

STUDENT MILITANCY AND THE COLLAPSE OF REFORMISM

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OVER the past few years the activities of students have provided the world's press with an unprecedented number of headlines. Often this has been due essentially to the dramatic or picturesque character of those activities rather than to their intrinsic importance; for while the significance of a college occupation or sit-in is not to be crudely measured by its immediate effects, it would be rash to rate the "average" event of this kind as more important than, let us say, a private lunch between the chairmen of ICI and Courtaulds, or Prime Minister Wilson's phone conversations with Chancellor Brandt. The significant difference is that the students, unlike, for much of the time, our *de facto* and *de jure* rulers, conduct their politics in public, and so are available to the press.

Sometimes the space devoted to students and to advanced education generally, particularly in the more serious newspapers, has been so disproportionately generous that it has become obvious that what are involved are calculations not about news value but about the number of student readers who can be thus attracted. This desire to attract the students as customers has not so far corrupted the integrity of the leader-writers, however, whose comments on student militancy have been consistently critical if not downright hostile—with the conspicuous exception, it need hardly be added, of the role played by students in the Czechoslovak opposition to the Russian invasion of August, 1968.

But when every necessary allowance has been made for newspaper estimates of "what makes a good story/picture", and for competition to increase circulation, the fact remains that the students have made news for two entirely substantial reasons. The first is the startling world-wide growth in student militancy and political activity since the mid-sixties. The second is that this has led, in a great many countries, to their playing an important part in national and international politics. As anyone with even a smattering of history knows, neither of these phenomena is exactly unprecedented. At sporadic intervals ever since the first students gathered to compose the medieval universities in such centres as Paris, Padua and Oxford, there has been turbulence within the universities, and there has been student participation in political campaigns, often of even greater turbulence.

This re-emergence of the students as an active force both within

educational institutions and in politics, has, rightly, generated intense debate in all but the most hopelessly moribund sections of the Left. The central questions are: what are the meaning, the causes and the significance of what the students are doing? Or, to put it another way, what *weight* is to be attached to student militancy in political terms? Do the students have a special, unique part to play in the struggle for socialism, and if so, what is it?

There are those who argue, or simply assume, that the "rash, fierce blaze" of militancy

". . . cannot last,
For violent fires soon burn out themselves;
Small showers last long, but sudden storms are short;
He tires betimes that spurs too fast betimes;"

And its essential transience means that it must be discounted ~~when~~ considering long-term strategy for the Left. I believe, and shall try to argue, that this view is mistaken. There is not, in my view, likely to be any substantial decline in student militancy in the immediate future, although its intensity does, of course, vary from institution to institution, from country to country, and from year to year. But both within educational institutions, and in the wider political context, students will continue to play an important collective role, and, already, I believe, there is much that socialists should be ready to learn from this upsurge of radical activity. But before considering the special significance of the revival of militancy, it is useful to look briefly at the context in which it has appeared, and at the response, which, by erupting into this context, it was bound to evoke.

I

Despite the many historical precedents, the revival of student militancy from the mid-1960s surprised and shocked many people, at least in the capitalist West, where it was widely believed that we had reached "the end of ideology", that "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved",¹ and that therefore the politics of large issues and the sharp political and social divisions connected with them were things of the past. Under the umbrella of a society-wide "consensus" a steady (i.e. not too fast) progress could be made towards agreed goals. The bonanza of affluence would contain something to satisfy every group within society, a healing balm to assuage every localized discontent. Given this context, what could be more disconcerting, and, indeed, outrageous, than to find that one of the more obviously privileged sections of the population, so far from expressing a suitably docile gratitude for educational benefits which

were being ever more widely distributed, was "taking advantage" of its privileged situation to challenge society's established consensus of values and its distribution of power, and very often in an unseemly, not to say insulting, manner?

Public reaction to student militancy has indeed been largely baffled and hostile, and in both respects it has been supported and encouraged by almost every section of the press, in which comment has mixed stupidity and viciousness in more or less equal proportions. For if there has been much unintended misrepresentation, there has also been much that was intended. Loving "law and order", and knowing that their readers love it too, it has suited the newspapers very well to throw around such words as "hooligan" and "thug", and to dwell on the theme of violence, when they must have known only too well that they were not misunderstanding, but actively misrepresenting both persons and events. This has been accompanied by an uncritical attitude towards "the authorities", and in particular towards the police, who, for the British press at least, remain "wonderful", and incapable, it would seem, of either violence or arbitrariness—despite abundant evidence to the contrary.³

The partiality of the press and other media of communication has undoubtedly played its part in generating and sustaining public hostility to students, and, of course, demonstrators generally. Yet it is a mistake to suppose that there is an entirely one-way relationship between the media and the public. The pundits of television and the popular press hold the positions they do because they can be relied on to strike the necessary, carefully judged balance between, on the one hand mildly stimulating their audience without seriously disturbing them, and on the other, conferring on ingrained prejudices the reassuring status of robust common sense. As far as students are concerned, these men and women have reflected as well as encouraged a widespread resentment.

It is always hard to generalize with any confidence about "public opinion". Opinion polls are liable to reflect surface reactions rather than more considered and deeply grounded attitudes, and are often conducted at moments when popular feelings have been aroused in one particular direction by a particular event or crisis. I suspect that the same kind of questions about students in general, asked at the height of the crisis at the London School of Economics, and after, let us say, a large-scale and well-publicized Oxfam walk, might have elicited significantly different responses. Individual expressions of opinion, in letters to national and local newspapers, and in radio correspondence columns like "Any Answers" and "Listening Post", come overwhelmingly from the more reactionary sections of the middle class. It may well be true that those who have most direct contact with students are

less hostile to them than those who, in the more remote and exclusive middle and upper class enclaves, rely on the media for their information, and shudder at the threat posed to their way of life by these "anarchists" and "nihilists".

Nevertheless, when due allowance has been made for the influence of the media, and for the noisy vehemence of the middle and upper classes—the very people who think, and are encouraged to think, of themselves as the *silent* majority!—the hostility is undoubtedly strong, and it is widespread. Like support for measures against immigrants, it can be found among working people, and even among working people with pronounced Left-wing views on other matters. It can be found in many sections of the organized and established Left. It does not do to under-estimate the degree of hostility towards student militants, not least because in so doing we are likely to misunderstand the nature of their challenge to society.

Surely its resentment and anger are not difficult to understand? The working lives of most people start at fifteen or sixteen, or started even earlier if they are older. For them the possibility of education beyond that age simply did not exist, in any real terms. But their more fortunate juniors, the students, not only start work much later in life; their further education leads many of them into salaried jobs with a higher degree of security, comfort and social status than their elders could ever have hoped to attain. What is more natural, then, than that these elders should react with anger when they see these same privileged young turning on the very institutions to which they owe their good fortune? For students to denounce the society which is paying for their education, the political parties which have encouraged the expansion of higher education, and even the very institutions from which they will receive the degree, diploma or certificate which is their vital "pass" into the world of work, is to bite the hand that feeds them with a vengeance. Why are these young people not duly grateful for benefits which they could not have received had they been born twenty or maybe even ten years earlier?

Bound up with this resentment is the enormous continuing strength of traditional puritan ethic of work. This ethic is often mocked, and is sometimes held to be increasingly inappropriate to developed societies in which the length of the working week is (allegedly) continually being reduced. Neither the mockery nor the argument appear to have done very much to undermine the ethic itself. Although it is normally associated with the capitalist ethos, it has, if anything, been strengthened by the emergence of socialism (which is, after all, the movement of the *working* class), which has been accustomed to distinguish between those who earn their income through their own work, and those who receive their income simply from the ownership of property, including

the labour of others. But it is characteristic of a capitalist, and highly stratified society that resentment against those who live without working is usually directed not against the remote, respectable rich, but against the "army of scroungers" who, according to popular mythology, are "living off the (welfare) state", and, now, against the students.

There are indications that these attitudes, common enough among working people, are to some extent shared by the still disproportionately small number of working class children who receive further education of some kind. Unlike the children of the bourgeoisie, they are sharply aware of their good fortune in escaping the normal fate of going to work in their middle or late teens, and are concerned to make the most of it, by working hard enough to gain better than average qualifications. While their contemporaries are out on the streets (demonstrating), or attending yet another lengthy meeting of the students union, many of these students are keeping their heads down in the libraries and labs.

Then it has to be remembered that in a society geared to the acquisition of individual wealth it is natural for people of all classes at work to identify themselves with that most typical martyr of bourgeois mythology—the taxpayer. It is a basic tenet of such a society that every penny which the individual, or for that matter the individual enterprise, acquires, whether by work or by less reputable means, is his property as a matter of natural and inalienable right. It follows from this that taxation is, in essence, a form of robbery practised by the state—which in the same mythology is portrayed as a monster whose very nature is to prey on the hapless, helpless individual. Taxation can at best be tolerated as a necessary evil. And notwithstanding that it has increased, is increasing, and will continue to increase with the ever larger demands that are made upon public authorities and services, public resentment of taxation remains a live force, and the role of taxpayer is one that the individual is constantly encouraged to adopt, not least by the politicians.

As far as students are concerned the politicians have certainly not been inactive in this respect. They have found, to their delight, that they can pose simultaneously as the defender of the taxpayer and the enemy of the student, by echoing the public outrage at the waste of "taxpayer's money" on "academic thugs", and by threatening rebellious students with the loss of their grants.⁵ Mr Patrick Gordon-Walker's forecast to students of a "taxpayers' revolt" provided a classic instance of a prediction which was also meant to be a threat. What made it so much more sinister was that Mr Gordon-Walker was then the Secretary for Education. The participation of successive Secretaries in this demagogic campaign in the name of the "taxpayer" has been one of the most ominous elements in the overall reaction to student militancy—even

if the moral bankruptcy of the Labour Government made that participation entirely predictable.

To the self-righteousness of the perennially aggrieved "taxpayer", and the more justifiable resentment that people at work often feel towards those who are not (or not under the same kind of constraints, at least), other elements of outrage must be added. There is the age gap. This has become such a cliché that many people find it hard to take seriously. But what is commonplace is not necessarily false or empty. In fact a cliché is often a truth which has, by stale repetition, lost its weight and its impact, its capacity to shock or startle us into thinking. Inevitable differences in formative experiences and in historical perspective always create a gap in understanding between different generations which it is hard to bridge, and when social and cultural change are more than usually rapid that gap is sure to be enlarged. This process is aggravated by a consumption-oriented capitalism whose momentum can only be maintained by generating a constant appetite for "what's new", and by regularly changing fashions; and by the logic of the economy the thirst for novelty and fashionableness are not confined to such harmless spheres as the clothes you wear or the furniture you buy. Books, art, films, and other cultural forms are all affected, and through them ways of feeling and thinking and seeing.

The result is that the young, in their tastes and their preoccupations, in their styles of living and even of speaking, as well as in their sexual, social and political attitudes and behaviour, can very easily seem totally alien and incomprehensible to their elders—even to sympathetic elders. The flexibility and responsiveness of intelligence and imagination which enable the septuagenarian Marcuse to write with so much understanding of the styles of life and politics of the dissenting young (in, for example, his contribution to *The Dialectics of Liberation*, and in *An Essay on Liberation*), are rare indeed. Even a commentator like Stephen Spender, whose *The Year of the Young Rebels* contained many sympathetic insights, was judged by more than one reviewer not to have been entirely successful in his attempt to cross the gulf which separated him from those he was writing about :

" . . . the attempts to find parallels to student militancy in the past all finally fail to capture its true flavour and meaning. There is a struggle apparent in the text here between two Spenders, one who is really deeply sympathetic to what the students are after . . . and the other who is really middle-aged and fink. Genial and progressive fink, but fink nonetheless."

Too harsh a judgment, I think, but not a misdirected one. Both the judgment and Spender's book suggest how difficult it is now, even when the will, sympathy and intelligence are there, to traverse a gap which is generational as well as ideological.

The students, among many other young people, also offer to society the traditional, but still much resented, challenge of bohemianism. The scorn and disgust with which the respectable of all classes react to such innocuous phenomena as long hair (male), colourful clothes (male), and even, God help us, beards, are familiar enough, but still startling in their vehemence. They contribute to the isolation of the young from the rest of society, as Senator Eugene McCarthy understood very well, when he insisted that his army of student supporters should conform in these minor ways to conventional expectations (Keep clean for Gene). It was for similar reasons that the young W. H. Auden told Spender to drop the "Shelley stunt", because poets should dress and behave like bank clerks, or Mr *Everyman*.⁹

But the truth is that the marginal eccentricities of the common bohemian type are not in themselves enough to antagonize bourgeois society. To those artists and others who gratify conventional tastes and give apt expression to conventional ideas and sentiments, outward eccentricities may even be held to add a suitable touch of glamour. Thus Alfred, Lord Tennyson was probably more popular as a poet in his own lifetime than any English poet before or since, and was honoured not only with the poet laureateship but with the (for a poet) unique accolade of an hereditary peerage, because he expressed "the spirit of the age". Yet—was it because so much establishment recognition made him uneasy?—he used to stride about the Isle of Wight clad in a long cloak and broad-brimmed hat, and his impeccably respectable admirers would go there to gaze upon him.

Today's young bohemians do not, however, for the most part express the contemporary equivalent of Tennysonian sentiments. And when due weight has been given to the various ways, some more trivial than others, in which the students give offence to a bourgeois society, it is, of course, the ideological challenge they present which most accounts for the extraordinary virulent hostility which they have evoked. It is a long while since countries like Britain and the United States have witnessed an ideological challenge so absolute and comprehensive (I am not speaking now of the political or economic challenge involved), and it is these qualities which are the key to understanding both the militancy and the response to it. When we have allowed for deliberate misrepresentation, intended simultaneously to discredit the students and alarm the respectable, there are nevertheless many people who sincerely believe that the militant students are indeed "nihilists", who are seeking to destroy society as such. In a characteristically limited and confused way they have understood that the socialism of the militant students does indeed seek the destruction of capitalism and the bourgeois social order it sustains. And being unable to conceive of any other kind of economy or society as a real alternative possibility,

they naturally identify the end of the bourgeois order with the end of human society itself; in much the same way as Edmund Burke, gazing across the English Channel in fascinated horror at the spectacle of France in ferment in October, 1789, thought that :

“ . . . the Elements which compose Human Society seem all to be dissolved, and a world of monsters to be produc'd in place of it . . . ”⁸

Since they cannot conceive of a society which is not irrevocably divided between Them and Us, between those who make decisions and those who only accept them, it is natural that they should identify anarchy, meaning a stateless and non-authoritarian society, with anarchy, meaning disorder, even as Burke believed the French Revolution to be

“ . . . the most extensive design that ever was carried on, since the beginning of the world, against all property, all order, all religion, all law and all real freedom.”

It is time to look more closely, and directly, at this ideological challenge.

II

We cannot hope to understand the character of student militancy, including its excesses and those aspects of it which may even appear to many people to be not political in any meaningful sense, unless we place it in relation to the quite spectacular failures of orthodox reformist politics and democratic institutions in the West in the 1960s.

Traditionally, the strategy of most sections of the Left in Britain has hinged upon the existence, in the shape of the Labour Party, of a large reformist party, nominally socialist, and enjoying the support of a majority of the working class and the status of one of the two alternative governing parties. The most optimistic of the Left groupings, the Labour Left which has been connected with the weekly paper *Tribune* since the latter's inception in 1937, has taken the view that the Labour Party is not just nominally socialist, but is also potentially so, could in fact "be made a most powerful instrument for achieving Socialism at home and peace abroad".⁹ Usually less explicitly, this group has also rejected the prescription of socialism through revolution as unnecessary, and assumed the feasibility of a steady, if stormy, evolution into socialism, with parliament as its focus. Aneurin Bevan, the brightest luminary of this grouping, put it explicitly :

“ . . . to the Socialist, Parliamentary power is to be used progressively until the main streams of economic activity are brought under public direction.”

For him parliament was "The arena where the issues are joined", and parliamentary democracy "a sword pointed at the heart of property-power".¹⁰

It was consistent with this faith in parliament and in a political party dedicated almost exclusively to winning parliamentary majorities to believe that the "rank-and-file" of the Labour Party were fundamentally socialist in their principles and aspirations, but were constantly being "betrayed" or led astray by right-wing opportunist leaders. The great aim, therefore, was to substitute a left-wing or socialist leadership for the usual right-wing one. There were those who were prepared to believe that this had actually been achieved in 1963, when Wilson succeeded Gaitskell as leader of the Labour Party.

Other left-wing groupings were always less sanguine about the likelihood of converting the Labour Party to socialism, but virtually all of them, whether or not they were committed to a long-term revolutionary strategy, involved themselves in the politics of the Labour Party. They saw in the Labour Party and the trade unions the institutions through which contact could be made with the most politically conscious and committed sections of the working class, and they also combined to put whatever pressures were necessary on the Labour Party to edge it a little further to the left. Campaigns and groups concerned with a single issue, even when both the campaign and the issue were very large, as in the case of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, also directed their energies towards influencing the Labour Party, or, best of all, converting it to their policies. Thus the two fundamental assumptions behind this kind of strategy were first, that the Labour Party was open and sensitive to left-wing pressures, and second, that limited but not negligible advances could be made through a Labour-dominated parliament. This was a limited but serious faith in reformism and in the possibility of working through existing political institutions. I think that the situation was comparable in some respects in both the United States and West Germany, where the left adopted the parallel strategy of putting pressure on the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party respectively.

The events of the 1960s have done incalculable and quite possibly irreparable harm to this faith and the strategy based upon it. In America the sequence begins with the failure of President Kennedy and the refusal of Congress to enact legislation which would meet the demands of a civil rights movement which, as its name implied, had till then been premised upon the realization of racial equality primarily through federal power and legislation. There followed the gigantic electoral fraud through which Lyndon Johnson campaigned against Goldwater in 1964 as something like a "peace" candidate, but within weeks of winning the election embarked on the bombing of North Vietnam and the massive expansion of the war in the South. Additional damage was done to the credibility of the formal political

system by the fact that no declaration of war was ever made, and in this way Congress was by-passed while Johnson used as his authority a blank cheque unwittingly given him by Congress at the time of the (probably deliberately manufactured)¹¹ Tonkin Bay incident in August, 1964. The lack of any principled opposition from nearly all the professional politicians made it inevitable that the anti-war movement should possess an "extra-parliamentary" character, and as the war continued and the opposition to the movement was defamed in speeches and disregarded in practice, it was equally inevitable that the movement should turn from protest to resistance,¹² with all the risks that that involved.

In the first half of 1968 it seemed possible that the political system might begin to operate responsively when Senator McCarthy's success in the Democratic primaries forced the withdrawal of President Johnson and led to Robert Kennedy's entry into the electoral battle. McCarthy was in fact quite consciously "testing the system", as he put it at the press conference at which he announced his candidature.¹³ But once more the system failed. The assassination of Kennedy and the fixing of the Democratic convention to ensure that the candidacy went to Vice-President Humphrey, suggested that the forces of violence on the one hand, and of traditional machine politics on the other, were strong enough to defeat the attempt to make America's formal democracy operate democratically, and to swing the Democratic Party to the left.

The history of Mr Wilson's Labour Party is depressingly parallel to that of Johnson's Democratic Party. Retrospectively, it looks as if the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's pyrrhic victory at the Labour Party Conference of 1960 was a decisive event in two respects: it demonstrated the futility of trying to shift the policies of the Party dramatically to the Left, and it inaugurated a period in which the decisions of the Party itself at its annual conferences were systematically devalued simply by being consistently and totally disregarded by the Party's leaders, both when in opposition and when in government. That is not the way it appeared at the time, particularly when in 1963-4 Wilson, by then the Labour leader, seemed to go some way towards CND by pledging a Labour government to abandon Britain's "independent deterrent". But there was with Wilson, as with Johnson, a great gulf fixed between the impression he chose to give before the election and what he chose to do after it. Nor have several years of resolution-passing at successive party conferences served to deflect a Labour government in any degree from the policies which have most angered its supporters. It would be otiose to enumerate them.

Even now, after nearly six years of Labour government, there are still socialists so wedded to the politics of the Labour Party that they cannot, or will not, grasp the scale of the catastrophe. One way of

assessing it is by surveying the number of traditional alibis for Labour failures which it has exploded. It cannot be said, for example, that it is right-wing leadership which is to blame—though some on the left can still be heard talking about "the right-wing leadership", as though there were some left-wing alternative to it, which is all too plainly false. Wilson himself was once associated with Bevan, dissociated himself ostentatiously from Gaitskell's brand of revisionism, and arrived at the leadership by what might be called the left-wing route, with the active and enthusiastic support of the Parliamentary left. And if his reputation for leftism was perhaps always ambiguous,¹⁴ the same could hardly be said of Mrs Barbara Castle, who nevertheless transformed herself with no apparent difficulty from the scourge of British (or at least Tory) imperialism into the scourge of the British trade unions.

It cannot be said that, in the time-honoured phrase, Labour had office without power. On the contrary, its success at the 1966 election produced a Parliamentary majority of exceptional size. After 18 months of precarious office the Party had received a remarkable vote of confidence. It cannot be said that the Party ran into trouble by doing what its supporters wanted, or even by courting popularity as measured by the public opinion polls. On the contrary, many of its policies were as unpopular generally as they were with the Labour movement itself.

The conclusion is inescapable: from 1966 Britain had a Labour government with as "left-wing" a leadership as it is every likely to have, and in as strong a Parliamentary position as it is ever likely to achieve, including, be it noted, an unusually large contingent of the Parliamentary left. And in these exceptionally favourable circumstances Labour moved steadily *away* from socialism. Many of its policies were not merely non-socialist, they were fiercely and unflinchingly anti-socialist. The reformist, evolutionary prospect outlined by Bevan had collapsed. It was perhaps asking too much to expect socialists who had devoted their life to the struggle to make the Labour Party an agency of socialism within the Party's overall framework of seeking parliamentary power, to recognize or to accept the collapse of this entire perspective—though some have in fact been able to make this break, not without pain and bitterness. But the young suffer from no such handicaps. These are bonds that have never weighed upon them. Thus it comes about that from the failure of Labour, which is by no means an isolated phenomenon as I have tried to indicate by brief reference to the American experience, they have drawn large lessons.

III

The strategy of working in, through, or upon the Labour Party has been abandoned. This is not merely on account of the anti-socialist

character of much Labour policy. It is because the Labour Party, and the Parliamentary Left within the Party, have lacked the will and the ruthlessness to get these policies defeated or dropped, even when they have most strongly disapproved of them. There is only one significant exception to this generalization—the Labour Government's abandonment of its planned anti-strike legislation in 1969, and even in that case it is probable that the decisive part was played not by the Labour Party as such, nor by the Left, but by the TUC. It is also because of the systematic devaluation of the internal democracy of the party, as expressed primarily in its annual conference. Of course the conferences go on, but this can now be seen as typical of so many aspects of a professedly democratic system: the democratic *forms* are maintained, and are used by political managers as a façade to conceal the oligarchic and manipulative realities of contemporary capitalist politics.

To some this kind of dichotomy exemplified either the cynicism or the "extremism" of left-wing commentary. In fact there are many distinguished precedents for this kind of analysis. Walter Bagehot, a century ago, made a famous distinction between the dignified and the efficient parts of the constitution, the former serving as a façade for the latter, in his study of *The English Constitution*. Of this "discovery", R. H. S. Crossman has written: "What was, when it was first published, a deeply shocking approach has long since become a standard technique of political science. . . ." And Gibbon showed how the first Roman emperor, Augustus, was careful to conceal the reality of his own autocratic power behind the façade supplied by the continuance of the older constitutional institutions

"The names and forms of the ancient administration were preserved by Augustus with the most anxious care. . . . It was on the dignity of the senate that Augustus and his successors founded their new empire. . . . In the administration of their own powers they frequently consulted the great national council, and *seemed* to refer to its decision the most important concerns of peace and war . . . the system of the Imperial government; as it was instituted by Augustus . . . may be defined an absolute monarchy disguised by the forms of a commonwealth."¹⁶

Sham consultation, meaningless (because wholly ineffectual) participation—in these respects the young socialists of today see the Labour Party merely as typical of a society in which democracy is more preached than practiced, more of a myth than a reality.

To opt out of the politics of Labour is, however, not a simply negative action. As has been noted, the political actions of nearly every grouping on the Left, whether explicitly committed to revolution or not, have hinged upon the susceptibility of the Labour Party and movement to Left-wing pressure. Now that that assumption can no longer be sustained, these groupings are thrown back upon their com-

mitment to revolution. What has often been a long-term, and therefore not too urgent, goal becomes all at once a matter of day-to-day tactics and strategy.

Nor is it only the (more or less) permanent formal groupings which are affected by the Labour catastrophe. The more fluctuating protest movements have also shaped their strategies upon the same assumption. They have acted in the belief that protests and demonstrations are not merely tolerated, but are in the long run effective, in changing the climate of opinion and in making some perceptible impact upon the policies of Labour, whether in government or opposition. "They can't ignore us", we thought as we marvelled at the size of the Easter CND marches in the early 1960s. Nothing like it had been seen in Britain for years. Surely the politicians could not fail to respond to such an unprecedented demonstration of public concern and anxiety. But they could and did, though not in the strict sense that no notice was taken of the demonstrators. On the contrary, they were vilified by both Conservative and Labour politicians with all the fierceness that now has to be reserved for far more militant demonstrators. But nuclear policy went unaltered. We have seen how CND's traditional strategy of capturing the Labour Party was thwarted. The consequences of this failure pointed the way towards the overall pattern of left politics in the late sixties. One section turned to direct action, largely of a symbolic and formal kind (yet it seemed an extreme step to take at the time). Official CND policy remained committed to the orthodox forms of protest and pressure. Not surprisingly, the Campaign went into what was a long decline. It could not find a way out of a dilemma which has now become the common fate of the whole Left in Britain, and elsewhere.

This is not to say that the political system, or the Labour Party, is totally closed to pressures of any kind. A limited flexibility has been and still is one of the strengths of the system. So long as one does not press against the limits something can be achieved. This, indeed, is the justification and explanation of the pressure group system, and it applies to the realization of the more immediate targets of such groups as Shelter, the Child Poverty Action Group, and some of the anti-racist organizations. Reformism still works, though within increasingly confined boundaries. But the Left groups and campaigns have, almost by definition, been concerned precisely to press at the limits of the system — through the Labour Party. It is that path which now appears to be totally and finally blocked.

IV

This is the situation which has made the adoption of revolutionary perspectives among the militant young, the development of more

militant forms of protest, and the remarkable spread of direct action, more or less inevitable developments. At the very least they can be seen as expressions of aspirations and discontents, which can find no outlet within the established political system. But they are more than blind, irrational responses, or gestures of impotent, uncomprehending anger. Many of the forms of action which have been adopted are proving to be rational and effective alternatives to the old, devalued recipes for campaigning.

This is particularly the case with direct action. And once again it is to the anti-nuclear campaign of the late 'fifties and early 'sixties that we must trace the beginnings of this development. The ordinary reaction to the non-violent direct action protests staged by the Direct Action Committee at nuclear rocket bases in the period from 1958 onwards, and to the sit-downs staged by the Committee of 100 after its formation in the autumn of 1960, was a mixture of derision and scandal. What shocked people was that protesters should deliberately break the law, and George Brown's view that

"A declared intention to disrupt the forces of law and order cannot be permitted in a modern democratic state."

was widely shared. Those to the left of Mr Brown, being less ready to identify themselves with "the forces of law and order" or in other words, police and troops, adopted more involuted pragmatic arguments. They were apt to suggest that civil disobedience was "unnecessary", or that it was ineffective, or that it would alienate public opinion.

In the case of nuclear disarmament neither constitutional nor unconstitutional methods have been successful; but what has been most striking subsequently has been the extent to which direct action, still usually non-violent, has been taken up and used, for an enormous variety of causes, by an enormous variety of different groups in the population, many of whom would hate to think that their campaigns owed anything to recognized left-wing "troublemakers" like Pat Arrow-smith or even Lord Russell. Attentive reading of the newspapers will reveal that these illegal actions are now almost an everyday occurrence. Farmers prevent water board officials from entering a valley which they plan to turn into a reservoir.¹⁷ Villagers in Carmarthenshire prevent the army from turning a beach into a firing range by sitting down in the roads.¹⁸ Homeless people move into empty houses and barricade themselves against the local councils and their bailiffs. Mothers block main roads in protest against heavy traffic and accidents to children.¹⁹ Examples can be multiplied.

The issues are usually local, and may not even be seen as political. There is often the possibility of remedy within the existing social and political framework. So that in some respects the implications of such

actions are not particularly radical. But what is significant is that so many people, now, are discovering that direct action is both necessary and effective. It is necessary because the ossification and bureaucratization of political processes which are characteristic of late capitalist societies have turned what are usually described as "the normal channels" (i.e. the constitutional procedures) from channels into cul-de-sacs. They have become, and are often consciously used as, ways of diverting and disabling popular protest and opposition, and an increasing number of people are coming to understand this—though they have not yet seen that the frustrations and obstructions which drive mothers to block roads and the homeless to occupy empty houses are fundamentally the same as those which drive students into sit-ins and demonstrators to clash with the police. Direct action is effective, at least in limited situations, because it is an exercise in power. People oppose to the normally overwhelming powers of "the authorities" the only real powers they have—the power of obstruction and the power of non-co-operation, and where they are sufficiently determined they can win.

We are brought unavoidably to the issue of the use of force. For it cannot be denied that to block a road, even by sitting-down, or to occupy a building, is an act of force. Such actions are held by many to be intrinsically undesirable, and are frequently presented as being the very antithesis of what is constitutional, democratic, and rational. To use force, Lord James, Vice-Chancellor of York University has suggested, is to "reject reason". The student who wants to "change things", "will use rational arguments, and never anything else".²⁰ *The Guardian*, in a typically on-the-one-hand-on-the-other editorial, made the same antithesis :

"In some situations it is right to build and man the barricades. But reason, not rioting, is the civilized way to change society. The ballot box is preferable to the bomb."²¹

One political commentator has contrasted the politics "of the slogan, the streets and the slung stone" with "peaceful democratic politics", and yet another identified the politics of the militant students as "the politics of unreason".²²

Much of this comment is either hypocritical, or, more probably, self-deluding. Yet it does not require abstruse analysis to see that it is quite absurd to talk as if force were altogether excluded from the politics of the Western democracies. In the first place these countries all possess police forces and armies, which are not infrequently used against the citizens of those countries, and these operations quite often involve substantial brutality and sometimes deaths. It may be said that a government must have the authority to employ force in this way

when it judges it to be necessary. Maybe, but force is being used, nevertheless. There may equally be occasions when sections of the people also judge that it is necessary for *them* to use force, *against* governments and other authorities, for such authorities, after all, are not infallible, and all too easily trample on the rights of those they govern. There are other ways in which force is built into the fabric of the society. A strike may be said to be an exercise of force. Many people would like to prohibit strikes, although no such wholesale attempt has yet been made. They remain recognized as a legitimate method of putting pressure on obdurate employers and paymasters. Why is it that strikes are not universally denounced as an anti-democratic exercise in unreason? It is because it is recognized, albeit tacitly and with considerable embarrassment, that there is an ineradicable structural struggle for power in industry in a capitalist society, and that against the employer with power given to him by ownership, the workers have the right to use the power that is theirs—the power to act together, and to withdraw their labour.

What these sanctimonious commentators do not, or will not, recognize is that the situation in industry is not basically very different from the position in nearly all the institutions of our society. Everywhere power is concentrated at the top, in the hands of small and often totally irresponsible and unrepresentative oligarchies. Frequently their power, or authority, are not derived from either ownership on the one hand, or from popular election on the other, but simply from the inherited, established and, of course, perfectly constitutional structure of the institution. This is the situation in most, if not all, British universities and other educational institutions. It is, therefore, a monstrous impertinence for a Vice-Chancellor, from his position of established power, to tell students that *they* must employ only reason. For it is not by virtue of their superior rationality that the authorities in the colleges are able to defeat the students who want to "change things", but because it is they who have the legal, recognized, power. In resorting to sit-ins and occupations, the students are using the only power that they have, in much the same way as striking workers. Sit-ins and other disruptive actions are still treated by the educational authorities as illegal and unconstitutional, and therefore punishable offences. But sooner or later they will have to be legitimized, as strikes eventually were. Sooner or later, too, the educational authorities will have to abandon the equally silly and hypocritical attitude embodied in the slogan "no negotiations under duress". Again it is recognized in industrial struggle that the only serious negotiations are precisely the ones which take place "under duress", when there is a threat of "trouble" in the background. This will have to be accepted in the sphere of education and elsewhere, unless there is some miraculous change in

the attitudes of the governing Clites, and instead of using, or more accurately, abusing, routine bargaining as a way of delaying and diluting concessions to "constitutional" pressures, they start to democratize institutions of their own free will.

This is unlikely. "For it is part of the reality (as against the myth) of parliamentarism as of most other politics, that concessions are made to pressure and not to argument."²⁰ Despite specious claims that the universities and colleges constitute a kind of realm of pure reason in which rational argument rules supreme, the politics of education are not likely to prove any exception to this general truth. The forms of political pressure throughout our society have been and are changing, and do not exclude the use of force. But what of violence?

There has been much loose thinking and unscrupulous and sensational commentary on this subject, with the result that a general impression has been firmly established that there is a widespread cult of violence for its own sake among students and other young people, which receives regular direct expression in manufactured clashes with the police in the course of demonstrations. It is first of all important to insist on the distinction between force and violence. It must be clear that it is an abuse of ordinary language to describe a strike, a sit-down or an occupation as in itself an act of violence, as enraged employers and academics are wont to do when they have either lost their heads or are consciously seeking to inflame public opinion. If a sit-down or sit-in is to be described as an act of violence then no meaning can be attached to the concept of non-violent direct action; yet we know immediately what is meant by that notion, because we normally (and rightly) attach a narrower meaning to the term "violence". We use it to describe the use of physical force to destroy or harm persons or things. That is how it should continue to be used, and its use to denote any illegal or forceful act of which the authorities and conservative opinion disapprove should be exposed for the sensationalist fraud it is.

Given this more precise definition of violence, it is at once obvious that any "cult" of violence, any glorification of violence for its own sake, must be repugnant to any humane person, and clearly has more in common with fascist-type doctrines than with any variant of socialism. But that is not at all the same thing as suggesting either that the use of violence is never justified, or that it never yields results. It is only the absolute pacifist who rejects the use of violence in all circumstances. The political leaders of the western world—the sustainers of the arms race, the architects of the slaughter in Vietnam, the suppliers of arms to Federal Nigeria—are not absolute pacifists. This blatantly obvious point is worth stressing since in 1969, the centenary of the birth of Gandhi, many of them chose to deliver lectures to the

public on the virtues of non-violence. It is clear that they themselves consider the use of violence to be justified when they see no other way of gaining their ends, and it is not clear why they should presume to suggest any other attitude to the peoples they rule. What inspired these homilies, of course, was the apprehension that there is a growth of political violence within the societies they govern. There is reason to think that that apprehension, or expectation, is justified. For violence is the characteristic expression of discontents which can find no other outlet, and there is evidence that such discontents are growing, if only in relation to the closing of outlets to which I have already referred. When—but only when—that is the case, and when it is likely that violence will be effective where all else has failed, a situation exists in which it is impossible to condemn violence, and may be right to support it. Such a situation clearly existed in Northern Ireland in 1969, and there can be little doubt that nothing less than the extreme militancy of the Catholics and the civil rights campaigners (if not necessarily the violence involved) could have made an impact on a paralysed and corrupt political structure. But there are other less extreme circumstances in which violence is futile and self-defeating, and to explain it as the expression of frustrated political energies is not to justify it. For it is a test of any rational strategy for the Left that it is able to discover more effective and more humane expressions for such energies.

v

But it is in the adoption of revolutionary perspectives that the militant students offer the most serious challenge to existing society, and it is in relation to the revolutionary commitment as well as to the decay and corruption of established political institutions that the development of direct action and militant forms of protest must be placed. The different factors that have coalesced to create this commitment deserve a study in themselves, and I cannot survey them here. There can be no doubt, however, that the 1960s have quite decisively altered the entire political climate in the capitalist West, as anyone can see by looking again at the literature and journalism which, in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties, celebrated "the end of ideology" and the triumph of a humane and democratic capitalism. It is simply not possible to think or write in such a vein any longer. It was always a false triumph, and it is now generally seen to have been so. Above all in the war of aggression in Vietnam and in the reaction to the demand for racial equality. But young socialists have hardly been less slow to grasp capitalism's less dramatic but more fundamental defects—its injustice and its irrationality, as demonstrated by the constantly widening gap between the developed and under-developed countries, and by the

inability of capitalism to do what is now technologically possible—provide a reasonable standard of living for all. Using the kind of analysis provided by Herbert Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man*, they have noted its capacity, as a total economic, social and political system, to absorb and disarm opposition and criticism, to the point where even movements and parties nominally committed to replacing capitalism by socialism come to reflect the character of the society they in principle oppose.

It is this last point that provides a context for the collapse of reformism which has already been discussed. But the analysis goes beyond the failure of particular policies and strategies. What has appalled the young militants has been the way in which entire political institutions and movements including the Communist parties of the West, have been smoothly incorporated, with an awful appearance of inevitability, into the established political system of bourgeois society. (Nothing more served to confirm this than the reaction of the French Communist Party to the astonishing events of May 1968.) Add to this a strong, and in my view entirely healthy, reaction against Stalinism and the bureaucratization of Communism in Eastern Europe, and it is then not difficult to understand the recurrent emphasis on spontaneity among young socialists, the influence of anarchist ideas, their deep suspicion of leaders and the cult of leadership, their reluctance to be drawn into formal organizations and institutions, and the consequent appearance of chaos as they search for ways of opposing and challenging capitalism which can be sure of escaping the debilitating fate of incorporation into the system. It is the determination to avoid incorporation and emasculation that explains the wholesale nature of their challenge to bourgeois society, and the intensity of the hostility and bafflement which that challenge has provoked. Once one begins to make concessions to bourgeois society, even in such trivial matters as the length of one's hair, where will it end? Will not social respectability lead in turn to political respectability? The experience of the fate of so many formal socialist parties and groups do not allow us the right to patronise these responses to what is generally acknowledged to be a fundamental political crisis. It is not enough to respond simply by re-iterating a supposedly Leninist stress on the need, in a revolutionary struggle, for leadership, discipline, and organization. We have to ask whether these are in fact the right recipe for the contemporary situation. The prospect of a socialist revolution in Britain or any other capitalist country is certainly remote, though the May 1968 events in France suggest that it might not be quite so remote as was once supposed. But given this, there is, I think, scope and need for the challenge to capitalism to be mounted in a great variety of ways, not all of them obviously or intentionally political. Hippies who challenge the work ethic, or chal-

lunge the institution of private property by occupying empty buildings, may in the long term be helping to change the general level of consciousness, and this, as Marcuse has suggested, is the immediate task before us :

"Under total capitalist administration and introjection, the social determination of consciousness is all but complete and immediate . . . Under these circumstances, radical change in consciousness is the beginning, the first step in changing social existence: emergence of the new Subject. Historically, it is again the period of enlightenment prior to material change—a period of education, but education which turns into praxis: demonstration, confrontation, rebellion."¹⁴

There is one further point to be made about this commitment to revolution. It is conceptually dependent upon a definition of socialism which rejects the means-ends distinction, the definition of socialism as an end which, in theory at least, could be arrived at by any conceivable means. Socialism, by definition, cannot be manipulated into existence. People cannot be liberated from above. That is not a factual statement, but a conceptual one. Many benefits can be conferred from above, but not liberation. If people do not liberate themselves they are not liberated at all :

"Socialism cannot be impersonally manipulated into existence, or imposed on those whose consciousness resists, precisely because socialism is the victory of consciousness over its previous enslavement by economic and political activity. All other forms of society have been suffered by men; socialism is to be lived by *them*."¹⁵

As the same writer (Alasdair MacIntyre) has written elsewhere, "nothing worth calling socialism *could* come into being by reformist methods". Or by Stalinist ones. Hence a value is found in direct action in itself, as providing both a model and a training for the self-activity which must be characteristic of both the struggle for socialism and the form of a socialist society. The intrinsic value of direct action is, again, something not easily appreciated by those who apply to politics a simple means-ends analysis. Yet quite apart from the official objectives of direct action, and the likelihood of achieving them *through* direct action, anyone who takes part in it knows that it is not only politically instructive but also an experience which can dissolve class and status barriers and generate an atmosphere of comradeship still only rarely achieved in our society.

VI

Bearing these last observations in mind, we can appreciate the enthusiasm with which students often resort to a sit-in or an occupation, which scandalizes the majority of academics. But if they cannot be

expected to endorse the revolutionary virtues of such actions, they could perhaps come to recognize their pedagogic value :

"Students are always being told about history and its great doings, but too rigid a separation has been interposed between learning and living, and youth has been struggling to overcome it. It may learn more about history and politics by taking part in one college campaign than from fifty books."²⁶

Student activism within educational institutions is directly connected with their analysis of, and challenge to, bourgeois society. They see higher education and its institutions as being closely integrated into the structure of capitalism, their function being "the production of a managerial élite", according to the brothers Cohn-Bendit,²⁷ or, alternatively, "to train the flood of technicians and manipulators which neo-capitalism . . . demand(s)", according to Alexander Cockburn²⁸—the latter not so much an élite as a white-collar section of the proletariat. There is an "ever greater connectedness of university-college structures and the capitalist productive apparatus," according to John Cowley, writing in last year's *Socialist Register*. Parallel to this, they note, is the dominance of "bourgeois ideology" in a range of fields, most conspicuously the social sciences, which are not necessarily of direct importance to the economy. Through this ideological dominance these studies are moulded to the shape of a capitalist society. This, crudely, is the kind of diagnosis made by the student militants, and what they challenge is what they see as the subordination of supposedly free learning to the most narrowly utilitarian and economic demands of society, and to its ideology.

There can be little doubt that the current very rapid expansion of higher education which is certainly expected to continue for at least the next decade, reflects a structural economic need for more skilled manpower. Or, as it was expressed in the Robbins report of 1963 :

" . . . the growing realization of this country's economic dependence upon the education of its population has led to much questioning of the adequacy of present arrangements. Unless higher education is speedily reformed, it is argued, there is little hope of this densely populated island maintaining an adequate position in the fiercely competitive world of the future."²⁹

This has always been the attitude taken by politicians like Mr Wilson, whose habitual way of justifying educational expenditure is to refer to it as an "investment" in the future.³⁰ The financial metaphor is typical of this way of thinking about education, and it is not hard to see that this line of thought, pushed to its logical limit, would lead to the elimination of all the more "remote" areas of study, which could not be shown to make a concrete contribution to economic expansion.

Nor can it be denied that private industry is exerting a growing influence over higher education, and not only as a source of finance.

The rise of the business schools, of management studies and the rest, show how the overall pattern of studies is being shaped by the power of industry. And the campaign to tighten the links binding the colleges to industry is an open and generally respectable one. Thus the Duke of Edinburgh, opening a conference on the place of the university in the industrial world, at Salford University, declared that

"the boundaries between university and industry must be kept as flexible and integrated as possible."

and at the same conference the chairman of Ferranti Ltd., Dr Sebastian de Ferranti, said

"there was much criticism of the British university system, and much of this criticism came from industry. It was alleged that universities were failing to serve properly the needs of industry and commerce. The critics . . . said that too many graduates wanted to work only on research and development. This had become an end instead of a means to an end."

Dr de Ferranti went on: "The real end is manufacture, sales, making money, and exports. . . ." ⁸¹

That the pressures—to subordinate education to industry and the economy, are there, and are powerfully supported, cannot, then be denied. But the real question is, whether they are overwhelming, whether their dominance is virtually absolute. And the same question has to be asked about the supposed dominance of bourgeois ideology. It is at this point that I believe the militant case to be exaggerated. There has been a great deal of resistance to the attempt to make the educational system do no more than serve the economy. It has come from the students who have benefited from the expansion, who have chosen to study "useless" subjects, despite the difficulties in subsequently finding employment that this often leads to. And it has come from the academics. It is not simply that many of them have an obvious vested interest in "useless" knowledge. It is not only that many have a genuine belief in free ranging scholarship. Behind their resistance and that of the students (even though many academics are unwilling to recognize this common factor) there lies a long and honourable tradition of resistance to the insistent pressure of the values of industrial capitalism upon education and the entire sphere of culture. Against a crass utilitarianism this tradition has constantly asserted more humane values. Against the powerful tendency to reduce every question of values to the level of mechanical and monetary calculations, this tradition has asserted the importance of imagination and feeling, and the concept of the complete, fulfilled human personality. This is the tradition examined by Raymond Williams in *Culture and Society*, and, with all its weaknesses and ambiguities, it will not do simply to attach to it the single label of "liberal élitism" and so dismiss it. Cer-

tainly it does sometimes take an élitist form, as in the work of Leavis, but equally obviously Leavis's attack on what he calls a "technologico-Benthamite" society and its attempts to dominate education has much in common with the position of the militant students.¹² And Leavis's own attitudes are not entirely unrepresentative of those of many other academics. The total, closed nature of the capitalist system, the completeness of its dominance, which were over-stated by Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man*, are also sometimes over-stated by student militants, and not only in relation to education. of course. To do this is to create a puzzle: how does it come about that such a complete and overwhelming system nevertheless cannot prevent the emergence of revolutionary-minded students, not to mention shoals of other discontents? It is worth recalling the third of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach :

"The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated. The doctrine has therefore to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society."

A more complex, flexible and dialectical picture of society is required. Certainly educational institutions reflect the structure and dominant values of the society as a whole, but not in a simple mirror relationship. The continued existence of the anti-utilitarian tradition I have mentioned means that the student socialists are not in every respect as isolated as they sometimes suppose.¹³

VII

From time to time predictions are made that the present "wave" of militancy will soon spend itself, and that the established political and educational institutions will, in the not too distant future, be able to settle back into their normal patterns, which will not have been seriously altered by all the sound and fury of the "extremists" and "agitators".¹⁴ I think I have probably said enough to indicate why I believe these predictions to be mistaken. The crisis in higher education, and the discontent which has now spread into the schools, are the products of a fundamental dislocation in the structure of late capitalism. It creates aspirations and expectations which it is unable to satisfy, and the further expansion of higher education can be expected to increase the tension and the pressure for radical changes of both content and organization within the educational system. The growing militancy of protest and of the actions and policies of the Left, are the inevitable response to a political crisis in which other channels have been closed, both by the continuous paralysis of constitutional and established political institutions, and by what looks like the final sealing off of

parties once of the Left to pressures from the Left. Without a wholly unlikely, not to say miraculous, transformation of the Labour Party into an internally democratic organization committed, as a reality and not simply as a formality to the socialist transformation of our society, the spread of revolutionary ideas and practice in Britain is bound to continue.

Whether this will lead to the formation of a new revolutionary political party or movement is difficult to predict. But that, in any case, is not the real problem. To adapt a famous aphorism: founding political parties is easy; it's been done hundreds of times. The crucial test is to get beyond the membership of a few hundreds or fewer thousands which virtually any grouping can be certain of attracting. The British Labour Party's capacity to survive disaster has been demonstrated many times in the past seventy years, and there is a (perfectly explicable) inertia in British politics which makes major changes in political habits and allegiances very rare indeed. We may have reached a period of political fluidity similar to that in which the Labour Party emerged at the end of the Nineteenth Century, but this writer, at least, is not in a position to argue confidently that it is so.

Maybe a different comparison is more apt. The challenge offered by today's radicals to contemporary capitalism is a challenge not only to its economics and politics, but also to its ideology and values. This ideology takes the form of a particularly crude version of utilitarianism, by which every consideration of culture or social justice is placed in subordinate, distorted relation to the dominant criteria of production and economic growth. (We have already seen how education is typically thought of, and justified, by politicians as an "investment".) The reaction against this ideology takes many forms, including that of simply opting out, of refusing to compete or produce, as well as more positive attempts to set up small, so far as possible self-contained, groups — communes—operating on quite different social and moral principles. This situation is strikingly similar to the confused scene in the early Nineteenth Century. Then, too, the dominant ideology was a crude utilitarianism—the kind so devastatingly analysed by Dickens in *Hard Times*. Then, too, the reaction against industrial capitalism took the form of a plethora of experimental attempts to establish utopian communities and political movements.

Intellectually, that period was in many respects superseded by the development of Mamism. But politically the challenge to capitalism, in Britain and western Europe, faded into the emergence of trade unions and social democratic parties. The politics of compromise—which some people hold to be the only possible politics—and of operating within the framework of capitalism and its political institutions, took over. This time perhaps, with the advantage of knowing that sad

history, the total challenge to capitalist society will not be diluted, incorporated, and finally defeated, but will retain its character of total challenge, without which there is no possibility of socialism.

NOTES

1. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (1960), p. 406.
2. For just one example, see the report on police treatment of demonstrators at the Springbok rugby match at **Swansea** on November 15, 1969, in *The Sunday Times*, November 23, 1969. For another piece of evidence relating to the same occasion, see the letter from nine students at **Bangor**, in *The Guardian*, November 20, 1969.
3. Three examples: The Secretary for Education, Edward Short's speech to the House of Commons, January 29, 1969, in which he declared that local authorities "have a major deterrent in their hands". The then chief Conservative spokesman on education, Sir Edward Boyle's forecast that "more students will have to be sent down and certain number of lecturers may have to be dispensed with", reported in *The Guardian*, April 30, 1969. Mr Wilson's speech at Bradford University on July 13, 1969, *The Guardian*, July 14, 1969.
4. Professor John Rex's review in *The Sunday Times*, April 20, 1969.
5. See Stephen Spender's autobiography, *World Within World* (1951), p. 62.
6. Not just a piece of rhetoric for public consumption, since it appears in a letter to his son, October 10, 1789. Quoted by **Conor** Cruise O'Brien in his Introduction (1969) to *Reflections* on the Revolution in France, p. 14.
7. Also quoted by Dr O'Brien, *op cit.*, p. 60.
8. Michael Foot, in *Tribune* 21 (1958), p. 12.
9. Aneurin **Bevan**, *In Place of Fear* (1952), p. 31.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
11. For the evidence for this see I. F. Stone, *In a Time of Torment* (1968), pp. 195-206, and also the same author's article in the *New York Review of Books*, March 28, 1968.
12. The best comment that I know on this is **Noam Chomsky's** "On Resistance" in *American Power and the New Mandarins* (1969).
13. Quoted by Andrew Kopkind in *America: The Mixed Curse* (1969), p. 142. Kopkind also wrote that "Kennedy's role is to 'save the system from inside' . . .", *ibid.*, p. 164.
14. For an "early" comment on Mr Wilson's ambiguities see "Labour Policy and the Labour Left", by **Ralph Miliband** and **John Saville**, in *The Socialist Register*, 1964.
15. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chapter 9. Augustus's relation with his senate is compared by I. F. Stone with President Johnson's with his, in I. F. Stone, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-2. The quotation from Mr **Crossman** is from his introduction to the Fontana edition of *The English Constitution* (1963), pp. 10-11.
16. Quoted by Christopher Driver in *The Disarmers* (1964), p. 130.
17. *The Guardian*, December 20, 1969.
18. *The Guardian*, November 21, 1969.

19. Two examples, at Bridge in Kent and Thirsk in Yorkshire, reported in *The Guardian*, August 25, and November 15, 1969, respectively.
20. "Open letter to a new student" in *The Guardian*, October 20, 1969.
21. December 15, 1969.
22. Ronald Butt in *The Sunday Times*, December 28, 1969, and Alan Watkins in the *New Statesman*, October 18, 1968.
23. E. J. Hobsbawm, reviewing Ralph Miliband's *Parliamentary Socialism*, in *New Left Review*, No. 12.
24. Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (1969), p. 53.
25. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Notes from the Moral Wilderness, I" in *The New Reasoner*, No 7. The other quotation is from his "Rejoinder to Left Reformism" in *International Socialism*, 6.
26. V. G. Kiernan : Notes on the Intelligentsia, in *The Socialist Register 1969*, p. 73.
27. *Obsolete Communism* (1969), p. 42.
28. *Student Power* (1969), p. 10.
29. *Higher Education*, Report (1963), p. 5.
30. For example in the speech at Bradford referred to in note 3.
31. Conference report in *The Guardian*, December 13, 1969. Undoubtedly the campaign to bind industry and education closer together suffered a setback as a result of what was uncovered at the University of Warwick in February 1970. See *Warwick University, Ltd.*, edited by E. P. Thompson (1970).
32. As Raymond Williams pointed out in a review of *English Literature in Our Time and The University*, by F. R. Leavis, in *The Guardian*, December 18, 1969.
33. Note, for instance, the almost unanimous opposition within the universities to the Thirteen Proposals put to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals by the Government in late 1969, almost all of which involved a lowering of educational standards with a view to securing further expansion of higher education "on the cheap".
34. For example, John Gross in *Black Paper I* (1969), and Ronald Butt in the article already referred to (see note 22).