Crisis in Eurocommunism: The French Case

Abstract

In the old days the Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) was a model of Third International propriety. It was devoted to the Russians, convinced that the Soviet Union was the socialist model to be emulated, enthusiastically accepted the International's theoretical vision, and was internally run along lines very similar to those of the CP-USSR.' Of late it has adopted "Eurocommunism." It has become decisively French, abandoned the Soviet model of socialism as a goal, committed itself to democratic norms and adopted a radical reformist United Front strategy for change. Recent events have made it clear, however, that "Eurocommunism" is not a thing whose qualities can be listed once and for all, but a complex process leading once quite predictable political formations into uncharted waters. What prompts such reflections specifically about the French variant of Eurocommunism is, of course, the French Left's failure in the general elections of 1978. These elections were to be the culmination of more than a decade of PCF devotion to a Eurocommunist United Front strategy. Up to the last minute everything indicated that in March, 1978, a French Left dedicated to serious change would come to power for the first time since Liberation. Hopes, which were very high, were smashed by the results. With the failure of the Union de la Gauche a period of reflection, debate and party crisis unprecedented in the entire history of French Communism has begun, a period in which one thing has become obvious. The Eurocommunization of French Communism to the extent which it has occurred, has created new and complex contradictions for the French party. The situation is dramatic and the stakes, not only for the PCF but for the entire European Left, are high.