

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE LEFT IN CHILE

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CHILE is one of the few Latin American nations in which Marxist parties exist that can claim a mass following. Both the Socialist and Communist parties are directed by persons who have adapted to legislative roles within the constitutional "rules of the game". Joined together since 1956 in a Popular Action Front (FRAP) electoral coalition, the SP and CP have over the years managed to forge a stable and expanding constituency among lower class voters. Benefiting from popular disillusionment with the failure of the Frei (Christian Democratic) Government to implement a rapid "anti-oligarchic" transformation of socio-economic structures (the so-called "Revolution in Liberty"), these two parties increased their popular support from less than 22 per cent in 1965 to almost 30 per cent in the 1967 municipal elections.¹

As in the nearly 1960's, it is likely that in the months preceding the 1970 presidential election, there will be a surfeit of reports dwelling upon the imminent "danger" to parliamentary democracy in Chile. While it cannot be denied that Marxist dedication and the failure of Christian Democracy to institute "rapid" or "sweeping" reforms in poverty-ridden Chile have enhanced the appeal and the strength of the Left, there remain certain important aspects of the political system that operate in a contrary direction. Of especial importance is its "openness" to aid and other forms of pressure and influence by the United States. In the following paragraphs, structural factors that "mobilize bias" against political groups seeking the revolutionary transformation of that system through the electoral process will be surveyed.²

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Little more than 40 per cent of the Chilean electorate has completed primary school while less than 8 per cent are secondary school graduates. As a consequence of widespread functional illiteracy which may range as high as 40 per cent at the adult level, much of the Chilean public does not rely upon reading matter for political news. Surveys have indicated that radio broadcasters are the main sources of news for the majority of the population, while newspapers occupy a position of secondary importance—especially for the lower income groups where

the Left concentrate their propagandist efforts. Few Chileans read magazines, periodicals or pamphlets.³

Insofar as both newspapers and the radio are concerned, it is reasonable to assume that conservative definitions of what is "news" as well as interpretive accounts in these highly politicized media naturally work against the political position of the Socialist and Communist parties. According to Carlos Altamirano—a Socialist Senator and professor at the University of Chile—the combined 1966 daily circulation of the two pro-FRAP newspapers in the country was not more than 55,000; while newspapers which were in varying degrees hostile to the Left totalled a circulation of more than 600,000.

The structure of radio broadcasting was even more unfavourable to FRAP. Altamirano noted that only two small provincial stations were owned by persons sympathetic to the Socialist Party. None were operated by Communist sympathizers while 128—including the nine major stations in the country—were charged with biasing their news against Marxist views and parties.⁴ Radio, television and the press frequently rely upon wire services owned by U.S. publishers (AP, UPI) for their accounts of international news, and even, on occasions, for domestic events.

During the 1964 presidential campaign, the "dean" of Chile's newspapers, *El Mercurio*, disregarded all subtlety in openly distorting its treatment of the FRAP candidacy of Salvador Allende.⁵ And in June of that year, Socialist and Communist senators complained that they were refused the right to buy air time by the following major stations: Radio Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura (branches in Santiago, Valparaiso, Los Angeles); La Voz de Chile (Antófaagasta, Valparaiso Santiago, Concepción, Temuco, Puerto Montt); Radio Co-operativa Vitalicia; and the Corporación Chilena de Broadcasting y Televisión. Major restrictions such as broadcasting at 1 a.m., limitation to twenty sentences, or censorship were charged against the Radio Sociedad Nacional Minería and Radio Portales.⁶ In the aftermath of the election, Christian Democratic, Radical and Rightist (Liberal, Conservative) legislators rejected FRAP demands that stations be required to provide equal time to all candidates during electoral campaigns.



Close to ninety per cent of the Chilean population are Catholic. Three fourths of the women and perhaps a quarter of the men attend Church once a month or more often.⁷ Catholic values are naturally also to be found in the government-subsidized parochial schools which educated more than a third of Chilean youth in 1964. At that time, priests and other clerics operated 1,200 primary schools, 138 technical and vocational schools, 149 secondary schools, twelve teachers training colleges

and three universities.⁸ Other instruments of clerical influence include Radio Chilena and the Radio School of the Institute of Rural Education.

For many years the Church has propagandized against the evils of "materialistic" and "atheistic" Communism. Following FRAP gains in 1958 and especially 1961, the leadership of the Church intensified this propaganda and began to support the Christian Democratic candidacy of Frei.⁹ An October 1962 Pastoral Letter of the Episcopate endorsed socio-economic structural reforms as the best means of preventing a FRAP victory. This programmatic orientation paralleled and reinforced the Christian Democratic position. Although the reforms were also valued for their intrinsic embodiment of Christian Social Doctrine, greater emphasis was placed upon the Communist (FRAP) menace. Thus the bishops used their moral prestige to warn Chile's faithful against voting for the Socialists or for any other party in coalition with Communism :

the Church considers communism to be a noxious doctrine for human society. . . .

Collaboration is not possible with communism. What collaboration, what possibilities can there be with a system or party that has as a basic postulate the destruction of all ideas and institutions to which it is opposed? those who collaborate with the communists are sons who have separated themselves from the paternal house.

The desire to aid communism in achieving power even with the intention of not following its dictates or opposing it once the latter is secured, constitutes an immoral act which cannot be justified and that assumes a lack of tactical adroitness upon the part of the communists, something that is very alien to reality. . . .¹⁰

There are some difficulties in estimating precisely the extent of clerical influence. Upon certain broad issues such as divorce and "favouring Communism", survey data suggest that between a third and a half of adult women fall within an effective Church constituency.¹¹ The women's independence from more anti-clerical males is ensured through separate electoral voting tables. Fear of clerical disfavour is such that no non-Marxist party has dared advocate the liberty of marital divorce, legislation of abortion, birth control, an end to rising State subsidies to clerical schools or the imposition of taxes upon Church-owned properties and business interests. The sex differential in the 1961 presidential balloting also probably reflected a great susceptibility by Catholic women to anti-Communist electoral propaganda, although many men were also responsive to such appeals.¹²



To such institutional factors as the structure of the mass media and the Church may be added a third, the State itself. Examples of how

public revenues or public authority may be used to minimize support for the Left are the following: "Obligatory (radio) chains" are frequently utilized by the president or his ministers to justify the Government's position respecting one or more issues. This, of course, capitalizes on the psychological dependence of many Chileans—average daily listening time ranges from two and a half to three and a half hours—upon the electronic media. All radio and television stations in the nation are compelled to carry simultaneously the Government message during prime listening hours. In the course of electoral campaigns, this instrumentality may be utilized as often as once a week. Since Frei's victory in 1964, Christian Democratic supporters have been investing heavily in the remaining "independent" mass media outlets. In addition, during 1967 a U.S. Press Attaché commented that it has become virtually impossible for a person "not sympathetic to the Government" to obtain employment as a professional in the mass media industry where licensing and official advertising were allegedly conditioned by political neutrality or support for the Government.¹³

Worth noting too are the charges that during recent electoral campaigns government vehicles and facilities were used to aid Christian Democratic candidates. A former Christian Democratic legislator has also claimed that Bank of Chile loans were provided to some of that party's candidates during the 1965 congressional campaign.¹⁴

Finally, under the Chilean Constitution a plenary session of congress elects the nation's president from the two highest ranking candidates when neither has obtained an absolute majority at the polls. Although the tradition has been to vote for the candidate with a plurality, in 1946 and 1952 a minority of congressmen cast ballots for the second ranked candidate. Similarly, FRAP members voted for Allende in 1958 despite Jorge Alessandri's plurality of about 30,000 votes. In 1964 Eduardo Frei received an absolute majority, so no congressional vote was required by the Constitution. If the FRAP does manage to win a popular plurality in 1970 after failing to secure a congressional majority in the 1969 congressional elections, it is more than likely that a congressional majority would decline to vote for the FRAP presidential candidate. As in 1964 when there was a serious threat of such preventive tactics,¹⁵ it will not be the presidency but the existing social order that will be thought to be in jeopardy by a Leftist accession to the "strong" presidency provided for by the Chilean Constitution. For once invested with State power, the Marxist-led coalition—even if it were broadened to include the opportunist Radicals—could be expected to initiate a series of structural reforms which, if they were followed by a massive flight of capital, might well result in the transformation of the existing monopolistic capitalist economy into a Socialist one. Such

a prognosis was widely accepted in 1964, when the fate of pre-revolutionary Cuba's upper and middle classes was not unknown to their Chilean counterparts in society and politics. As in the 1963-1964 campaign therefore, the political environment in 1970 will be inflamed by a massive and intense propagandist "campaign of terror", focusing upon the imagery of a Communist tyranny in an Hispanic setting. Continued Socialist and Communist affiliation with the Havana-based Latin American Solidarity Organization—even though only nominal for the Communists—will be used against the Left as was FRAP support for the Cuban Revolution in the early sixties.



Perhaps the most obvious institutionalized "insurance agency" for Chile's existing social system are the armed forces (about 40,000) and the militarized national police or Carabineros (about 20,000). The officer cadres tend to be recruited from the social-climbing and anti-Marxist middle class sectors.¹⁶ In the army of 1961, there was reported to be one general per thousand men and one colonel for every two hundred soldiers.¹⁷ By 1962, virtually all officers who were ideologically neutral or who harboured Socialist sympathies were reckoned to have been forced into retirement or otherwise removed from their commands."

Although no *golpes* were attempted during the 1940s, or 1950s,¹⁹ the Chilean military have been characterized as essentially "autonomous". Their separation from politics has been held to be conditioned by a sort of "gentleman's agreement" that "the armed forces' customary 20-25 per cent of the national budget must not be revised downward" and that the armed forces must be allowed "to function unmolested and to look after their own affairs".²⁰

The Chilean military have in recent years avoided making *pronunciamientos* concerning political questions of the day. Nevertheless, their anti-Communist and Constitutionalist sentiments have been occasionally manifested through conservative Chilean periodicals. In May 1960, it was reported that a "group of young officers" in the army had drafted an unofficial document urging greater preparations against "subversive war". It warned that "professional agitators" might take advantage of widespread social discontent and stage a series of massive street demonstrations in an effort to take control of the capital. The fate of the military, according to the document, would be the same as had occurred in Bolivia and Cuba. About two years later, a retired general who had served as a Military Attaché in Washington and who yet retained "great prestige in the Armed Forces", forwarded a public petition to the Minister of Defence for the outlawing of the Communist Party. Finally, in the course of a January 1966 interview,

a general about to retire articulated what is probably a typical army view of the military's internal security role :

Its duty is to constitute itself as a bulwark of internal security, so that the Constitutional government can carry on its work.

Our respect, as soldiers of the fatherland, is for the Constitutional government. Its breakdown would bring great harm to the country. . . . As long as there is a Constitutional government, it will have the unreserved respect of the Armed Forces."

It need hardly be recalled that many instances of recent military intervention in Latin America have been rationalized as necessary to preserve "the Constitution". Since the FRAP is committed to a radical programme (withdrawal from the OAS and the Rio Treaty, abrogation of the military assistance agreements with the United States and all others which "contravene the national interest", nationalization of Church schools, expropriation of major U.S. investments as well as heavy industry, finance; foreign commerce, insurance and public utilities, "democratization of the armed forces" and existing political institutions, etc.),²² it would not be difficult to interpret—with strong civilian support—an electoral victory of the Left as a "threat to the Constitution". The almost certain purge of hundreds of anti-Communist officers from their commands and "wav of life" would reinforce such fears as would the imminent termination of U.S. military and economic aid, accompanied no doubt by a flight of domestic as well as of foreign capital.



The availability and uses of campaign funds also function to limit the probabilities of a left-wing electoral success. In Chile, those who are able to save are naturally in the upper or upper-middle classes, with the remaining ninety per cent of the population existing slightly above or near a debt-ridden subsistence level.²³ With memberships drawn largely from the blue collar sector, the Socialist and Communist parties as well as the leftist labour confederation (Central Unica de Trabajadores) are continually faced with financial problems.²⁴ During electoral contests, the Marxists have been able to solicit only an extremely narrow sector of the wealthy classes for campaign funds. All USIA and other public opinion surveys, not surprisingly, indicate minimal support for the Left by the oligarchic strata, i.e. upper and upper-middle classes.²⁵

Hence, in 1964 the FRAP campaign was hindered by such a shortage of funds that presidential candidate Allende was compelled to mortgage his home.²⁶ Meanwhile, the country was "deluged" with anti-FRAP propaganda claiming that an Allende victory would "transform Chile into another Cuba".²⁷ This *inundation* effectively portrayed

the Cuban and Soviet systems as earthly Hells to the mass public. As two students of the campaign were later to observe :

The second aspect of the Communist (issue) was its effectiveness as a campaign weapon against Allende. This matter was drummed persistently into the consciousness of the Chilean electorate, and there is no doubt of its great effect. While the more blatant propaganda was laughed off in typical Chilean fashion, one must believe that even this left its mark. Allende was constantly on the defensive concerning this issue and found it necessary . . . to protest the charge of Communism. Defeat left the FRAP in a very bitter mood, and it denounced the "campaign of terror" that had driven voters to Frei through "fear". This assertion may contain more than a grain of truth. The fact is that many voters were so frightened before the election that they laid in a week's supply of food in case of riots or other political upsets that might be attendant on a FRAP victory. Another indication of this anxiety was the fact that airline reservations were booked out of Chile for several months after the elections as a hedge against a FRAP victory. When people are prepared to leave their country because they have supported a losing political candidate, it is safe to say that they are indeed alarmed.

In the same study, Gil and Parrish noted "their impression that the Christian Democratic candidate was supported by more numerous campaign posters, radio spot announcements, and newspaper advertisements than the FRAP candidate. But how much more money was available to Frei than to Allende simply cannot be determined."²⁸

In a social system characterized by economic stagnation and mass impoverishment, campaign funds are used not only for propaganda. Modern Chilean vote-buying in slum areas has encompassed the pre-electoral distribution of one shoe, one bed, half of a ten or fifty Escudo banknote, etc., and an undetermined number of poverty-stricken voters in 1964 were promised the other half if Frei were victorious in their commune.²⁹ On the eve of the 1965 and 1967 elections, CARE and other agencies supporting the Christian Democrats were reported to have distributed sewing machines, public telephones, television sets and P.L. 480 foodstuffs in urban slum districts.³⁰

Anti-Marxist campaigns are also reported to be financed by some U.S. firms with investments in Chile. Although direct contributions are occasionally given to candidates of the Centrist or Rightist parties, inflated legal fees constitute the principal channel for such subsidies. Important political figures are also appointed to directing boards of local subsidiaries.³¹

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One of the principal characteristics of the Chilean political system is that it is an open one. This concept may imply more than an absence of negative restraints upon the articulation of plural interests. It has also been "open" to extensive aid and other inputs by the United States Government and supporting organizations which have indirectly

strengthened the electoral appeal of parties committed to private enterprise and the existing political order.

(1) *Economic Aid.* Economic aid and particularly budgetary and balance of payments assistance was maximized during the early 1960's, when Chile was receiving one of the highest per capita injections in the world. Following the failure of the Chilean Government to introduce major reforms or to administer efficiently AID project loans in 1962, more vague criteria were substituted in 1963 to rationalize the step-up in assistance. Although the objectives of these "programme loan" criteria were not fulfilled in 1963, "AID continued budget support and balance-of-payments assistance during the 1964 election year to prevent economic deterioration which would have sparked unemployment and discontent and, presumably, a swing to the far left politically. The assistance was also designed to present the incoming Chilean administration with an economy in reasonably good shape."¹³

Economic aid in the form of P.L. 480 (Title III) surplus commodities and shipping reimbursement was also given to more than two score "approved" non-governmental organizations with programmes in Chile. "Under this programme through fiscal year 1965, Chile received over 661 million pounds of food, with an estimated market value of over \$47.6 million and freight charges totalling some \$11 million." Freight reimbursement for the transport of other equipment and relief supplies probably amounted to about \$12 million.¹⁴

An examination of United States official statistics reveals major increases in such shipments during the presidential election campaigns of 1958 and 1964.¹⁴ Not only was immediate discontent thereby alleviated, but the material resources of many religious and other anti-Marxist groups were strengthened. Many of these organizations transmit Christian or democratic values through the operation of schools, leadership training institutes, exchange of persons programmes, etc.¹⁵

(2) *Peace Corps.* Hundreds of Peace Corps volunteers have done much to transmit American values in their liaison work with Chilean government agencies and non-governmental organizations. Since 1961, volunteers have been working in one of the most important anti-FRAP organizing efforts in rural Chile. In October of that year, forty-five volunteers previously trained at the University of Notre Dame arrived in Santiago; and after a five-week orientation session, they were assigned to the Institute of Rural Education (IER) which is the Rural Department of CARITAS—the heavily U.S. subsidized social welfare agency of the Chilean Catholic Church. The IER was subsidized not only by CARITAS, but also by the Chilean Government, CARE, the Braden Copper Company, MISEROR, ILO, UNESCO and other

international organizations. In 1962, AID provided \$1,300,000 of which \$575,000 was allocated for the construction of five new schools for the training of peasant leaders.

By early 1962, the IER was operating eleven training schools with an enrollment of 1,650 men and women on full scholarships. In these training schools, the peasants were given "moral" education as well as vocational courses and others explaining how to operate co-operatives. During this period there were already 5,000 alumni who had been organized into 402 peasant *centrales* with an average of twenty families each. By October 1962, Peace Corps volunteers had been assigned to 200 of these *centrales* which were the constituent units of the National Association of Peasant Organizations (ANOC).¹⁴

ANOC, the Union of Christian Peasants and the Movement of Independent Peasants were all financed and assisted by the reportedly C.I.A.-subsidized International Development Foundation from 1964 until 1967. With the aid of IDF officials, they were merged as the National Peasants Confederation which by 1967 had elected two deputies to the Chilean Congress. The continuing IDF strategy is to build a quasi-party which would ally itself with the Christian Democrats in rural zones against the FRAP. Neither group will enter candidates in constituencies where the other is better organized.¹⁵

In their self-help projects in urban zones, Peace Corps volunteers—who must pass both political and psychological standards to be assigned abroad—tend to establish quite close relationships with the largely unorganized lower income groups with whom they come into contact. Outward-going and willing to live in primitive surroundings, the volunteers are probably the only Yankees that such Chileans have ever known. This is also true for most students in educational institutions where the volunteers are teaching. These Chileans are presumably conscious of the fact that the Peace Corps volunteers were sent by the U.S. Government; but when a FRAP political organizer approaches such Chileans and argues that the U.S. is exploiting Chile, by taking away all of her riches as well as being the principal obstacle to Latin American development and self-determination—his reception by such peasants, slum dwellers or students is unlikely to be very sympathetic. Few of these persons comprehend the Leninist theory of imperialism, but all are likely to be impressed by the *simpático* Yankee who—selflessly—has been sent by Washington to help them help themselves. In addition, by involving the poor as individuals in self-help co-operatives, housing construction, community improvement, etc., the volunteers help to neutralize existing or potential expectations that it is governmental programmes that are of primary importance in developing a society.¹⁶

As for their value transmitting role, the volunteers are not ideologi-

cally neutral in the Cold War. After the FBI has investigated an applicant's moral and political background, he then undergoes rigid screening and training. The volunteer's instruction includes international affairs, U.S. Government aims and policies and "effective disputation" with Marxists.⁴⁰ Although they are not specifically propagandists, their selection, training and roles in the field inevitably place them in a value-transmitting and image-projecting role. Both Peace Corps officials and U.S. Congressmen are fully aware of this function.⁴¹

(3) *Financial assistance in elections.* The "openness" of Chile's political system also permits the external financing of anti-Marxist presidential campaigns. While there is some inconclusive evidence that the Radical candidate was the beneficiary of such subsidies in 1964,⁴² there is little doubt that the Frei campaign was heavily financed by U.S. corporate and governmental agencies. The following account is based upon information obtained from persons who had been recommended to the correspondent by U.S. Embassy officials in Chile.⁴³

Frei played his hand with the skill and cunning of a professional Latin gambler. He played his best card—the one that said "The Only Alternative"—both inside and outside the country. And with equal success.

In Washington he convinced the White House and the State Department that the United States must back him; on Wall Street he convinced the businessmen. No, he kept arguing, we will not nationalize the copper mines (almost all American-owned), but we do want them turned into partnerships. No, we will not expropriate all the land, but we are going to take and redistribute what is being left fallow and we will damned well see to it that what we don't take produces food. Yes, we are going to increase taxes, but you of course realize that taxes are now ridiculously low, so no right-thinking man can mind that.

Backing he finally got. By mysterious ways, not talked about and always officially denied, Frei's campaign was bolstered by Yankee dollars and piles of Chilean pesos. A reasonable estimate is that the Christian Democrats got about \$1 million a month, for many months, from American sources, and an estimated \$18–\$20-million more from the Christian Democrats in West Germany. Italy and Belgium."

(4) *Military Assistance.* Of major importance is the impact of U.S. military assistance programmes upon the effectiveness, responsiveness and ideology of the Chilean armed forces. Chile signed her first military assistance agreement with Washington in 1952. Between that date and the end of fiscal 1965, \$111 million in aid—largely grants rather than loans—was provided to the Chilean military. Again official U.S. statistics indicate how greatly the programme was stepped-up after the Cuban revolutionaries accepted Soviet support for their own revolution which involved, of course, large-scale expropriations of U.S.-owned properties.⁴⁴ Since 1961, the major function of Chile's armed forces has been

defined as internal security by U.S. officers associated with the programme.⁴⁵

It has been reported that between 1953 and 1966 more than 2,600 Chilean servicemen were transported to U.S. bases for one reason or another.⁴⁶ Within this group, large numbers of officers have received instruction at U.S. military installations in the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico or the United States. Since 1961 the courses have especially focused upon counter-insurgency tactics. The following colloquy between Congresswoman Bolton and General O'Meara was part of a wider discussion of the educational programmes given to officer trainees :

Mrs. Bolton. I think so, too. May I ask you about the training and education of the officers? Do they receive any really thorough grounding in what communism is and how it functions?

General O'Meara. We go into the subject of communism extensively in our schools in the Canal Zone. We have discussion periods. We call in guest lecturers from the services of the countries themselves, sometimes through USIS channels—to the armed forces of the countries who request them—literature of it in the form of comic books addressed to the soldier. (Security deletion).

Mrs. Bolton. Along the psychological and philosophical lines as well as the more visible things?

General O'Meara. We try to keep it on a pretty practical level.⁴⁷

It is not unreasonable to expect that the anti-Communist sentiments of many Chilean officers who underwent such training were confirmed, if not intensified.

As for personnel who enrolled in courses at Fort Bragg, Fort Knox, Fort Monmouth or other installations in the continental United States, similar courses may have been prescribed. In early 1963, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs recommended that "use of these [military] training programmes for a broader purpose, concurrent with training in military fields, must be approached with care, but the opportunity is very great and should be seized upon. The recent trend toward giving the military visitors maximum exposure to the United States, to American people, and to the American system in general, is to be commended and encouraged."⁴⁸

The political aspects of this military training have not been limited to anti-Communism and "exposure" to the virtues of North American civilization. Some attempt has also been made to present the merits of the U.S. pattern of civil-military relations. Were Chilean officers confronted by an imminent FRAP (Communist) accession to Governmental authority, an obvious conflict would arise between these values. Not only is the FRAP committed to the abrogation of military pacts with the United States and an "anti-American" foreign policy,

but when he accepted the Popular Action Front's nomination in January 1963, Salvador Allende prognosticated changes for "our armed forces who are controlled from abroad". In 1967, the FRAP leadership organized a Latin American Solidarity Organization committee in Chile in order to symbolize its support for revolutionaries in other countries, and there is no reason to believe that the Marxist position on the question has, or is likely to change. As noted earlier, officers known to be sympathetic to the Left have long since been purged from the armed forces.

Another important dimension of these military relations centres upon the personal friendship established as a direct consequence of the training process. They are reinforced by frequent visits to Chile by U.S. military officers and missions. The cordiality of these interactions is reflected by the high rate of reciprocal bestowal of decorations and medals.⁴⁹ And in a distant but related context, "it has been said that the most important function of the Caribbean Air Command consists of making friends for the United States within Latin America. The mission responsibilities assigned to the command by Headquarters, USAF are such as to require close personal contact between personnel of the command and representatives of the twenty republics of Latin America. The development of attitudes of mutual trust, respect, and friendship is essential to the successful accomplishment of these missions."⁵⁰

During 1963 there were sixteen Military Attachés assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, and an additional forty-five officers were attached to U.S. Military Missions in Chile. Eight or ten weeks before the 1964 election, "a delegation of thirty-five officers of various U.S. services arrived in Chile". And at the time of the election, Chilean army units were reported to be "undertaking in various parts of the national territory what they call 'anti-subversive exercises'". Joint naval and air exercises were scheduled for the period when the Chilean Congress would be electing the next president, if no candidate had received an absolute majority at the polls.⁵¹

(5) Propaganda. Finally, in recent years there has been a significant increase in the U.S. propaganda and cultural exchange programmes in Chile. Thus, during the 1958-1964 (fiscal) period, USIA utilization of locally held currency in Chile almost doubled. The annual expenditures were \$155,007 in 1958 and \$294,640 in 1964. There was a smaller yet significant increase in the dollar costs of the programme budgeted to Chile: \$220,525 (1958); \$259,199 (1960); \$291,992 (1962); \$287,992 (1963 est.); and \$294,640 (1964). By 1963-1964, greater amounts were being allocated to only four other geographically larger Latin American nations: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela.⁵² The increase in personnel was also substantial during the years in

question. In 1961, the USIA requested the addition of six locals and three North Americans for Chile. Between 1962 and 1964, six more Chileans and one North American were added. The total personnel in full time U.S. propaganda work in Chile during 1964 (10 U.S. and 51 locals) was exceeded only in Mexico and Argentina.⁶³

One of the traditional activities of the agency has been short-wave radio broadcasting to Latin America. Daily Spanish programmes to the hemisphere before Batista's downfall were less than one hour. Although no change was made during the following year, in March 1960 a "general intensification of information programmes" was begun. At that time, one hour of Spanish language "news, features, and commentary" was beamed to the hemisphere for two hours (original and repeat) each evening. "By the end of June, its audience had been increased through a total of seventy-five local radio stations in eight Latin American countries which relayed the programmes over their medium wave facilities to their regular listeners." Within a year, the agency reported that "150 local stations in a dozen Latin American countries" were rebroadcasting the programme to an estimated audience "outside of Cuba" of "about 300,000 or 400,000." And in June 1963, seven hours per day of Spanish language programmes were being directed by short wave to Latin America, excluding Cuba. This level was maintained through 1964, and reduced to 48 hours per week early in 1965.⁶⁴

Because the listening audience owning short-wave receivers in Chile is limited to the upper and upper middle classes, the agency has since 1953 relied upon "packaged programmes" for placement on standard wave bands by local radio stations. Between 1953 and fiscal 1960, the USIA contracted with station WRUL in New York City for the short-wave transmission of approved programmes. WRUL then paid local Latin American stations for standard wave rebroadcasts. In 1959, Chilean stations were rebroadcasting sixty quarter hours per week of news, and eight quarter hours per week of features. Twelve outlets covering the nation's entire population collaborated: Radio Minería and Radio del Pacífico (Santiago); Radio Libertad (Antofagasta); Radio Simon Bolivar (Concepción); Radio Esmeralda (Iquique); Radio Austral (Punta Arenas); Radio Lircay (Talca); Radio La Serena (La Serena); Radio Co-operative Vitalicia and Radio La Frontera (Temuco); Radio Baquedano (Valdivia); and Radio Minería (Vina del Mar).

In fiscal 1959, the agency began to "package" programmes itself in both Washington and Santiago. During that year WRUL and the agency placed programmes on Chilean stations, but no payment was made by USIA to broadcasters who used its materials. The contract with WRUL was not renewed after fiscal 1960. In fiscal 1961, local

use of USIA materials in Chile averaged thirty programmes per week; 70 per cent of them were "substantive" in nature, and 63 per cent were sent out during prime listening time. The thirty programmes averaged fifty hours per week, and up to fifty-three broadcasters had used a single programme. Almost 80 per cent of the programmes were duplicated by more than one station.⁶³

Although no figures have been publicized to document an increase in the use of "packaged programmes" by Chilean broadcasters in the succeeding years, certain inferences may be drawn from the following data.⁶⁴ While only 80,000 hours of USIA "packaged programme" material were placed on local Latin American standard band broadcasts during the fiscal year 1959, by March 1961, agency officials were testifying that about 1,350 stations would broadcast 156,000 hours of such insertions during the fiscal year 1960. In 1962, this figure had climbed to 468,000 hours—an average of 9,000 hours "every week that passes in the cities, towns, and villages of the continent."⁶⁵

Like the short wave, television in the early 1960's was primarily heard in Chile by opinion-makers, professionals, businessmen and university students. In 1961, there were 21,000 sets and an estimated audience of 168,000. The estimated figures for 1964 were about 45 per cent higher.⁶⁶ Since the Frei administration has been distributing TV sets to social centres in slum districts, it is likely that in the late sixties the audience has begun to reach mass proportions. Since at least 1962, USIA propaganda has been placed on Chilean television.⁶⁷

In recent years, the agency also has supplied materials to the press and magazines in Chile. During 1961, "USIS posts in Latin America estimated that local press usage ranged from 40 to 70 per cent of all Agency materials distributed, and that radio and television usage ran much higher". In the 1963-1964 period, the "press and publications service" was transmitting over short wave nineteen hours of materials per week to agency posts in Latin America.⁶⁸ Such materials were being used by the government newspaper *La Nación*, Chile's leading daily *El Mercurio*, a large circulation Santiago tabloid *Las Ultimas Noticias*, and as far south as *Punta Arenas* in the *Prensa Austral*.⁶⁹ In 1966 a Chilean USIA employee estimated that as much as 10 per cent of the reading matter published by the nation's press consisted of agency releases. Only the Socialist *Las Noticias de Ultima Hora* and the Communist *El Siglo* did not receive and use such materials.⁷⁰

USIA films are produced for television and other usage. In 1961, agency films reached "a Latin American audience of more than 44 million people". During that year more funds were expended for "the distribution or placement of projectors, screens, and films for the showing of motion pictures to selected audiences" in Chile than in any

other Latin American nation. Almost one-fourth of the estimated budget for the whole continent was allocated to Chile where there was an operating inventory of eighty-three projection machines on 30 June, 1961. The number was to be increased to ninety-two within three years. In 1964, a USIA film—The President—was shown to 340,000 Chilean theatre-goers by a commercial chain.⁶³

Chilean and other Latin American university students are the target audience for the agency's book translation programme, whereby low-priced editions of selected books are printed by Latin American publishers under contract with the USIA. Although initiated early in the decade, by "the end of 1959, the programme was producing 9,000 books per day of 35 titles in low-priced Spanish-language editions". The figures cited below reflect that massive expansion of this effort during subsequent years (Spanish and Portuguese for Latin America):⁶⁴

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Editions</i>	<i>Copies</i>
1961	60	535,000
1962	76	723,000
1963	323	3,550,000
1964 est.	475	4,982,000

According to agency officials:

These books cover a broad range of subjects calculated to further the goals of the Alliance for Progress, to strengthen the sense of identity of interests and values between the United States and Latin America, and to demonstrate that Castro-communism is not the answer to the economic and social problems of the Western Hemisphere.

Once a book is published, the Agency plays another important role: USIA normally takes from one-fifth to one-third of each edition for its own distribution. Some copies are given to magazine and newspaper editors and radio or television commentators for review in print or on the air. Many are sent to public, university and school libraries as well as to professors and educators who could be instrumental in having books adopted as texts or supplementary reading material in schools and universities. Copies of appropriate titles are given to government officials, political leaders and others.⁶⁵

Another important aspect of the information programme is the publication by the USIA of its own pamphlets and cartoon booklets. In Chile where during the early 1960's about 40 per cent of the adult population had completed a primary school education, the importance of such simplistic illustrated media is fairly obvious. In the first six months of 1961 "more than 800,000 copies of a carton booklet on the Alliance were published in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed throughout Latin America".⁶⁶ Two years later, the agency reported:

The use of booklets has been stressed particularly in Latin America where their purpose has been twofold: to document dramatically Castro's betrayal of the Cuban revolution, and to tell people about the Alliance for Progress and engender support for it.

In the first 6 months of this year, more than 7 million copies of such booklets were distributed in Latin America, thus bringing the total in the 2-year programme close to 20 million. Nearly half of the orders were for titles previously published, which indicates a continuing popular demand for the first of several editions of these booklets.

Three new titles were published to help meet the great need for direct, graphic, and easily understood appeals to Latin American workers and farmers. "The Despoilers", seventh in a series, depicts the way Communism breeds hunger and oppression in every country it blights. Two others deal with the message of self-help under the Alliance for Progress. . . . orders for more than 1,500,000 of this one broke all records.

USIS posts in Latin America distribute free copies of the cartoon continuities in various ways: through labour unions, through stores where shoppers pick them up, and through instructors who use them as textbook material for use in reading instruction."

Worth noting perhaps is the fact that in 1963, AID established in excess of one thousand literacy centres in Chile, "and more than 10,000 volunteer teachers were recruited to instruct 80,000 adults".¹⁰ These centres were almost certainly those administered by CARITAS and the Institute of Rural Education-organizations which collaborated with Christian Democracy during the 1962-1965 period and since.

In 1963, a USIA deputy director testified that "our Latin American posts also carry on active field publications programmes, tailoring their pamphlets to the local situation, and giving special attention to the Alliance and Communist Cuba". An estimated \$5,500 was spent in Chile during fiscal 1961 for the local production of pamphlets, leaflets and posters. These materials were "for distribution to student and labour groups".¹¹

(6) *Cultural Exchanges*. Leaders and organizations in the student and labour field are also the recipients of "special presentation items" (gramophones, records, books, etc.) from USIA. These are generally justified to Congress as a means of increasing U.S. or agency influence among such groups. For this purpose too, the agency has assigned special student affairs and labour information officers to its Chilean mission. Special publications are distributed to these groups as well as to intellectuals. Similarly, the agency programme extends to the provision of "informational media guarantees" so that selected books, films, periodicals, etc. may be purchased by Chilean importers for local currency rather than dollars.

The targets for the State Department's cultural programme have been the intellectuals, students, labour leaders, politicians, journalists and artists. During the 1955-1959 period, seventy-seven Chileans received Fulbright Programme grants for study, research or teaching in the U.S., while forty-three U.S. nationals were sent to Chile under such grants. The data reported below indicates how the programme was expanded :¹²

<i>Fiscal year</i>	<i>Chileans to U.S.</i>	<i>U.S. to Chile</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>
1959	85	25	\$371,200
1960	97	28	353,100
1961	69	38	437,561
1962	90	44	475,062
1963	91 est.	47 est.	606,635 est.
1964	130	44	497,869
1965	143	39	521,493

As for its objectives, this exchange programme "is not a sentimental gesture. It is not an effort to be generous to foreign students and visitors, nor just a means of providing Americans a personally enriching tour or period of residence abroad. It is a hardheaded investment in our future and the world's future".⁷¹ Or in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "This activity is extremely important for the long-range effect on the lives of nations. . . . It is through this programme as perhaps in no other way that we can take certain leadership in the change that is taking place in the world".⁷²

The aims and purposes of the programme of culture exchanges can therefore be summed up as: (1) the creation of favourable attitudes toward U.S. society and policies among selected Chileans, and (2) the establishment of relationships of confidence between such Chileans and U.S. officials or co-operating private organizations. Thus, the State Department in justifying its appropriation requests several years ago, informed Congress that:

the exchange of persons programme is designed to provide continuing links of communication, thereby reinforcing democratic orientations and strengthening respect for democratic institutions and processes. Operating as it does among all the levels of the population—the student, the professor, the teacher, the school and university administrator, the legislator, the artist, the journalist, and the writer—that is, the leaders and potential leaders of the hemisphere—the programme provides continuing opportunities for guiding the movement toward mature democratic societies in the area.

It is a programme through which ideas are transmitted, contacts and association established, and understanding deepened between the peoples of North and South. These are the bases on which the unity of the Western Hemisphere must be built.

Examples of the contribution the programme is making in shaping the leadership in the other American republics necessary to reinforce the goals of the Alliance for Progress, are the many former grantees who now hold high official office in key fields of activity. At a time when the communists are becoming increasingly active in the whole area of exchanges in the other American republics, it becomes all the more imperative that the United States Government continue to strengthen its relationships. . . .⁷³

Both AID and its forerunner, ICA have financed agreements between U.S. and Chilean universities which involved the exchanges of teaching staff and students:

Interchanges of university professors, school teachers, and students with other Latin American countries, either individually or as components of co-operative inter-university projects, are planned to contribute toward strengthening the educational structure of the respective countries. For example, in Chile, under the leadership of the Fulbright programme research programmes are being developed in Chilean universities in the social sciences. . . .

Examples of [broadening the democratic experience of youth] projects carried out in fiscal year 1963 . . . include the interchange of student groups such as the one between the National University of Chile and the University of Texas, which has significantly influenced the student leadership of the National University along democratic lines."

When Chileans who have travelled to the United States on U.S. government fellowships or leader grants return to their homeland, they often become involved in some aspect of the State Department's follow-up programme. In the early 1960's about \$200,000 per year was being spent for such purposes in various countries.⁷⁹ Those who have studied at North American universities may be invited to join the Women's University Club or the Men's University Club which function in co-operation with the USIA-directed Chilean-North American Cultural Institute in Santiago. Some will receive professional journals for which the State Department spends about \$75,000 annually world-wide.⁸⁰ Or they may be personally contacted by embassy personnel. In urging Congress to increase the staffs assigned to diplomatic missions in Latin America some years ago, department officialdom argued that :

The Department's staff must be in a position to seek out and meet frequently with persons of influence in many non-official circles, e.g. business, labour, church, student, political and agricultural leaders. United States efforts to influence these groups should be increased and must necessarily be carried on where these people are found rather than in the capital city alone."

* + *

The long term effect of these activities of the mass media, the Catholic Church, campaign propaganda disparity and U.S. propaganda inputs would appear to have been the hardening of anti-Communist attitudes among a majority of Chilean adults.⁸¹ In the mid-1950's it was estimated by a USIA report that no more than three per cent of the population had "internalized" Marxist concepts.⁸² The Communist Party was denied legal status between 1948 and 1958; and during the 1962-1967 period it was further estimated that not more than between four and thirteen per cent of the populace voted for such Marxist goals as class struggle, expropriation without compensation, socialization of the entire economy, etc.⁸³

As for attitudes towards foreign affairs, in 1955 only 14 per cent of urban Chileans held favourable views of the Soviet Union while comparable figures for China and the United States were 5 per cent and

62 per cent respectively. Similarly, while 12 per cent harboured unfavourable images of the U.S., the proportion with unfavourable sentiments toward the USSR and China was 40 per cent and 49 per cent. In general, anti-Soviet (like anti-Communist) sentiment was slightly less frequent among the blue collar sector, except for union members whose anti-Sovietism was greater than that of the general population.⁸¹ Public surveys during the late 1950s and early 1960s indicated a slight rise in U.S. popularity and a minor deterioration in that of the Soviets.⁸² Thus in 1962 urban Chileans were asked whether they thought the United States was "sympathetic" to the "wishes and hopes you have for the future of our country". Fully 65 per cent answered in the affirmative, while only 10 per cent viewed Washington as unsympathetic. The same survey revealed that 54 per cent believed the U.S. supported a redistributive land reform while 66 per cent expressed "considerable" or "very great confidence" in "the ability of the United States to provide wise leadership for other countries in dealing with present world problems".⁸³



The general effects of these institutional or structural factors are undoubtedly to increase very substantially the difficulties with which the Left as a whole are confronted. Were the Socialists to renounce their alliance with the Communists, and their radical and anti-American objectives, then the political situation would be changed quite dramatically and the Socialists would presumably begin to receive some of the "benefits" that other parties now receive from the Americans. But so far, at least, this is unlikely.⁸⁴ This analysis, it should be said, does not deny the possibility of FRAP winning an electoral victory, especially if the perennially opportunist Radicals were to join the coalition. The FRAP parties can count upon certain factors which will continue to work in their favour. Among these are the widespread urban disillusionment with Christian Democracy: a solid reputation as consistent defenders of working class interests; and some twenty thousand dedicated activists. But the FRAP grouping also have a number of problems internal to themselves which unquestionably are hampering and hindering their further growth, especially in electoral terms. They lack, for instance, a leader of national stature to oppose the PDC's dynamic Radomiro Tomic in 1970; there are continuing frictions between the Socialists and the Communists; there is serious intra-Socialist factionalism, both ideological and personal; there is Communist hostility towards ultra-left groups and Socialist secretarism towards the Radicals. All parties and groups of the Left lack in some degree the techniques of modern mass campaigning, but this is due not least to the absence of substantial financial backing.

The problems that face the Left in Chile are immensely complex, and they are made very much more difficult by the massive American intervention in the decades since world war two: an intervention, it should be noted, that has been increased since the revolution in Cuba. For the Chileans, as for other countries of Latin America, Yankee imperialism has become increasingly enmeshed with their own native reactionary social classes, and the struggle for socialism has thereby become inextricably inter-twined with the struggle against imperialism.

NOTES

1. The elections had been defined as a plebiscite by Frei and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Although officially opposed to such a categorization, the opposition parties were forced to (successfully) contest it on the 'Government's terms. Two U.S. observers with obvious Christian Democratic sympathies have concluded "that the following are the most likely explanations for the 1967 election: (1) the PDC failed to attract many marginally motivated voters who had voted in 1964 and 1965 and it could not retain the support of some voters who had switched to it because it seemed to be the only viable alternative or because they thought it would work painless miracles; and (2) the other major parties were able to regain many of their original supporters and perhaps to attract some disillusioned former PDC supporters. . . . The party's apparent commitment to develop a popular base among the 'marginated' parts of the population involves high risks. After politicizing these people and convincing them of the necessity for 'revolution,' a failure of the PDC to achieve its reforms could tilt the Chilean electorate still further to the left." Michael Francis and Eldon Lanning, "Chile's 1967 Municipal Elections", *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXI (Autumn 1967), pp. 34-35.
2. For an interesting discussion of the "mobilization of bias" approach as applied to decision-making studies, see Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power", and "Decisions and Non-decisions", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVI (December 1962), 947-52, Vol. LVII (September 1963), pp. 632-42.
3. Roy E. Carter Jr. and Orlando Sepulveda, "Some Patterns of Mass Media Use in Santiago de Chile", *Journalism Quarterly*, Vol. XLI (Spring 1964), 216, 219-24; Orlando Sepulveda, "Medios de Comunicación de Masas y Cambio Social (mimeographed report for the Institute of Sociology, University of Chile, 1966, without page markings); and Frida Kaplan, Yolanda Navarrette, and Daniela Rubens, "Algunos Factores que determinan la Conducta Electoral de la Mujer" (unpublished thesis for degree in psychology, School of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy and Education, University of Chile, 1964, without page markings).
4. *El Mercurio*, 17 November, 1966, p. 15
5. Federico G. Gil and Charles J. Parrish, *The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4, 1964*, Part I (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965), p. 40.
6. Chile, Congress, Senate, *Diario de Sesione*, Vol. CCXCIV, 2d sess. (10

June, 1964), pp. 23-26, 56-57, 4th sess. (17 June, 1964), pp. 282-83; and Salvador Allende, "Cuarta entrevista realizada el 19 de Junio de 1964", and "Quinta entrevista realizada el Viernes 10 de Julio de 1964", *Arauco*, Vol. V (August 1964), pp. 74-76, 81-82.

7. Centre of Socio-Economic Studies, Institute of Economy, University of Chile, "Greater Santiago Survey, January 1965" (unpublished, without page markings); and Kaplan, Navarrette, and Rubens, "Algunos Factores que determinan".
8. The extension of the clerical role in this area is indicated by the fact that while in 1928 State schools accounted for 88 per cent of the student population, by 1957 this proportion had declined to 64 per cent. "A propósito de un discurso extraiño", *Mensaje*, No. 131 (August 1964), p. 345; and Joseph H. Fichter, *Cambio Social en Chile* (Santiago: Edit. Universidad Católica, 1962), pp. 17-18.
9. Rural priests urged peasants to support the Christian Democrats, influential Church leaders began to call for a reformist approach and initiated a "model" land reform on some estates with technical assistance from PDC experts, and during the 1964 campaign about \$70,000 worth of foodstuffs (close to a million pounds) was given by CARITAS officials to PDC campaigners. This was discovered in a post-election audit by AID which donated the commodities through the then National Catholic Welfare Conference and other relief agencies. Furthermore, some non-misappropriated foodstuffs were distributed by Christian Democratic activists who informed the recipients that such gifts were consequential to the generosity of their candidate. Other manifestations of clerical support appear in *La Voz* (August 23, 1964), and *Mensaje* (July 1964—January 1965). Cf.: Donald W. Beatty, "The Chilean Dilemma", *Current History*, II (December 1965), 347; Sergio De Santis, "Chile", *International Socialist Journal*, Vol. II (August 1965), p. 457; and Kalman H. Silvert, *Chile: Yesterday and Today* (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 168, 171.
 10. Fernando Aldunate, *Por Qué los Conservadores Estámos con Julio Dúran* (Santiago: "El Diario Ilustrado", 1964), p. 10; Fernando Sanhueza Herbage and Juan Orellana Peralta, *La Juventud y la Estrategia del Comunismo Internacional* (Santiago: Edit. Universidad Católica, 1962), p. 34; and Sergio Viiskovic and Osvaldo Fernández, *Teoría de la Ambigüedad: Bases ideológicas de la Democracia Cristiana* (Santiago: Edit. Austral, 1964), p. 68. Cf. "Declaraciones del Cardenal Arzobispo Monseñor Raul Silva Henriquez", *Política y Espíritu*, Vol. XVI (September 1962), pp. 33, 35; and *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. XV (November 1962), p. 32.
11. Kaplan, Navarrette, and Rubens, "Algunos Factores que determinan"; Centre of Socio-Economic Studies, Institute of Economy, University of Chile, "Greater Santiago Post-Electoral Survey, November 1964" (unpublished, without page markings); and George W. Grayson Jr., "Significance of the Frei Administration for Latin America", *Orbis*, Vol. IX (Fall 1965), p. 762. Cf. Ernst Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), p. 202; and Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, "Socio-Economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile 1952", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXI (December 1967), p. 1061.
12. In the 1964 presidential election, Frei received 50 per cent of the male vote and 63 per cent of the female ballots. Comparable figures for Allende

- were 45 per cent and 32 per cent. Federico G. Gil and Charles J. Parrish, *The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4, 1964*, Part II (Washington: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1965), pp. 10-11.
13. Charles Wolfolk, statement to the writer, 4 April, 1967. The expansion of ownership and control of mass media outlets by PDC members, as well as alleged attempts to eliminate critics of the Government through dismissals from employment by such media, are described by Left commentators in: "Crisis en la prensa chilena", *Punto Final*, Vol. II (16 January, 1968), pp. 6-7; and "Aumenta el control", and "Mordaza para la televisión", *ibid.* (27 February, 1968), pp. 8, 13.
 14. Those interested in charges of using government vehicles and facilities should consult the issues of *El Siglo* and *Las Noticias de Última Hora* for months preceding the March 1965 congressional election and the April 1967 municipal elections. The Senate *Diario* almost certainly contains similar charges and some evidence. Patricio Hurtado is the PDC legislator referred to in the text. His revelations appear in a supplement published by *Punto Final* during early 1967.
 15. "Nueva Táctica anti FRAP", *Ercilla*, No. 1508 (15 April, 1964), p. 9. Arturo Olavarria Bravo, *Chile entre dos Alessandri*, Vol. IV (Santiago: Edit. Nascimento, 1965), pp. 145-46.
 16. "The army officer corps is for the most part composed of persons of middle-class background, with only a few officers possessing an upper-class background. . . . They are repelled by radicalism and by the expressions of it in strikes, riots, and other destructive disorders. These officers do not appear to be as strongly nationalistic as their counterparts in other Latin American countries, and there are no vestiges among them of uncritical anti-imperialist sentiments. The navy, as also is often the case in Latin America, is politically 'liberal' in the best English tradition." Federico G. Gil, *The Political System of Chile* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 296.
 17. *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. XIV (September 1961), pp. 637-38.
 18. Based upon a statement of Socialist Senator Raul Ampuero as quoted in Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism*, pp. 151-52.
 19. A politically-oriented "*Linea Recta*" group was active, however, during the 1950's. Upon at least one occasion it was said to have planned a coup, and during the 1958 presidential campaign this military clique released a declaration which indirectly supported the Rightist candidate, Jorge Alessandri. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33. *Hispanic American Report*, Vol. XI (June 1958), p. 334.
 20. Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 169. Cf., Gil, *Political System*, p. 296.
 21. "La Nueva Guerra Subvertiva", *Ercilla*, No. 1304 (18 May 1960, pp. 16-18; "La Semana Política", *ibid.*, No. 1404 (18 April, 1962), p. 9; and Augusto Olivares, "Habla el General X", *Desfile*, No. 16 (6 January, 1966), pp. 6-7ff.
 22. These FRAP objectives date from the 1961-1963 period. Even if they are moderated in the 1969-1970 campaigns for tactical reasons—and that is problematic—the Marxist parties will continue to be associated with them by their opponents and their own followings.
 23. Thus, 703,100 urban wage earners receive \$8 or less per week while the comparable figure for about 400,000 white collar employees is \$14. In-

comes are substantially lower in most rural areas. And the Frei administration's wage policy has been to oppose wage readjustments that fully compensate for prior rises in prices (except for the lowest paid category of public employees), thus further depressing lower class living standards. See "El Reajuste del Hambre", *Punto Final*, Vol. II (26 March, 1968), Suplemento.

24. Although the CUT claimed 950,000 union members in 1959, dues were only collected from 25,000. And this provided the labour confederation with a \$3,000 annual budget. The situation is similar today when constituent unions remit what they wish or are able to the headquarters of the poorly organized confederation. While the Communists possess greater financial means than the Socialists, even the former are confronted by many party members who refuse to inform the leadership of wage increases—party dues are one per cent of a member's income. Collecting dues is an even greater problem for the less disciplined and organized Socialists. *El Mercurio*, 30 September 1959, p. 3, 2 October, p. 19; "Las 4 Caras del Torneo de la CUT", *Ercilla*, No. 1420 (8 August, 1962), p. 8; Aniceto Rodríguez Arenas, "Veinticinco mil obreras y campesinos ingresaron al Partido Socialista con el Contingente 'Fidel Castro'", *Arauco*, Vol. III (June, 1962), p. 15ff.
25. U.S.I.A., Research and Reference Service, *Chilean Attitudes Toward Communism and the East-West Conflict* (Washington: Report #14, 16 December, 1955), pp. 6, 10, 12; *Idem*, *The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes Toward the Alliance for Progress* (Washington: R-110-63(R), June, 1963), pp. 30, 36; and *Appendix I: Breakdowns by Economic Sub-Groups within the Urban Sample* (Washington: R-50-64, 30 April, 1964), pp. 5, 22, 25, 28; Chilean Institute of Public Opinion, "Encuesta de Opinión Pública a algunos aspectos de la Realidad Política Chilena" (unpublished survey, February 1964, without page markings); and Kaplan, Navarrette, and Rubens, "Algunos Factores que determinan".
26. The great shortage of Marxist campaign funds is discussed in Olavarria Bravo, *Chile entre*, Vol. IV, pp. 53, 279-81, 296, and in Chile, Congress, Senate, *Diario de Sesiones*, Vol. CCXCIII, 52d sess. (6 May, 1964), p. 4153, Vol. CCXCIV, 4th sess. (17 June, 1964), p. 289, Vol. CCXCVI, 6th sess. (15 December, 1964), pp. 378-81. Olavarria also comments upon the fact that campaign strategists and organizers were employed for Frei by the Centre for Latin American Economic and Social Development (DESAL). This foreign financed clerical agency was directed by Roger Veckemans, S. J., who also played a major role in drafting the Chilean Bishops' October 1962 Pastoral Letter which indirectly but clearly urged popular support for the Chilean Democrats. The International Development Foundation, apparently a heavily subsidized CIA "front", listed DESAL as a co-operating agency in 1964. With regard to the CIA-IDF relationship, see the *New York Times*, 20 February, 1967, and the *New Republic*, 4 March, 1967, p. 7. The IDF-DESAL relationship appears in American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Technical Assistance Information Clearing House, *U.S. Non-Profit Organizations (Voluntary Agencies, Missions and Foundations Participating in Technical Assistance Abroad), A Supplement: 1965* (New York: TAICH, 1965), p. 272.
27. Halperin, *Nationalism and Communism*, pp. 216-17.

28. And they concluded that "anti-Communism in the campaign . . . was probably the most important factor in the Frei victory". *Chilean Presidential Election*, Vol. I, pp. 40, 44, 49.
29. Based upon conversations with several lower income group residents of Santiago during 1967.
30. With regard to the 1962-65 period, see: LHP, "La DC Destrozó los Cronómetros", *Ericilla*, No. 1555 (10 March, 1965), pp. 18-19; James Petras, "After the Chilean Presidential Election: Reform or Stagnation?" *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. VII (July, 1965), p. 375; Olavarría Bravo, *Chile entre*, Vol. IV, pp. 114-16, 293, 296, 303; *idem*, *Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana* (Santiago: Edit. Nascimento, 1966), pp. 25-26, 35; and Chile, Congress, Senate, *Diario de Sesiones*, Vol. CCXC, 43rd sess. (4 September, 1962), Vol. CCXCIII, 50th sess. (29 April, 1964), p. 3926. Those with an interest in the 1967 campaign may examine the issues of *El Siglo* and *Las Noticias de Ultima Hora* from January until April of that year. It was charged that the Frei Government had been assigning preferential subsidies to neighbours' committees, mothers' clubs, social and sports centres in slum areas which were led by Christian Democrats. See, e.g. *El Siglo*, 25 December, 1966, p. 6.
31. Based upon a 21 January, 1967 conversation with Raul Mendez (pseud.). Mendez is a leader of one of the Centre parties and an attorney who has represented such firms. Upon one occasion, he saw a company list of politicians' names with various amounts—a question mark followed his own. A university professor and former Ambassador under Alessandri, Mendez expects to be a candidate in the 1969 congressional election.
32. U.S., Congress, Committee on Government Operations, *United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study*, by Hon. Ernest Gruening, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 115. Hereafter cited as *Gruening Report*. The supreme importance of this dollar assistance is indicated by the fact that "during the period of 1960-1964, foreign financing amounted to 40 per cent of the total (budgetary) deficit and in 1965 to 65 per cent". Inter-American Development Bank, *Social Progress Trust Fund: Fifth Annual Report, 1965* (Washington: IADB, 1966), p. 210.

The objective of limiting the appeal of Marxists ("Castroism", "subversion", etc.) following the "loss" of Cuba and Havana's advocacy of hemispheric revolution, was probably the most important factor contributing to the intensification of U.S. military and economic programmes for Chile and other Latin American countries. On this relationship, see: Inter-American Development Bank, *Social Progress Trust Fund: Fourth Annual Report, 1964* (Washington: IADB, 1965), p. 2; U.S., Congress House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Hearings*, before the Committee on H. R. 5490, Part V. 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, pp. 852, 854-57, 861, 878, 907, 943, 946, 948-49, 960; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Hearings*, before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, pp. 16, 18-19, 23, 25-27, 37-38; U.S.I.A., *19th Review of Operations: 1 July 31 December, 1962* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 5; Delesseps S. Morrison, *Latin American Mission* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 179, 181, 189, 218-20; *El Mercurio*, 5 September, 1960, p. 3, 10 November, p. 3; Alberto Lleras Camargo,

"La Alianza despues de Kennedy", *Mensaje*, No. 130 (July, 1964), pp. 279-80; and Juan de Onis, "Latin Alliance Revisited", *New York Times*, August 18, 1966, p. 14.

33. *Gruening Report*, pp. 13, 41.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

35. The activities of more than eighty U.S. non-governmental organizations in Chile are summarized in: American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Technical Assistance Information Clearing House. *U.S. Non-Profit Organizations (Voluntary Agencies, Missions and Foundation Participating in Technical Assistance Abroad), A Directory: 1964* (New York: TAICH, 1964); and in the supplement to this directory which is cited in note 26 above.

36. Benjamin Maluenda M., "El Instituto de Educación Rural: Factor en la Reforma Agraria", *Mensaje*, No. 108 (May 1962), p. 170; "La Conferencia Sindical de los Trabajadores de Amkrica Latina", *ibid.*, No. 113 (October 1962), p. 495; Instituto de Educación Rural, "Instituto de Educación Rural: Un Impulso solidario a la superación Campesina" (mimeographed IER report, Santiago, 1960, without page markings); Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (A.N.O.C.), *Discursos y Conclusiones (Extractos) de la I.a Convención* (Santiago: Abumohor Impresores, 1962), pp. 9, 12, 14, 19; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peace Corps Act Amendments, Hearings*, before the Committee on H.R. 10404, A Bill to Amend the Peace Corps Act, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., 1962, pp. 151-52; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *To Amend the Peace Corps Act, Hearings*, before the Committee on H.R. 8754, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, pp. 4, 14.

37. Based upon conversations with an IDF official in Guatemala City on 22 December, 1967. As for the likely CIA relationship, see the sources cited in note 26, above.

38. On this "problem" as viewed by a Chilean Leftist, see Augusto Carmona A., "382 Espias 'Voluntarios': Historia de Los Cuerpos de Paz en Chile", *Punto Final*, Vol I (1 July, 1967), Suplemento.

39. Claudio Aguirre Bianchi, "Los Cuerpos de Paz", *El Siglo*, 31 December, 1966, p. 7; *Peace Corps Act Amendments*, pp. 128-29; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964, Hearings*, before a subcommittee, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 609.

40. *Peace Corps Act Amendments*, pp. 91, 99-101. *To Amend the Peace Corps Act*, pp. 45-51, 58-59, 68-69.

41. Gil and Parrish, *Chilean Presidential Election*, Vol. I, pp. 37-39.

42. Based upon statements by Embassy officials in the presence of the writer on 4 April, 1967.

43. Barnard Collier, "Eduardo Frei Is Trying 'A Revolution Without The Execution Wall'", *New York Times*, 19 February, 1967, Sec. 6. During 1967, two Christian Democratic Party members stated to the writer that the party had received CIA funds. One maintained that this was still the case and would remain so (only) until it had effectively pre-empted the political spectrum from extreme left to extreme right.

Gruening Report, p. 14.

45. *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, Vol. V, pp. 874-75.
46. *El Siglo*, 10 November, 1966, p. 3.
47. *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, Vol. V, p. 919.
48. And sixteen months later the Commission reported that "following a joint review with the Department of State and USIA, the Secretary of Defence has asked the services and commanders to modify training programmes, manuals, and facilities in such a way as to give foreign military trainees a balanced understanding of our society, institutions, and ideas. Some of the subjects to be added to the curriculum are: U.S. Government institutions; the judicial system and the doctrine of judicial review; the role of the opposition in a two-party system; the role of the press, radio and television in American life; the position of minority groups in the United States; the diversity of American society; agriculture; the economy; labour; and education." U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, *A Beacon of Hope: The Exchange of Persons Programme*, A Report from the Commission, April 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 54; *Idem, A Sequel to a Beacon of Hope: The Exchange of Persons Programme*, A Report from the Commission, August 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 18.
49. With regard to 1959 alone—before the intensification of military assistance and training—see the following issues of *El Mercurio*: 9 April, p. 1; 10 April, p. 15; 29 July, p. 14; 1 September, p. 18; 17 September, p. 21; 18 September, p. 20; 20 September, p. 21; 22 September, p. 17; 23 September, p. 19; and 14 October, p. 17. These references are illustrative and not necessarily inclusive for that year.
50. U.S. Air Force, *Bibliography for Latin America* (Albrook Air Force Base, Canal Zone: Office of Information, Historical Division, Caribbean Air Command, 1959), Foreword.
51. *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 394; L. Kamynin, "Chile: Pre-Election Volcano", *International Affairs* (Moscow), August 1964, p. 60; "Está en Chile el yanqui que derrocó a Goulart", *Punto Final*, No. 18 (December 1966), p. 7; Luis Hernandez Parker, "Al Final: La Batalla Psicológica", *Ercilla*, No. 1526 (19 August, 1964), pp. 16-17; and Chile, Congress, Senate, *Diario de Sesiones*, Vol. CCXCIV, 23rd sess. (18 August, 1964), pp. 2197, 2209.
- There is a fair probability that U.S. military personnel in Chile would urge their Chilean counterparts to intervene in order to prevent a Socialist-Communist (FRAP) Government from assuming authority. This was the case during the April Revolt in the Dominican Republic where the Communists were far less prominent than they were in Chile (1964) or will be in 1970. On the events in Santo Domingo, see Theodore Draper, *The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy* (New York: Commentary, 1968), pp. 72-79. Cf., J. P. Murray, "The United States and Latin America", in *Latin America: Reform or Revolution*, ed. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1968), pp. 113-16.
52. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for 1960, Hearings*, before a subcommittee, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1960, pp. 140, 142; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations*

- for 1962, *Hearings*, before a subcommittee, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 240; *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 175; and U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, Hearings*, before a subcommittee, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 116.
53. *Departments Appropriations for 1962*, pp. 51, 54-55; *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, pp. 168-69; *Departments Appropriations for 1966*, p. 112.
54. *Departments Appropriations for 1960*, p. 818; *Departments Appropriations for 1962*, p. 651; U.S.I.A., *14th Review of Operations: January 1—June 30, 1960* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 5; U.S.I.A., *Twentieth Review of Operations: January 1—June 30, 1963* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 49; U.S.I.A., *23rd Report to Congress: July 1—December 31, 1964* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 40; and U.S.I.A., *24th Report to Congress: January 1—June 30, 1965* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 27.
55. *Departments Appropriations for 1962*, pp. 30, 678-86, 691, 699.
56. According to William D. Rogers (former Deputy U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress and former Deputy Assistant AID Administrator for Latin America) USIA "packaged programmes" were "almost certainly" placed on Chilean stations during 1964-1965, "some identified (to the listeners) as such and others not so designated". Address at Cornell University, July 30, 1966.
57. *Castro-Communist Subversion*, pp. 113-15.
58. *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 515.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 509, 515, 519; *Departments Appropriations for 1962*, p. 481; and *Departments Appropriations for 1966*, pp. 490-92.
60. U.S.I.A., *17th Review of Operations: July 1—December 31, 1961* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 11; and U.S.I.A., *Twentieth Review of Operations*, p. 51.
61. Data justifying such inference appears in: U.S.I.A., *11th Report to Congress: July 1—December 31, 1958* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 17; U.S.I.A., *19th Review of Operations*, p. 10; and U.S.I.A., *22nd Report to Congress: January 1—June 30, 1964* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 31. Both *El Mercurio*—perhaps the most consistently pro-U.S. daily in Chile—and *Las Ultimas Noticias* are under common ownership and are produced in the same building.
62. Based upon reiterated attestations to a Fulbright Programme Research Fellow during July 1966.
63. U.S.I.A., *17th Review of Operations*, p. 13; U.S.I.A., *22nd Report to Congress*, p. 17; *Departments Appropriations for 1962*, p. 236; and *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 394.
64. U.S.I.A., *21st Report to Congress: July 1—December 31, 1963* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 31.
65. *Castro-Communist Subversion*, pp. 120-21; and U.S.I.A., *21st Report to Congress*, p. 32.
66. U.S.I.A., *17th Review of Operations*, p. 12.
67. U.S.I.A., *Twentieth Review of Operations*, pp. 22-23.

68. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1964*, Hearings, before the Committee, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, p. 572.
69. *Castro-Communist Subversion*, p. 117; and *Departments Appropriations for 1462*, p. 235.
70. *Departments Appropriations for 1960*, pp. 1081-82; *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, pp. 1246, 1453; and *Departments Appropriations for 1966*, p. 882.
71. U.S. Advisory Commission, *A Sequel to a Beacon of Hope*, p. 1.
72. *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 1436.
73. *Zbid.*, pp. 1436, 1452, 1454. *Departments Appropriations for 1966*, p. 883. Latin Americans have been more prone to attitudinal manipulation through this programme than have nationals from other regions of the world. U.S. Advisory Commission, *A Beacon of Hope*, p. 160.
74. *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 1456. Other U.S. institutions which have been involved in such programmes have included MIT, Cornell, Fordham, California, Indiana and Pittsburgh. *Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, Vol. V, pp. 869-70, 872.
75. U.S. Advisory Commission, *A Sequel to a Beacon of Hope*, p. 13.
76. *Zbid.*
77. *Departments Appropriations for 1962*, p. 1302. *Cf.*, *Departments Appropriations for 1964*, p. 363.
78. See the sources cited in note 25, above.
79. U.S.I.A., Research and Reference Service, *Chilean Attitudes Toward the United States and U.S. Economic Policies* (Washington: Report No. 3, 31 October, 1955), pp. 3, 6.
80. U.S.I.A., *Economic and Political Climate*, pp. 8, 13, 17, 23, 29, 30, 31; Kaplan, Navarrette, and Rubens, "Algunos Factores que determinan"; and "Encuestas: Las Clases Sociales", *El Mercurio*, 8 January, 1967, *Revista del Domingo*, p. 6.
81. U.S.I.A., *Chilean Attitudes Toward the United States*, pp. 1-2; U.S.I.A., *Chilean Attitudes Toward Communism*, Foreword.
82. Eduardo Hamuy, Danilo Salcedo and Orlando Sepulveda, *El Primer Satelite Artificial: Sus Efectos en la Opinión Pública* (Santiago: Edit. Universitaria de Chile, 1958), pp. 86, 90-91; Centre of Socio-Economic Studies, Institute of Economy, University of Chile, "Greater Santiago Stratification Survey, September 1961", and "Greater Santiago Pre-Electoral Survey, August 1964" (both unpublished, without page markings).
84. See "El Partido Socialista contra el Reformismo", *Punto Final*, Vol. II (16 January, 1968), Suplemento.
83. U.S.I.A., *Economic and Political Climate*, pp. 14, 41.