

## FRANTZ FANON AND THE "LUMPENPROLETARIAT"

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IN 1960, I attended the All-African People's Congress in Accra, Ghana. The proceedings consisted mainly of speeches by leaders of African nationalism from all over the continent, few of whom said anything notable. When, therefore, the representative of the Algerian Revolutionary Provisional Government, their Ambassador to Ghana, stood up to speak for his country, I prepared myself for an address by a diplomat—not usually an experience to set the pulses racing. Instead, I found myself electrified by a contribution that was remarkable not only for its analytical power, but delivered, too, with a passion and brilliance that is all too rare. I discovered that the Ambassador was a man named Frantz Fanon. During his talk, at one point, he almost appeared to break down. I asked him afterwards what had happened. He replied that he had suddenly felt emotionally overcome at the thought that he had to stand there, before the assembled representatives of African nationalist movements, to try and persuade them that the Algerian cause was important, at a time when men were dying and being tortured in his own country for a cause whose justice ought to command automatic support from rational and progressive human beings.

I think this incident reflects one special quality that is characteristic of Fanon's writing also: its passion. It is also ruthlessly honest and highly intellectual, if not always worked-through. It is this special blend of intellect and passion that stamps Fanon's work as the product of a unique and powerful mind. Though a scientist, whose professional experience informs his whole thinking, his style of writing appeals to the total "sensibility". Though highly diagnostic, it is never merely clinical. It is also denunciatory and prophetic. It is political thought and feeling about the total human condition distilled into poetic prose. And the context in which I heard his talk reflects, too, the fact that though his life was dedicated to the Algerian Revolution, he was also concerned with the general theory and practice of revolution in the Third World as a whole.

Fanon's ideas are not the product of armchair reflection, then. Nor were they entirely original. No man's are. But the synthesis was very much his, and his views on violence and on the revolutionary

potential of the lumpenproletariat, which I discuss below, reopened issues which had not received much attention since the era of Bakunin. He acquired most of his intellectual stock of ideas, however, from two well-developed traditions with which, as a French colonial subject, he inevitably came into contact: the tradition of Black protest in the form of *négritude*, and the existentialist and Marxist traditions.

It is not merely to understand the genesis of his thought that we need to locate him in these traditions, however. Fanon would have been the first to insist that the validity of his theories could never be established simply by cognitive tests, by the yardstick of their internal consistency or logical rigour. He would have argued that not even the extent to which they constituted adequate analyses or explanations of the condition of life in the Third World, as purely intellectual exercises, would have constituted an adequate test, either. For he was not just trying to understand the Third World, he was trying to change it. He would have asked that his theories be evaluated in the light of revolutionary practice.

The successive formative components in his thinking were, firstly, his discovery of Black consciousness; secondly, his revolt against racist colonialism embodied in his theory of violence; thirdly, the incorporation of existentialist and Marxist influences; and, finally, his ideas on the transformation of society via revolution in the Third World. But it is his ideas on the agencies and sources of this transformation—the revolutionary party, the peasantry and the so-called lumpenproletariat—that we wish to pay special attention to. Because this last is the most underemphasized element in his thinking, and because it is his most original notion, it will receive most attention here, but we should remember that party and peasantry are the other two key elements.

His discovery of Black consciousness naturally came first. It was almost inevitable that the redefinition of identity for colonial man should have been best articulated and communicated by men who were not only from the French colonies, but from French colonies in the New World, for the French policy of removing selected individuals from their indigenous cultural and social milieux and converting them into coloured Frenchmen—*e'volue's*—placed a tremendous psychic and social strain on those who were being groomed for *entrée* into the professional and *élite* strata of colonial society. Were they West Indians or Frenchmen, or men of two worlds, torn or lost between both?

This French policy reposed, as the word *évolué* implied, upon a simple evolutionist-racist assumption that Black cultures were primitive and backward, and that progress consisted in becoming more

and more like the White man in the Western capitalist world, whose culture was the highest pinnacle of human evolution. The demolition of this view that Western culture was culture, tout court, has been primarily a social refutation: the achievements of socialist regimes and the challenge of independence movements in Third World countries have demonstrated in practice that Western capitalism is not the only way forward. But it has also been an intellectual demolition, and of Third World thinkers none has been more impressive than Frantz Fanon.

The French policy of cultivating a Black élite had unintended consequences. The schools in which the Clite was educated did indeed produce their due share of docile colonial puppets as intended. But they also produced crop after crop of old boys whose names read like roll-calls of nationalist and revolutionary leaderships. One of the reasons for this unexpected criticality amongst these young men was the fact that it was French culture that they were being exposed to. They were an intellectual Bite in the French style. Two central attributes of the culture which the new Clite produced stand out: one, that it was a literary Clite, placing a high value on "culture", sc. the creative arts, in true Gallic fashion. Early Black nationalism in the French colonies was a cultural movement of writers and particularly of poets.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, they exhibited a typically Gallic proclivity to create sophisticated theoretical social and philosophical systems. These two features sharply mark off the anti-colonial movements in French colonies from their counterparts in the British colonies, which were typically led by men occupying humble jobs as functionaries in the public service and whose political programmes were couched in the practical, atheoretical language of British empiricism.

The task of intellectually redefining the identity of colonial man was accomplished initially by Black francophone writers like Césaire and Fanon, not simply because of their exposure to French intellectual culture, however, but also because the Antilles had been occupied by colonial Powers for much longer than Africa. (Senegal was the big exception in Africa, and it produced Senghor.) West Indian reaction against French colonial domination long antedated African nationalism, and had engendered a literary tradition of activist declarations by Negroes in the new World of the value of indigenous African and Caribbean cultures, of the continuities between Africa and the West Indies, and of a concomitant revolt against slavish adulation of things European.

This body of creative writing, however, did not emerge as some inexplicable *prise de* conscience. Nor did children selected to be processed into Frenchmen resist the process because of some mysterious autonomous spirit. Their resistance to colonization of the person-

ality was part of a literary tradition, true, but the literary tradition was itself part of a wider social movement of resistance to colonialism which was not just intellectual or literary. The new *élite* was still culturally and socially tied to the kinsmen who were disprivileged French colonial subjects. Hence to become an *évolué* involved alienation from one's parents, and a rejection of Black culture. For those unwilling to turn their backs on their fellow-men, inspiration could readily be found in the history of resistance to colonial rule that had assumed the most extreme form possible: armed revolution. Literary Black nationalism, that is, was part of a history of revolt that spanned the nineteenth century, from Toussaint L'Ouverture's revolt against French rule in Haiti at the beginning of the century to the Cuban War of Independence at the end. (Cuba, it should be remembered, was the last country in the Americas to achieve its national independence via revolution and the last to abolish slavery. Fidel Castro in the 1950s started a revolution in a country only two generations away from the last major national and social revolution.)

But revolt was not the universal condition of life in the nineteenth-century Caribbean history. Many islands had no such heroic traditions to appeal to. Revolution in Haiti had degenerated as early as the establishment of the vicious despotism of Dessalines, Toussaint's successor. The creation of a tradition of revolt out of these historic instances, distributed in time and space, was the work of intellectuals who seized upon these elements, constructed a revolutionary tradition out of them, and began to communicate this image of the revolutionary past and future to people who had never heard of such things. Significantly, the literature of *négritude*, the celebration of blackness, that emerged, was the creation largely of Martiniquais, Senegalese and Madagascan writers, whilst the revolutions that inspired them were Haitian and Cuban. Black dignity did not just emerge, then: it was created by intellectuals who reworked the past so as to contribute towards a renaissance in the present and future. The renaissance, from the beginning, was a political as well as a cultural one, as in the nineteenth century when the predecessors of modern *négritude* had produced a literary and intellectual culture which was part of a political awakening: in Haiti, the writings of Anténor Firmin and Hannibal Price, and in Cuba the anti-slavery novels, culminating in that apotheosis of Cuban literature, Jose Martí.<sup>3</sup>

Frantz Fanon's intellectual formation took place under these influences. But the tradition of Black revolt had itself become intertwined with the other major stream of revolt which Gallicized intellectuals inevitably soon came into contact with—Marxism. The closeness of Fanon's involvement in both, and the tension between the

two, is beautifully symbolized by the very title of his major work, *Les Damnés de la Terre*.<sup>3</sup> The words, of course, come from the Internationale. But they were also used by the Haitian poet, Jacques Roumain, in a poem in which he calls for Negro revolt as part of a general revolt against the White and bourgeois world.

It is more than possible that it was Roumain's poem, rather than the Internationale, that was the source of Fanon's title. It is a poem that saw the revolt of colour and the revolt of class as overlapping:

"It will be too late, I tell you  
 For even the **tomtoms** have learned the language  
 of the Internationale  
 All together  
 the dirty Indians  
 the dirty Indo-Chinese  
 the dirty Arabs  
 the dirty Malayans  
 the dirty Jews  
 the dirty peasants  
 and we are all on our feet  
 all the damned ones of the **earth**'.<sup>4</sup>

Roumain, after a "furious embittered rhapsody on the sufferings of the Negro", stops himself short with a **POURTANT** in capital letters—

"And yet  
 I only want to **belong** to your race  
 workers and peasants of all countries."

A very different—and a growing emphasis—can be found, however, in other Black literature of the time. As Coulthard remarks, the appeal to the solidarity of Black, Brown and Yellow men in their common struggles against the domination of the White man "at times . . . almost overshadows the appeal to the workers of the world" (p. 55), the Marxist theme of the common *class* interests of all underprivileged and oppressed people, whatever the colour of their skin. In Aimé Césaire's fierce lines, identification with the workers and peasants of the world is still hinted at in the use of **the** word "fraternal", but what really comes across is his hatred, not of the ruling class or imperialism, but of "Europe", *tout court* :

"Europe  
 I give my support. . . .  
 to all that is loyal and **fraternal** to all that  
 has the courage to be eternally  
 new to all that can give its heart to fire . . . ;  
 to all that is not you  
 Europe  
 pompous name for **excrement**."<sup>5</sup>

This tension between the revolt of colour and the revolt of class runs through the writings of the Afro-Cubanists of the 1920s and the revolutionary Caribbean poets of the 1930s, and has persisted into the Black writing and Black politics of the present day. It informs the confrontations—by no means merely verbal encounters—between those who emphasize loyalty to socialist or communist *class* identity and internationalism as against national, Pan-African or other supra-national ethnic identity.

Fanon's arrival in Paris brought a personal heightened awareness of both streams of political culture. As a colonial subject from the periphery of the imperial system in whose political and cultural capital he now found himself, he was to extend his connections with Black intellectual counterparts, many of whom were revolutionaries or nationalists. At this time, he himself was still an assimilationist. But in such company, and with the colonial background we have outlined, it was almost inevitable that he should address himself in his earliest writings, to the assertion of the validity and autonomy of Black cultures, to the decolonization of the personality, and to the expression of a new contempt for the oppressive colonialist culture of the White man. In *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*<sup>6</sup> he came to terms with his experience of colonialism in Martinique, an experience deeply intensified by the arrival in 1940 of 10,000 French refugees, in a society where there had hitherto only been 2,000 Europeans. The ensuing sharpening of racial hostility was the background against which Fanon grew up.

But in Paris, he was being exposed more intensively than before to influences other than those of colour and *négritude*, notably to Marxism, both as theory and in institutionalized form in the shape of the Communist Party. Whatever Marxism had to offer, the PCF had little appeal to a budding Black revolutionary.

Fanon's comment, written later, that "for a long time now history has been written without the Left in Europe", was the end-result of an experience of French Communist Party policy that had even preceded his arrival in Paris. His further experience whilst in Paris of the perennial vacillation and periodic betrayals of the PCF in its policies towards colonial independence and particularly towards revolutionary anti-colonial struggles, led him to reject orthodox Communism. Martinique had returned two out of three parliamentary deputies to Paris after 1945. These had become assimilated to the French Communist Party, which had fought against the war in Indo-China, but was far more compromising over Algeria. Cauter has summed up these differences well :

**"The rebels in Indo-China had been Communists, strongly supported**

by both Russia and China. The Indo-China war had not involved military conscription, and therefore working-class boys were not involved in the action, and the dying. Then Indo-China was far away, whereas France and Algeria reached across the Mediterranean in a tight and painful finger-lock. There were plenty of Arabs working in France; the French worker knew them and despised them. An old French word for 'strike-breaker' is 'bedouin'. Even the poorest French families had relations who had settled in Algeria, hard-working people like themselves, who were 'exploiting nobody'. The greatly intelligent Albert Camus said it: my family are simple people, they have exploited nobody.

The Party hesitated, equivocated, called for 'peace', but not for independence. In March 1956 the Communist parliamentary deputies voted in favour of special powers that enabled the Government to do virtually as it liked in Algeria. Aimé Cksaire was outraged, resigned from the Party and wrote to Thorez: 'What I desire is that Marxism and Communism should serve the Black people, not that the Black people should serve Marxism and Communism.' For Fanon, too, this was the decisive moment of no return, the *coupure* with Europe. In 1957 Thorez spoke up for independence, but the Gaullist reaction in the following year involved another retreat, pious reflections about the feelings of the French masses in the face of FLN terrorism in France and the abandonment of the word 'independence'. In 1960 Thorez beat back pressure from the non-Communist Left with the reflection that 'boycotting the war is a stupid phrase', and that 'Communists must take part in no matter what war, however reaction-  
ay'."

If orthodox Communism failed Fanon, orthodox *négritude* proved equally bankrupt. Césaire's departure from the Communist ranks because of their betrayal of the revolutionary anti-colonial cause was to be matched by his own defection after the French Antilles had voted for total integration with France in the referendum of 1958 (a choice which was the opposite of Guinea's [lone] decision to go for independence). When André Malraux, former left-wing hero of the Spanish Civil War and now de Gaulle's Minister, visited Fort-de-France, the appropriately-named capital of Martinique, he was received, again appropriately, by another renegade in the person of none other than Aimé Césaire, now Mayor of the capital, who greeted him with the words: "I salute in your person the great French nation to which we are passionately attached". The crowd sang the Marseillaise.<sup>8</sup> The other great apostle of *négritude*, Léopold Sédar-Senghor, was to play a similar role as President of Senegal. (I treasure particularly a photograph of the Senegalese Army parading outside the National Assembly, over the portals of which the words "Chambre de Commerce" are still visible.)

Neither orthodox Communism/Marxism nor traditional *négritude* had much purchase on Fanon by this time. The most positive influence on his thinking was Jean-Paul Sartre, in whose circle he moved<sup>5</sup> and from whom he received a particular blend of Marxist

ideas incorporated within Sartre's ever-changing existentialism. It is important to remember that Fanon's use of Marxist categories is only partly directly received from Marxist writings; most of it is mediated by existentialist reworking of Marxist ideas, particularly the emphasis upon human assertion and a general "critical" reluctance to be bound by established categories or institutions. His connection with Sartre also reinforced his detachment from orthodox French communism because Sartre and his followers were actively engaged in initiatives against the Algerian War, notably the anti-conscription activities of the Jeanson movement. It was the experience of Algeria, the revolutionary storm-centre to which he naturally gravitated, that finally transformed him into a revolutionary.

He first experienced Algeria not in the capacity of a revolutionary, but as a professional psychiatrist at a hospital in Rlida. After psychiatric training in France he went to Algeria, where he encountered appalling cases of individual breakdown, of neurosis and psychosis. He did not, however, interpret these mental conditions either as due to some personal lack of psychic resilience, or as the outcome of strains built into the "human" condition in general. Rather, he diagnosed them as a result of social strains specific to a particular kind of society—colonialism, and a colonialism at the end of its tether, ready to do anything to human beings in the effort to preserve colonial domination. His interpretation of the psychiatric cases he had to deal with engendered his study *L'An V de la Révolution Algérienne*<sup>10</sup> and the later section of "Colonial War and Mental Disorders" in *The Wretched of the Earth*. And it was out of this experience he was to generate the theories concerning the role of violence, in particular revolutionary violence, for which he is so well-known. By 1957, he was involved in a pro-FLN doctors' strike; shortly afterwards he fled to Tunisia to work for the revolution.

### *Fanon on Violence*

Fanon's ideas on violence thus constitute a *social* theory. They have nothing in common, for example, with those fashionable discussions of aggression purveyed by many contemporary ethologists who treat war and revolution as manifestations at the social level of biological "instincts" we share with other animals, or those formal theorists who equate all forms of competition for scarce resources, whether the competition be about bananas or oil-supplies, or between chimpanzees or nation-states. Aggression, for Fanon, is a cultural product which can be socially fostered or inhibited. Pop ethology of this kind is simply misanthropic ideology incapable of explaining the phenomenon of the *expansion* of human wants (which may well indeed generate new bases for conflict) since it reposes upon pre-social

science reductionist assumptions about innate and fixed needs and drives. Nor does it recognize that cooperation and peace are to be found in animal society, or that in human society aggression and war are cultural products, as much learned behaviour as are peace and cooperation.

Violence is often thought of, sentimentally, as a deviation from a normal condition of natural order and shared understandings. Thus violence is often treated as social "pathology". Yet even the most orthodox political theorists also recognize, often quite inconsistently, that in the last analysis ruling Clites depend upon force, even if they usually try to buttress their power by persuading those they rule that they have a legitimate right to rule. Manipulation of economic rewards is a second major source of political influence. A third is the use of symbolic manipulations, such as propaganda or distractions—foreign wars, football, or religious or tribal bigotry. These modes of control can be combined in various ways, from the ancient policy of "bread and circuses" to Brazil's contemporary "bread and cudgels" or Portugal's "blood and smiles". But many regimes do depend primarily upon their command over tanks and torturers, and in the contemporary world the number of regimes which have to resort to naked force as an everyday means of ruling rather than as a "last resort" (since their legitimacy is exhausted or never existed, and their capacity to manipulate other resources is no longer effective) is growing daily in all continents: Greece, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc. To parody Keynes, the "last resort", like the "long run", comes only too quickly these days.

In the French and Dutch colonies after World War II, the attempt to maintain, even to restore, colonial rule generated nationalist resistance. The colonialist response was to resort to violence which was extreme both in scale and intensity. The Dutch attempted to strangle the Indonesian Revolution, and the French butchered many thousands in Madagascar in 1947, and again in the repression in Algeria in 1945 following the Sétif shootings, even though armed revolutionary action was absent in both territories.

In some countries, this was enough to suppress revolt; in others, the revolutionary movement grew. But in yet other countries armed confrontations were avoided altogether: dependent independent countries were created. Peaceful transfers of power took place in India and Ceylon, for example, even in the absence of any immediate revolutionary threat, since in the light of experience of revolt elsewhere, prudence and forethought suggested that the opportunity-cost would otherwise soon become the cost of holding down a sub-continent. (Straightforward and bloody attempts to hold on were commonest in countries with local White settler communities:

Kenya, Angola, Mozambique, and Algeria.) It is against this background of intensified racialism and repression that Fanon's ideas on violence were to crystallize out.

Fanon's model of violence is much more historicist (not in Popper's sense), much less absolute, than is often assumed. For him, violent protest is initially personal, spontaneous, expressive, in a word, anarchic. But it becomes "socialized" as society becomes more highly organized, both in terms of the organization of the capitalist State and the corresponding organization of revolutionary movements. But what was crucial for him was that the mobilization of the working class in the industrialized capitalist countries, even where it had occurred under Marxist leadership, had nowhere resulted in revolution. Mass bourgeois parties, usually within a parliamentary framework, had successfully mobilized the working class; where mass revolutionary parties did emerge, they had eschewed violent insurrection, whatever their theoretical position, and had become equally institutionalized.

The world-historic exception, Russia, never seems to have attracted Fanon's attention. He does not expressly discuss the Chinese Revolution either, but it is clear that it is this revolution, in a semi-colonial agrarian country, and that of Viet Nam, more recent and against the same enemy, France, which influenced him most. For these were revolutions in contemporary backward colonial countries. And they had been brought about not, as in the Russian case, via the seizure of power by a small party at the head of a section of the urban proletariat, but via the politicization of the peasantry.

This transformation of the peasantry from spectator to major revolutionary actor had become possible only because a novel agency of transformation had been brought into being: the revolutionary party. For millennia, peasants had normally been fatalistic and subservient, and when, periodically, they did rise in *jacqueries*, were easily tricked and divided. The roots of this impotence lay in their "high massness and low classness",<sup>11</sup> their way of life that generated a consciousness of themselves as a stratum of rural producers with a common way of life rather than as members of sets of antagonistic classes with interests parallel to those of their counterparts in the cities.<sup>12</sup> But it proved quite possible to politicize them and to organize them once the revolutionary party had immersed itself in the life of the villages, and produced a political strategy that grew out of that experience rather than out of books of revolutionary theory generated out of the vastly different experience of European industrial urban life.

This kind of Party and this kind of theory was created by Mao Tse Tung in the 1920s.<sup>13</sup> Though a tight-knit vanguard party, similar in

some respects to the Leninist model created under the conditions of underground struggle in Tsarist Russia—and hence relevant to the equally harsh demands of armed revolution against ruthless enemies from Chiang Kai Shek to the Japanese—it was a mass party, and the masses were peasants. It also held a liberated territory and carried out guerrilla war elsewhere. But the party was only able to mobilize and unify the peasantry because it supplied them with an explanation of the world and of their present place in it, a "utopia" of what the world ought to (and will) be in the future; a guide as to what is to be done, who is to do it, and how; and the organizational machinery through which it can be done. To use Kenneth Burke's terms,<sup>14</sup> the party supplied a "rhetoric" of action, in which each key element—scene, actor, act, agency, and motive—was present, but a rhetoric whose peculiar power consisted in the *synthesis* of all of these.

To such organized parties, the aimless, "expressive" violence of the *jacquerie* is anathema; so is individual or random resort to violence. Fanon may have taken the primacy of the peasant from Mao, but he was to fuse it with a theory and practice of urban terror which was his own. The political result was the twin strategy of the rural *guerrilla*, on the one hand, and the very different Battle of Algiers on the other.

His view of terror is quite classical. Firstly, it is to be used against key persons whose deaths, because of their symbolic or organizational importance, will unhinge the morale of their supporters or weaken their organization. The assassinations of **Tsars** in the nineteenth century and the killing of village headmen in Viet Nam are of this order.

Secondly, terror has always been used in order to transform life into something completely unpredictable. The innocent suffer with the guilty, and no one knows when it will happen (more sophisticated Manichaeian versions hold that there are no innocent; all who do not protest are complicit). By bombing *cafés* or rocketing cities, the terrorist intends to demonstrate that no one can retire from the struggle into some private oasis of security, that no ruling group can protect you, and that the revolutionaries have the power and determination not just to smash "the social order" in some abstract and structural sense, but to render everyday life completely unliveable.

Purely expressive violence, however, and terror unaccompanied by large-scale, organized mass struggle, is rejected by Fanon, because it simply brings down collective punishment and superior force upon those least able to defend themselves, and lacks the political understanding which would result in a sharpening rather than a diminution of resolve as a result of such repressions, and would therefore be more likely to lead people to give up in fear and impotence.

Violence, Fanon says, to be effective has to become socialized. It is given the requisite social direction when it is utilized as part of a rationally-planned collective revolutionary struggle. In the process, it produces new men, no longer men who react wildly against colonial control by ad *hoc*, individual, or localized outbreaks of disorganized aggression, but men who "stand up" with arms in their hand and thereby direct the collective destructiveness of organized violence into the positive channel of revolution. But it is not easy to turn men, especially illiterate peasants, into revolutionary fighters. The readiness to take to arms is something that the revolutionary organization has to work hard to bring about, for men are scared when confronted with overwhelming power, and repression breeds hopelessness, compromise and avoidance. But it breeds resistance, too, and this can be built up. (It is significant that it is the total savagery of Portuguese counter-revolutionary violence that has generated the major contemporary anti-colonial armed liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné.) Just as even South African and Rhodesian ruthlessness pales in comparison to the Portuguese, so does the scale, collectivity, intensity and the violence of the resistance it provokes.

With his back to the wall, Fanon says, the knife at his throat (or, more precisely, the electrodes at his genitals), the native becomes a man. He can no longer afford random, fantastic, purely individual, or purely destructive outlets for his repressed aggression. This situation of fundamental choice, therefore, necessarily involves turning one's back on any attempt simply to survive, or to live by one's wits. "You can no longer", Fanon remarks, "be a fellah, a pimp or an alcoholic as before." Hence, he claims, violence often occurs as a collective act, in which each individual performs "irrevocable actions" as part of a group. In Mau Mau attacks, he says, commonly "each person struck the victim, and was thus personally responsible for the death of that victim". Violence of this kind is thus a social violence, and the transformations of personality entailed are social transformations. Hence, also, the common phenomenon of the puritanism of revolutionaries, and the remarkable individual manifestations of this kind of revolutionary transformation of the personality evinced in such autobiographies as that of Malcolm X, who changed from being pimp, hustler, lindy hopper and ~~zool-suiter~~, a predator upon White women who was ashamed of his crinkled hair, as a result of his conversion, firstly, to messianic religious Black Nationalism under Elijah and later to a more universalistic revolutionary Islam which renounced Black racism and which was so threatening to racists of all colours that it brought him a violent death.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, for Fanon, violence cannot be treated either in absolute

moral terms or ahistoric social terms. Initially the wickedness of the animal that occasionally bites back when harassed and cornered once too often, becomes transformed into a means of social renewal when harnessed to revolutionary ends, the only mode of securing justice in that kind of society where, as he remarks, "there has not yet been a single Frenchman indicted before a French court of justice for the murder of a European" (p. 72).

In such popular writing, Fanon is commonly spoken of as an "apostle of violence", one who elevates violence into a mystique as an end in itself. This is a travesty of his treatment of violence as a social practice whose significance is relative and situationally-determined. It is legitimate, indeed sacred, where it is used instrumentally as the means of revolution, and through revolution leads to the beginning of a higher social order and the development of new human potential.

Far from celebrating violence as an absolute, Fanon insists that "hatred is not a programme" for the revolution, even whilst armed struggle is in progress. He also rejects, despite those who misrepresent him, any form of racialism, not just White racialism. The inverted version of White racism, often fathered into Fanon is more appropriately attributed to Sartre's misrepresentation of his thinking in the preface to *Les Damnés*.

Fanon's view of violence, then, is no cult of destruction. Indeed, in one important respect it is not realpolitik at all, but romantic idealism.

It is paradoxical, indeed, that the man who, above all others, excoriated the neo-colonialist nationalist bourgeoisie as a "good for nothing", inauthentic bourgeoisie, incapable of transforming society since it is a mere dependency of international capital, using the State and Party to extract pelf and to repress discontent, should also have written of a vision of an independent Algeria which reads like an account of the Garden of Eden.<sup>16</sup> It is obviously partly explicable in terms of his desire not to undermine revolutionary morale by raising doubts about whether an independent Algeria was going to be so marvellous after all. But he does seem to have romantically assumed that liberated Algeria would be a "non-antagonistic" extension of the revolutionary underground cell—where "the citizens should be able to speak, to express themselves . . . , [where] the branch meeting and the committee meeting are liturgical acts". But those who actually won out were not the elements represented by Fanon's colleague, Ben Bella, but the Army which had spent the war outside Algeria, in the shape of Boumédiène's Islamic chauvinistic authoritarian military regime, an Algerian version of the now-familiar Nasserite mix.<sup>17</sup> Fortunately, Fanon did not live to see this. Had he

lived, he must surely have gone the way of Ben Bella, unless some peripheral and honorific position could have been found for him as a distinguished theorist no longer in active politics, like Plekhanov after 1917 in the USSR—a role, as an activist, that he would have rejected.

A further unresolved contradiction in Fanon's ideas on violence has been noted, mainly by the pacifist critics, at the level of the individual. They point out that though he celebrates the use of violence against the colonizer as a positive reassertion of independent human identity on the part of the colonized, his own clinical notebooks reveal cases of Algerians who had planted bombs, or killed White men selected at random in revenge for similar killings, but who had suffered severe mental disturbances as a result of so doing. Caute further observes that Fanon's "psychiatric case histories concern not only the victims but also the perpetrators of violence" (p. 87), and also points out that the use of violence was equally disturbing to those Algerians who used it on the colonialist side, for Fanon records cases of policemen who had cracked as a result of their experiences as torturers, etc.

The shortcomings of any simplistic celebration of violence, however, are not limited to the level of individual psychosis. It is also seriously misleading at the societal-political level. The justification of the continuation of military and terroristic styles of government generated in underground and revolutionary civil war conditions into the post-revolution era in Russia, via the theory of "intensified class struggle", is a monumental warning of one possible outcome of the institutionalization of violence as a mode of social control.<sup>18</sup>

### *The Agency of the Revolution*

But in the sixties, Fanon's appeal, and particularly his insistence on the necessity of violent armed challenges, fell upon receptive ears as a result of the Cuban experience and the example of Viet Nam in successfully standing up to the USA. As with the appeal of Che Guevara it represented a "voluntaristic" brand of revolutionism which was impatient with the determinism of those who had been waiting until conditions were "ripe" for the last two generations. The success of the eighty crazy men who landed in the *Granma* seemed to suggest that this achievement could be reproduced anywhere if only men would stand up and fight. (The attempt to reproduce Cuba in the sociologically wildly inappropriate circumstance of the closed corporate communities<sup>19</sup> of highland Bolivia, in the aftermath of a land reform, amongst Indians to whom the guerrillas were as Martian invaders, of course proved disastrous. Similarly, for Africa, Fanon's exhortations to instant revolutionary action contributed to premature and bloody reverses.)

But his revolutionary theory goes far beyond the mere emphasis on action that is all that most people seem to get out of him. He recognized clearly the central role of the party as the organizer of the revolution. Furthermore, he attempted to identify those strata from whose ranks the revolutionaries would be recruited, and those which would be likely to support the status quo. In doing so, he was obliged to provide an overview of both colonial and post-colonial society.

The key classes providing support for the revolution, for Fanon, are (1) the peasantry and (2) the lumpenproletariat, though for either class to struggle with success they must unite with "urban intellectuals", a small number of whom "go to the people" in the countryside and begin to live and work among them. The revolutionary struggle itself creates the political party. (Here the resemblance to Debray is close.) By contrast, bourgeois politics (before and after Independence) is something that takes place in the capital; the peasantry are treated as "incapable of governing themselves"; the bourgeoisie shun the country districts as if they were plague-zones; and the rural poor themselves also flock to the towns. Bourgeois parties, then, are imitations of urban European politics, and have no organic relationship to the culture of the society.

The strategy for the revolutionaries is the antithesis of this: to root themselves in the rural areas as equals, not superiors; to engage in armed struggle; and to establish a second social base among the lumpenproletariat. (This central requirement, if neglected, is paid for dearly, for the guerrillas cannot even find their way about a countryside with which they are unfamiliar unless the local peasants guide them. The blind wanderings of Guevara's men in Bolivia are eloquent testimony.)

Fanon's belief in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry today seems quite uncontroversial. But only twenty-five years ago it was rank heresy to orthodox Marxists, for example. Only the success of the Chinese Revolution made it acceptable. His notion of the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, however, is still largely ignored, partly because the idea is too novel for people with fixed ideas to absorb easily, and in part because it had long been declared wrong in the sacred texts they adhere to.

For the notion is not new. It was part of the stock-in-trade of nineteenth-century anarchists, nihilists and terrorists, who believed in the "cleansing" power of the lumpenproletarians, including the criminal elements among them, as a force which would destroy the social order. This was a major issue of contention between Marx and Bakunin, as was Bakunin's converse belief that the proletariat were inherently a bureaucratized, non-revolutionary force. Because

Marx excoriated the *lumpenproletariat* of his day, contemporary Marxists have usually been content to parrot his views as definitive.

It is high time that they stopped looking at the twentieth century through nineteenth-century eyes. For one of the major features of the contemporary Third World is the explosive growth of urban populations composed of immigrants from the countryside and the smaller towns who are not established proletarians either in terms of occupation—since they live in a chronic state of unemployment or under-employment—or of political culture, since they have not absorbed the life-style and mentality of established urban workers. Countries like India and China are indeed overwhelmingly peasant societies.<sup>20</sup> But in Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay, 40 per cent and more of the population live in towns or cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. Some cities even have substantial developed industry: Johannesburg or Sao Paulo. But most of them are incapable of absorbing the growing populations into productive employment, for they are under-industrialized cities. The cities of the Old World grew equally explosively during successive Industrial Revolutions. In the long run, they were able to absorb these new populations because they were expanding economies, whatever their ups and downs. The new Third World cities cannot cope with the human flood, except where ruthless controls are operated to keep the inflow in line with the requirement for urban labour. Thus in Johannesburg, despite the rhetoric of *apartheid* and the Bantustan policy, the African population expanded by half a million in the 1950s.<sup>21</sup> Every year, thousands of new recruits flock to the *favelas*, *barriadas*, *bidonvilles*, shanty-towns or whatever the local name is for the universal phenomenon of life, in encampments made out of cardboard, flattened petrol-tins, and old packing-cases. Whatever term we use to describe this social category it is high time to abandon the highly insulting, inaccurate and analytically befogging Marxist term *lumpenproletariat* which is so commonly used. "Underclass" or "subproletariat" would seem much more apt characterizations of these victims of "urbanization without industrialization": the central attribute that distinguishes Manila, Rio, Saigon, Cairo, Bangkok, the cities of the Third World, from those of developed countries. For these people are at the bottom of the heap. In comparison, the established industrial proletariat, where it exists, is relatively privileged and secure as Fanon pointed out. Hence the immigrants constitute a stratum beneath those who may only have their labour-power to sell, but do at least succeed in selling it. We could almost speak of the "non-working classes", a phrase which carried the dual implication of social proximity to their closest reference-group, their successful neighbours who have made the working class, but which at the same

time emphasizes the important social distance between **them**—"property" in jobs.

Many writers have emphasized the volatility of this new population. For many of them, especially in the early years of town life, insecurity is the normal condition of their lives, and obtains in all dimensions of their lives. They have no steady jobs; they live from hand to mouth, sell a few stolen goods here, buy farm-produce from relatives and resell them so as to "make" a hundredth part of a penny profit. Sol Tax's term, "penny capitalists",<sup>22</sup> describes the scale of their operations well. Sometimes they get a brief job as a coolie; a vast mass of them live off their relatives, with whom they live on arrival in the city and on whom they fall back when times are **bad**.<sup>23</sup> Their domestic and marital life is similar: a set of disconnected episodes rather than a continuous series of unfolding successive phases in the normal development sequence of family-life: getting married, having children, their growing up, their leaving home, etc. For the lower depths, marriage itself is abnormal, "faithful concubinage", fatherless, matricentral families the norm. Residentially, the family has no home, only a temporary dwelling-place; they live in shanty-towns made of packing-cases, not in houses, not even in slum-houses.

Coming from the rural areas, and unable to find employment, the process of becoming absorbed and accepted within the urban culture is a **difficult** one. Their identification with city life is further impeded because they are not yet fully divested of their rural integument. Many of them come as "target" workers, hoping to make money which they can invest (usually in land or in a shop) back in the village later. These people have no intention of becoming permanent city-dwellers. They **are** not even necessarily men who have lost their land. Many of them retain holdings in the village and have claims to the support of their kin there. The money they send home helps keep the village economy going, in some **situations**;<sup>24</sup> the women, children and old men carry the brunt, but can hire labour with the cash sent home, or else make up the **difference** between lowered agricultural output and their wants from these remittances. Nor is the umbilical cord to the village necessarily decisively cut in other ways. Where it is geographically and financially feasible (e.g., in the city of East London described by Philip Mayer in *Tribesmen and Townsmen*, OUP, 1961), or at the end of contracts in the mines of Peru or Southern Africa, men return home for visits. Mayer shows that his "Red" (not communists but traditionalists—because of the red ochre they use on their clothes) townsmen spend most of their time in the city with **fellow** slum-dwellers from similar rural backgrounds: people from the same province, tribe or village. It is with

these people that they form urban voluntary associations, where they have any at all.<sup>55</sup> Their key social values are those of rural, not urban life. They are, he says, "encapsulated" within the city, in it, but not of it. In the past, links with the countryside have been also activated in times of economic distress, when thousands fled back to the alternative of the villages. But the obverse is more common today: in a bad year, as many as 200,000 people will quit the backlands of the North East of Brazil and move South.<sup>56</sup> Most of us might think hell preferable to the limbo they inhabit in the cities, but for them it represents a distinct improvement upon village life: otherwise they would not be where they are. In the early days of colonialism, they had to be forced out to work on plantations and in factories. Now they go readily. Many regimes indeed, have to *force* them to go back to the villages.

Overall, then, they are turning their backs on the village, whether the exodus takes place once and for all, or is stretched out over time. So if they do not become instant proletarians, they equally do not remain simply peasants living in the city. Whatever their initial intentions, where force is not used to return them, few return permanently. There are, of course, very many varied forms of mobility and migration, so that, generalization is extremely difficult. Circulatory migration is normal, for example, in southern Africa, because of political factors. Where the decision to migrate or return home is left to the individual, the trend is unmistakable: however much they may think of, and talk about, the village as "home", even after decades of living in the city, the truth is that home is now this world of the shanty-town. Few of them will return home permanently. The overall directional tendency is one-way, from the country to the town. Sheer economic pressure now usually does the job without any political intervention by the State, for the countryside can no longer support them, certainly not in the style to which they have become, not so much accustomed (for they live miserably), but to which they aspire. Their poverty is often absolute—a sheer struggle to survive—but is usually enhanced because of newly-generated relative deprivations. Their expectations are indeed rising, because their reference points are no longer the kinds of wealth and status traditionally available in village society, but those which they observe their more fortunate fellows to have achieved in the towns, and even (revolutionary thought!) the lives which White men, or the new élites which have displaced the White men, are living.

This new population of the cities of the Third World should not be thought of in static, "structuralist" terms as a separate category—lumpenproletarians—distinctly marked off from the peasants on the one hand and the workers on the other. As we have seen, they are

only recent ex-peasants in many cases so that they are essentially *people in process*, not a fixed and consolidated, let alone self-conscious and organized social class. They are *becoming* townsmen—eventually, they hope, a part of the settled, employed urban population.

Fanon perceived that this population was a new element inadequately catered for in existing theorizing about the Third World. He was one of the first to appreciate not simply the existence and the sheer size and rate of growth of these populations, but their revolutionary potential. In place of the familiar revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry, he posited an alliance between the peasantry and the urban underclass. It was heresy almost as startling as that on which Mao Tse Tung based the Chinese Revolution, by his *de facto* substitution of the peasantry for the proletariat as *the* crucial revolutionary class. Mao, like most innovators, was denounced as a revisionist, and removed from his then Party office. For the theory that the peasantry had revolutionary potential seemed to possess one singular property: it ran counter to the experience of most recorded history. It seemed preposterous. (Nowadays, the opposite is, equally fallaciously, assumed: that peasants everywhere are going to be the decisive revolutionary force. Partisans of this notion have had to think again, after Bolivia.)

Mao based his theory not on general assumptions about some abstract "peasantry", but on a most careful examination of the specific social and cultural features of the situation in Hunan in 1926. Fanon, much less rigorously, based his ideas on his experience of Algiers. Just as Mao had to face those who used the traditional passivity of the peasantry to deride his new strategy, critics were not slow to use historical experience of the "city mob" as a conservative-populist force as a stick with which to beat Fanon.<sup>17</sup> For throughout history, the volatility of the urban poor has been harnessed by organizers of reaction to rally the underclass in support of "Church and King", and similar slogans.<sup>18</sup> Fanon was aware that the urban poor could be supports for the *status quo*. But he *also* knew that peasants, supposedly inert and resigned, have *become* revolutionary in this century, when provided with ideology, leadership and organization, and that it has been the agency of the revolutionary *party* that brought about this transformation. For classes are not themselves agents of social mobilization, since they are not *so* much social groups as categories which constitute catchment-areas out of which people can be recruited to organized political (and other) activity, and which also throw up associations and organizations which can be "won over". But there has to be an agency to do this crucial work of organizing. This is the world-historic significance of Lenin's construction of the first, very rigidly centralized modern revolutionary

party, a fusing of the modern communist project for a new kind of society with a centralized mode of organization.

There seems to be no good reason why the new underclass should not become revolutionary in the second half of the twentieth century if similar leadership were given them. Certainly, they are going to erupt into all kinds of very nasty, and often sanguinary and disastrous *jacquerie*-style actions anyway. The recent threat in Bengal to take the cholera into Calcutta is one indication that a more conscious and willed destruction of urban life may be attempted. Manuals now exist telling you how to bring urban life to a halt.<sup>29</sup> The destruction of civil order, however, is not a social, let alone a socialist programme. It places an emphasis upon violence which invites the counter-violence, that, as Pontecorvo's film reflected faithfully, invited the superior counter-violence of Massu's *paras* who did, in fact, win the Battle of Algiers. Victory in the war, however, went to those for whom nationalism under middle-class leadership was the only social content to the revolution, and who carried their control over the means of violence to its logical conclusion: a military take-over. Though the propaganda of the FLN during the struggle proclaimed impeccably socialist aims, such views were not distributed where they would count: amongst those who held decisive military power, and among the masses.

The underclass has indeed been mobilized to support Nasserist regimes of the Boumédiénne type, thus confirming existing stereotypes of their negative revolutionary significance. But there seems no good reason at all why they should not be taken in quite other directions. Given good will, appropriate theory, and hard work, they are as revolutionary material as are peasants, or—one might say—these persistently non-revolutionary proletarians which revolutionaries still continue to place their hopes on. Hitherto, the political and other culture "brokers"<sup>30</sup>—to use Eric Wolf's term<sup>30</sup>—who have organized them have been reactionary forces. At present, the dominant outlook of the underclass is usually that described by Mangin for the *barriada* residents of Lima :

**"Work hard, save your money, trust only family members (and them not too much), outwit the State, vote conservatively, if possible, but always in your economic self-interest; educate your children for their future and as old age insurance for yourself. [They aspire] toward improvement of the local situations with the hope that children will enter the professional class."<sup>31</sup>**

One of the crucial reasons why the underclass has, indeed, generally constituted a support of the status quo is that they have been rejected by revolutionaries and courted and won over by their opponents, and one of the major factors keeping the underclass depoliticized or

even positively conservative is the very theory that they are a lumpenproletariat. Revolutionary theory has thus had a self-defeating effect, since most revolutionaries have taken notions about *lumpenproletarians* from Marx.

Marx's image of the lumpenproletariat is typified by this passage on Louis Napolkon's "Society of December 10th":

" . . . vagabonds, discharged soldiers, mountebanks, *lazzaroni*, pickpockets, *literati*, organ-grinders, rag-pickers, knife grinders, tinkers, beggars—in short, the whole indefinite disintegrated mass, thrown hither and thither, which the French term *la bohème* , . . . , this scum, offal, refuse of all classes . . . ."<sup>32</sup>

Similarly, Engels called it "the 'dangerous' class, the social scum, that passively rotting mass . . . . for the [most] part a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue . . . .", and as ". . . . the worst of all possible allies . . . . absolutely venal and absolutely brazen . . . . Every leader of the workers who uses these scoundrels as guards or relies on them for support proves himself by this action a traitor to the movement".

Bruce Franklin has shown the inaccurate and confusing nature of these views about a class composed of people from all classes, but mainly impoverished proletarians, and how Lenin and Mao exhibited a better understanding of the lumpenproletariat, embodied in the latter's remark:

"Brave fighters but apt to be destructive, they can become a revolutionary force if given proper guidance."<sup>33</sup>

Ruling classes should be very grateful that modern revolutionary leaders have more often taken their ideas on the lumpenproletariat from Marx rather than Mao, for treating people like apolitical pariahs will help to ensure that they remain so. As Raymond Williams remarked of a similar **denigratory** categorization, that of "mass culture": "There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeing people as *masses*".<sup>34</sup> That shanty-town populations have hitherto "supported fundamentally conservative populist figures"<sup>35</sup> is quite true. But similar observations used to be made about the new urban populations of nineteenth-century England, or the peasants of the entire world. It would seem that one not unimportant reason why the Right has organized the urban poor is that the Left has let them get on with it while they have persisted in trying to organize the more privileged proletariat.

There is a special reason, however, why the sub-proletariat is denigrated: this is because their mode of life deviates from the lifestyle of either bourgeoisie or working class. Both find them **shocking**, for people who are very poor often survive by their wits, and by

doing illegal things. In the process, they often become labelled "anti-social". Amongst the urban underclass, there are plenty of not very "nice" people, undesirable elements who want no part of respectable values or virtues. It is these people who are often thought of as coextensive with the entire urban underclass. Fanon himself makes this identification :

"the pimps, the hooligans, the unemployed and the petty criminals . . . . , the prostitutes . . . . and the maids who are paid two pounds a month, all the helpless dregs of humanity, who turn in circles between suicide and madness. . . ."

A revolutionary theorist and practitioner who has not made this mistake is Amilcar Cabral. Cabral recognizes **two** categories of what he calls "rootless" people in the towns :

"One of these two groups does not really deserve the name of 'rootless', but we have yet to find a better name for them. The other group is easily identified and might easily be called our lumpen-proletariat, if we had anything in **Guiné** we could properly call a proletariat: they consist of beggars, layabouts, prostitutes, etc.

Now it is on the first of these two rootless groups that we have concentrated particular attention, and it is a fact that they have played an important part in our liberation struggle. They consist of a large number of young folk lately come from the countryside, and retaining links with it, who are at the same time beginning to live a European sort of life. They are usually without any training and live at the expense of their **petty-bourgeois** or labouring **families**."<sup>19</sup>

This analysis (given, incidentally, at the **Frantz Fanon Centre** in Milan in 1964) decisively rejects the notion of the non-revolutionary nature of the sub-proletariat. It makes an equally sharp distinction, however, between the *déclassés*, the socially and politically demoralized section of the sub-proletariat who do in fact support the Portuguese, and the rest of the sub-proletariat, who are not *déclassés*.

Cabral is no doubt right about the *déclassés* in general. True, the distinction is not absolute. At any time, any of the sub-proletariat may become a pimp or a prostitute, a thief or a gangster; conversely, those who adopt these occupations may sometimes become politicized. The relationship between criminal cultures and the rest of society also varies from situation to situation, and we do not find the same relationship universally. Hobshawm's study of banditry, for example, shows that hostility to orthodox social values and to the State do at times provide a basis for alliances with radical social movements or generate a "social" banditry.<sup>20</sup> Even the criminal *déclassés* were regarded as revolutionary cleansing agents in the nineteenth-century writings of anarchists, terrorists and nihilists such as Bakunin,

Tkachev and Nechayev. Had criminals in fact been present in revolutionary movements in any numbers, ruling-class lumping-together of revolutionaries and criminals, "bandits", etc., normally paranoid, for once might not have been so far wide of the mark. But most were, in fact, intellectuals, not criminals. The current celebration of Genet, however, shows that the celebration of criminality and deviance as a way of life is still very much alive; in the United States in particular it is a mass cultural phenomenon. It informs the current identification with Bohemia, with tribal cultures, the search for the exotic and the irrational, for mystical, hallucinatory, sexual and other modes of seeking to transcend the quotidian, the mundane, the everyday and the routine, and also informs identification with all kinds of "alternative", "underground" deviant and minority social groups and "deviant sub-cultures".<sup>38</sup>

Despite these romanticizations, the politicization of the *déclassé*,—the "Ali la Pointe" of Pontocorvo's film—is rare; it is only common where the revolutionary party exercises decisive political and ideological hegemony in the city. But Fanon's assumption that "the rebellion will find its urban spearhead" within this sub-proletariat, that "[this] horde of starving men constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people", nevertheless reveals an understanding of the Third World urban life, and a readiness to think, that is absent amongst those who go on parroting the conventional wisdom of the European Left about the proletariat, and among those who conduct abstract and sectarian debates about the primacy of the peasantry versus the primacy of the proletariat.

Neither of them ever do any serious research. And what is striking about Cabral's analysis is that it is rooted in a profound examination and understanding of not only the social structure but also the culture of Guiné. He opens his analysis by distinguishing between the urban and the rural areas. Then he discusses the "stateless" groups like the Balante and the "state" societies such as the Fula. He goes on to make the crucial cultural distinction between Muslim and "animist", to point to the differing position of *women* in these various societies and to varying forms of marriage, to differences in types of political authority at village level, and to different forms of land-ownership and land-usage. His type-cases (Fula and Balante) do not simply reproduce European class-categories, but spell out the *African* stratification system; chiefs, nobles and religious figures at the top; then itinerant artisan; then itinerant traders; then peasants.

When he turns to the towns, the first major distinction drawn is between Europeans and *Africans*. Each of these is then sub-divided: Europeans into high officials and managers of enterprises; medium

officials; small traders, those employed in commerce; the liberal professions, and the workers (mainly skilled). This concreteness is also applied to the African urban population: higher officials; middle officials; the liberal professions; then petty officials in commerce with contracts, and those who can be sacked from one day to the next. Farmers are part of these backward non-industrial towns, too. Finally, he discusses the wage-earners:

**"those who work without contracts, dockworkers, workers in boat-transport, domestic servants (mainly men), workers in repair shops and small factories, and porters, etc."**

His conclusion is significant:

*"You will notice that we are careful not to call them a proletariat or a working-class."*

All this is a long way from those crude Marxist models of "social structure" that restrict themselves solely to an occupational classification, and recognize only such broad categories as "bourgeoisie", "proletariat" and "peasantry", and a few sub-categories. What these analyses totally lack, of course, is not simply the specificity of Cabral's analysis but his introduction of *cultural* attributes of social groups: religion, the position of women, ethnicity, and so forth.

A society like this is quite unlike European industrial capitalist societies. If it lacks a proletariat, neither is its peasantry initially revolutionary at all, even though it is, as Cabral says, the "real exploited element". It is not even a landless rural population of any size. But Guiné is a very backward society indeed, and cannot be taken as a prototype of the Third World. In particular, its sub-proletariat is very different from those populations which have lived in the large cities of Asia, and Latin America now for generations in some cases. Plainly, sub-proletariats in other societies, with different cultures and different histories, will be very often different also.

In longer-established communities, like the massive *bustees* of Calcutta or the *barriadas* of Lima, the residents are by no means all recent arrivals. Moreover, to be without a permanent and legal dwelling-place does not necessarily mean that one is unemployed. For some of the shanty-town population, indeed, life actually improves. The population is differentiated when it arrives, and class and other differences emerge over time:

**Mangin<sup>29</sup>** shows that the settlements of long-standing in Latin America commonly recruit their members from the city itself, or from small towns, not directly from the countryside. The very formation of the settlement often involves a most highly-organized

"invasion" of illegally-occupied land, and a consequent persisting defensive organization (for a while at least). There is often a high level of organized associational life. Nor does "empirical evidence indicate that crimes occur more frequently within squatter settlements than outside" (p. 71). "Family and kinship relations are strong and provide a degree of crisis insurance (p. 72). Squatter settlements involve considerable investments of capital, and improved housing is built wherever possible. Businesses, markets, and services develop. Usually over two-thirds of the active population have jobs, though a very high proportion of these may be casual. Literacy rates are remarkably high. The lives of these shanty-town dwellers are thus far from being unstructured and hopeless. Tens of thousands, however, are still wretched and insecure; they are ambivalent in their mixture of pessimism and optimism: "the same people who see the future becoming blacker every day have hope for the future" (op. cit., p. 73).

Patently, Lima is not Bissau, and Bissau is not Calcutta. None of these constitutes the prototype of the Third World city, which is a various and changing phenomenon. There may well be as great a range of differences between shanty-towns as there is between one city and another. Settlements established at different points in time, within different political cultures, have different political connections. These depend, often, upon the relationships established with political parties during the critical formative years of growth of the settlement. The crucial variable is the agency that acts as the agent of mobilization. Some of the most recent settlements have links to the newer revolutionary movements. Schram has claimed that the "backbone" of the Chinese Communist army in 1928 was "not made up of peasants, still less of workers, but rather of rural vagrants or *éléments déclassés*, who were given intensive political training".<sup>49</sup>

It is not good enough to simply go on proving that sub-proletarians have generated no revolutionary theory, never act unless led, have been conservative, etc. Similar things were said in history about women, Blacks, the proletariat, colonial peoples, and so on. Sub-proletarians, then, are not necessarily "anomic" or devoid of collective self-consciousness, though at present such consciousness is likely to be of a "communal" rather than a political or trade union variety. By "communal", I mean a sense of common identity as sharing a life-style, within, usually, a local community, which is distinctly different from that of other classes: in this case, the bourgeoisie or the long-established working class. Communal class-consciousness takes the form of a diffuse sense of being part of Hoggart's "Us" as against "Them", and generates a solidarity which finds practical expression in inter-personal mutual aid rather than collective political action.

The importance of this kind of solidarity is not appreciated in most sociological theory. Marxists write off the sub-proletariat as "pre-" or "falsely" conscious. Writings from the Chicago School of the 1920s to the Moynihan Report regurgitate tired theories about "social disorganization" and "social pathology".

Yet we all know that slum life is often highly structured at primary group level. Further, we know that such groups are often articulated to wider social institutions, e.g., to political parties (usually via patronage and similar links), to criminal organizations (gangster empires, etc.), to churches, and so on. Such organizations do *organize* the sub-proletariat as effectively as they have often organized the proletariat too.

Governments of these countries, on the other hand, have been much more sensitive to these new populations than those revolutionaries who write them off as *lumpenproletarian*. They often send them back to the rural areas because they appreciate their revolutionary potential. The only groups they fear as much are the Army, the trade unions and the intelligentsia.

Fanon regarded the theory of the leading revolutionary role of the proletariat as a hangover from colonialism: a political idea imported from urbanized and industrialized Europe, where the proletariat had not produced any revolutions either. Hence his views, particularly his querying of the revolutionary contribution of the proletariat in underdeveloped countries, and his lack of admiration for the role played by institutionalized State communisms vis-a-vis colonial revolutions, have infuriated all kinds of Marxists. Thus Nguyen Nghe,<sup>44</sup> a Vietnamese writer, adheres to the traditional assertion that the Vietnamese revolution is "proletarian", even though he admits that the revolutionary armies are 95 per cent peasant in composition. Their proletarian-ness consists, in this view, in their being led by men committed to a "proletarian" perspective, i.e., one which derives from classical Marxism. A revolution led by those who base themselves on this ideology will be more soundly directed than one led by intellectuals or peasants. "A purely peasant revolution", he rebukes Fanon, "can only be a *jacquerie* with no future", will be incapable of making the transition to modern warfare, and is doomed to fall under bourgeois influence. Fanon's shortcomings are attributed to the pernicious influence of Parisian existentialism peddled by "subjectivist" and individualist intelligentsia, a philosophy which, however radical, has, he asserts, been unable to develop either an adequate political theory or an effective political movement since the Liberation.

The final sin is that Fanon is contemptuous of international class-solidarity. Fanon did believe that the re-creation of man had to be

undertaken from the Third World. He does acknowledge the help of the Communist countries but with considerable reservations, since Algeria had little help from that quarter during the revolution. Support from within capitalist countries he discounts as insignificant. So the main groupings wider than the nation that he refers to are pan-African continental identity and membership of the "Third World" of ex-colonial and still-colonial countries.

He wished to create a new, socialist, autonomous and humanistic Third World. He wished to steer clear of the embraces of communism in its institutionalized State forms. But despite his emphasis on the Third World, it was to Europe that he addressed himself. For in the end, he was not a racist: for him, one of the greatest crimes of the new bourgeois castes in neo-colonial countries was that they had installed inverted versions of White racism. But since he was himself formed, as we have shown, as a Black man amongst intellectuals in Paris, and appreciated that allies in the imperialist countries *are* important, he does not, in fact, do what he says should be done. Far from duplicating his message on cheap paper, writing it in Arabic, Swahili, Hindi or Malay, and distributing it to the peasants and sub-proletarians of the Third World, he wrote it in French and published it in Paris so that it could be read by Western intellectuals.

His influence on the Third World has therefore been quite small. It has been in the heartlands of developed capitalism that he has been influential: in the revival of direct action in Paris and Berlin, but above all in the Black ghettos of the United States where his books have sold in thousands.<sup>12</sup> Many commentators have pointed out that Fanon's readers have responded to his celebration of being Black, and his stress on "violence": that revolutions are made by having them. What they have underestimated is the importance of Fanon's message about the *lumpenproletariat*. Yet this notion is central to the theory of leading Black Panthers, for example, who reject racism and preach class alliance with oppressed people of any colour. They reject racism even though vigorously insisting that Blacks are the most severely exploited group of all<sup>13</sup> and that they constitute an "underclass" in US society, held down by *racial* discrimination on top of *class* exploitation. (Average family income for Blacks is only 53 per cent of the average family income for Whites [and slipping further, too]; five times as many Blacks under 21 are unemployed as compared with Whites, in proportion to their numbers in the population.)

The Blacks of the USA have all the characteristics Fanon outlines for the *lumpenproletarians* of the underdeveloped world. True, the urban underclass in capitalist societies is not *solely* restricted to Blacks. All the major characteristics of the life of the sub-proletariat,

from their family life-style to their employment-patterns, are equally well-documented for the "lower classes",<sup>44</sup> below the working classes, of Whites in Britain and the USA. Hence it is no surprise to find the classic analysis of a slum society of this kind is not a study of a Black ghetto at all, but of an Italian immigrant community during the Pre-World War II Depression, William Foot Whyte's *Street Corner Society*.<sup>45</sup>

But it is the Black man who is most likely to be unemployed and under-privileged. He will be treated this way because of his colour, and hence his political consciousness reflects this extra dimension of oppression. For he is more oppressed than those who merely suffer class exploitation. This kind of "overdetermined" oppression exists both in Guiné and in the United States, in the still-colonies, the ex-colonies and in the most advanced heartlands of the capitalist world. The Third World condition, therefore, is not something peculiar to a certain set of backward countries only. It is true that the mass of the exploited of the earth are to be found in Third World countries. But Third Worldness is better thought of as a social condition that can be found in the relations between centre and periphery, for instance in the relationship between Plains/prairie farmers in North America and the power-wielders in the cities "down East", or between North and South Italy. The relations between imperial states and their colonies are not so different in kind from those between centre and periphery within the imperialist "mother-country" (hence Eldridge Cleaver's distinction between "Mother Country" [White America] and "Black Country" [Black America]—both within the boundaries of the US polity). Third World conditions also typify the life of the (coloured) sub-proletariat in New York, Washington, Chicago or Watts as they do the condition of the shanty-dwellers in Lima and Calcutta.

In this sense, then, the notion of the "Third World" refers to a set of relationships, not to a set of countries. It also points to the special misery of peasantry, lumpenproletariat, and to the broad division between the White "Lords of Human Kind"<sup>46</sup> and the "Natives" of the earth, whether these be in Harlem or Hong Kong.

For Fanon, Hong Kong was far more likely to produce revolutionary challenge than Harlem. Oddly enough, he did not think about the "lumpens" in advanced capitalist countries at all. His notion of the Third World was indeed that of a set of countries in a world system of imperialism. Hence, for him, the crucial struggle was that between the "proletarian" countries of the world and imperialism. In rejecting the classical notion of the revolutionary primacy of the proletarian class, he has been anathema enough to most Marxists. By basing the world revolution on the Third World countries, rather

than on the proletariats of all countries, he compounded his heresy in Marxist eyes.

Yet Fanon said clearly, too, that independence was not the end, that the neo-colonial castes had to be overthrown. His thinking takes place within Marxist categories and assumptions, and is not a rejection of Marxism. Marxism is so much a part of the intellectual equipment of twentieth-century man that the search for the "true Marxism", in any case, is a matter of opinion. There are now as many "Marxisms" as there are "Christianities", made up of permutations of Marxist themes, which can also be blended with ideas not found in the founding fathers. Lenin, Mao and others were themselves revisionists insofar as they departed from established ideas. And in one important respect, Lenin anticipated Fanon, for he did say that the ultimate triumph of world communism was assured because of the growing revolt of the mass of mankind that was located in the *colonial* world—notably India and China. And it is this idea that one finds, too, in the contemporary Chinese theme of the world's cities being surrounded by the world's countryside.

The most decisive revolutionary challenges are still likely to come from within the Third World. But this does not mean that the developed world is inoculated against internal challenges for ever. France 1968 showed that. Ten years ago, ideologists like Daniel Bell were proclaiming the "End of Ideology".<sup>47</sup> They believed that there were no longer any insoluble issues dividing the populations of the advanced capitalist countries "antagonistically". Hence there was no need for "ideologies" to justify sectional (e.g., class) interests, (since these were compatible and negotiable through the exercise of reason on the part of institutionalized "voices" of the various parties in industry), nor any place for "utopian" dreams of a better society, for the good society, Lipset told us, had already arrived: we were living in it.<sup>48</sup> Differences did remain, but these were not severe; far more striking was the existence of broad areas of agreement on fundamentals, and the further agreement that the remaining differences were to be dealt with within the rules of the democratic game, in which opposition to the existing Government was legal and institutionalized, and the Government could be constitutionally replaced by the Opposition. In such a two-party system, one party was the party of progress, and the other of caution. It was essentially a *parliamentary* conception of democracy. Notions of popular participation in Government, or of direct contact between ruled and rulers, are dismissed as no part of democracy. They were labelled "populism", and were a threat to democracy proper.<sup>49</sup> Similar ideas have been professed by Robert Mackenzie and Bernard Crick in this country.

In the decade that followed the emergence of this theoretical vogue, the United States was rocked by political battles over Civil Rights, Viet Nam, and student unrest, often violently. Surely no theory has ever been made to look more idiotic more quickly than the notion of the "end of ideology".

It is important to note that the revolt began amongst America's Blacks with the rise of Martin Luther King. It spread to students who went South on the Freedom Rides with SNCC. They took back to the campuses an awareness of the grim reality of power in the United States, and new techniques of resistance, particularly direct action, which they learned down South. Viet Nam provided the occasion to use them. Black protest down South dialectically sparked off resistance amongst privileged White students. But the most explosive challenge on the streets came from the mass of the American Black population who now live in the cities.<sup>10</sup> They know only too well that they are an underclass. Their spokesman, Bobby Seale, for example, uses the word "lumpenproletariat" as a matter of course to describe the Black urban population.<sup>11</sup> But the theoritization of the notion of Blacks as a specially oppressed underclass has been best expressed by Eldridge Cleaver :

"After studying Fanon, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale . . . ■ adopted the Fanonian perspective, but they gave it a uniquely Afro-American content . . . .

We have in the United States a 'Mother Country Working Class', and a 'Working Class from the Black Colony'. We also have a Mother Country Lumpenproletariat and a Lumpenproletariat from the Black Colony . . . ■

. . . . We are Lumpen . . . ■ The Lumpenproletariat are all those who have no secure relationship or vested interest in the means of production and the institutions of capitalist society. That part of the 'Industrial Reserve Army' held perpetually in reserve; who have never worked and never will; who can't find a job, who are unskilled or unfit, who have been displaced by machines, automation, and cybernation, and were never 'retained or invested with new skills'; all those on Welfare or receiving State Aid. . . . Also the so-called 'Criminal Element', those who live by their wits . . . . those who don't even want a job . . . . in short all those who simply have been locked out of the economy and robbed of their rightful social heritage.

But even though we are Lumpen, we are still members of the proletariat. . .

In both the Mother Country and the Black Colony, the working class is the right wing of the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat is the left wing . . . . We definitely have a major contradiction between the working class and the lumpenproletariat . . . . The Labor movement have abandoned all basic criticism of the capitalist system of exploitation . . . . (it) has become a new industrial elite.<sup>12</sup>

He goes on to say that the students focus their rebellions on the campuses, the working class on factories and picket lines, and the lumpens on the streets. If one had to choose between the relevance of Marx's analysis of the *lumpenproletariat* in his day, and that of Eldridge Cleaver, one would have to conclude that Cleaver's is steeped in a direct awareness of the life of a mass underclass, stigmatized by colour, and that Marx's is a century out of date. Far from developing an independent anti-Marxist ideology, Black Panther theorists work within a clearly Marxist framework. But they have introduced an element completely missing before: the notion of the revolutionary role of the "lumpenproletariat".

Fanon's ideas have been received most enthusiastically not among the sub-proletariat of the Third World, but in the Third World enclaves of the American ghettos.

The reasons for this are not hard to seek. The underclass in the United States has had its intellectuals to speak for it in the same way that intellectuals in the past have articulated the interests of the working class. (Marx, Engels, Lenin or Mao were no horny-handed sons of the soil or the work-bench.) The underclass in the underdeveloped world has few such persons to speak for it. Fanon has been the major exception.

In an era when the growth of the sub-proletariat is a central feature of the world scene, it would be pointless to neglect the ideas of those who speak for the sub-proletariat. Soon they may start to speak for themselves, and they may well say different things from Newton, Carmichael, Cleaver or Seale. Nor need we accept the idea that the sub-proletariat are the only or the prime **revolutionary** force. They are not even inherently revolutionary. (But no social class is "inherently" anything.) Where they go depends on who approaches them, and how. But it is a fair guess that they will not continue to be the upholders of the *status quo*: the sub-proletariat, at that point, will become a directed and self-conscious force. The actualization of such a latent possibility is something that can only come about by political action. It is also extremely difficult, like all revolution, and will take a long time with many setbacks, like all revolutions. But political activists, like analysts and researchers of all kinds, have been hamstrung by outmoded theory. The kind of "situated" analysis grounded in clear-eyed empirical experience of the situation provided by Cabral is a *sine qua non*. Cabral's real uniqueness, however, is something even the clearest analyst lacks: the testing and refashioning of his theories in the course of directly carrying through a revolution.

It will not do, then, to parrot Cabral's findings for **Guiné**. Rather,

similar analyses of the social structure and culture of other countries is called for. For each country has its own sub-proletarian culture, which is not easily grasped precisely because it is protean and emergent.

Thus Eldridge Cleaver's formulation of the situation of the lumpenproletariat, whilst emphasizing their specially oppressed special oppression, sees them as still "part of the proletariat". There are thus ambiguities in his position, and in most other contemporary thinking about the "lumpenproletariat". Are these latter part of or separate from the proletariat? Are the latter privileged? Are they, indeed, even hostile to the "lumpens", a labour aristocracy or Clite—possibly shock troops of Right wing populism (a nice inversion of the view that it is the "lumpens" who are the Right-wing shock "disposable masses" of the Louis Napoléon type), as against the radical "lumpens"?

The ambiguities are not just functions of unclear thinking, I would suggest. They reflect the existentially ambiguous status of the sub-proletariat in society, and the irreality of any sharp or universal dividing-line in situations where even regularly-employed workers have to pursue secondary occupations ("moonlighting") in order to make ends meet, often criminal occupations: where men float between regular and irregular income-opportunities and are often involved in both: and, basically, where over a half of the city population may be sub-proletarian, i.e., not engaged in full-time wage-employment. Thus in Nima, Hart shows that the "economically active" population (themselves 76.7 per cent of the whole population of working age), only 47.5 per cent were in public or private employment (60.5 per cent of the men and 4 per cent of the women). 32.9 per cent were employers or self-employed, 16.9 per cent "unemployed" (with the qualification that these figures are based on inadequate official categories). In Lagos,<sup>53</sup> Marris reports that "only 40 per cent of those at work were in wage employment" in 1959, "and many of these traded on the side". Ruth First points out, more generally, following Arrighi and Saul, Samir Amin and Mahjemout Diop, that the population that does work regularly for wages is not only small in tropical Africa, but also a very different kind of working class from that of industrial capitalist countries." Tropical Africa, for instance, has, in her words, a "tiny, stunted working class . . . only eleven out of every 100 members of the labour force are in wage employment, and this includes migrant labour, so that the proletariat proper is even smaller".

The situation in the Third World thus differs profoundly from that in the imperialist heartlands in two chief respects: the existence of a large sub-proletariat (often the largest segment of the urban

population), and the "nee-colonial" composition, as well as, commonly, the small size of the "working class". Moreover,

"everywhere government is the largest employer of labour. In Nigeria, for example, four in every ten wage-earners are typical white-collar workers, such as teachers, sales personnel and office staff. In the last ten to fifteen years, wage employment has been relatively static in Tropical Africa. In some countries, indeed, the working class has shrunk in manufacturing and service industry jobs."

This slow growth stems from the capital-intensive policies of the international corporations which dominate the economies. Arrighi and Saul have expressed the difference as one between the "permanent" and the "irregular" sections of the working class in rather different terms again. They describe the style of life of those workers who have inherited colonial salary rates, and earn three to five times as much as sub-proletarians, as that between a "labour aristocracy" much closer in life-style to the *élites* and sub-*klites* in bureaucratic employment, i.e., a "*middle class*" style of life, as against the sub-proletariat which, they say, really belongs to the *peasantry*. The categories in use thus differ a good deal, but whichever categories are used, it is the basic distinction between the two sections of the urban population that emerges.

As for the peasantry in Africa, First describes them as

"in the main neither spectacularly wealthy nor desperately poor; on the average, they are middle peasants. More marked inequalities in land-holding, and even an agricultural proletariat, have developed in some areas of West Africa. [But] across huge regions, there has emerged neither a land-owning aristocracy nor a dependent agricultural force, for there has been little dispossession of the land."

And she says significantly, of one crucial but far too understudied African revolt which has actually taken place, the "**Mau Mau**", that it was "the peasant rising of the **Kikuyu** that ignited [it] . . . the unemployed and wretched of the towns who supplied it and sustained it", and the breaking of the link between the *urban* slums and the forest which brought about **defeat**.<sup>55</sup>

One must be very careful, however, not to accept Fanon's assertion that the employed are always "privileged", since the mass of unskilled labourers in the towns are hardly living high on the hog, and since the employed poor, too, are "sub-proletarian" in living standards and pursue "informal" income-opportunities (so that is no clear border-line between "proletariat" and "sub-proletariat"). *Relatively* the latter have an extra advantage, if they can keep their jobs (for which there are always ten others waiting at the factory gate or outside the office). Only in exceptional cases, such as the African

miners in the towns of the Copper Belt, do proletarians have a highly privileged position, both in terms of income and "job property", strongly defended by powerful trade unions.

The composition, numbers, relative weight, and political involvement of proletarians, peasants and sub-proletarians all vary enormously from country to country. Where no one of them is preponderant, some combination of their joint energies is the needed revolutionary mix. Such a "pluralist" view may repel those for whom the intrinsic radicality of proletarians or peasants are absolute articles of faith. I suggest that notions about proletarians and peasants generated in very different times and places, and under social, political, economic and cultural conditions different from those which obtain today (e.g., from nineteenth-century Britain, from Tsarist Russia or inter-war China) may be as much hindrance as help, if taken as absolutes. They will also prevent us from seeing the importance of quite new populations which are neither classic proletarians nor peasants, and which have usually only been emerging in the last couple of decades. It took many decades for proletarians in Europe to become a "labour movement"; around a century for the Chinese peasantry to move from Tai Ping millenarianism to the victory of Communism. Analogous processes of political displacement and maturation are likely to be immensely speeded up in the contemporary world, and will also be very different from those of even the recent past.

In order to understand these new developments, we need, not empiricism, but empirically-grounded theory. Such theory will inevitably arrive at different conclusions-for-action for different countries. Its methodology and concepts may be applied as general strategic and "sensitizing" guides as to what to look for and as tools of investigation; but its substantive findings will be as varied as the societies to which such methods and concepts are applied.

It is high time that, in place of abstracted and sterile debates about the preferability of an urban strategy for revolution as against a rural one, or about reliance on the proletariat as against the peasantry, hard empirical analysis of the actual situations in the widely-differing countries of the Third World is undertaken. It is this that Cabral has done for Guiné, and that the Panthers have attempted for the USA, and as Mao did for Hunan in 1926, and Lenin—though probably wrong in his conclusions—for the Russian countryside before 1917. What is needed, that *is*, is not "formal" theory, but theory "grounded" in concrete examination of given societies.

In Latin America, for instance, the relationship between the urban areas and the countryside—and the *kinds* of urban and rural populations—are very different indeed, in Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile.

For Brazil, for instance, the enormous city of Sao Paulo *and* the afflicted North-East are *both* important features of the overall social situation. In India, though peasants are a decisive majority, urbanization is occurring rapidly in middle-sized cities and in the **two** massive conglomerations of Calcutta and Bombay.

Certainly, no analysis which neglects—as most do—the **sub-proletariat** of the new cities will be adequate. We are not, however, saying that sub-proletarians are "the wave of the future". They are no more *the* revolutionary force than other classes. But they are wretched and growing in numbers. Whether they become a revolutionary force, however, does not depend simply upon their "existential" situation alone (i.e., numbers, degree of misery, expectations, relations with other classes, etc., etc.) but in significant measure on the leadership they are given (if any). But this is true of proletarians and peasants too. In sum, there is no single absolute general proposition that one can make about any particular *type* of class, universally, as being *the* or even *a* revolutionary force. Proletarians today, may be even counter-revolutionary, peasants and **sub-proletarians** revolutionary or potentially so. Each class may have a **differential** significance in different countries, and this significance is a function of their position in an overall class *system* of classes.

#### NOTES

1. Notably the collection edited by Senghor, *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre Malgache de Langue Français*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948.
2. See G. R. Coulthard *Race and Colour in Caribbean Literature*, Oxford University Press, 1962.
3. Maspéro, Paris, 1961, *Cahiers Libres* Nos. 27-8; MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1963; Penguin, 1970. The "condemned", with its implications of the willed transformation of men into victims—a conscious and repressive *production* of inferiority by the powerful—would be a more apt rendering of "damnés" than either the archaic "damned" or the unfortunately now-established "wretched". The former is too religious; the latter too passive and Dostoevskian: Fanon's *damnés* "stand up" and conquer both their misery and their oppressors.
4. Coulthard, *op. cit.*, p. 84. Coulthard translates *propriétaires* as "landowners", but Roumain surely means "peasants" (oppressed or exploited micro-farmers, whether they formally own land or not). "Landowners" is too grand; ownership of a pocket-handkerchief subsistence plot scarcely justifies such a label.
5. *op. cit.*, p. 45.
6. Editions de Seuil, Paris, 1952.
7. David Caute, *Fanon*, Fontana/Collins, 1970, p. 48. The French campaign against the Viet Minh in 1945, moreover, had been launched by a Government which included Communist Ministers. On the international level the USSR was advocating "peaceful co-existence" and encouraging

de Gaule vis-a-vis NATO. Colonial revolutionaries, however, took the view later expressed by Guevara that "peaceful co-existence" does not include the co-existence between the exploiter and the exploited, the oppressor and the oppressed.

8. See Caute, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-60.
9. See Simon de Beauvoir, *La Force des Choses*, Gallimard, Paris, 1963, pp. 610, 619-24. Further glimpses of Fanon are obtainable from people who knew him at this and other stages of his life, in "Hommages à Frantz Fanon", *Prksence Africaine*, XL, 162, pp. 118-38.
10. Maspéro, Paris, 1962.
11. See Teodor Shanin, "The Peasantry as a Political Factor", *Sociological Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 5-47, plus his *The Awkward Class*, Clarendon Press (forthcoming).
12. Boguslaw Galeski, *Basic Concepts of Rural Sociology*, Manchester University Press, 1971.
13. See my "The Revolutionary Party as an Agency of Social Change (or The Politics of Mah Jong)", Michigan State University (forthcoming).
14. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, University of California Press, 1969.
15. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, Grove Press, New York, 1965.
16. See also *La Révolution Algérienne par les textes*, Maspéro, Paris, 1962. These extracts, largely from *El Moudjahid*, the FLN newspaper, were mainly written by Fanon and close associates.
17. Eric Wolf has suggested that it is the reformist, "Jacobin Islam" of the Badissia religious reform movement which originated in the 1920s and 1930s amongst the urban and rural middling classes, that has turned out to be the victorious social creed (see his *Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century*, Faber & Faber, 1971, pp. 210-47).
18. See Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties*, Macmillan, 1968, Penguin, 1971.
19. See Eric Wolf, "Closed corporate peasant communities in Meso-America and central Java", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 13, pp. 1-18.
20. And peasant societies where land-shortage is widespread. This is reflected in the wider occurrence and the greater sharpness of revolutionary outbreak in Asia as compared to Africa, where, with important exceptions, land is still available, so that subsistence farming at least still remains possible.
21. See my "Problems of the Have-not World", in *The Times History of Our Times 1945-1970* (ed. Marcus Cunliffe), Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971, pp. 43-61.
22. *Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Economy*, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 1953, (Institute of Social Anthropology Publication 16).
23. Serious research into the economic life of the sub-proletariat is only beginning. Keith Hart, in his "Informal income opportunities and the structure of urban employment in Ghana" (in R. Jolly and C. Cruise O'Brien (eds.), *Urban Unemployment in Africa*, forthcoming) provides a pioneering study of Nima, Accra. He is led to reject the very categories "unemployed" and "underemployed", preferring instead to think in terms of "formal" and "informal income opportunities". Even those who are employed are *not* well off, but have to supplement their wages. Hence money-lending, "moonlighting", dependence on kin and living on credit, the working of land within the city, and crime, all become central features of everyday economic life.

24. See, e.g., W. Watson, *Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy: a study of the Mambwe people of Zambia*, Manchester University Press, 1958.
25. They are not so prone to form urban associations as some writers suggest, e.g., K. L. Little in *West African Urbanisation: a study of voluntary associations in social change*, Cambridge University Press, 1965. The theory that they are great "joiners", because they seek social support in cities where they are isolated, has been rejected by others, who point out that the majority are not joiners at all, and of those who are, it is people of higher socio-economic status that do the joining and leading, just as it is with the middle classes in Europe. For Africa, see A. L. Epstein's "Urbanisation and Social Change", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 8, No. 4, October, 1967, pp. 280-2. For one example out of the European literature see T. B. Bottomore, "Social Stratification in Voluntary Associations", in D. V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1954, pp. 349-82.
26. See Josuk de Castro, *Defeat in the Northeast: Poverty and Revolution in the Northeast of Brazil*, Random House, New York, 1966.
27. Populism exists in both Left and Right varieties, of course. But the basic notions of participation and control over leaders are far from conservative. See *Populism: its meanings and national characteristics*, (eds. G. Ionescu and E. Gellner), Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.
28. *Op. cit.*, Chapter VII. See also George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1959; *Wilkes and Liberty*, Clarendon, Oxford, 1962; *The Crowd in History, 1730-1848*, who shows that political action on the streets was by no means necessarily confined to the urban poor, however, nor was it always reactionary.
29. Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat: a practical handbook*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969.
30. E. R. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 58, No. 6, pp. 1065-78.
31. William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: a Problem and a Solution". *Latin American Research Review*, Vol II, No. 3, Summer 1967, pp. 65-98.
32. From "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoléon", *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968, p. 138.
33. Bruce Franklin, "The Lumpenproletariat and the Revolutionary Youth Movement", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 11-25.
34. *Culture and Society, 1750-1950*, Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1961, p. 289.
35. David G. Epstein's "A Revolutionary Lumpen-Proletariat?", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 21, No. 7, December 1969, p. 54-6.
36. Quoted in Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, Penguin, 1969, pp. 50-1. A markedly different translation of the whole text is given in *Revolution in Guinea: an African People's Struggle*, Stage 1, 1971, pp. 46-61.
37. See E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, Manchester University Press, 1959, esp. Chap. VII, and *Bandits*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.
38. See Stuart Hall "The Hippies" in Julian Nagel (ed.), *Student Power*, Merlin Press, 1969.
39. *Op. cit.*
40. Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse Tung*, Pelican, 1969, pp. 71-2.
41. "Frantz Fanon et les Problèmes de l'Indépendance", *La Pensée*, No. 107, February, 1963, pp. 22-36.
42. See Stokely Carmichael, "Black Power" in *The Dialectics of Liberation*

- (ed. David Cooper), Pelican, 1968, pp. 150-74. He describes **Fanon** as "one of my patron saints". See also **Eldridge Cleaver**, *Soul on Ice*, Panther Books, 1970, and **Bobby Seale**, *Seize the Time*, the Story of the Black Panther Party, Arrow Books, 1970.
43. **Ronald Segal**, "The White World of the United States", Chapter 4, *The Race War: the world-wide conflict of race*, Pelican, 1966, pp. 194-299.
  44. **Josephine Klein's** phrase in her *Samples from English Cultures*, Routledge and **Kegan Paul**, London, 1965, Vol. 1, Chapters 1 and 11.
  45. University of Chicago Press, 1943.
  46. **Victor Kiernan**, *Lords of Human Kind: European attitudes toward the outside world in the Imperial Age*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
  47. Collier Books, N.Y., 1961.
  48. **S. M. Lipset**, *Political Man*, Chapter VII, "The End of Ideology?", Mercury Books, London, 1963.
  49. See my "The concept of populism" in **Ionescu and Gellner** (eds.), *Populism*, pp. 212-50.
  50. With massive international migration from the Mediterranean poorer countries to the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe, shanty towns are now found in e.g. France.
  51. See, for example, **Bobby Seale's** references to **Fanon** and to the Blacks of the USA as a Lumpenproletariat, *op. cit.*, pp. xi, xii, 41-2, 48, 51, 52, 55, 210, 211, 243, 250, 271, 392, 405, 418 and 473.
  52. "On the Ideology of the Black Panther Party" (n.d.), pp. 6-7.
  53. **Peter Marris**, *Family and Social Change: a study of rehousing in Lagos*, Routledge and **Kegan Paul**, p. 69.
  54. **Ruth First**, *The Barrel of a Gun: political power in Africa and the coup d'etat*, Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 1970, pp. 455-61.
  55. See my article "Mau Mau: the Revolution that Failed", in vol. III of the *Fourth Dimension of Warfare*, edited by **M. Elliott Bateman**, Manchester University Press, forthcoming.