demarcation between the individual and his family, on the one hand, and the community, on the other, that there exists in the new states such a large-scale private or personal misuse of political power and public funds. The partition between "familyhood" and nepotism is very thin and is easily broken. When the family or communal ties of an individual are as strong as on this rather idealized view they are made out to be, there is the serious risk that the individual occupying a public office will develop a proprietary attitude towards it and endeavour to translate it into personal advantage, even if he sees his personal advantage through the prism of family and clan ties. The African leaders are only too well aware of this problem, and continually exhort their citizens to be "public-spirited", "conscientious", and "mindful" of the "public trust"—for example public properties and funds—which as public servants they administer. Nyerere himself has urged that "the same socialist attitude of mind which, in the tribal days, gave to every individual the security that comes of belonging to a widely extended family, must be preserved within the still wider society of the nation"<sup>11</sup>.<sup>100</sup> And yet, as Nkrumah and Sékou Touré realize, this is more than a matter simply

of an "attitude of mind", and involves creating new institutional safeguards.

It is this same concern with fashioning a new ethic of public responsibility as one of the imperatives of development which makes African leaders underline the obligation in traditional society to work. The basis of the "great socialistic achievement" of traditional African society, which gave "the sense of security" to its members, Nyerere notes, was "that it was taken for granted that every member of society—barring only the children and the infirm—contributed his fair share of effort towards the production of its wealth". There were no "loiterers" or "idlers" in that society. "There is no such thing as socialism without work."<sup>101</sup> The Kenya White Paper, after noting that "every member of African traditional society had a duty to work", adds that "African Socialism expects the members of the modern State to contribute willingly and without stint to the development of the nation".<sup>102</sup> President Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic states: "In order to be a socialist, one must practice brotherhood, solidarity, and love of work. . . . People who do not work are not socialists but capitalists; therefore, we want to form unions to defend the interests of those who are working. . . ."<sup>103</sup> In less "traditional" terms, men like Nkrumah urge their people to work harder and better to raise "productivity", "gross national product", and so on. All this, of course has nothing directly to do with "building socialism"; one would presumably need to work even for building capitalism. That is why this is one of the very few themes upon which all African leaders—socialists or not, and no matter what the quality of their "socialism"—are agreed.

In a well-known address Nkrumah declared:

. . . Africa needs a new type of man; a dedicated, modest, honest and devoted man. A man who submerges self in service to his nation and mankind. A man who abhors greed and detests vanity. A new type of man whose meekness is his strength and whose integrity is his greatness. Africa's new man must be a man indeed.<sup>104</sup>

Quite clearly, he is here referring neither to the "traditional African" nor to "today's African"; he is in fact projecting the "model" African without whom socialism cannot be possible. The ingredients from which his model African is assembled have a distinctly religious flavour. It is no wonder that he, and other African leaders even more, in their attempts to inculcate a new ethic of work and self-sacrifice among their people, have sought to enlist religion on their side. Senghor and Dia often speak of the "socialism of the believers", and many African "socialists" have reproached Marxism for its atheism, and have ostensibly rejected it for this reason. At the very least, they have been most anxious to reassure their people that "socialism" is not incompatible with religion. Nkrumah has stated

in his autobiography that "today I am a non-denominational Christian and a Marxist-Socialist and I have not found any contradiction between the two".<sup>81</sup> Kofi Baako, one of his closest associates, goes further: "Nkrumaism is not a religion and has not come to replace any religion, but it preaches and seeks to implement all that true religion teaches. I can therefore safely describe Nkrumaism as applied religion, and it is a way of life which must be lived."<sup>82</sup> African leaders in whose countries Islam is the main religion have often emphasized its affinity with "socialism". Nasser has stated: "Islam in its early days was the first socialist state".<sup>83</sup> Referring to "Neo-Destourian Socialism", Bourguiba has stated that their method was "that of solidarity and association as members of one family united in all circumstances. . . . These qualities are not foreign to us. They were the characteristics of the Prophet's companions in the first century of Islam, who were socialists before the invention of the word."<sup>84</sup> In a sophisticated analysis, the Algerian Amar Ouzegane argues that the "incompatibility of Islam and socialism is a false image of Marxist theory. Their coexistence reflects a socio-economic reality and expresses a certain relationship of forces within the underdeveloped countries. . . . We need a new kind of *jihad* to achieve the Algerian revolution, the triumph of national democracy, the conquest of social justice."<sup>85</sup> There is evident in all this an attempt to deploy religion alongside social forces seeking ascendancy, if only, so Ouzegane appears to suggest, to disarm the "ultra-conservative forces" of one of their possible "ideological underpinnings".

The importance which the literature of African Socialism accords to religion must, then, be viewed in the context of a three-fold relationship between the forces of tradition and forces of change. First, the ruling class uses all possible means to promote modernization, whether partial or total, and especially including tradition so as to mitigate the traumatic effects of abrupt or rapid social and economic change. Secondly, particularly when the ruling class itself is **tradition**-ally-based—in either pre-colonial or colonially-created tradition or in a combination of both—and is interested therefore only in minimal or partial modernization, it uses tradition as a brake with which to regulate the speed and momentum of modernization, and in particular to ensure that the process of social change will not undermine its own pre-eminence founded, at least in part, upon tradition. This is true of the majority of the new African ruling classes. Thirdly, even when as part of its prospectus of radical or total modernization the ruling class systematically undermines tradition and particularly "traditional authority" as a hindrance to its assumption of social as well as political control, in order **more** effectively to execute its grand design of social change, it seeks nevertheless to assimilate some of the traditional symbolism in order to broaden or reinforce the basis of its legitimacy.



## V

The problem of the relationship between "the ruling class" and other "social classes", particularly in the context of the claim that there are no "classes" in Africa, brings us to the "class problem" which looms large in the literature of African Socialism. This is so for several reasons. African leaders—and to this African "socialists" are no exception—are the exponents par *excellence* of the single-party political system, in which the ruling party, when not the sole political party in the country, exercises a monopoly of political power, which it is most reluctant to share or part with. Most African leaders, whether they espouse or repudiate Marxism, have in various forms absorbed the Marxian notion that political parties represent socio-economic interests or classes, and that the struggle for power among political parties is, in the main, over the manipulation of the institutions of the state for furthering the interests of a particular class. To admit to a diversity of classes in African societies is, therefore, to admit of rival and competing claims to political power, and thus to undermine the basis of the single-party system; a possibility which, given their view of the fundamental importance of that system in the technology of nation-building, they regard as likely to subvert "national unity", of which they deem themselves both the embodiment and the custodian, and "economic development" the success of which they believe to depend upon effective political control and direction.

The refusal to admit rival claims to political power is linked with a subordination of all "sectional" interests and groups to the overriding claims of "political supremacy". This is nowhere more clearly seen than in their handling of trade unions in their countries. Many African leaders began their careers as trade unionists; many still proclaim trade union sympathies. Yet African leaders otherwise as diverse as Sékou Touré, Senghor, Nyerere and Nkrumah have repeatedly enjoined upon the trade unions the need for a fundamental reorientation of outlook, compounded of the assertion, first, that "wage-earners" and the working class are a small, and, compared with the peasant masses, indeed a privileged minority, who cannot arrogate to themselves the right to legislate for the whole nation—a right reserved solely and unconditionally to the party as the nation's embodiment; and, secondly, that they must outgrow the negative if essential "consumptionist" outlook of the trade unions during the struggle for national independence, which was then politically expedient, indeed necessary, as well as being in line with the "traditional functions of a trade union—the promotion of the economic interests of its members. As the state is "theirs", and as in any case they are mostly (especially in French-speaking Africa) government employees, they

cannot possibly strike against "themselves". As they are represented in the party and on its higher councils, they cannot possibly question the supremacy of the party. There are, to be sure, fundamental differences between the views, for instance, of Nkrumah and Touré and those of Senghor—the former two, unlike Senghor who seeks in effect politically to neutralize the unions, impart to them a political dimension by integrating them with the party, while at the same time enlarging their "non-political" functions—but certain significant similarities remain. In discussing the "problem" (Senghor's term) or the "role" (Nkrumah's and Touré's term) of the trade unions. African leaders also often affirm the primary importance and the "revolutionary" role of the peasantry which, consisting as it does of the bulk of the population, is often the mainstay of the party.

African "socialists'" approaches to the class problem in Africa display a significant variety, even while suggesting a remarkable similarity in the political conclusions they draw—at least insofar as these conclusions converge upon and underline the hegemony of the ruling party.

At one end of the spectrum there are those, mostly East African "traditional Socialists", who maintain quite categorically that there were no "classes" in traditional African society, and that there are none today; from which they proceed to infer the inapplicability of Marxism to African conditions. Nyerere doubts "if the equivalent for the word 'class' exists in any indigenous African language; for language describes the ideas of those who speak it, and the idea of 'class' or 'caste' was non-existent in African society". "The foundation, and the objective, of African Socialism is the extended family."<sup>70</sup> The Kenya Government White Paper is even more categorical: "Marx's criticism of the society of his time and place was a valid one. . . . Valid as Marx's description was, it bears little similarity to Kenya today. . . . The historical setting that inspired Marx has no counterpart in independent Kenya." Again:

The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe have no place in African Socialism and no parallel in African society. No class problem arose in the traditional African society and none exists today among Africans. The class problem in Africa, therefore, is largely one of prevention, in particular:

- (i) to eliminate the risk of foreign economic domination; and
- (ii) to plan development so as to prevent the emergence of antagonistic classes. . . .<sup>71</sup>

As no "classes" exist in Africa, no serious analysis of social forces in Africa is therefore called for or provided. Senghor has stated that "West African realities are those of underdeveloped countries — peasant countries here, cattle countries there — once feudalistic, but traditionally classless [sic] and with no wage-earning sectors".<sup>72</sup>

This "utopian" view of traditional—that is, pre-colonial—African societies is linked with the view that colonialism, by importing into Africa the institutions and values of capitalism, originated a tendency towards the formation of classes in Africa. Senghor suggests this. More particularly, men like Nkrumah and Sékou Touré argue that colonialism for its own reasons gradually "precipitated" a "middle class" to serve as an intermediary between colonial authorities and African populations—a middle class which, if originally creating and articulating nationalist sentiments, has more recently become a willing tool or partner of "neo-colonialism". In Consciencism, after noting that traditional Africa's attitude towards man was "socialist", Nkrumah argues that in that social situation "it was impossible for classes of a Marxian kind to arise. By a Marxian kind of class, I mean one which has a place in a horizontal social stratification. . . . In this sense, there were no classes in traditional African society." He adds:

But colonialism came and changed all this. . . . For its success, the colonial administration needed a cadre of Africans, who, by being introduced to a certain minimum of European education, became infected with European ideals, which they tacitly accepted as being valid for African societies. . . . In addition to them, groups of merchants and traders, lawyers, doctors, politicians and trade unionists emerged, who, armed with skills and levels of affluence which were gratifying to the colonial administration, initiated something parallel to the European middle class. There were also certain feudal-minded elements who became imbued with European ideals either through direct European education or through hobnobbing with the local colonial administration. . . .<sup>78</sup>

Sékou Touré, in recounting the "plundering" of colonies by "colonial capitalism", maintains that this policy involved:

- (a) the conversion of feudal rulers into land owners, who were made the agents of execution of the economic exploitation by colonial monopolies;
- (b) the creation of an African lower middle class, including the native cadres, in small number, and the graduated students who, psychologically, were won over to the theory of assimilation;
- (c) the general pauperization of the toiling masses, whose purchasing power dwindled as their production was growing.

Clearly, the efforts to let a category of landowners and a bourgeoisie emerge from the subdued masses tended less, at that time, to the establishment of an actual bourgeois régime, than to the transformation of the straightforward colonial rule into an indirect rule through the medium of the elements of the colonized people who were thus won over to the cause of imperialism. These are now the tactics of neo-colonialism."

He notes elsewhere how the colonial policy of "assimilation" promoted the "incipient opposition between what we may call the intellectual *élite* on the one hand, and the rural masses on the other hand".<sup>16</sup>

But although colonialism succeeded in manufacturing an indigenous middle class in African societies, it did not produce their complete stratification; this, because while it promoted the development of a middle class, colonialism "*obstructed the development of a national African capitalism and (thus) the emergence of classes*".<sup>17</sup> Touré maintains therefore that "*we are fortunate in that we form a society in which sound human relations prevail. Real as they are, antagonisms linked to selfish interests are still at an elementary stage, and can be easily transcended by vigilant, persevering party action.*"<sup>18</sup> He warns that "*class antagonism would emerge in our society if we let selfish groups of interests—even labour interests—form themselves into classes of a reactionary nature and bourgeois tendency*".<sup>19</sup> In the meantime, however, he firmly "rejects the class struggle because of African social groups' identity of living conditions and lack of differentiation into antagonistic classes, and because of the economic and political alienation to which the peoples of tropical Africa are at present subjected".<sup>20</sup>

African leaders are thus agreed that no full-scale stratification has as yet occurred in their countries. (Some opposition parties maintain, on the contrary, that such stratification has *already* occurred, and that the government in their particular country, for example Senegal, is a "bourgeois régime".<sup>21</sup> The significance of this is discussed below.) But many of them claim that it *could* occur, unless necessary "preventive" action was taken. They lay particular stress on the possibility that the educated administrative and technical cadres, through the survival of "petit-bourgeois" or "capitalist" tendencies, might develop into a "new class". Nyerere has said :

As nationalism becomes successful, the chance of Europeans and the Asians maintaining a permanently privileged position in our countries will tend to diminish. But the chances of the educated Africans to become a new privileged class will multiply. Yet this will not be so obvious while the European and Asian are so strikingly wealthier than the Africans. The would-be African exploiter can masquerade as a great social reformer by concentrating the attack on European and Asian privilege. Before we know where we are, what is now an essentially dying-out privileged class will have been replaced by a permanently privileged class of educated Africans."

Noting the shortage of "cadres and technicians" in developing countries, Mamadou Dia states that "the danger is real that these cadres, small in number in relation to the needs, will take advantage of their scarcity to get advantages and unjustified standards of living. Thus would come about a privileged class . . . not unlike the holders of capital in the capitalist economies".<sup>22</sup>

It is worth remarking that most African leaders, in underlining the danger of the rise of a privileged "administrative class", seem to ignore the more serious, and certainly the more real, danger of the "political cadres", particularly within the framework of the single-party system (from which the checks of an effective two- or multi-party system are absent), developing into a privileged "new class". This in fact has happened in most African countries, where the political and administrative *élite* has either equipped itself with the full regalia of a "social class"—with large and numerous houses, businesses, unnumbered Swiss bank accounts, and often through the facilities of the "extended family"—or, better still, joined with and moved to the apex of the existing "middle class".<sup>83</sup> Nkrumah is almost alone in acknowledging this danger, and in taking measures (with only partial success) to counteract it. He warned in 1959:

The Convention People's Party has developed from a small organization to a nation-wide movement, embracing within its ranks and among its sympathizers the overwhelming majority of our nation. The composition of the party has become socially quite heterogeneous and there is the danger that our socialist objective may be clouded by opportunistic accommodations and adjustments to petit-bourgeois elements in our ranks who are unsympathetic and sometimes even hostile to the social aims to which the party is dedicated."

In his well-known "dawn broadcast" in 1961, he was even more explicit:

In spite of my constant clarifications and explanations of our aims and objectives, some party Members in Parliament pursue a course of conduct in direct contradiction of our party aims. They are tending, by virtue of their functions and positions, to become a separate social grouping aiming to become a new ruling class of self-seekers and careerists. This tendency is working to alienate the support of the masses and to bring the National Assembly into *isolation*.<sup>84</sup>

Some African leaders have discussed the class problem in connection with their defence of the single-party system, although they make the connection between "classes" and "parties" reversible. Nyerere argues that "the Anglo-Saxon tradition of a two-party system is a reflection of the society in which it evolved", and in which there was a "struggle" between "haves" and "have-nots". "Thus, the existence of distinct classes in a society, and the struggle between them, resulted in the growth of the two-party system. . . . With rare exceptions, the idea of class is something entirely foreign to Africa. . . . To us, 'the other party' is the colonial power." He lists some other factors as well, to argue that the two-party system is not the "only pattern of democracy".<sup>85</sup>

It is in the literature of "Senegalese Socialism", however, that the relationship between "classes" and "parties" is seen most clearly. In

Senegal, Senghor's party, the Union Progressive *Sénégalaise* (U.P.S.), holds all the eighty seats in the National Assembly; but, as there exist in the country some other if ineffective parties, the U.P.S. is, according to Senghor, the "majority" party, the "dominant" party, the *parti unifié*, which he distinguishes from the "single" party or the *parti unique*—for example, the C.P.P., the P.D.G., and T.A.N.U. Both Senghor and Mamadou Dia (Senghor's former premier, whom he removed and imprisoned some time ago) have discussed their country's political system in terms of the social groups and forces within it. In discussing the government's efforts in recent years "on behalf of the peasantry" to transform colonial economic structures, Dai has argued:

It is true that this structural transformation is hampered by the existence of middle classes and a local bourgeoisie, products and subproducts of the established system, which finds in these elements influential allies and important pressure groups. The resistance thus formed cannot be minimized, as the nation's leaders are obliged to restrain a political opposition that, while claiming to be leftist, stands ready to ally itself with all backward forces. . . .<sup>25</sup>

The implications of this argument are made more explicit in Senghor's analysis. He claims that there are "no classes in our society. But analysis reveals a certain tendency, a real movement toward the *formation of classes*."<sup>26</sup>

The full political and ideological significance of the argument must await an analysis of the "social forces" in Senegal and Africa. It is necessary, meantime, to emphasize its salient features. There are no "classes at war" but only "social" or "technico-professional groups struggling for influence". It is the duty of the "majority", but especially of the "opposition", parties to "prevent social groups from hardening into antagonistic classes". The "intellectuals" include "liberal professionals, civil servants, employees, and even labourers"—even labourers! An "opposition" is implied between the interests of the "intellectuals" (who include "political and trade-union leaders") and those of the "peasants, shepherds, and artisans", who must be guarded, particularly by the "majority parties", against "oppression" by the "intellectuals". One comment seems to be in order, however, even at this stage, insofar as it bears on the connection between "classes" and "parties". As well as claiming that the party in their countries is the embodiment of the nation as a whole (and not just the protector of the interests of one particular section of the population, no matter how numerous), African leaders like Nkrumah repudiate the multi-party system because, in their view, it is open to manipulation and misuse either by "regional" or "tribal" interests (that is, by interests which militate against the integrity and unity of "the nation") or by "neo-colonial" interests or, more often, by a combination of the two.

Senghor, on the other hand, justifies repressive measures against the opposition parties (or against the recalcitrant elements within his own camp) on the ground that, by their unhindered promotion of the interests of the "intellectuals", the opposition will assist the hardening of the "technico-professional" or "social groups" into "antagonistic classes". The distinction between "classes at war" and "social groups struggling for influence"—which is analytically meaningless—thus becomes all-important to Senghor's defence of the *parti unifié* political system. To admit that these "technico-professional groups" *are* in fact "antagonistic classes" would force him to admit the case for the "party-warfare" normal in a "class society". But by arguing that there is as yet only "a certain tendency towards the formation of classes", which can and must be reversed, but which the full exercise by the opposition of its rights will only serve to harden into antagonistic classes, he is able to justify adopting laws and measures to forestall "subversion" by the opposition which, by a complete non *sequitur*, he manages to declare as "teleguided" from abroad. It hardly needs saying that these opposition parties, on the whole, stand very much on the left of Senghor's party.

## VI

Many African leaders—Marxist or not—admit that there do exist in their societies certain "social contradictions" or "social differentiations", which cannot be dismissed out of hand, especially as some African intellectuals and trade unionists use the concept of "class struggle" to justify their criticism of and opposition to their governments. We have already noted Senghor's "social" or "technico-professional groups". Sékou Touré acknowledges the existence in Guinean society of "contradictions between individuals and groups", particularly among the latter :

There is, in fact, a group individualism, just as there is an individualism of the person. Here there is not a man who considers himself in relation to another man, but an entire ethnic, racial, organic group, which is defined in relation to another group. This collective attitude creates antagonisms which, joining together, constitute a very strong impediment, a powerful brake on the political and economic development of the nation.

We are faced here with a cellularization of particular interests peculiar to a social faction, and which is in conflict with the general interest, or which forms a common front with other factional interests.

He adds, however, that "these various contradictions never put in doubt the political principles" of the P.D.G.<sup>29</sup> This is presumably what makes him insist that one must not confuse "social differentiations" with "social classes" which, by definition, are "antagonistic". In a subsequent analysis, he states:

Although Guinea's social life is not dominated by class antagonism or profound social differentiations, it is nonetheless marked by contradictory trends, which might develop into class struggle if the P.D.G.—by its economic and social purposes—and the Guinean state—by the revolutionary tenor of its laws—did not call a halt to any further development of these trends and of the sectional interests underlying them.

He identifies "several layers" in Guinean society: "peasants who live from individual, family or co-operative farming, herding, fishing or crafts"; "wage-earners"; "planters who command important material and financial resources and employ a growing number of paid labourers"; "owners of rented houses"; "merchants, commonly called '*dioulas*', who make a living from commercial speculation"; "bigger traders, owners of stores, public conveyances, etc."; and "contractors, owners of workshops or smaller processing industries". "Merchants, manufacturers and higher-ranking officials", he notes, "are frequently inclined to some measure of 'embourgeoisement'; they tend to distinguish themselves from the mass of the people, that some even openly hold in contempt". The bourgeoisie is "a base for subversive, disruptive and counter-revolutionary activities. While the financial bourgeoisie engages in bribery and economic sabotage (trafficking, unlawful price rises, etc.), the white-collar bourgeoisie engages in intellectual speculation founded on subjective arguments, when it does not poison the minds with reactionary or opportunist theories".<sup>10</sup>

The "social group" or "faction" which is most frequently analysed are the "wage-earners", whose "factional interests" as articulated by their trade unions have in many African states come in conflict with the "general interest" which the party or the government (of the "majority" party) "represents". (The distinction between whether it is the party or the government which "represents the general interest" is fundamental, as the following discussion will try to establish, in order to evaluate the "socialist" quality of the "socialism" of any particular African leader.) Particularly as, historically, socialism and trade unionism have long been closely connected, it is all the more necessary therefore to analyse and compare African "socialists'" views on the "wage-earners" and the role of the trade unions.

Many African leaders claim that, in their countries, the "wage-earners" are, in effect, "a privileged minority", unlike the proletariat in capitalist countries which are an underprivileged majority, and where therefore the concept of "class struggle" makes sense. After noting a "real movement" towards the formation of classes in Africa, Senghor states:

Paradoxically, some labour leaders include in the proletariat the entire union membership, which is composed exclusively of government employees and salaried workers in private employ. But the annual income of an African civil servant is about 360,000 C.F.A. francs; that



of a wage earner in the private sector is 180,000 francs; whereas that of a peasant in the former French West Africa is 10,000 francs. The proletarian is not necessarily the one who claims that title.

From this he proceeds to argue against any salary increases for the civil servants" (who often base their claim for an increase, not only on the continually rising living costs, but also by pointing out the abandon with which members of parliament and ministers frequently vote increases in their own emoluments and allowances).

Referring to Guinea, "where the whole population consists of workers, living in very poor conditions", Sékou Touré writes:

Only 3 or 4 per cent of the working masses are wage-earners, with a majority of civil servants who, socially, are in a rather privileged condition. Here in Guinea, the average yearly income of the unskilled labourer is about twice that of the farmer; moreover, while the farmer lives in insecurity, constantly menaced in his work by natural disasters, the labourer enjoys social security: family allowances, gratuitous health care, accident insurance, pension, etc. . . . Yet, most of what he needs for his sustenance is produced after great toil by farmers and herders.<sup>92</sup>

Touré, who in principle accepts the Marxist analysis of "classes" and wholeheartedly subscribes to the need for "class struggle" in industrialized capitalist countries, denies at the same time that it applies to African countries, where exist not "antagonistic classes" but "social differentiations". He argues that the "Marxist definition" of the "working class" covers, *"besides the industrial workers, the agricultural labourers and all wage-earning categories exploited by a class of employers who are the owners of the instruments of production"*. This definition, he adds:

. . . does not apply in non-industrialized countries, as are most African countries, since these have no national bourgeoisie owning the instruments of production: in underdeveloped countries, the term "working class" embraces all the labouring masses that make up the productive forces, but within which the wage-earners—manual labourers or white-collar employees—[form] a comparatively privileged minority as compared with other workers. . . .<sup>93</sup>

The "colonial working class" is, then "also the bourgeois fraction of the colonized people". The path by which we are made to arrive at this conclusion is lined with numerous and suggestive ambiguities, which open up fascinating prospects of social analysis. As well as the "liberal professionals" (who "like the high government officials", Senghor says in a footnote,<sup>94</sup> are "very few in number"), Senghor's "privileged minority" of "intellectuals" consists largely of "civil servants, employees, and even labourers"; and is remarkably similar both to Sékou Touré's "privileged minority" of "wage-earners" consisting in the main of "civil servants", of "manual labourers and white-

collar employees", and, again, of "industrial workers, employees and unskilled labourers", and to Fanon's "working-class-cum-bourgeoisie" which includes "tram conductors, taxi drivers, miners, dockers, interpreters, nurses, and so on". Whether membership in a particular class is determined on the basis either of the identity in the source and size of the incomes, or of the similarity of living conditions, of its members, there is obviously scope for a major re-classification within the analyses made by Senghor, Touré and Fanon. A social category which is so far-ranging as to include manual as well as white-collar "workers", industrial workers as well as unskilled labourers, nurses as well as labourers, civil servants as well as taxi drivers—a category selected, that is, without reference to any of the criteria and determinants in use in "class analysis"—has little analytical utility, but considerable political significance. There is however, in these analyses, one fundamental difference, in spite of their otherwise striking similarity. Whereas Senghor is anxious to underline the opposition between the interests of the "privileged minority" and those of the "peasants, shepherds, and artisans", Sékou Touré is equally anxious, by citing the absence of a "national bourgeoisie" (and by insisting, moreover, that the "democratic structures" of the "popular régime" in Guinea "form a barrier" to its "emergence"), to emphasize that the interests of the whole "working population" and of its "privileged wage-earning sector" are fundamentally one.

From this emphasis on the "wage-earners" as a small and privileged minority derive attitudes and policies common to many African leaders, which devalue the political contribution and role of trade unions, repudiate their autonomy of political organizations—party as well as governmental—and exhort trade unionists as the wage-earners' representatives and leaders to overcome a narrow occupational "selfishness", by which they are led to promote their members' interests as against, or at the expense of, those of the community or the nation as a whole. As "the unions now represent only a small minority of Kenya's adult population", the Kenya Government White Paper states, "they cannot be permitted to benefit these few at the expense of large numbers of [their] less fortunate brothers",<sup>23</sup> whom Kenyatta in a subsequent gloss on the paper identifies as "peasants".<sup>24</sup> Tom Mboya, who as Kenya's minister for economic planning and development was mainly responsible for the drafting of the Kenya paper on African Socialism, started his public career, like some other African leaders, as a trade unionist; many of them have, or claim, not only labour sympathies but active trade-union backgrounds. They often acknowledge the trade unions' great political contributions—through well-timed strikes, etc.—during the struggle for national independence. Many of them claim to have contributed in their turn, since becoming government leaders in their countries, towards improving the wages and living conditions of workers. Most of them, on the

other hand, have encountered repeated demands and strikes for wage increases and other amenities, to which they have rejoined not only with appeals to workers for "wage restraints" and "sacrifice" but also with severe repressive measures, as in the handling of strikes. In most of their countries, certainly, trade unions—willingly or otherwise—have suffered a general diminution of their activities and importance, both politically and economically.

During the colonial era, trade unions were essentially, at least to begin with, "consumptionist"; they sought and agitated for economic gains. Particularly as, especially in French Africa, the oldest and often the best organized trade unions were those of African civil servants (in very minor positions), or industrial unions (and "capital" was largely expatriate or "colonial"), their economic demands and agitations were at the same time "political", tending to undermine the colonial system. As they were also largely urban, their members were often the most active part of the nationalist parties and movements. On the whole, therefore, the trade unions were politically a most active element; and sometimes, their leaders managed to displace the moderate "intellectuals" at the head of a particular nationalist movement, thus quickening its pace as well as making it more radical. At other times, strikes were politically inspired by nationalist leaders, so as to induce a general disarray in the colonial system.<sup>97</sup> After independence, however, the same trade unions have confronted the new "nationalist" governments with "consumptionist" demands. The governments, on the other hand, have urged a "productionist" outlook on the trade unions, arguing the need for greater productivity and so on, admonishing the trade unions for their "selfishness" in wanting "more and more" and not caring enough for their "less fortunate brothers", and have on the whole resisted demands for wage increases and firmly handled strikes and recalcitrant trade union leaders. Whereas during the struggle for national independence, the political leaders benefited from, and often encouraged or "inspired" strikes, now—especially in those countries where the unions on the whole sympathize with the opposition parties—they have denounced strikes as "politically inspired". In other countries, the "old-fashioned" trade unionism has given way to "political unionism", with the trade union movement completely integrated with the party, and with individual trade union leaders sometimes playing an active role in or about the government.

In discussing the role of African trade unions, Nyerere has opposed the importation into Africa of the notion, derived from the experience of trade unions in European countries where "the state" for long was the political instrument of the "capitalists", of trade union independence from political control.<sup>98</sup> In his discussion of "socialism", he labels as "capitalist" a group "exploiting (or trying to exploit)" other social groups. For a group to demand a greater share in

the general income because of its greater contribution to it, even at the expense of the interests of other members of the community, would be to display a "capitalist" attitude of mind."<sup>100</sup>

Many of these trends in the relations between the governments and the trade unions are best reflected in Senghor's characteristically neat analysis, in which three themes run persistently. First, he maintains that the "wage-earners" are in Senegal (or in the Mali Federation or in tropical Africa) a numerically small and economically privileged minority. Not only are their "present wages . . . at least equal to those received by metropolitan employees", but also there already exists a large gap between "the living standards of city dwellers—civil servants, workers and labourers—and of the peasants who constitute more than 90 per cent of the population". "In France, government workers constitute 17 per cent of the adult population and are paid 25 per cent of the budget. In Senegal, they constitute only 1 per cent of the population, and are paid 48 per cent of the budget!"<sup>101</sup>

Secondly, while noting the great political contribution of trade unions before the creation of political parties and especially before the *Loi-cadre*. Senghor urges upon the trade unions a "reconversion" to their "natural role, which is primarily to defend the purchasing power of its members". Before the existence of Negro-African political parties, "it was incumbent on the Negro-African Labour movement to assume all responsibilities of the *quasi-nation*". But after the appearance of political parties in 1945, and particularly after the political developments in and following 1956–7 centred upon the *Loi-cadre*, "it was no longer incumbent on the unions, but rather on the political parties, to assume the totality of national responsibilities. From that moment on, the unions should have reconverted themselves to their natural role of defending professional interests". This reconversion, "implicit in Marx's thinking", has in fact "in all the Communist régimes . . . taken place after the proletarian revolution. Because it represents the totality of the interests of the masses and nation, the *Party* plays the major role of direction and control." Referring presumably to the 1959 election, Senghor claims that "this party (the UPS) comprises 85 per cent of the population!"<sup>102</sup>

But to urge a "reconversion" in its role, in the third place, does not mean that "trade unionism must change, selfishly, into an agency for grievances". Senghor continues:

As the best educated and therefore the most conscious group, the wage-earners must transcend their own group interests and their strictly professional preoccupations. Placing themselves on a higher level, they will embrace all the interests of all social groups and, first, those of the underprivileged: the peasants, shepherds, fishermen, and artisans.

After repeating that the wage-earners (and their trade unions) were "the most enlightened and influential social group" in the country,

Senghor joins issue with the National Confederation of Mali Trade Unions for advocating, in a resolution, its own "participation in the *management* of economic and social affairs, not simply as a consultant organization, but as *responsible*" (Senghor's italics). After reminding them that "the wage-earners constitute less than 10 per cent of the active population" of the country, Senghor adds: "To entrust them with control of the nation's interests, even if this were limited to economic and social affairs, would violate the rules of democracy: it would deny the existence of the state".

Senghor develops the argument further, "speaking as a trade unionist". After noting that in the past the unions had been concerned "more with defending their members' interests than those of the *quasi-nation*", he refers to the rise in the annual income of the peasants, etc., which is "less attributable to the unions than to the political party, for the simple reason that most members of the party are peasants, shepherds, and fishermen, not to mention the artisans and shopkeepers". The "underprivileged groups" must "no longer be neglected as they were under the colonial régime. It is no longer possible to equalize African salaries and those of the metropole. . . . Therefore, wages will not be lowered, but rather blocked, starting this year [1960]. This will enable us to utilize the savings thus realized for productive investments in the infrastructure, agriculture, cattle-raising, fishing, and handicrafts."<sup>102</sup>

Earlier, Senghor had made some significant remarks about other "distinct social groups" in West African society. "As for the merchants, most of them are small shopkeepers who present no immediate social threat. The danger would be that, instead of getting rich, they become poorer and poorer because of foreign capitalism and their lack of organization." Regarding the "liberal professions": "though they are the most highly educated, their members are not the most influential, either politically or economically". But "the situation of the wage-earners . . . grouped in trade unions", as we have already seen, was "quite different".<sup>103</sup> In an earlier discussion, Senghor had identified the "students" and the "labour leaders" as "our *élites*". He told the students: "As models, they may take the North African students, who have always trusted the *political* leaders of their respective *countries*".<sup>104</sup> Senghor was no doubt referring to the students', as well as the labour leaders' "No" during the September 1958 referendum, in contrast with his and his party's "Yes".

There are thus several significant aspects of Senghor's reasoning. He not only projects his political party—forming the **Government**—as the spokesman and protector of the interests of the "under-privileged" groups: "the *peasants*, shepherds, fishermen, shopkeepers and artisans", but also denies that either the merchants or the liberal professions are either a large, an influential, or a "dangerous" social group, underlining at the same time the "wage-earners" as the "real

bourgeoisie" striving to promote their own interests at the expense of those of the "nation", of which the majority party was the embodiment and its government the guardian, and arguing in effect for the political emasculation of the trade unions. It is no wonder therefore that in Senegal relations between the unions on the one hand, and "the majority party" and the Government on the other, have been and are hostile. Trade-union leaders have generally supported the "minority parties", which are either proscribed or ineffective. It is significant, in this regard, that Senghor, who always professed pan-African loyalties and based his resistance to the Loi-cadre because of its proposed disintegration of the "federal structure" in French Africa, has in recent years not only joined the ranks of "gradualists" and "regionalists" on the question of African unity, but has also actively opposed Senegalese trade unions joining pan-African trade union organizations. "One cannot combat European, French colonialism merely to replace it with African colonialism. The imperialism of certain independent African States where the unions are in fact only satellites of the majority party" (precisely the relationship which Senghor prescribes for trade unions in his own country) "removes all doubt of the danger of the Pan-African Union."<sup>105</sup> Initiative for such pan-African trade-union organizations has generally been taken by trade unionists in African States like Ghana and Guinea, whose leaders are not only radical pan-Africanists, but in which the national trade-union organizations are very closely integrated with the national parties and governments.

## VII

The present "political class" in most new states of tropical Africa is wholly and peculiarly a product of the colonial situation in Africa. Originally, it consisted of a very small number of Africans—those on the lowest rungs of the colonial administrative ladder; in the liberal professions, like law, teaching and medicine; merchants (mostly in the retail trade); and large- and medium-sized farmers and cultivators of cash crops (especially in West Africa). It was not a "national bourgeoisie (although *since* independence it has developed many of the characteristics of one), of the type which developed, for example, in India as a by-product of British colonial rule, since in Africa colonial economic and political policies—by which large-scale industry, trade and plantations were almost wholly and securely under European control—effectively prevented the accumulation in African hands of that sufficiency of capital as would enable an indigenous entrepreneurial class to develop an African capitalism. On the other hand, the colonial rulers were forced—both by the smallness of their own numbers and by their need to govern millions of peoples with alien customs

and languages—to "isolate" from among the mass of Africans small groups to serve particular—in the main, "intermediary"—functions. The system of "Indirect Rule"<sup>7</sup> was one such device; but by their very nature—their traditional character—the native authorities were unable effectively to assist in the partial modernization which the colonial system, by its underlying economic and political objectives, was obliged to undertake. The colonial authorities needed, above all, a group of Africans with enough "European" education—that is, educated in the language of the colonial power—with which to staff the very junior posts in the colonial administration—clerks, typists, messengers, etc. In return, members of this group were accorded some the residual "privileges" of the colonial *klites*. They received regular if small salaries; they settled in larger towns; they and their children went to schools; and they were in many other ways drawn into the colonial value-system, although only at its periphery. "Education" was the differentia, and became the hallmark, of this group. With the expansion of educational opportunities, this group was joined by another, although much smaller, group of Africans in the "liberal professions"—legal clerks and later lawyers, primary-school and later secondary-school teachers, medical assistants and later doctors. Another group, of small merchants, in due course joined this incipient "class". While large-scale trading was in European (and to a lesser degree in Asian and Arab) hands, enterprising and presently affluent African merchants managed the retail trade, especially in smaller towns. Finally, as the colonial authorities encouraged the cultivation of cash crops like cocoa, coffee and peanuts, a group-of fairly prosperous African cultivators appeared on the scene, particularly in West Africa, where the climate was found inhospitable for large-scale European-owned and -managed plantations.

The most important feature of this numerous, but in relation to the total African population fairly small, group was its homogeneous, and in consequence its "class-conscious", character. It was a "middle class" insofar as it occupied an intermediate position between the colonial *klite* and the mass of African peoples; but it was *not* a "middle class", in the European sense, insofar as it did not have an independent economic base or a clearly differentiated economic function in the colonial system, comparable to the European, or even the Indian, capitalist class. On the other hand, relative to the rest of the population, it was far more centralized: most of its members lived in the cities or larger towns, and those in the "bush" either were part of the authority exercised from the principal administrative centres, or developed urban ties and interests, through the merchants and cultivators acquiring property, for example, or sending their sons in search of education to schools in larger towns. Its predominantly urban character thus facilitated much more regular and thorough communication among its members. This class was at

once differentiated from both the colonial masters and the colonial masses, and by the same criteria derived from the colonial situation itself. From the colonial masses, it was differentiated by its "education", by its "special position" *vis-à-vis* the colonial *élite*, by its comparatively higher living standards and, even more, by its higher economic expectations, and by the European orientation of its value-system. From the colonial masters, it was differentiated by the colour or the "culture" bar built into the colonial system itself: by the very terms of the colonial situation, it found itself restricted to inferior positions, in administration, in the professions, in business and trade, and for the same jobs, its members were paid less than the Europeans; its members found themselves virtually domiciled in the "native quarter". even though their style of living was far closer to the European than to the African; the colonial system, in short, placed a very firm and very nearly insurmountable administrative and political ceiling on its advance. Its education set it apart from Africans, its colour from Europeans. The very ambiguity of its position within the colonial situation made it stand out as a clear-cut social class. Its intermediate position in the colonial hierarchy of values—wealth, prestige, power—not only sharply outlined its social contours in colonial society, but also made its members "conscious" of their membership of the same class.

Nowhere was the ambiguity engendered by its intermediate position better reflected than in its political attitudes, before and since independence. It gave voice and shape to African nationalism; but, in the final analysis, its nationalism was no more than its desire and determination to surmount the disabilities under which the colonial situation had placed it, to achieve maximum political and economic self-expression, and to exercise over its "own" people the hegemony which, in the light of its own self-evaluation, it deemed its due. Its "nationalism" in many cases was genuine enough; and it sought the assistance of "traditional rulers" wherever possible, and of the "common people" wherever necessary, to secure the defeat of colonialism. At the same time, however, and this was particularly true of the "assimilated" French-Africans, its nationalist perspective was so completely shaped and circumscribed by the colonial *élite* and by the norms of colonial society as to make it incapable of understanding—or unwilling to acknowledge—that the termination of colonial rule was but the first stage in the complete dismantling of colonial structures, without which the living standards of the African populations cannot in any meaningful sense be improved. It sought, not to destroy the colonial system, but to displace the colonial *élite*. It sought not to transform but to "Africanize" colonial structures. And this class is now the ruling class in most new states in tropical Africa. It may be called the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie," not in the narrow sense in which the term is used, for example, by Potekhin to mean only "the



high-salaried civil servants",<sup>106</sup> but insofar as it derives its economic power through its monopoly of political and administrative power, so that, for instance, its "commercial" components secure their numerous advantages—import licences, foreign exchange and so on—*via* their shared control of the political and administrative apparatus. And "African Socialism"—and its cluster of "national" "Socialisms"<sup>w</sup>—is the "ideology" of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

African economies are overwhelmingly agrarian, and land is the source of a living for the largest mass of the population, as well as providing the state with a large part of its revenue. Economic development therefore is, first and foremost, a matter of improving the living standards of the peasant populations (at first by modernizing agriculture and making it yield a higher living standard, but in the long run, and more fundamentally, by shifting more and more people away from dependence upon land for a living, through diversification of the economy in various ways). African leaders like Senghor, Nyerer and Mboya maintain that, in Africa, land was held and owned in common, by the tribe or the community. "To us in Africa, land was always recognized as belonging to the community. . . . The T.A.N.U. Government must go back to the traditional African custom of landholding. That is to say, a member of society will be entitled to a piece of *land on condition that he uses it*. Unconditional, or 'freehold', ownership of land (which leads to speculation and parasitism) must be *abolished*."<sup>107</sup> But, whatever the basis of land ownership—and the Kenya White Paper admits of "some conflict of opinion with regard to the traditional attitude towards rights to land"—there is little disagreement among African leaders that the right to the use of land is in African societies exercised on an individual family basis. African land is in fact cultivated by "a vast mass of small-holding peasants". A peasant and his family cultivate a small piece of land which, while he may not alienate or transfer its ownership, is the peasant's as long as he uses it. Different types of agricultural co-operatives being tried in Africa all leave unimpaired the cultivation of land on an individual family basis. (Ghana, *inter alia*, is experimenting with state farms.) In order to adapt to "a modern, monetary economy", the Kenya White Paper states, "the ownership of land must . . . be made more definite and explicit if land consolidation and development are to be fully *successful*."<sup>108</sup> A recent study dealing with Tanganyika refers to the 1963 legislation, along lines adumbrated in Nyerere's paper on "African Socialism", which effectively abolished all free-hold titles. "However, this policy deliberately did not apply to land held by Africans 'under native law and custom', and hence not regarded as freehold." In effect, therefore, the legislation only applied to European and Asian land. The same study notes that among "the coffee-growing Haya and Chagga, the two wealthiest and most highly developed societies in Tanganyika, individual owner-

ship and transfer are common". Nyerere's views about abolishing freehold ownership "were not well received, and many prosperous coffee growers went so far as to threaten to quit T.A.N.U. over this

The African leaders, then, stress the "modernization" of agriculture as their primary concern, in promoting which the government must take the lead through different types of "productive investments" and through encouraging marketing co-operatives, etc. This emphasis on the "leading role of the State" is in line with the tremendous enlargement of the role of the Government which took place during the colonial period, in spite of certain conceptual and structural differences among the policies of colonial powers. As part of the process of furnishing their colonies with an integrated administrative and political frame and, as a concomitant, with an infrastructure—especially in the context, moreover, of the extreme centralization of French and Belgian policies and the "welfare" orientation of British policy particularly after 1945—the colonial "state" was built up into a massive aggregation of administrative and political power. After the "transfer of power" into African hands, both in view of the absence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class and, even more, on account of the unavoidably infrastructural character of a good deal of development—with little attraction for "private enterprise"—the state must continue to play a prominent, and increasingly larger, economic role. And, insofar as socialism assigns to the State a leading economic role, it is all too easy for many African leaders to attach a "socialist" label to their development policies.

But, in order to succeed, the modernization of agriculture must involve the fullest participation of the peasant populations themselves: the "masses" must be "mobilized" behind the development effort. This is attempted, in part, through "*animation rurale*", "*l'investissement humain*" and other similar "community development" and "self-help" programmes, which seek to enlist the voluntary co-operation and labour of the peasants themselves in particular "improvement" projects. This in turn postulates the need for making the masses work harder and endure self-sacrifice. Whatever the concrete achievements of rural self-help programmes—and in countries like India, where they have been attempted on a large scale, the results have fallen far short of expectations—they are directed and supervised by government and party functionaries, thus providing the ruling class with an invaluable opportunity for consolidating itself at the village—at the grass-roots—level. As well as urging upon their peoples an ethic of hard work, self-help and self-sacrifice, the African leaders must also inculcate among them a sense of national "belonging" and national unity. "African Socialism" is an excellent multi-purpose ideology—with its emphasis upon "equality", upon the "welfare of the people", upon the pre-eminence of the "social" (or, in traditional

terms, the "communal") over the "individual" interest, and above all with the great advantage of its "integrating", all-encompassing rhetoric, especially in the context of Africa's "classlessness".<sup>110</sup>

"Socialism" as "planning" proves a singularly attractive and effective device. Many African leaders have almost a religious faith in "planning" as the panacea for all their ills, and treat it not as an aid to, but as a substitute for, radical structural change. Senghor, who has composed some of the finest prose in praise of "*planification*", is a good example. In a preview in 1959 of the "plan", Senghor noted that it would include three sectors: "a socialized sector—agriculture; a mixed sector—public utilities and semigovernmental societies; and a free sector. The latter—banks, commerce, industry—will itself be oriented toward the objectives of the Plan and, to a certain extent, controlled. How? By a long-term moratorium on taxes, accorded either to new investments or to enterprises that enter the framework of the Plan." "As for agriculture, we are fortunate that it has traditionally been socialistic, given its communal nature in Negro-African society." Earlier, in explaining that "there can be no question of nationalization in an underdeveloped nation", he added "one final argument: since capitalists train and employ African personnel, reinvest part of their profits, and pay taxes, capital is, for all practical purposes, nationalized".<sup>111</sup> In a discussion in 1964 of the Senegalese plan, "which socializes what can be socialized, and that alone", Senghor states that, given the absence in Africa of property in land—"we find here, solved at one stroke, the problem of social justice in Black Africa"—"the primary sector—rural economy—is, therefore, socialized". He adds: "Secondary and tertiary sectors—industry and handicraft, banks and trade—will only be controlled. Here foreign capital will have the opportunity to invest. Those who will do so, within the framework of the Plan, will enjoy certain guarantees and certain tax-reliefs thanks to the *Code* of Investments. However, the socialist ideal shall not be abandoned for all that. A *Code* of Labour which, practically prevents strikes, insures to workers, along with wages which are among the highest in Black Africa, a reasonable amount of Social *Security*."<sup>112</sup> There is a dogged determination behind all this to avoid any major or drastic change in colonial structures. The great advantage of "planning", of course, is that it underlines and reinforces the directive role of the state, facilitates further accretion and concentration of political power, and helps consolidate even more the control by the ruling class of the administrative and political apparatus. There is a great emphasis on the "Africanization" of administration and economy which—while a necessary part of decolonization—is by itself no more than a multiplication of outlets for the members and auxiliaries of the ruling class. A recent tabulation of the professions of U.P.S. political leaders is in this connection very revealing. Of the 167 non-parliamentary

members of the U.P.S. Executive Committee for whom data were available, 79.5 per cent were in "government employment", 4.8 per cent in "professional employment", and 15.6 per cent in "business, farming, etc.". The corresponding percentages for 79 members of the National Assembly were 63.3, 22.8, and 13.9; and for 42 members of the party's highest organ, the Executive Bureau, 64.4, 28.6 and 7.2, respectively.<sup>113</sup>

The ideologist of this ruling class must underscore the opposition between the "masses" and the "privileged minority", *but* by disguising the real "privileged minority" which is the ruling class itself. He must indeed keep up the fiction of the multi-party system, with the "dominant party as the party of the masses". In a significant passage, Senghor states his reasons for preferring the "dominant party" to the "*single party*", grouping intellectuals, workers and peasants [which] was conceivable in Europe after the socialist revolution", and which African leaders like Nkrumah, Sékou Touré and Modibo Keita are trying to fashion. "In an underdeveloped country", Senghor argues, "the single party seemed to present the danger of government by clique, the danger of sclerosis. . . . The formula of the *dominant party* seemed best to us. It rejects violence, which is useless here".<sup>114</sup> In order to consolidate and legitimize its monopoly of political power, the ruling class must postulate and "encourage" an opposition of interest between the "underprivileged masses" and the "privileged minority", correlated with the opposition between the "dominant party" and its government and the "minority parties" (although not all African leaders are concerned with ideological refinement as elaborate as Senghor's, and are content to dispense altogether with the opposition parties, while clinging to their role as the protector of the "masses" against the "privileged minority"). At the same time, the "dominant party" is careful to refrain from any major restructuring of society, either internally or in its international relationships. Internally, among other things, parliamentary institutions stagnate and atrophy from protracted disuse. And, as Fanon notes, the dominant or the single "party plays understudy to the administration and the police, and controls the masses, not in order to make sure that they really participate in the business of governing the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from them obedience and discipline".<sup>115</sup>

Because in many new African States, the profession of "socialism" is combined with the practice of the dominant- or the single-party rule, many people tend to assume that it is the determination to achieve "socialism" which must explain the choice of many African leaders of the "political controls" of an authoritarian political system; and this is a view which these leaders are only too willing to encourage, and for which they generously provide the necessary "documentation". In actual fact, however, it is the need to explain and justify the

authoritarian system, not least to their own peoples, which accounts for their choice of "socialism". If in this paper, Senegal has received a large degree of attention, it is only because the chief spokesman of its ruling class has provided the fullest and clearest statement of its ideology, and one in which "African socialism", "traditional Socialism", and "national" "Socialism" are carefully and systematically blended.

## VIII

There are a few other African countries—Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria (although Ben Bella's overthrow has introduced a note of uncertainty, for the time being, as to the course of its development)—where "Socialism" plays an entirely different political and ideological role. Inevitably, there are several similarities between their course of development, and that of countries like Senegal, in consequence of the fact that they are all "underdeveloped"—although some (like Guinea) more than others (like Ghana); that they have all alike inherited colonial structures, and that all their leaders have to work out their policies in an African and international setting over which they have some influence, in varying degrees, but little effective control. The first striking thing about this smaller group of African states is that their leaders never talk about "African Socialism" or "traditional Socialism" or "Guinean Socialism", and so on. There is a caustic passage in Sékou Touré about this:

There is much talk of "*African Socialism*", and this seems to infer that there also exists a Chinese Socialism, an American Socialism, a Yugoslavian or Bulgarian Socialism. . . . Why would people, tomorrow, not speak of the Nigerian or Togolese path of African Socialism, or of Senegalese chemistry or Moroccan mathematics? . . . Engaging in "socialism for the sake of socialism" is trying to mow with the sickle's handle."

And Nkrumah has often affirmed that there is only one "socialism". In Mali, the phrase "planned socialism" is used more often. The best way in which to understand these countries' political and ideological outlook is to return, once again, to their leaders' discussion of the role of the trade unions in their countries.

Nkrumah notes that the trade unions in African countries were always in the vanguard of the nationalist movements, and that the nationalist leaders, who are now in most cases government leaders in their countries, have continually encouraged and supported the trade-union movement. In Ghana the relations between the Convention People's Party and the Ghana Trades Union Congress have always been close. During the "second revolution" for the country's economic reconstruction, as during the first revolution for the

country's political independence, the **C.P.P.** is the "political vanguard" of the national effort, which during this second phase requires, even more than in the past, complete unity and full mobilization of all social forces—under a common, centralized, political direction—for achieving the national objectives. The **C.P.P.** thus is "the political expression" of the trade-union movement, which in its turn is the "trade-union wing" of the **C.P.P.** The **C.P.P.** Government has taken a series of measures to improve the wages and living conditions of the workers. "The workers are for the State and the State for the workers, and thus they are working for themselves." The workers in their turn must reciprocate by working harder and better, so as to raise productivity and increase national wealth, which will enable the party and the government to improve the living standards of the people as a whole. To enable the workers to develop a sense of direct and personal participation in national development, workers' management is being introduced in certain state enterprises. The **C.P.P.** must attend to the political and ideological "education" of the trade-union movement, because only the party as the embodiment of the whole nation is qualified to pronounce upon national objectives and priorities and "to smooth out the differences amongst social classes". Representatives of the trade unions, as of other popular organizations, are in the central committee of the **C.P.P.**; the **C.P.P.** Government is "a people's Government, that is, a workers', a farmers', and a peasants' Government—indeed a government of the people—free, strong and independent, pursuing a Socialist pattern of reconstruction. The interest of workers is therefore well catered for by the State. The trade unions therefore have a different role from that of trade unions in a capitalist society." Trade-union officials must accordingly "discard their colonial mentality and methods and remember that they are not struggling against capitalists. And where they have to fight against exploiters, the state shall be their protector." This is coupled with the oft-repeated determination not to permit "Ghanaian private capitalism" to develop. Nkrumah insists that the role of trade unions in independent African states must be distinguished from their role in colonial territories. In the former, the trade unions "must mobilize for rapid national economic development and this must dictate the necessity for wage restraint and personal sacrifice on the part of workers for the greatest good of themselves and all the people". In colonial territories, on the other hand, the trade unions "must be organized for political action: the overthrow of colonialism".<sup>117</sup>

Sékou Touré's detailed and more systematic analysis of the role of the trade unions in colonial and post-colonial Africa deserves careful scrutiny. Before Guinea's independence, he consolidated his leadership of the nationalist movement initially through his control of the trade-union movement. He was also the inspiration and the first secretary-general of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique*

*Noire (U.G.T.A.N.)*. He begins his analysis by showing how in its formative years the African trade-union movement; aiming solely at promoting its own "economic" interests through "economic" action, soon discovered the futility of its narrow "professionalism", of its "anarcho-trade unionism". In consequence the trade unions merged their efforts with the "national liberation movement", in which presently they became the leading and the most active element. In "non-colonial" (that is, capitalist) countries, the classic task of trade unions is to further the "class struggle" by all means. But in colonial territories *"during the period of national liberation the social aspect of our struggle takes on a secondary character in relation to the political exigencies imposed on our awakened conscience by this freedom struggle"*. And, after all, "the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle necessarily takes on the character of a class struggle, seen on the international level in the antagonistic relations between the labour force which produces and the financial forces which exploit the physical and intellectual capacities of the workers".<sup>138</sup> Even after a country attains formal independence, it can continue to "have a non-independent people whose conditions of life are identical to those of a legally colonial or dependent country. . . . *The struggle for the democratization of structures is a necessary stage in the affirmation of the power of self-determination of our peoples.*"

One major difference between African and European trade unions lies, however, "in the very small minority of salaried workers in relation to the overall population of our countries. This minority varies from 2 to 20 per cent of the people. It is the obvious sign of the undeveloped or underdeveloped state of all our African countries." This enjoins upon the workers all the more the need for a "unity of action" with "the exploited strata" and with "the democratic and revolutionary forces" during the national liberation struggle. Another fundamental difference lies *"between the role of the state in European countries and the role of the state in the underdeveloped countries of Africa"*. In a "predominantly capitalist country the state is *a priori* the instrument of the forces of exploitation". In underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, "the state embodies the totality of aspirations and the totality of desires for liberation and democratic progress of populations kept in poverty and ignorance". He adds:

However, the state is a political structure, and the trade union organizations within it must appreciate its role in the nation's development to keep sight of the political line accepted by the people as well as the political phenomena likely to speed up or *compromise* the evolution of the national movement. . . . *Our* nations have to be created and consolidated, and this creation and consolidation cannot result from the dispersion of our forces nor from a fundamental opposition between the social strata otherwise possessed of identical conditions of life: economic backwardness with its social and human consequences.<sup>139</sup>

But in an independent African state like Guinea, the problem of the proper relationship between the trade-union movement on the one hand, and the national party and the state apparatus on the other, needs close examination. In Guinea itself, the P.D.G. and its government were faced with difficulties with the Teachers' Union and the Railwaymen's Union. Given the party's role as "the political vanguard" both in the struggle for national liberation and for national reconstruction, there can be no question of an "independent" trade-union line—*independent*, that is, of the political line of the P.D.G. Different mass organizations have different functions, but they severally become "meaningful" only in relation to a general political orientation as formulated by the party as the embodiment of the nation as a whole. The trade unions themselves, of course, fully and actively participate in the formulation of this common political line, but once established in strict conformity with the "democratic procedures" of the party—"democratic centralism", "criticism and self-criticism", and so on—the trade unions as well as all other mass organizations and groups in the country are obliged to abide by it. To argue otherwise is to undermine the nascent national unity and "national democracy". Nor can the trade unions, in view of the fact that the workers are only a small minority of the total population, (which is also, barring children, etc., the total "working population"), demand or expect a decisive voice for themselves. As well as amounting to a "dangerous overrating" of the present position and importance of the "wage-earners" in relation to the "African working masses" as a whole, to allocate them a supreme or primary position would be highly "undemocratic", because "a nation's unity is essentially political unity, and this will not be achieved by any trade-union, since it cannot be engendered by a thought that does not embody the democratic aspirations of the broadest mass of the people, nor by any action that a minority would impose upon the majority. Political unity is engendered by common ideals, the community of popular interests and the consistent action that a politically committed majority imposes—if need be—upon a reactionary minority. This is why the P.D.G. has adopted the principle of popular dictatorship, as the functional and organic term of the people's *democracy*."<sup>120</sup>

To introduce the notion of "class struggle", Sékou Touré argues, is completely to misread the African situation. There can be "no ground for class struggle in a society that is not divided into antagonistic classes. When can there be talk of class antagonism? When one social class imposes on others a relationship of oppression and exploitation. And it is able to do so when it holds exploitation and oppression media: capital, and privately owned production media."

Then [he continues], let us ask this question: have we such conditions in the Republic of Guinea, a country where all major sectors of the



nation's economic life are under direct control by the state, a country where land property is abolished, a country where farmers and wage-earners work out the laws and have extensive powers of management?

In such a situation, clearly, particularly as both the party's supremacy and the country's democratic structures effectively check the emergence of a "national bourgeoisie", "clerks, workers, doctors, teachers, magistrates, soldiers and other state agents are not in an antagonistic relationship to the ministers, regional commandants and heads of State enterprises or public services". Whom, therefore, would the strikes affect?

Before our independence, with regard to the anti-popular structures of public services, strikes by public employees affected the colonial groundwork politically and economically, and thus, served the cause of our people's emancipation. But today, who would bear the financial, economic and political consequences of a strike in a national enterprise or public service, if not the people of Guinea?"

Sékou Touré is careful to insist upon the extensive responsibilities of the workers and the trade unions in managing economic and industrial activities on behalf of the nation; although stressing at the same time that the "democratization" of management cannot mean the "collectivization" of state enterprises, with the workers gathering the fruits and profits—in a "guild spirit"—from property which belongs to the nation and must be collectivized only at the nationwide level.<sup>123</sup> Nor does he seek to deny social differentiations either inherent in "human nature", or derived from pre-capitalist societies, or based, as in any modern society, on different "functions". All that he claims is that, at present, these differentiations and "contradictions" are not in the nature of antagonistic classes, and can only and must be harmonized at the national level, politically, and through the popular and democratic character and procedures of the P.D.G. By linking the trade unions organically with the P.D.G., therefore, Sékou Touré seeks to reorient and enlarge their functions both economically and politically; unlike Senghor, who seeks to "neutralize" them politically, as well as curtailing their economic functions. Both in Ghana and Guinea, the leading trade unionists are a part of the top layers of the party leadership; Kaba Mamady, the president of the Guinean trade-union organization, for example, is a member of the National Political Bureau of the P.D.G. Nkrumah, Touré and Modibo Keita have actively sponsored pan-African trade unionism which, as well as being coaxial with their policy of "non-alignment", serves to ensure that their efforts at "reconverting" trade-union movements within their countries will not be hindered through outside "interference".

In these African countries, it is the "national party"—the C.P.P., the P.D.G., or the *Union Soudanaise*—which is the linchpin of the

political system and gives it its peculiar character. Structurally and ideologically, the "national party" is very different from the "dominant" or the "single party". Originally, during the colonial phase, its leadership was essentially petit-bourgeois, and derived from elements on the periphery of the African *e'lite*, rather than from within that *e'lite*. On account of its petit-bourgeois origins, the social distance of this leadership from the African masses was considerably less than that of the African *e'lite*, which enabled it soon to transform its political party into a national movement and then to win national independence. As a result, it often experienced the hostility and opposition of the African "intelligentsia" or the *e'lite*, whose claims to "lead" the African populations it denied or pre-empted.

Both in its programme and, more important, its organization, the "national" party" eschews "tribalism" or any other narrower loyalty likely to hamper or impair "national unity". It regards itself as the "political vanguard" of the "national revolution", for both the country's "liberation" and its "reconstruction": Its composition is "popular", its outlook "national", and its procedures "democratic" (although in practice it falls short of the model). It is "monolithic", insofar as all other popular and mass organizations are integrated with it and function under its political direction. While acknowledging that "contradictions" and "differentiations" exist within the country, it under-emphasizes them and seeks to subordinate them to the general and overriding interests of the nation as a whole. Regarding itself as the political, and the state as the "technical", instrument of the nation, it proclaims and exercises its supremacy over the state apparatus. It is very much on the "left" of the political axis, particularly in relation to the conservative opposition tendencies within the country; in contrast with the "dominant party" in Senegal, for example, which is very much to the "right" of the opposition parties. Its language is radical, its aims revolutionary, its organization highly integrated and centralized. The national party seeks to mobilize the mass of people behind its efforts not simply to modify the colonial structures, or mitigate their ill effects, but in the long run completely to transform and reconstruct them, and in the meantime steadily to restructure the economy, so as to improve the living standards of the population as a whole. Its ideology is "socialism"; and "Africa's liberation and unity" (especially in the light of its view of "neo-colonialism"), together with "non-alignment in international affairs, are the co-ordinates of its "socialism".

#### NOTES

1. *Ghanaian Times* (Accra), 20 December 1965.
2. *The Worker* (Accra), 1 (1) May 1965, p. 31.
3. Republic of Kenya. *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya* (1965), p. 2.

4. Michael I. Okpara, Premier of Eastern Nigeria, in an address in 1960; cited in *Africa Report* (Washington, D.C.), 8 (5) May 1963, p. 24.
5. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress* (Cairo, n.d. [? 1963]), p. 362.
6. Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana* (Edinburgh 1959, paperback ed.), p. 7.
7. Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism* (London 1964), p. 74.
8. Kwame Nkrumah, "Why I Founded 'The Spark'", *The Spark* (Accra), No. 100, 13 November 1964, p. 1.
9. Cited in *Africa Report, op. cit.*, p. 20. Dacko has recently been overthrown by a military *coup*, which occurred very nearly at the same time as the military *coups* in Dahomey and Upper Volta. Along with the assumption of the presidency by General Mobutu in the Congo (Leopoldville) a little earlier, these military *coups* portend a trend worth examining carefully.
10. Cited in Kenneth W. Grundy, "Mali: The Prospects of 'Planned Socialism'", in William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *African Socialism* (Stanford/London 1964), p. 176.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
12. Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity* (New York 1961), pp. 35-6.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
14. Uopold Sédar Senghor, *On African Socialism* (New York 1964), p. 46.
15. This repudiation of "Western materialism and selfishness" which one encounters also in some varieties of "Asian Socialism," by people who, on the other hand, want to enlist "Western technology" in order to promote "economic development" within their countries, so as to improve the "living standards" of their populations, is an important symptom in tracing the aetiology and establishing the quality of a particular type of "socialism."
16. There are obvious difficulties in using the phrase "African Socialism." In this paper, when the phrase is used without quotation marks, it refers to all African leaders and theories using or claiming the "socialist" label. When the phrase is used with quotation marks, on the other hand, it refers to those who claim a special or unique "African" quality for their "socialism". In most cases the context in which the phrase is used makes its particular connotations clear.
17. See two excellent papers by Thomas Hodgkin on more general themes relative to African socialism: "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism", in Kenneth Kirkwood, ed., *African Affairs*, Number One (London 1961), pp. 22-40; and "The Relevance of 'Western' Ideas for the New African States", in J. Roland Pennock, ed., *Self-Government in Modernizing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964), pp. 50-80.
18. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford 1964), p. 23. The whole section on "The French Communists" is instructive reading.
19. *Zbid.*, p. 24.
20. It is interesting to speculate to what extent the failure of Communist parties to emerge in Africa (in contrast with their proliferation in Asia) or of the Communists to become a major political force in tropical Africa may be attributed to the inability of "orthodox" Marxism-Leninism to develop an adequate theory of the "racial factor" in African colonialism.
21. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress, op. cit.*, p. 116.
22. Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity, op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.
23. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *On African Socialism, op. cit.*, p. 33.
24. *Zbid.*, p. 69.
25. Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom* (London 1962), p. 43.

26. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London 1965), p. 12.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
28. Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "African Socialism: Declaration of Ideological Independence", in *African Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
29. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 134, 139.
30. *Zbid.*, p. 146. In this, as in all subsequent citations, italics are in the original, unless otherwise specified.
31. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Prose and Poetry* (London 1965), p. 100.
32. Cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
33. *Towards Socialism: Osagyefo's Message to the Seminar for Regional Commissioners, &c., on the 24th November, 1962* (Accra), p. 3.
34. Frantz Fanon, *The Damned* (Paris 1963), p. 38.
35. *The Spark*, No. 67, 17 March 1964.
36. Aimé Césaire, "The Political Thought of Sékou Touré", in *Prksence Africaine* (English ed., vol. 1), p. 65.
37. See Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Dakar Colloquium: The Search for a Doctrine", in Friedland and Rosberg, *African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, especially pp 120-22.
38. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
39. Cited in Césaire, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
40. *Zbid.*, p. 69.
41. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
42. But cf. Madeira Keita: "When a man like Nehru, who seems to me like a good British bourgeois from the City . . ."; cited in Paul E. Sigmund, Jr., ed., *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York 1963, p. 180.
43. Tom Mboya, "African Socialism", in *Africa's Freedom* (London 1964), p. 87.
44. Sékou Touré, cited in Césaire, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-8.
45. Introductory statement by Jomo Kenyatta, in *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, *op. cit.*
46. Julius Nyerere, "'Ujamaa': the Basis of African Socialism" in *Africa's Freedom*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
47. Chabi Mama, the secretary-general of the then governing *Parti Dahoméen de l'Unité*, in 1962; cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
48. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
49. President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic; cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
50. "Democratic Socialism" is altogether an unfamiliar phrase in Africa, and the Western European democratic-socialist and labour movements have had remarkably slight impact on Africa either politically or through the trade-union movements.
51. Two examples from Senegal: Mamadou Dia: "It is estimated that in Senegal, military expenditures amount to almost 10 billion francs. This helps to stabilize the national income and emphasizes the consequences of a mass evacuation of French troops, an evacuation justifiably rejected by [the Federation of] Mali's leaders." (*The African Nations and World Solidarity*, p. 115). Senghor (*On African Socialism*, pp. 57-8) argued in 1959 that their membership in the French Community "must create no inferiority complex whatever", since as underdeveloped countries Senegal and Soudan must get financial aid from outside; in turning to "European nations and to the U.S.A." they would "only be changing guardians— you see the disadvantages; at the worst, we could turn to everybody, thus bringing the Cold War ever closer to us." (Italics added.) Senghor is here using the cold-war fears to justify unwillingness to cultivate trade and aid

- relations with the Soviet-bloc countries, alongside those which already exist with the Atlantic-bloc countries; whereas, on Nkrumah's view both of non-alignment and of decolonization, it is imperative that an underdeveloped and non-aligned country must develop economic relations with the Soviet Union and other "socialist countries" in order to reduce dependence on the West, as well as establishing a "proper" equidistance from both East and West. Ghana's opposition to the stationing of foreign troops on African soil—and, in general, to military alliances between African and non-African states—is well-known.
52. Léopold Sédar Senghor, *Democracy and Socialism* (Ibadan University 1964, mimeographed), p. 17.
  53. *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
  54. A comment on the Dakar colloquium in *Le Monde*: ". . . We must, first of all, remember the striking moderation of the talks from the rostrum as well as in private conversations. . . . What is even more striking is that nobody challenged the necessity of calling upon foreign aid and investments." Cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
  55. Julius Nyerere, "'Ujamaa' . . .", *op. cit.*, p. 76.
  56. Tom Mboya, "African Socialism", *op. cit.*, p. 80.
  57. Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–9, 74.
  58. Kwame Nkrumah, "Why I Founded *The Spark*", *op. cit.*, p. 1.
  59. J. Nyerere, cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
  60. Nyerere, "'Ujamaa' . . .", *op. cit.*, pp. 76–7.
  61. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–1.
  62. *African Socialism. . . Kenya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.
  63. Cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
  64. Kwame Nkrumah, *Building a Socialist State* (Accra 1961), p. 12.
  65. Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
  66. Kofi Baako, "Nkrummaism—Its Theory and Practice", in Sigmund, *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 188. A recent letter in *West Africa* (No. 2532, 11 December 1965) congratulates "the Ghanaian Government for the purchase of half a million Bibles for religious instruction in Ghanaian Schools. It was the largest order in the Bible Society's 150-year history".
  67. Quoted by Sigmund, *op. cit.*, p. 17, fn. 18.
  68. Cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
  69. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
  70. "'Ujamaa' . . ." *op. cit.*, p. 76.
  71. *African Socialism. . . Kenya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7, 12–3.
  72. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
  73. Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
  74. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
  75. Sékou Touré, *Toward Full Re-Africanisation*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10.
  76. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress*, p. 212.
  77. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
  78. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
  79. "Resolution on CGTA [*Confédération Générale du Travail Africaine*] Doctrine", cited in Thomas Hodgkin, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism", *op. cit.*, p. 37.
  80. Cf. the views of the banned *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* (P.A.I.) on "Senegalese socialism": "This 'Socialism', which safeguards the interests of the local bourgeoisie and the foreign bourgeoisie is nothing more nor less than an African form of capitalism belonging to the neo-colonialist era." Cited in "Senegal and the African Party of Independence", in *The African Communist II* (3), April-June 1963, p. 50. See also *Democratic*

*Socialism: Being the Manifesto of the Action Group of Nigeria for an Independent Nigeria* (Lagos 1960), for an interesting analysis of the Nigerian "economic classes".

81. Cited in *Africa Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
83. For an excellent portrayal of one such political *élite*, and of the way it operates in the context of "neo-colonialism", see Benoît Verhaegen, "Social Classes in the Congo", in *Revolution* 1 (12) April 1964, pp. 115-28.
84. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom* (New York 1961), p. 163.
85. *Dawn Broadcast* (April 1961), (Accra), p. 3.
86. Cited in Sigmund, *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-9.
87. Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity*, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
88. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
89. Sékou Touré, *Toward Full Re-Africanisation*, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
90. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress*, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-8.
91. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
92. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 211-12.
94. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, p. 143.
95. *African Socialism . . . Kenya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-5.
96. Jomo Kenyatta, "African Socialism and African Unity", in 1 (1) Summer 1965, p. 37. In Kenyatta's paper, incidentally, the connection between "African Socialism" and "African unity" is never established. Most of the African leaders who talk of "African Socialism," in fact, notice or create no link between it and African unity. On the other hand, leaders like Nkrumah and Toure who repudiate the notion of an "African Socialism" continually link the building of "Socialism" within their countries with the imperative need of Africa's political and economic unification.
97. For a somewhat contrasting view, see the chapter on "Trade Unions" by Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley/Los Angeles 1964).
98. Cited in Sigmund, *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-05.
99. "Ujamaa' . . .", *op. cit.*, pp. 74-5. In Tanganyika there has been considerable conflict between the government and the national trade-union organization. Following the mutiny of the Tanganyika Rifles in January 1964, "upwards of 200 trade unionists, according to official announcements, were 'detained' " (Friedland and Rosberg, *African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 285, note 17), and the Tanganyika Federation of Labour and its constituent unions were dissolved by legislation. A single new union, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers, was created in its place. By this legislation, the President of Tanganyika (that is, Nyerere) is given the right to appoint the general secretary and the deputy general secretary of the Union. The Minister of Labour at the time was appointed the first general secretary.
100. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-6.
101. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-7.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-9. Senghor continually emphasizes his concern for the interests of the "underprivileged peasants. etc." Superficially, this would seem in line with the primary importance accorded to the peasantry by several African leaders. Sékou Touré has noted the greater "revolutionary consciousness" of the peasantry. And Fanton has asserted that "in the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain." Fanton's thinking was mainly

shaped by his participation in the Algerian war. Ben Bella and other Algerian leaders have also laid stress on the primary role of the peasantry; so has Modibo Keita. Those African leaders still engaged in the "struggle for national liberation," like **Amilcar** Cabral in Portuguese Guinea, or the leaders of the Sawaba Party of Niger fighting a "neo-colonial" régime, emphasize, again, the crucial role of the peasantry. And they all refer to the Chinese and Cuban revolutions. It would seem that in all those countries where the struggle for national liberation has become transformed into a "war of national liberation"—with the use of armed violence on a mass scale, and with guerrilla fighting in the countryside or in the mountains, depending for its success on the active and whole-hearted support and participation of the rural masses—their leaders have been obliged to acknowledge the primary or leading role of the peasantry. But this, clearly, has little in common with Senghor's solicitude for the "underprivileged."

103. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-5.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

106. I. Potekhin, *Africa: Ways of Development* (Moscow 1964), p. 64.

107. "Ujamaa' . . .", *op. cit.*, pp. 72-3.

108. *African Socialism . . . Kenya*, *op. cit.*, p. 10-11. In his *Freedom and After* (London 1963, pp. 172-3), Tom Mboya, a most ardent "traditional socialist," doubts that the Israeli kibbutzim will be acceptable to Africans, for, he states, "more Africans are increasingly coming to want individual possessions, which they can dispose of at will, and of which they can say 'these are mine'."

109. Fred G. Burke, "Tanganyika: The Search for Ujamaa", in Friedland and Rosberg, *African Socialism*, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

110. The concept of "non-egalitarian classlessness" is, of course, relevant here. See Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (London 1963).

111. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, pp. 58-9.

112. Senghor, *Democracy and Socialism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-3.

113. William J. Foltz, "Senegal", in Coleman and Rosberg, *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, *op. cit.*, table 9, p. 32.

114. Senghor, *On African Socialism*, p. 145.

115. Fanon, *The Damned*, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

116. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress*, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

117. Nkrumah's views have been paraphrased from three of his speeches on trade-union matters, made in October 1959, July 1960 and March 1962. They are to be found in *I Speak of Freedom*, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-8; *Speech Delivered by Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah at the Opening of the Hall of Trade Unions* (Accra); and *Osagyefo in Kumasi: Four Speeches by Osagyefo in March 1962* (Accra).

118. Sékou Touré, *Guinean Revolution and Social Progress*, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-72. This latter point is made in different forms by many African leaders.

119. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-4.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-3.

122. *Ibid.*, pp. 188-9, 193-5.