

ZIMBABWE: THE NEXT ROUND*

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Marxists and other progressives have quite correctly celebrated the success of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the Zimbabwe elections of 27-29 February of this year as a triumph of heroic proportions. Whatever the difficulties which may now confront the Zimbabwean revolutionary process the fact remains that in those three days over 80 per cent of the adult African population in Zimbabwe (those who voted for ZANU and the other wing of the Patriotic Front, the Zimbabwe African People's Union—ZAPU), stood up, quite literally, to be counted in the final act of wresting their freedom from settler political domination. And they did this in spite of attempts to blunt any such statement, attempts made by British officialdom (through the terms imposed during the Lancaster House agreement and through the activities of Lord Soames and his team on the ground), by the structures, very much intact, of the Rhodesian settler state itself, and by Bishop Muzorewa and his cronies (including his huge private army, albeit one well subsumed within the white military hierarchy, of 'auxiliaries' and such backers as South Africa and a wide array of international economic concerns). Moreover, contrary to the claims of some unsympathetic journalists, the vote was for far more than merely ending the war. Most Zimbabweans sensed that the Patriotic Front, and particularly ZANU, also bore the promise of a new social order, one defined, however vaguely, in ways which would serve the interests of the broad mass of the impoverished black population and, in particular, the interests of the country's rural dwellers

The immediate aftermath of the election came as something of a surprise, however. Here was the Prime Minister-designate Robert Mugabe, the Marxist **wildman** of settler and South African propaganda whose **party's** militant Maoist formulations had scorched the pages of its journals, *Revolutionary Zimbabwe* and *Zimbabwe News*, for a number of years, announcing calmly that

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as far as we are concerned, we have stated quite clearly that we are not going to interfere with private property, whether this be farms, or the mining sector, or the industrial sector... We recognise that the economic structure of the country is based on capitalism and that whatever ideas we have must build on that. Modifications can only take place in a gradual way.

True, he looked eventually to 'meaningful change in our lives' and spoke, in following days, of the need to deal vigorously with the land question. But even the relatively modest statement of intent to 'evolve a socialist pattern' for the Zimbabwe economy which appeared in ZANU's electoral manifesto was noticeably downplayed. Now such 'socialism' as came front and centre referred primarily to the desire to meet the welfare requirements of the mass of the population in terms of health and education. Far more dramatic than any socialist themes in his initial statements, in fact, was Mugabe's embracing of General Walls, **Commander-in-Chief** of the Rhodesian Armed Forces and the man who had directed the carnage inflicted upon Zimbabwe (and upon neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia) during the war. The latter was being asked to preside over the integration of the three forces (Rhodesia's, ZANU's and ZAPU's) into a single national army, working, it was announced, 'in conjunction with the ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders' and with 'the assistance of British military instructors'. Beyond that, 'co-existence' with South Africa was stated to be a central feature of the new government's policy!

Had the electoral denouement to the eight-year war (and much longer political struggle) merely brought **forward** a neo-colonial anti-climax? Initial reaction was only somewhat mixed as white settlers, South Africa and western media-mongers alike **rushed** to embrace this show of 'pragmatism'. 'To believe it is a Marxist government seems to be totally fallacious', stated Sir **Ian** Gilmour, Britain's Deputy Foreign Secretary, almost at once in Parliament when taxed by the right wing of his own party for allowing Mugabe to slip into power. 'How Mugabe changed his spots', read the headline in London's prestigious *Observer*.

Though *Business Week* still worried 'whether Prime Minister Robert Mugabe will—nor indeed can—stick to the moderate line he has taken' (5 May 1980), Bridget Bloom of London's *Financial Times* had soon seen enough encouraging signs to conclude that 'for those people in Britain who thought that ZANU meant communism, Mr. Mugabe's victory ought to be especially poignant'. 'Perhaps', she added, 'it may become an object lesson for those who are so apprehensive about change in Namibia and South Africa!' Similarly *African Confidential*, a London-based and sometimes well-informed scandal sheet, emphasised that 'Mugabe's victory was based primarily on military stamina and traditional nationalism, not on Marxism' and looked to a 'technocratic core' in the new Cabinet to help Mugabe with 'the key theme of (his) next few months': 'the cooling of his

own militants'. Even the *Financial Mail*, South Africa's most intelligent and hard-headed business journal, which had warned darkly of a Marxist takeover of Rhodesia only weeks before (and hinted at a possible case for South African **intervention** to prevent such a result), began almost immediately after the election to speak of Mugabe as a possible 'force for stability' and within weeks stood in praise of 'the renewed and continuing evidence of moderate pragmatism from Mugabe himself.

Clearly some of this enthusiasm was genuine, whether based on a careful (if controversial) reading of the auguries by certain analysts or merely on a massive sigh of relief (the reaction of many settlers). At the same time some of it no doubt reflected the belief that even if Mugabe's concessions were merely tactical they should be encouraged in the hope of eventually hardening them into a pattern of compromise with Zimbabwe's capitalist infrastructure from which it would be difficult for the new government to retreat. Perhaps no-one presented the basis for this alternative reading of the situation as subtly as David Willers (of the egregious South Africa Foundation) in a special column of the *Financial Mail* (4 April 1980) 'What can an Italian political prisoner, who died of maltreatment by **Mussolini's** secret police in a fascist prison in 1937, have in common with Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Prime Minister-elect of the new Zimbabwe?', Willers asked, and answered his own question: 'Perhaps plenty'.

For in Willers' view Mugabe is 'no wishy-washy African socialist'. Like Gramsci, who avoided premature confrontation and counselled 'tactically winning influence and control over the trade unions, cultural agencies, media, education, religion and the main production centres', Mugabe 'appears to be following the Gramsci line in every respect and (has) thus far averted a rebellion by the bourgeoisie'.

Tactically, Mugabe has been without fault: a primary objective, namely to persuade the Rhodesian bourgeois whites that ZANU-PF is a national, credit-worthy party of reconciliation, free of obedience either to the Russians or the Chinese, has largely been achieved. The emphasis, aimed at wooing the middle classes, has been on moderation. Lulled into a sense of security by a projection of ZANU-PF as a party of economic sanity, the bourgeoisie have not complained.

... One hopes that Rowan Cronje will be proved wrong when he feared that whites would be kept on in Zimbabwe merely for economic expediency or as neutral factors of production. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Robert Mugabe will soon be taking far-reaching and meaningful steps to turn his country into a socialist state on the Gramscian model. . .

Willers' conclusion: 'There will be plenty of scope for free enterprise, but the advantages will lie with those businessmen who have learnt their dialectics!'

What are those on the left to make of such diverse interpretations? In an interview with Karen Gellen (*The Guardian*, New York, 26 March, 1980),

Kumbirai Kangai, the new Minister of Labour, challenged the 'ultra-**left**' criticism already coming from some elements of the U.S. left (which says that ZANU. . . has "sold out" the Zimbabwean revolution'.

The goals we were fighting for have not been abandoned We think people should give us a chance and see what is going to happen in our country. . . We believe we are going through a national democratic revolution whereby the institutions, the society has to be democratised. This is a national democratic phase but it is also a transition to socialism Our leader has made it clear that we envisage a socialist society in the final analysis Of course things can't be done overnight—we have to reeducate some Zimbabweans as we go along. But the means of production will have to be controlled by the peasants and workers themselves, and we are moving toward that goal.

In and of itself such a statement does not prove Willers' point, though it certainly lends it weight. Nor is it an argument for suspending judgment altogether, an error the left has made all too often in the past with reference to various presumed 'transitions to socialism'. Still, it may serve to remind us of how early in the process of defining a new Zimbabwe the present moment is, and serve too as a warning that humility and caution are in order in commenting on such a situation. Where, then, to begin an analysis of the 'next round' in Zimbabwe?

I

Obviously in making sense of the **current situation** much will depend upon our reading of the character of ZANU, of the class forces which it represents and of the kind of politics and ideology which it has come to embody—of how well, in short, ZANU itself really has 'learnt its dialectics'. Such a reading is no very straightforward exercise, however; the evidence is slippery, as we shall see, and the scope for difference of opinion and of emphasis vast. For this reason there may be some point in bracketing temporarily the ZANU question in order to look at the actual terrain for manoeuvre which confronts a Mugabe conceived, for the moment, as Willers' consummate Gramscian tactician. It is, in any case, a way of posing the issue from which Marxists can hope to learn. **Lenin's** enforced reversion to the New Economic Policy, Mao's early post-1948 dalliance with China's 'national capitalists', suggest that, in the transition to socialism, the shortest distance between two points is not necessarily a straight line, that 'ultra-leftism' can sometimes be as dangerous as going too slow. What of the Zimbabwean case in this regard?

Certainly the inherited terrain is formidably congested and the need for tactical dexterity patent, even if (especially if?) a transition to socialism is on the agenda. A good starting point would be to remind ourselves that Zimbabwe possesses a notably dependent capitalist economy, yet one which is at the same time much more developed than is the norm

in Africa Well endowed with minerals (chrome, copper, nickel, asbestos), gold is at present the country's largest foreign exchange earner, while on the agricultural side, as much as one-half of Rhodesia's agricultural production is exported, contributing a third or more of foreign exchange earnings. Nonetheless, this is also an economy where a quite highly developed manufacturing sector accounts for about a quarter of gross domestic product; this sector expanded notably after the Second World War when Southern Rhodesia was hub for the Central African Federation, grounded itself (with considerable government encouragement) during the UDI and sanctions period, and is now of substantial importance.

Despite such diversification, however, concentration of ownership and a very high degree of external control has remained one of the economy's two most distinctive characteristics (the other being the fact that black Zimbabweans are estimated to control no more than 12 per cent of the productive capacity of the economy!) Thus domestic capital—in agriculture, light industry, commerce and services—merely fill the gaps in an economy, described by Stoneman, **Bratton**, **Clarke** and others,' in which **7.6** per cent of manufacturing firms produce **68** per cent of total output and where, of the country's fifteen leading profit-earning companies, twelve are **foreign**-owned (as are all four banks), in which mining production, having quadrupled in value between **1964** and **1976**, is almost entirely dominated by foreign firms (88 per cent of jobs and 95 per cent of output), and in which, even in agriculture, perhaps as much as three-quarters of profits accrue to externally-owned plantations and estates. A number of very large companies control key sectors—Turner and **Newall** (asbestos), Union Carbide (chrome), Lonrho (mining and manufacturing), Delta (South African Breweries)—while the South African giant, Anglo-American, which is in mining (nickel, copper, coal), iron and steel, agriculture (Hippo Valley for sugar, **Mazoe** Estate for citrus), and milling and which has one or more directors on eighty-two different companies, has spread itself right across the economy. Indeed, the only real shift in this pattern during the UDI period was towards a much higher stake for South African capital in the mix, the latter now beginning to rival British capital for the lead in this respect (with American and other capital further back, though by no means absent from the game—especially in mining).

Of course these firms all rely on migrant and low-wage labour and have almost all been involved in high levels of remittance of repatriated profits and dividends, two things the Mugabe government can be expected to bridle at. But even in noting these facts in a recent special supplement on Zimbabwe, London's *Financial Times* could still smugly affirm that 'foreign-owned companies provide many jobs which the new Government cannot afford to **jeopardise** when it already has widespread unemployment to cope with. They are a primary source of imported technology for the relatively sophisticated manufacturing sector. They can provide expertise

in finding export markets. . . and they have ready access to sources of international capital.' On balance the FT apparently concludes that possession of such bargaining counters does make private capital relatively immune from radical governmental action. Note, too, the conclusion of Duncan Clarke, an economist very much more sympathetic to the cause of a transformed Zimbabwe than the *Financial Times*:

It is hard to find a sub-Saharan African example comparable to the Zimbabwean case, in which the role of foreign investments has been so long established, as deeply integrated into the sectors producing the bulk of output, so strongly interconnected with local capital, and in consequence probably as difficult to foresee being quickly and successfully altered.

Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand and indeed sympathise with the statement in the ZANU electoral manifesto to the effect that 'one of the existing practical realities is the capitalist system which cannot be transformed overnight.' Yet what meaning is then to be given to the attendant formulation that 'private enterprise will have to continue *until circumstances are ripe for socialist change*' (emphasis added)?

In fact, it has been tempting for Mugabe, on at least one occasion, to present the substantial state sector which does exist—marketing boards, electricity, railways, airline, post and telecommunications, an Industrial Development Corporation, all these together accounting for one-third of the country's total economic activity—and the quite diverse assortment of available state controls—over prices, imports, foreign exchange, new projects, many of these worked out to enable the settler state to battle sanctions—as some initial approximation to socialism. He must know better but, as hinted, it may seem to him dangerous to claim much more at present. The economy, despite an initial post-UDI decade of dramatic expansion, has more recently (since the mid-70s) experienced a serious crisis, structural in essence given the marginalisation of so much of the population, but compounded by rising oil prices, the spill-over of South Africa's own crisis, and the high costs of the war. Now that the lid is off fuller African participation in the economy (and sanctions lifted), Mugabe seems content to let businessmen, and market forces, get things moving again, rather than risk the short-term uncertainty, disruption (including possible food shortages) and *increased* unemployment that could follow from a *deeper-cutting* approach to the private sector and any resultant flight of capital and personnel. Certainly, right from the outset of their term, Mugabe and his ministers have striven mightily to scotch **rumours** that nationalisations in the **industrial** and mining sectors are on tap; moreover, it is obvious that the rather startling appointment of the Rhodesia Front's David Smith, once Ian Smith's Finance Minister, to the Commerce and Industry portfolio in the Mugabe cabinet was designed to

deliver a similar message to the private sector.

Only limited clues are available as to which way the new government is prepared to go in the longer run. It goes without saying that many (most?) elements in ZANU ultimately would be much more comfortable with a production pattern which, even at the minimum, serviced the 'basic needs' of the population in ways that 'market forces' are never likely to do. And then there is the recently published UNCTAD report, 'Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order', whose preparation was supervised on behalf of the Patriotic Front by Bernard Chidzero, then a U.N. functionary, though now Zimbabwe's Minister of Economic Planning and Development. This report, in advocating the move from political to 'economic independence', does call for a markedly increased range of state action: nationalisation of banks, extended control over industry and mining (including the possibility of nationalisation of the latter sector), and significant regulation of private sector investment decisions. In addition, it lays considerable emphasis upon the establishment of workers' control in all economic sectors. Chidzero, now receiving the report in his new role as Minister, emphasised that no 'precipitate or unconsidered measures' would follow from it. Nonetheless, the fact that Information Minister Nathan Shamuyarira affirmed 'the general thrust of the report (to be) in step with government thinking on major issues' does seem a promising augury.

Yet the *Financial Mail* (23 May, 1980) and other business papers received even this report calmly enough, the FM arguing that 'because (it) was largely prepared when the country was in the throes of a bitter war, some aspects reflect a harder line than is now likely to be adopted'. Moreover, 'it is a fact that as the ministers become more familiar with their tasks, their views on future policy are likely to change somewhat. It is one thing to adopt a firm socialist line outside government but quite another to hold firmly to that line when in office'. The FM did expect that 'economic uncertainty' and some delay in investment decisions would continue 'until the new economic policy is formulated and publicised' in detail. However it is obvious that the voices of capital, whether correct or not in their interpretation, continue to be remarkably confident that they hold a winning hand. And, after all, the FM had been able to bray only the week before at Mugabe's hasty retreat from the rather modest statement that investment, while welcome, 'must be Zimbabwe-oriented—in other words majority shareholding must remain inside the country (!) and profits reinvested'. For 'within forty-eight hours', Mugabe was assuring the AGM of the chamber of mines 'that the operative word in his (Bulawayo) **trade** fair speech had been "persuasion", not "compulsion".' Stating that 'it is not my government's intention to legislate against the repatriation of profits but rather to invite investors to join in the spirit of our **Zimbabwe**-**anisation** programme', he also denied reports that the government planned to take a stake in the mining industry or even to push a programme of

workers' committees. Obviously this is not very revolutionary stuff, any of it, and merely demonstrates the tight leash Mugabe feels himself to be on just at the moment.

The second conditioning factor in Zimbabwe's political economy is the land question, source of much of the heat behind the country's revolutionary thrust over the years and now a policy area of considerable challenge for the new government. The basic statistics are graphic enough. Historically, the country's land has been divided by statute into 45 million acres for Africans and 45 million for Europeans, a **figure** which takes on even more meaning when one realises that in 1976 there were approximately 680,000 African and only 6,682 European farmers! Add to this the fact that the so-called 'Tribal Trust Lands' occupy much the worst land, land which (as seen) is criminally overpopulated and overgrazed (in some areas 40 per cent of those between 16 and 30 are landless), and land which, in consequence, has deteriorated ecologically at a disastrous rate. Add, too, the impact of the war—the widespread and disruptive establishment of strategic hamlets, the flight of people from the war zones to the cities and across the borders (an estimate of at least one million displaced persons out of a population of seven or eight million would not overstate the case), the planned destruction of African agricultural capacity in order to deny the guerillas food (the notorious 'Operation Turkey')—and one has not only a compelling argument for structural change but also a short-term crisis of serious proportions.

Solving the short-term resettlement crisis (with its attendant problems of starvation and disease) will take considerable energies and resources. But it is clear that the redressing of the black-white imbalance in the rural sector represents a promise of such importance to the African population that the government cannot delay in fulfilling it. Yet here too there are constraints. For one thing European agriculture (which, incidentally, employs 38 per cent of the black labour force) has been responsible for 92 per cent of marketed output, and is therefore crucial not only to export earnings but, perhaps even more importantly, to the country's ability to feed itself. The government has made an unequivocal decision not to **jeopardise** this productive capacity for the foreseeable future, a decision which, has been an important premise for the overall package of compromise and outreach towards the white community which has marked the Mugabe government's approach since it has taken office. It is also a fundamental factor in determining the shape of such land reform initiatives as are likely to be forthcoming.

For there has seemed to be a way to have land reform without, in the short-run, rattling the existing commercial sector. The efficiency of European agricultural enterprises is notoriously uneven, running from the 60 per cent of farms which pay no income tax at all (and whose failure has been subsidised by a wide range of government assistance programmes)

to the 271 European farms which in 1976 contributed 52 per cent of taxable income (these including such giants as the million acre-plus estates owned by **Leibig** and **Lonrho**). And, as Roger **Riddell**, an admirably trenchant observer of Zimbabwe's rural scene, has pointed out,² inefficiency is often combined with almost criminal **malutilisation** of land; vast amounts of commercial farm land are unused (and some even abandoned), and the figure for land available in these terms might even reach as high as 60 per cent or more when underused land is also included. It is on some of this land that the government has now set its sights for the first stages of large-scale African movement into the former 'European' area; indeed Dennis Norman, president of the white Commercial Farmers' Union, had already begun to calculate this possibility even before the ZANU victory, and this must account in part for his presence—a presence which is in any case reassuring to his **fellow** white farmers—as Minister of Agriculture in Mugabe's cabinet.*

Not that this approach is itself entirely straightforward. One of the greatest compromises made by ZANU and ZAPU at British dictate during the Lancaster House Conference was to accept the entrenchment (effectively for ten years) in the Constitution's Declaration of Rights of a stringent section on 'Freedom from Deprivation of Property'. Summarising the implications of this recently in the *Financial Times*, Michael **Holman** writes that

compulsory acquisition can only take place when it is for the 'public benefit' or 'in the case of underutilised land, settlement of land for agricultural purposes'. Acquisition can only be lawful provided there is 'prompt payment of adequate compensation', remitted abroad 'within a reasonable time'. The provisions are justifiable and thus the High Court—at present without a single black **judge**—could have a vital role. Much is left to the judges since there is no definition of **underutilised** land, adequate compensation or prompt payment.

The result seems likely to be a very high price for land indeed (including court costs) and great foreign exchange problems, so much so that as sympathetic an observer as **Riddell** (quoted by **Holman**) can conclude: 'Even if the new Government of Zimbabwe were committed to implementing a comprehensive land resettlement programme... under the constitution it would be well nigh impossible to carry out'.

In short, the British, with this section in the Constitution, have tried to corner the new Zimbabwean government (and control the pattern of expropriation) even more effectively than they cornered the new Kenyan

*Of course, there has also been created a Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development under a ZANU minister, and it has been stated that this will be the coordinating ministry for rural development purposes. The precise division of labour which is worked out between these two ministries will obviously be of considerable importance.

government almost two decades ago. Ironically, the UNCTAD report (cited above) warns quite specifically against a replay of the costly Kenyan model—the use of externally-borrowed funds to compensate white farmers—yet the government has felt compelled to reaffirm its commitment to the Lancaster House agreement and to the avoidance of expropriation. It will, therefore, be particularly **instructive** to see how it plans to fight its way out of this corner as it begins to spell out its land reform. For fight it must if its revolution is to have any substance at all. Equally instructive will be the pattern of productive relations which is encouraged during the actual process of rural transformation: ZANU's election manifesto, very different from any Kenyan intentions, promised the promotion of 'collective villages' and 'collective agriculture'. But this is an issue to which we will have occasion to return.

The strategic positioning and exaggerated dominance of the white community—settler and multinational—in Zimbabwe's industrial and agricultural sectors is paralleled in all spheres, of course, though most dramatically within the state apparatus and, especially, within the military. White power is much more immediately vulnerable in the civil service (where the number of Africans in established posts have only recently passed the 10 per cent mark, with these, in turn, mainly concentrated in technical grades—teachers, doctors, nurses) than elsewhere, and there can be little doubt that accelerated Africanisation will be well up on Mugabe's agenda. Nonetheless, the new government apparently feels that caution is necessary even here in order to ensure a continuity of expertise and experience and, more generally, to underwrite the viability of the whole 'stability' package. Yet 'expertise and experience' are not politically neutral, as a number of first-hand observers have found in reporting the apparent incomprehension of incumbent officials when fielding questions about the implications for their **ministries** of various newly-styled progressive government policies. Examples in education and health—where African needs have conventionally had a very low priority—have been cited but clearly in all sectors ZANU's long march through such institutions is bound to prove a treacherous one. Even more serious is the related danger that change which is 'slow but sure' may run the risk of reducing itself to *mere Africanisation* of the established state apparatus, rather than premissing any more fundamental remodelling of it.

Needless to say, the handling of the military apparatus presents an even more daunting challenge to the new government. While the unambiguous nature of ZANU's electoral triumph helped pre-empt any extreme white backlash, Mugabe's decision to incorporate the formidable General Walls in his team—as coordinator of the process of military integration—may have been the necessary icing on the cake in this regard. Hailed by many observers as a brilliant tactical move in defusing general settler anxieties, this step was probably equally important for its facilitating the **demobilisa-**

tion of various extremely dangerous special-forces units within the Rhodesian army (the Selous and Grey Scouts, and the Rhodesian Light Infantry, among others), these being composed of the worst detritus from failed empires around the world, as well as the most ruthless of local elements, both black and white. The need to be seen to be dealing even-handedly and fairly with the numerous and well-organised (if much more conventionally trained) forces from ZAPU, the other liberation movement, also has encouraged adoption of as apparently neutral a process of blending the three armies as is now underway.

The main long-term danger in this process also will be evident. For the strength of ZANLA (the ZANU military wing) lay in its development of a classic guerilla army, a process still unfinished at the time of the Lancaster House Conference but characterised, nonetheless, by a practice on the ground and *vis-à-vis* the peasantry which had begun to give ZANLA a distinctive political cast. It also has been argued that ZANLA, in consequence of this practice inside the country, had become the source of much of the pressure towards radicalisation of the parent movement, ZANU, over the years. Does the possibility arise that in order to placate a settler **army** a people's army will have had to be demobilised? And what kind of standing army will emerge from the ministrations of a General Walls and of 'British military instructors'? Time alone will tell.

British military instructors. These are, in any case, merely a small fraction of the external actors who will now be active in the attempt to lock the new government's various compromises firmly into place. In the first instance there is South Africa itself, its private sector increasingly prominent in the Zimbabwean economy, its state a backer of Muzorewa and military partner in the settler cause, especially towards the end of the war. The ties to South Africa which remain are extremely tight, reinforced by large debts (unlikely to be repudiated) accumulated during the war and by that country's considerable competitive advantage in transporting land-locked Zimbabwe's goods to and from the sea. Eventually current efforts to develop regional multi-state alliances outside the South African sphere of influence, and the reconstruction of alternative transport linkages (via Mozambique, for example), may help Zimbabwe to draw more firmly north but South Africa has great clout at present. And not just clout in the metaphorical sense. Prime Minister **Botha's** first response to Mugabe's victory was a very heavy-handed warning to the new Zimbabwe, and South Africa is both strong and ruthless enough to do considerable damage both above and below ground. Mugabe has associated himself strongly with OAU positions on the necessity for change in South Africa but for the moment will necessarily proceed with caution on this front.

Other imperial actors will be more subtle. We will return to this point, but here it bears noting that such actors have been crafting the 'false decolonisation' of Zimbabwe for some time—at least since Henry

Kissinger's dramatic reversal of field in **1976** when he and Anthony Crosland first plotted a pre-emption of the further militarisation and radicalisation of the struggle in Zimbabwe. It is worth recalling Crosland's remark, made at a NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting at the time of the Geneva Conference, that

if the British government gave up hope (of negotiated settlement), there would be no doubt over who would eventually win on the battlefield. But if the issue were settled on the battlefield it would seriously lessen the chance of bringing about a moderate African regime in Rhodesia and would open the way for more radical solutions. . .

One can then trace the various permutations and combinations of that strategy—a strategy only temporarily complicated by Smith's playing of his own (quite unconvincing) neo-colonial card, the Internal Settlement—which eventually brought the liberation movements to the bargaining table at Lancaster House.

Of course, the military advance of the liberation movements was also setting the pace here, and it has not always been clear just who was manoeuvring whom. However, on the imperial side it can at least be said that the plotting has been broad-gauged. Thus, attendant upon the David Owen-Andrew Young 'Anglo-American Plan' (a reincarnation of the Crosland-Kissinger initiative) was an elaborate aid package, the Zimbabwe Development Fund, designed not merely to smooth, but to shape, the transition to black majority rule. Indeed, as stated, the question of how best to shape the transition has been a long-term preoccupation both of U.S. imperial planners in particular (witness the **1977** reports by the Southern African Task Force of the African Bureau of **USAID** and, also, for **AID**, by the African-American Scholars **Council**)³ and of multinational capital in general (witness the development of possible reformist scenarios by the corporate-funded Whitsun Foundation within Rhodesia itself). In light of this, it will appear as no accident that it was the United States who came forward at a particularly delicate moment in the Lancaster House parleys with a promise of economic aid for judicious land reform when the terms regarding that item on the agenda became contested.

Strikingly, the U.S. seems to have moved with speed, since the February elections, to reinterpret the terms of its commitment on that item, and even to have reduced the level of its promised aid in spectacular fashion (to a mere \$27 million—to be shared with Zambia and Mozambique—in **1980-81**, compared with the **\$1 billion-plus** package considered at the time of the Anglo-American Plan). Indeed, a relative shortfall in aid seems to be the picture right across the board, even though significant amounts will come (and even though these amounts will still be designed to service the various

neo-colonial purposes, mentioned above, which lie behind them).* The Zimbabwe government seems confident it can handle any such inputs on its own terms, and, in fact, looks directly to the United Kingdom as its principle source of help. Thus Simon Mzenda, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, stated in this connection that 'the one country we can be closest to is the country which colonised us', while among Mugabe's first diplomatic initiatives was a journey to **meet Mrs** Thatcher in order to discuss the possibility of her increasing assistance. Nonetheless, the short-fall is there and it would seem to reflect the growing confidence in western ruling circles—paralleling that in the business press, as cited above—that the terms of the Lancaster House agreement and the stranglehold of private capital are themselves pretty substantial guarantees of continuity. They might even reason that a stickiness with aid could actually be a positive thing, encouraging the government in Salisbury, in the words of the indefatigable Financial *Mail*, to deepen its acknowledgement 'that private sector capital is going to have to play a vital role if black economic and social aspirations are to be met in the Eighties and Nineties'.

Perhaps this smugness is reinforced by the thought that Zimbabwe really has nowhere else to turn as long as it continues to play a **quasi-conventional** development game. For better or worse strong links to the Soviet Union do not exist, and will not easily develop, even though ZAPU, the Soviet Union's much preferred liberation movement during the armed struggle, is now a junior partner in the ZANU government. Such links as ZANU itself had during the struggle were, initially, with China, with such countries as Rumania and Yugoslavia, and with a number of African states; the Soviet arms which they did obtain came via third parties, Mozambique and Ethiopia for example. Yet none on this list is a strong counter-pole of attraction away from the tactic of bidding for a share of apparent western abundance. All of which is not to prejudge the question of where the Zimbabwean government will eventually locate itself on the world stage. But so far, in line with its caution on other fronts, it is playing a hand which could scarcely be styled anti-imperialist.

In summarising this section, then, it can be confirmed that the constraints are real enough. It is not beyond reason for the new government to see a pressing imperative in keeping the whites in place, international capitalism on side, and South Africa at bay in order to avoid short-term economic disruption—or worse. In Mozambique the precipitous departure of the colonialists (though even there there was no precipitous break with Mozambique's own South African connection) did in fact bring the economy near to collapse, especially since this departure was attended by considerable, and quite ruthless, sabotage. This had the

'An added irony will arise if a great deal of this 'aid' (including loans and the like) goes toward compensating settler farmers (see above) and paying the pensions of former Rhodesian civil servants, as the new government has committed itself to do.

advantage of creating in certain sectors something of a *tabula rasa* upon which to build new institutions (the state farms and the industrial production councils, for example) and quickly to acquire new skills; considerable creativity was displayed by FRELIMO in power in these various areas of challenge. But the process was also costly—not least in the agricultural sphere—and it seems that Samora **Machel**, himself now forced by the fragility of his economy to make real compromises regarding the pace of socialist advance, may have been one of those who counselled Mugabe to move gingerly.

Yet the latter approach carries dangers which, if less dramatic than short-term economic crisis, are perhaps even more serious in the longer run. For there is the very real possibility of becoming *trapped* on the terrain of short-run calculation, 'circumstances' never quite so 'ripe for socialist change' (to return to the words of the ZANU manifesto quoted above) as to make realisation of such change a straightforward exercise. Then, with powerful forces acting quite self-consciously to reinforce pragmatism and caution, long-term goals of transformation may, without ever having been quite 'ripe', merely wither on the vine! For a transition to socialism is never risk-free; the deftest (and most successful) of revolutionaries have been those who have pushed carefully but creatively at the margin of risk, expanding that margin and increasingly controlling it. This may be happening in Zimbabwe; once again there is no intention of **pre-judging** the situation there. But these formulations, taken together with what we have seen so far, may at least serve to underscore how much more fraught with complexity is this round of the Zimbabwean revolution than the armed struggle which preceded it.

Nor are the new government's calculations with reference to this complexity being made in a vacuum. Bourgeois commentators summarise the other side of the Zimbabwean coin by talking of a possible 'crisis of **expectations**'; Mugabe's party, the *Financial Mail* notes, 'has promised free schooling, free health services, a social security system for all the people, more and better paid jobs. . . more land for blacks'. And Mugabe himself has spoken quite explicitly of the difficulties he has in striking a balance 'between maintaining white confidence and also satisfying the expectations which our people have'. Even phrased in such conventional terms this is not a contradiction which is easily resolved. Already, for example, there are signs that deepening the tax bite sufficiently to cover such programmes will not be taken lightly by capital, and that some modification of goals in this sphere may therefore be necessary.

Yet even if some greater risk is likely to be run in order to meet some of these goals than might be the case in other policy areas, there is an additional danger in being forced to deal with the situation in these kinds of terms. For viewed from another perspective such expectations are real *class demands*, coming from those exploited classes in Zimbabwean

society who not only wish to redress their historic situation of deprivation but who also have every reason in so doing to see the white settlers and the multinationals as their class enemies. Moreover, it is precisely in the **class-conflictual** nature of mass demands that there lies the possibility of workers and peasants coming to see in socialism a broader solution to their deprivation, and of their coming to support a genuinely hegemonic project aimed at the fundamental transformation of the productive relations of Zimbabwean society.

In contrast, it is when such a transformatory project is not in train that class demands can dissipate into mere 'expectations' (the understandable, but economistic, drive for *more* education, *more* health, *more* pay, *more* land) and the movement's response transmuted into mere welfarism. In the latter event, such demands are then too easily construed as 'problems' to be dealt with administratively—the social-democratic trap—rather than becoming the substance of prioritisation and self-conscious planning by the dominated classes themselves. Class alliances fragment, and politicians, far from being catalysts of socialist consciousness, begin to outbid each other to deliver **sectoral** and regional favours. Or, alternatively, they become the instruments for **suppressing** such 'unreasonable' demands altogether!

Phrased in this way the contradiction which now confronts Mugabe is seen to be even more fundamental than his own formulation, quoted above, allows. For the problem comes into clearer focus when the danger inherent in leaning too far towards 'maintaining white confidence' is seen to lie not so much in a failure to 'satisfy popular expectations' as in a *demobilisation of the class struggle*. Short-term tactics may dictate that the class enemy be embraced as friend and helpmate, that social ownership or even any very firm governmental control over the private sector be defined as inappropriate at this time, and so on. The difficulty arises when knowledge that this is mere tactic must—again, for apparently very good reasons—remain the profane, tactically-suppressed, knowledge of the vanguard: how do you bring the popular classes into this kind of game without giving the game away? yet if they are not in on the game how do you keep the class struggle alive?

In short, any very Gramscian notion of developing a new hegemonic project could be the loser here, with Mugabe then finding himself less a Gramsci than a Thomas Munzer—as described by **Engels** in words which do provide one plausible reading of the current Zimbabwean situation:

The worst thing that can befall the leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government at a time when society is not yet ripe for the domination of the class he represents and for the measures which that domination implies . . . What he can do contradicts all his previous actions and principles, and the immediate interests of his party, and what he ought to do cannot be done. . . In the interests of the movement he is compelled to advance the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class with talk and promises, and with the

assertion that the interests of that alien class are their own interests⁴

Engels concludes that 'he who is put into this awkward position is irrevocably lost'. Yet even if this is in fact plausible, there are also signs that more is in motion, in class terms, within the Zimbabwean revolution than this formulation might imply. These are signs which Kangai's claim that present 'democratisation' points the way towards a transition to socialism is perhaps designed to epitomise. To this, and related considerations, we can now turn.

II

We can begin, then, to remove the brackets we have placed around such tactical questions by attempting to assess the moment in the Zimbabwean class struggle which now presents itself. Let us first return, for a moment, to Willers' 'bourgeoisie', those whites—only a couple of hundred thousand in a population of six million—who nonetheless continue to dominate the infrastructure of Zimbabwean society virtually across the board. As any number of commentators have pointed out this is far from a uniform group, being divided, however roughly, between settlers—farmers, skilled workers, small businessmen and civil servants—and those local actors who are attendant upon, or employed by, the large multinational enterprises mentioned above.

For obvious reasons it is the former group which has felt itself to be most directly threatened—in their land, in their jobs, in their life-style—by African advance, and has been both most enamoured of the UDI experiment and most supportive of the extreme limitations upon reform inherent in the Internal Settlement and the Muzorewa government. In contrast, it appears that multinational capital could have lived, on the terrain of neo-colonialism, with a much more adventurous version of black advance from a quite early period and can still plan to do so comfortably. Not, of course, that the interests of these two elements of the white community are even then to be distinguished too sharply. Inevitably there has been considerable overlap of self-identification and interest within the white community* and, in any case, multinational capital must certainly be fearful of too precipitous a rate of change, even if such change were merely to be in the direction of the judicious Africanisation of established structures which it is prepared to encourage. For it must see itself as being at least as reliant, in the short-run, on the 'expertise and experience' of the settler element as Mugabe apparently sees himself to be. Any indecently accelerated departure of the white community such as might threaten stability and

*Indeed it would not be surprising if a number of those now in the civil service were to move directly into the private sector. (Of course, in contrast, there will be whites, including some returnees from abroad, who will choose to play a progressive role.

business as usual would not be welcome. Nonetheless, the multinational fraction of the 'bourgeoisie' does have considerably more room for manoeuvre in the long-run than its 'settler' counterpart, and can be expected to continue to use it in an attempt to pre-empt any renewed radicalisation of Zimbabwean nationalism.

Gramsci is again relevant here, though in ways which go far beyond Willers' interesting but still rather jejune use of his theories. For the game of the most intelligent of this white bourgeoisie must now be—in **Fanon's** words—'to capture the vanguard, to turn the movement to the right, and to disarm the people'. Part of the tactic here consists, as we have seen, of threat, tacit or otherwise (capital flight, flight of personnel, industrial and agricultural collapse), and part will consist of the most obvious of carrots (promotions, agencies, directorships, even bribery, on the Kenyan model). But part of it, too, will be to draw 'the vanguard' ever more firmly onto the cultural terrain of international capitalism and to make the values and *modus operandi* of this global system the 'common-sense' of the new African petit-bourgeoisie-in-the-making. This **will** mean, in the Zimbabwe case, encouraging the making of a virtue of the necessity of 'pragmatism' and 'compromise'. It will be a part of the class struggle which will be fought not in the bush but on such prosaic 'battlefields' as the sundowner circuit, the ministerial office and the business meeting over lunch at **Meikle's** Hotel or the Salisbury Club. And it will be fought by the more sophisticated of white civil servants, military officers, and local managers of multinational firms as they regroup on the ground, and by the purveyors of aid, capital and technology who are even now descending upon **Salisbury** airport. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of this aspect of struggle.

There are limits upon such bourgeois action, of course; white supremacy is not merely a calculating machine and sheer racism will sometimes intervene. Doris Lessing, most acute of observers of white Southern African society, caught the nuance well. Martha Quest, her heroine, is bantering with Mr. Maynard, a cynical but sophisticated member of the colony's establishment (the time is the late 30s). 'Why not abolish passes altogether?' she asks.

'Why not? I suggest you put pressure on your Parliamentary representative to that effect'

Martha laughed again (and Mr. Maynard continues).

'I am firmly of the opinion that the sooner a middle class with privileges is created among the Africans the better it will be for everyone. Unfortunately, the majority of the whites are so bogged down in intelligent considerations such as that they wouldn't have their sisters marrying black men, that they are too stupefied to see the advantages of such a course.'

Lessing then writes that 'Martha was several years from understanding this

remark', but at this late date no-one else need be so naive. For even if racism does impede the process, it seems safe to say that real settler die-hards (always assuming a white counter-coup is avoided) will be among the first to go. At this point in Zimbabwe's history Maynardism must be, will be, ever more urgently the white-cum-bourgeois strategy. For Mr. Maynard, self-evidently, had learnt his dialectics!

Are there African recruits for such a strategy? Continue to bracket the question of the nature of Patriotic Front leadership and look instead at the overall class structure of the African community. Viewed in these terms and in continental perspective it would be surprising if there were not such recruits and more in Zimbabwe than in many other ex-colonies. Despite massive educational deprivation at the base, and real shortfalls in black skills relevant to such a relatively sophisticated economy, Zimbabwe does have a larger pool of trained Africans than other newly-independent African countries. Thus, some estimates set the figure of blacks with higher education as high as 20,000 including up to 8,000 people who have completed or are still undergoing training abroad. Complementing those already in *situ*, many of the latter will be returning to claim their place in the sun, often from western-sponsored programmes which have been more or less self-consciously designed to groom them for such a moment. In addition, as Colin Stoneman has recently documented in detail, there are in most sectors, public and private, skilled and semi-skilled Africans whose advancement up the job ladder has been artificially constrained by racist definitions of competence.⁶

As Stoneman puts the point, such facts 'present both an opportunity and a danger', the danger lying 'in the possibility that some fundamental characteristics of the white economy, in particular the extreme inequality in wealth, income, land distribution and decision-making, will survive, with the skilled and educated blacks slipping into white shoes', and thereby creating themselves as a 'black middle class... with interests directly at variance with the majority of the population (and in support of) growing integration with and subordination to the world capitalist economy in exchange for external support'. This is a familiar enough syndrome elsewhere in Africa to be a particularly salient possibility under Zimbabwean conditions. It is also worth reminding ourselves that there has been just enough scope for African agricultural activity—in the Native Purchase Areas (specifically set aside for African 'Master Farmers') and in parts of the Tribal Trust Lands where a certain measure of class differentiation has taken place—and entrepreneurial activity to sow the seeds for development of a private sector petit-bourgeoisie. True, settler economic control was sufficiently all-encompassing that these seeds are not quite parallel to the quite vigorous African private sector which had begun to bloom (in agriculture, trade and services) in Kenya even before independence. Still, there are elements here to complement and interpenetrate

with any 'new' or 'bureaucratic' petit-bourgeoisie which may now begin to form around the state and corporate hierarchies, and perhaps in future there will also be private sector opportunities for the latter to exploit for themselves. In short, black advancement will now be the name of the game and in that context it will not be the availability of recruits for 'mere Africanisation' which is in question. Rather, the crucial factor will be the political and ideological context in which such potential recruits now find themselves and in which they must define their practice.

We return by this route to the question of how a Gramscian Mugabe could hope to structure a counter-hegemony resistant to the cooperative wiles of Maynardism. It seems clear that members of the Zimbabwean petit-bourgeoisie-in-the-making can be recruited for more radical undertakings, as well as more conservative ones, but this possibility does not remain open indefinitely. In fact, it is in this connection that we can specify quite concretely another of the dangers of Mugabe's 'pragmatism', as analysed at the conclusion of the previous section. The point should by now be obvious: any tactical reluctance to generate revolutionary political institutions and a genuinely revolutionary culture could allow to breed, in the interstices of short-run compromise, precisely those people who will want to make that 'virtue of necessity' mentioned above. Marcelino dos Santos, a senior FRELIMO leader, once said that the most important way to guarantee against any such degeneration in Mozambique was 'to popularise' the revolutionary aims and to create such a situation that if for one reason or another at some future time some people start trying to change these aims, they will meet with resistance from the masses.'" What, in Zimbabwe, of Kangai's rather similar proposed inoculation against degeneration of the revolution there: 'democratisation'.

Fortunately, Kangai is not dragging this concept in arbitrarily from left-field. It has a basis in Zimbabwean history, and that basis is the armed struggle itself. For Zimbabwe has had, to this point, no straightforward transition to neo-colonialism, the strategists of international capitalism having been forced—in significant measure by unilateral settler action—to leave the process of cooptation until rather late in the day. Is it necessary to remind ourselves that Zimbabweans have acted in heroic fashion not merely to vote for their freedom, overwhelmingly, in the very last round of the independence struggle, but actually to wrench it from the settlers by force of arms: no successful guerilla war and Ian Smith would still be ensconced in power in Salisbury. Moreover, we have already suggested that that phase of the struggle had many of the attributes of a people's war. What are the prospects for a *people's politics* to safeguard the integrity of the new phase of the Zimbabwe revolution?

An initial key to this should lie in the role of the peasantry since it was among the peasantry that the Patriotic Front found its popular base for advancing the armed struggle as effectively as it did. It is at this point in

our analysis that we begin to enter the zone of controversy surrounding evaluation of the component elements of the Patriotic Front, ZANU and ZAPU, alluded to at the outset of this paper. But in the case of ZANU, in particular, much of this controversy is over how far the movement had gone in grounding its military struggle in a parallel process of political mobilisation, not whether that process had begun at all. Perhaps ZANU did have a penchant for overstating the extent to which it could lay claim to fully-liberated areas (and in truth establishing such areas would at the best of times have been far more difficult in Zimbabwe than in relatively backward Mozambique, given the dense infrastructure of settler control and the scattered character of the land allotted Africans). Yet impressive developments were in train as Lionel Cliffe, an unofficial observer at the Zimbabwe elections, has had occasion to note: 'Prone to assess the liberation movements by the exile leadership, many of us who sympathised with the liberation cause underestimated what had been achieved in the link between guerillas and people over a very wide spread of these fragmented pockets of the **TTLs**.'⁸ Cliffe and other observers brought back accounts of the *pungwes*, or all-night meetings, ZANU cadres had consistently held with local populations during the armed struggle, and of the dense network of *mujibas*, or young apprentice militants, which had complemented the guerillas in building a new political infrastructure among the people, a political infrastructure which, in turn, took the form of impressively functioning 'people's councils' in many areas. It was precisely such political realities, important, obviously, to the military success the liberation movements had, which also laid essential groundwork for the self-conscious militancy expressed by the African population in the February **election**.

But what of the main bearers of this process, ZANLA, the ZANU army. Some of its members apparently stayed out of the assembly camps (set up to field the guerilla armies during the electoral process) and did play a mobilising role in the election itself. But René Lefort, writing in *Le Monde Diplomatique* (May 1980), has suggested that some ZANLA people have seen in the compromises at Lancaster House and in the guerilla army's own incorporation into the new overarching standing army, an **undercutting** of the political process, established in the semi-liberated zones and sketched above, which had focussed popular energies and given them revolutionary thrust. Indeed Lefort goes so far as to argue that, as a result, 'the party runs the risk of being reduced to a leadership which is saddled with a very weak apparatus, one hastily constructed for the purpose of fighting the election and controlled by local "notables".' A serious risk if true—the spectre of the absorption of apparent 'parties of mobilisation' into class-differentiated social structures which has occurred elsewhere in Africa looms large here—though it is probably an overstatement of the case. Still, in querying the straightforward continuity of

development out of the armed struggle, **Lefort's** observation does underscore the main question of the moment: what political institutions can be generated (or, at least, freshly **reminded** for the new purposes at hand) on the ground in order to consolidate the popular base for further change?

To be sure, old structures are already in disarray because of the war, the people's councils already exemplify something of a new alternative, and in addition, further breaks with the past are implicit in the necessity for refugee resettlement and in the movement of people within the programme of land reform. Assuming the sheer **immensity** of these latter undertakings does not bury political creativity in a technocratic maze, and assuming that **ZANU's** break with the political imperatives of the armed struggle is not as sharp as Lefort might fear, there remains considerable opportunity here to have 'a rural **political** and administrative apparatus of potentially revolutionary design'.⁹ Perhaps for ZANU the key is to be found in its proposed programme of collectivisation. The movement's electoral manifesto is quite explicit about this: 'peasant agriculture, at present predominantly private, will be the basis of collectivisation', although, to be sure, 'such collective agriculture will be by persuasion rather than compulsion'. For 'it is essential that peasant land holdings are combined to constitute viable collective units on the basis of which State assistance, technical and financial, can be granted'.

When established such units could also provide the socio-political basis for the peasantry's organisation as an even more fully self-conscious class, though it must be admitted that one would feel more comfortable with such an extension of the argument if these possible positive implications for Zimbabwe's class struggle were actually to be found in the Manifesto itself rather than having to be sniffed out of it by sympathetic observers. For we know that such 'collective units' have often degenerated, elsewhere in Africa, into mere instruments of state control of peasant agriculture and peasant surpluses. What, in this case, will be the methods of political work which exemplify 'persuasion', what the countervailing mechanisms of popular participation and control, what the balance between leadership and mass action, remains to be seen. Let us assume, for the moment, that the instinct for 'democratisation' carried over from the armed struggle is still alive and well in Zimbabwe. Even then, to repeat, it is the way in which this instinct is given *current* expression in the rural areas as institutionalised and focussed peasant power that will be the litmus test of the direction the Zimbabwe revolution is taking. Unfortunately, the mere raising of such a question is as much as developments to date (and available information) permit us to do.

What of the Zimbabwean working class, an obvious candidate for guarantor of a socialist transition?" Of course the category 'working class' is a slippery one under Zimbabwean conditions; as in most Southern Africa settings much of the work-force is in migratory movement

between urban and rural settings and therefore not easily categorised. Moreover, this work-force (of roughly one million persons) is quite diversified; figures for 1975 show 38 per cent in agriculture (in this sphere, in particular, some are migrants from beyond the border); 6 per cent in mining; 14 per cent in industry; 7 per cent in construction; 21 per cent in services. The bases for extreme working-class discontent are also patent; in one recent year the average white monthly wage was \$423, the average black wage \$39. Indeed, between 1965 and 1975 the wage gap between black and white had actually doubled, and one estimate from several years ago suggested that less than 15 per cent of the blacks in non-agricultural employment earned above the Poverty Datum Line. Small wonder that with the electoral demise of white power the top blew off the Zimbabwean industrial relations system, and the new government was met immediately with successive waves of strikes, involving thousands of workers, in the private sector.

Presumably ZANU would not want to query the logic of such demands, since in many cases they are directed merely to drawing workers up past the Poverty Datum Line, or to guaranteeing workers sufficient income to facilitate the movement of their families out of the inhuman syndrome of migrant labour and into more permanent urban habitation. Given the vast discrepancies in income and life changes in Zimbabwe one must be cautious about using labels like 'economism' or 'labour aristocracy' to characterise the thrust of such labour action even when it does come, as is sometimes the case, from those sections of the work-force which are (relatively) least deprived and best organised. Two difficulties arise, however. First, it must be emphasised that the terrain for working-class organisation is already partially occupied. Despite settler-government restrictions (and security activities) there are a number of African trade unions, many with some history of struggle (albeit struggle defined, by and large, in quite apolitical terms and directed towards fairly narrowly-defined objectives). Less satisfactorily, some such unions have a history of extensive penetration by the most dubious of western influences (the ICFTU and the AFL-CIO, for example) and these are influences which are at present again zeroing in on the African working class in preparation for the next round in Zimbabwe.¹¹ Clearly the problem of adapting such union structures to any new nationally-defined purposes raises a whole set of questions of its own, though Mugabe has already commented on the virtues of constructing a single new national union structure. Second, there are potential contradictions of a different order that a party like ZANU must confront in dealing with the working class, contradictions exemplified in the possibility that any dramatic wage increases might have to be purchased at the expense of the peasantry or at the expense of those who are without work (unemployment being already a serious problem in Zimbabwe). As seen, only the development of a self-conscious alliance of

workers and peasants—with appropriate political institutions—capable of arbitrating competing demands by the popular classes and resolving such contradictions relatively non-antagonistically can then provide the key to future advance.

Such realities can help us avoid romantic oversimplifications regarding the role of the working class in the Zimbabwean revolution; they may suggest, too, some of the advantages which arise when the assertions of the working class are located under the umbrella of a broader hegemonic movement. But this merely serves to bring us back to the general formulation sketched at the end of Section I, a formulation which we can now hope to specify further. For the chief contradiction which ZANU must now confront antecedes any fine shading regarding the terms of a proposed worker-peasant alliance. As implied earlier, it will be difficult for a movement to mediate between classes and to propose terms for a class alliance when the very class character of the revolution is itself being downplayed. And it will be difficult for ZANU to present itself as a vanguard for working-class action in the context of its commitment to the health of the private sector. Under these circumstances an assertion by the party and its state that, to take one possible example, it is acting to balance off worker interests against legitimate claims to the surplus on the part of the peasantry and the unemployed might well be interpreted by the workers as a mere safeguarding of the profits of the bourgeoisie! So salient is this contradiction that the *Financial Mail* has even assumed that the government will be reluctant to press its (inevitable) reform of the old Rhodesian Industrial Conciliation Act too far: 'The old adage of poacher turned gamekeeper is... likely to apply. Legislation which seemed discriminatory and restrictive while one was in opposition may appear less so from the other side of the desk, and unions in Zimbabwe may be disappointed by the extent of the amendments, once they reach Parliament.'

ZANU's response to such difficulties is still being worked out, but they do present the movement with a real challenge in the labour sphere. For ZANU, despite the fact that it does have a notional trade union structure of its own (the Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress), has been largely a rural-based movement. True, it amassed a considerable number of votes in the urban and white farming areas but it will have to move creatively to give that immediate working-class support long-term focus and a revolutionary role to play. And that is the rub, for, as Mugabe noted disarmingly in an interview given just after the election, on this novel terrain it is necessary that ZANU 'first study the workers, how organised they are!'¹² It is not too surprising, then, that the reaction of Kangai, Mugabe's Labour Minister, to the aforementioned wave of strikes reflected some of the uncertainties here. On the one hand, and despite statements of sympathy for the workers' demands, he was reduced to recommending the draconic

Industrial Conciliation Act as the established procedure which must be used.* On the other hand, in the conversation with Karen Gellen cited above, he went rather further:

We think this development (the strikes) will help us to talk to multinational companies about the fact that there must be changes. . . (T)his uprising that is on will help us in forcing and persuading some people in Zimbabwe to accept that change is forthcoming. We think the workers should continue to work, but their demands will push those who have been controlling the economy to see that there must be fundamental changes immediately, because that is what the struggle has been all about in Zimbabwe.

It is not clear what form, if any, Kangai might hope this kind of expression of working-class energy to take in institutional terms, but it is the case that he is here striking a general note which other evidence suggests to be actively premissing at least some party activity on the ground. Thus a recent article in the *Johannesburg Star* (10 May, 1980), with a Salisbury dateline, notes that party cadres have linked up with workers, especially in the white agricultural sector where ZANU 'cells' are reported as being formed in the compounds to press grievances against the farmers. The *Star's* interpretation is that

there are people in ZANU (PF) far more radical than Mr. Mugabe. To a certain degree he rides a tiger and cannot be seen to be too conciliatory towards whites without harming his own image both inside and outside the party. And here lies another problem. It does not necessarily matter how pragmatic Mr. Mugabe is at governmental level because individual businessmen, civil servants, and farmers will still have to deal with party officials on a day-to-day basis, officials who may adopt a harder line towards whites than that advocated by the Prime Minister.. 'It is not Mr. Mugabe we talk to, nor his ministers but his party workers in the field and believe me these people can make life very difficult for us', said one dairy farmer. Commerce and industry has not yet been affected by this unauthorised 'interference' by party officials but some businessmen believe it will come.

Whether the *Star* is correct or not about Mr Mugabe, there is promise here, promise of a party which, on some fronts, is indeed beginning to embed itself within the dominated classes in facilitating the pressing of their class demands. The impact upon the party itself of such on-going practice could also be considerable.

Of course any promise here is still promise, performed on a tight-rope, given the government's overall tactical posture towards commerce and industry. There is, however, one other mechanism the new government

*Indeed some of the statements made by Kangai in this respect (but also by Mugabe himself) make particularly chilling reading, as witness the material included in the article 'We are all speaking—the Strike Wave' in *Zimbabwe Information Group* (London), 14, Summer 1980.

has begun to push which some see as having **long-term** promise of eventually resolving contradictions in this sphere in favour of the dominated classes: the workers' committee. **True**, the government's signals here are still a little mixed. We cited earlier one apparent retreat from this concept, though Mugabe has mentioned it positively on a number of other occasions (once adding—as if again to underscore the contradictions involved—that 'you've got to (establish committees) with the cooperation of the entrepreneur in every case!') More vocal is Dr. **Chidzero** who has highlighted the committee concept in many of his public utterances. And it is also a prominent item in the aforementioned UNCTAD report, an item singled out for special mention by Nathan Shamuyarira in his press conference welcoming the document when he emphasised that party thinking squared fully with the proposed 'democratisation' of socio-economic institutions through the 'participation of workers and peasants in decision-making processes of the institutions in which they work'. What this will mean in practice remains to be seen, especially in light of the initial strongly negative reaction from the business community to such proposals. Like collective villages, workers' committees are a two-edged sword, and can become either a means for advancing the class struggle—building strength for the eventual confrontation or of domesticating and containing it—in the 'public interest' and/or in the interest of capitalist allies. Nonetheless, in David **Willers'** opinion there is no doubt that the committees represent the Gramscian tactic par *excellence*:

There are already indications that Mugabe will eventually achieve the progressive transformation of the capitalist Zimbabwean economy into a socialist one through means other than the blunt instrument of nationalisation. One such is greater participation in management decisions.

The meaning of this could be clearer, but one can only hope that Willers' fears are justified.

In summation, we find that it is more than mere rhetorical flourish to ~~affirm~~ the strong class base for a continued deepening of the Zimbabwean revolution; as noted earlier, workers and peasants have deep-seated grievances in an inherited situation of gross exploitation, deprivation and alien control. However, as also noted, it is precisely because these grievances do not automatically find expression as a fully-fledged socialist project that questions of broader forms of organisation and ideology are so important. In Africa, the lead in focussing class struggle, building class alliances and generalising the impact of such endeavours has tended to come from nationalist movements and, at the helm of such movements, **petit-bourgeois** intellectuals. More often than not the trajectory of such organisations and such leaders has meant, in the end, a **pre-emption** of the further radicalisation of the struggle and an eventual demobilisation of the

dominated classes. Yet sometimes, particularly under the conditions of protracted armed struggle and often twinned with ideologically-premised struggles within the petit-bourgeoisie itself, they have facilitated the advance of these classes towards power. It is with reference to these two trajectories that Marcellino dos Santos, in the interview quoted above, elaborated the distinction between 'primitive' or 'bourgeois' nationalism on the one hand and 'revolutionary nationalism' on the other, with the latter, defined as **realising** 'the interests of the people as a whole' rather than 'the interests of a small group', permitting a 'true revolutionary leadership' (supported by 'resistance from the masses' against any backsliding) to open up 'real possibilities for an advance from liberation to revolution'.

There are those who are profoundly sceptical regarding such a scenario, hastening past the nationalist-cum-petit-bourgeois terrain (and often past the vast mass of the peasantry while they are at it) towards the goal of a 'working-class party'. The latter is not, however, the option which ZANU offers in present-day Zimbabwe. At its best (and in the present author's opinion this would be very good indeed) it offers some kind of expression of revolutionary nationalism, one (by definition) already transfigured by the entry of the popular classes into its politics and one which can facilitate the further expression of the revolutionary energies of those classes. The experience of the guerilla war demonstrates that this process was already underway during that period; some of the post-electoral evidence presented in the immediately preceding pages suggests that it is still alive and may be beginning to premise precisely that 'democratisation' which will be crucial to keeping alive the long-term question of structural transformation even in the teeth of short-term compromise. But considerable controversy swirls around the question of how strongly to affirm this point, of just what kind of promise of continued forward movement ZANU has to offer.

The difficulties which both wings of the Patriotic Front, ZANU and ZAPU, have had historically in moving past 'primitive' nationalism towards revolutionary nationalism are well known. An article which I wrote a number of years ago on precisely this topic occasioned considerable controversy because it emphasised the ways in which 'petit-bourgeois politicking'—the jockeying for position within and between movements which was clearly sub-ideological and premised on factionalism and personality and, to some extent, even the instrumentalisation of ethnic counters—had forestalled a deepening of the Zimbabwean revolutionary project.¹³ Yet these problems did not disappear, and have continued to be commented upon by other observers since. Thus in 1978 even such sympathetic observers as the editors of the *Review of African Political Economy* could wonder aloud whether the fierce internecine strife then on-going within ZANU represented 'petit-bourgeois factionalism' on the one hand or 'a gradual purge of the more militant' on the other.

Moreover, an editorial drafted for the Review in early 1980 (after Lancaster House but before the election) carried this argument even further, suggesting that many liberation movement leaders still saw armed action primarily 'as a means of **pressurising** the British to intervene and negotiate a settlement' (hence Lancaster House). This in turn may have influenced 'the *kind* of struggle that was being waged: over-reliance on outside bases rather than guerillas operating within the country amongst the people, on military as opposed to political forms of struggle' and so on.

All these tendencies were most marked within ZAPU in recent years but were present in some of the thinking of ZANU leaders too. Such tendencies, within movements each of which were broad fronts, probably came to be more dominant even within ZANU in the last three years as a result of changes in the leadership cadres that have brought in more of the old-guard nationalists who had been in prison or in more distant and comfortable exile as academics and the like and who had no first-hand experience of the guerilla struggle at the expense of seasoned but younger militants. The continuing conflict for power and the processes of learning through involvement will go on but are likely to be inhibited in the transition.

In consequence of this analysis Cliffe feels driven to the conclusion that 'even if the Zimbabwe movements as entities have not required the highest level of ideological clarity, there are still many outstanding cadres that have emerged during the last years of struggle, whose difficult position at the present time will need our understanding and whose continued efforts to see that the Zimbabwe revolution still lives will require our continued solidarity.'

Chilling stuff, though there may be grounds for thinking that the situation is a little less straightforwardly polarised than Cliffe suggests. The war did deepen after 1976 and this did have a continuing impact on the movement. In particular, an even stronger base of peasant support and militancy began to crystallise, a reality Cliffe himself was quick to acknowledge in light of his observation, as cited above, of the electoral process. This is a point to which we will return, but here we may also raise the question as to whether Cliffe's 'old guard—younger militant' dichotomy quite captures the terms of the on-going struggle which he correctly sees to be likely within ZANU's ranks. Certainly wasting internecine strife of no very edifying variety continued among ZANU politicians through the late seventies. Certainly, there remained a disjunction between the political advances forged through guerilla struggle within the country and any parallel transformation within the movement's overarching political structure (the latter being the chief reason for unease at the apparent swallowing-up of ZANLA into the new army and at the absence of guerilla personnel in key decision-making circles in the new government—a situation so very different from developments in

Mozambique for example).

And certainly there are those in the political leadership for whom the steamy Maoist terminology of the armed struggle (and of the hey-day of Chinese support) remained mere rhetoric—and now, of course, never to be heard on their lips—with any militancy they permitted themselves being more comfortably phrased in conventionally 'black nationalist' or virulently party-partisan terms; these and others are indeed possible recruits for Maynardism *within ZANU itself*; Yet it has also been suggested that there are those among the so-called 'old guard' (and its allies) comprising the political leadership whose nationalism runs deeper, whose commitment to the military struggle was not fragile, whose identification with popular aspirations is not merely rhetorical, and whose possible recruitment to a more revolutionary project cannot be ruled **out**.¹⁴ Under these circumstances it is tempting to argue that the war itself has kept ZANU on the boil and in a sufficient state of flux, that Cliffe's 'outstanding cadres' are still to be recruited at a number of different levels within the movement.

'Still to be recruited'—this is the key in any case. For the class struggle in Zimbabwe is scarcely to be considered over just because the guerilla war did not resolve as many of the contradictions in the nationalist camp as might have been hoped. Even if this process (political transformation premised on the logic of protracted struggle) had gone further—as perhaps it did in Mozambique—it would in any case merely have provided a running-start on the next round of struggle, the complex struggle over the terms of socialist reconstruction once in power. Moreover, this latter round has its own difficulties, whatever a movement's historical point of entry into it (as, again, Mozambique is discovering). It also has its distinctive opportunities. The peasant factor, mentioned above, becomes relevant here and the land question **provides** one such opportunity. ZANU epitomises peasant hopes and aspirations and that pressure will continue to stir within the movement. So, too, will the pressure from the working class which we have discussed. To the extent that these pressures make themselves felt Mozambique's (much criticised) encouragement of ZANU to run the risks of Lancaster House in order to reground the struggle on this novel and difficult—but perhaps ultimately more promising—terrain will not seem so amiss!

There is class pressure, then, in Zimbabwe to shake down the leadership, potentially revolutionary pressure to elicit militancy at the top. And there are those spread across the movement who, on this new terrain, can be expected to respond, and in turn to lead—thereby possibly rejoining the revolutionary dialectic at a level in advance even of that exemplified during the armed struggle itself. Only those who accepted uncritically all the things ZANU said about itself during the latter phase will be surprised to hear that it is no uniformly militant vanguard arbitrating the class struggle from an attained position of exemplary clarity and coherence.

But only those who ignored the drama of the armed struggle will be surprised to hear that the on-going class struggle is likely to take place, in important and potentially positive ways, within the movement itself.

To attempt to specify the players in this game with any further precision would smack too much of Kremlinology. Right-wing commentators make much of the possible differences between cabinet and central committee, between 'technocratic core' and 'hard-line militants', and the like—and they even name names. We will not so indulge ourselves here except to note that, however sensationalised and conventional their terminology and their speculations, they are probably not mistaken to be so preoccupied. As we have seen, there must be further struggle, class struggle, in Zimbabwe and within ZANU—at all levels including amongst the 'petit-bourgeois leadership' and over most of the concrete issues we have been discussing in this essay—as well as swirling around it. We will merely note that, and one more thing: how often speculation about Mugabe himself looms large in calculations about the future (*viz.*, 'How Mugabe changed his spots'). In contrast to the unequivocally militant image forged for him by the media in recent years, events since Lancaster House have found him cast more in the role of Sphinx, as he guards his options and seems deliberately to muddy the ideological waters, as when he stressed that 'the principles of common togetherness' which motivate him are 'really holy principles which find a basis not only in Marxism-Leninism but also in Christianity and other humanitarian doctrines'!

What then? Willers' consummate Gramscian tactician? or the business papers' consummate pragmatist? or merely another fuzzy-minded 'Nyerere-style leader'—albeit 'in a Kenya-style economy', as one mordant wit put it recently? One hopes not the latter, though it is sometimes difficult to escape a rather clammy sense of *déjà vu* as 'waiting for Mugabe' threatens to become the 1980s equivalent of the rather feckless 'waiting for Nyerere' in which many radicals, indigenous as well as expatriate, indulged themselves in Tanzania during the late 60s and early 70s. Somehow, reading his speeches and articles over the years, one senses that there may be more to Mugabe than this, that, however tight the corner he is in, Willers may just be right about him. And that, in any case, more is afoot in Zimbabwe, more steam in the kettle, more class actors who won't wait for anybody—because of the war, because of the developed and highly exploitative economy—than ever there was in Tanzania. In any case, neither comparisons with Tanzania (or, for that matter, with Mozambique) nor appeals to the past are likely to help us much. The class struggle in Zimbabwe is indeed joined on new terrain and at a new level. It is what happens in the next round that counts.

At the risk of anti-climax we must add one final complexity to our analysis of Zimbabwe which even now remains bracketed off. For the class

struggle which we see must cut across ZANU itself is at present taking place on a much more open political terrain than parallel processes in Mozambique and Angola where one-party systems have emerged from the liberation struggle. As already noted, this has implications for **class**-corporate organisations like trade unions and in this connection presumably will be hailed by some both on the right and on the left as a great advantage. On the right it will be hailed, for example, by those connected to such western trade union organisations as are prepared to work overtime to help pre-empt a politicised workers' movement, on the left by those who see in the existence of autonomous workers' (and peasants') organisations—however bankrupt these may be in the short-run—the basis for a class politics of resistance to future exploitation by state and capital. Such critics, the latter in particular, will see dangers where Mugabe sees challenge, the challenge of creating a single trade union centre, for example, or of making the party-cum-government sponsored collective villages the principle vector of peasant political activity. Of course, it is the broadest kinds of questions about the institutions most relevant to a transition to socialism which are being raised here, not merely the question of the likely capacity of ZANU *per se* to facilitate such a transition, and these are questions which will remain with us.

More immediately relevant, however, is the fact that this 'open terrain' contains other political organisations, and, in particular, ZAPU (or, as it is now somewhat confusingly called, the Patriotic Front (PF), having taken exclusive possession of that name when ZANU—as ZANU (**PF**)—chose to enter the election independently of the Patriotic Front alliance). We have already alluded to the fact that **ZAPU's** military strategy was from an early date of much more conventional cast than **ZANU's**, and that ZIPRA, if a more disciplined military force, did not acquire as many of the attributes of a people's army as ZANLA. Yet it would be a serious mistake to make too stark a distinction between the two movements on the basis of that difference. Joshua Nkomo, powerful, even authoritarian, and not notably progressive, may have kept a tighter lid on ZAPU after his resumption of active leadership than Mugabe ever did in ZANU, but there can be no gainsaying the fact that the Zimbabwean class struggle cuts across ZAPU, even across its petit-bourgeois leadership, in ways that parallel the ZANU situation. For, unquestionably there are exemplary militants who will engage creatively with the complexities of this next round and there are those who will adapt comfortably to the softer options.

Mugabe's approach has been to welcome ZAPU into a share of power, Nkomo himself, after having declined the offer of the largely ceremonial role of President, taking the Justice portfolio (albeit a portfolio stripped of some of its most important police powers by the time he received it). To be sure, the pickings have been slim—three relatively unimportant

ministries in addition to Nkomo's—and some grumbling has been heard from ZAPU about this. But the move towards a greater degree of unity, if difficult to accomplish (the antagonism between the movements is adhered to particularly venomously by some if for no other apparently very good reason than the self-reinforcing reality of a long history of rivalry), is particularly important. Not least because it can help **pre-empt** the temptation open to opportunistic politicians of seeking to cut across class definitions of politics with regional and ethnic definitions.

It is true that, contrary to the predictions of many bourgeois commentators, the ethnic variable was not a dominant factor in the Zimbabwean election. Indeed ZANU managed completely to wipe out electorally those politicians who sought to build constituencies on the basis of sub-tribal, intra-Shona groupings. Nonetheless, even if the elections were not about ethnicity, they were played out on a counterpane of ethnic identification. The people voted first and foremost for genuine liberation—in effect, for the Patriotic Front—but they did vote for that wing of the Patriotic Front whose image had become linked to their own *ethnie*. Various efforts by the movements themselves to escape such **exclusivism** notwithstanding, the elections found ZAPU with virtually a clean sweep of the vote from that **20** per cent of the population which is Ndebele-speaking, and ZANU the overwhelming choice of the majority Shona-speaking peoples.

Clearly the Ndebele peasants and workers must be involved in any hegemonic socialist project which may be forthcoming in Zimbabwe (just as, paradoxically, it is only such a project that will serve to make their participation in the Zimbabwe revolution *as Ndebele* even less salient in the future than it has been in the past). For this reason, ZAPU participation at Cabinet level in **defining** that project is an **important** step in forestalling a possible wasting fissure in the class alliance for change. How far can such a process go? Certainly unity has been an elusive, frustrating phantom in the past. Still, it is hard to see how progressive forces in either movement can hope to benefit from its absence,* for the chief imperative that both must feel is to raise the class struggle in Zimbabwe above the lowest common denominator of that 'petit-bourgeois politics' which feeds on catering to 'expectations' and facilitating fragmentation. Thus *the extent and the content* of the unity established between the two liberation movements may well be yet another index of how positively the revolution is progressing in Zimbabwe.



*This in spite of the fact that it is precisely among the more militant elements that there may be more grounds for ideological difference than between the two movements taken as a whole—ZANU militants being somewhat more inclined to favour Maoist definitions, ZAPU militants to favour Soviet-style definitions

At the minimum, then, the Zimbabwe elections represent a high-water mark in the political history of that wave of African nationalism which has crested across the continent since the Second World War. For in those elections Zimbabwean Africans spoke out as vocally against **white-minority** rule (albeit in the final round a white-minority rule which was fronted, however transparently, by a thin veneer of black puppetry) as any colonised people ever has. One needs only to have read Doris Lessing's *Going Home*, with its grisly portrait of smug Rhodesian settlerdom, to **realise** how important it is to have at least consigned the settler's political order to the trash-can of history.

Revolutionary nationalism? Socialism? How much more can be expected? It will be evident by now that there are no easy answers to these questions. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that the preceding essay will have posed such questions clearly. However, one final point does bear emphasising. Let us repeat that the electoral success of ZANU and ZAPU has premised on the military success of the Patriotic Front in stalemating, even defeating, the settler regime. With ZANU in power nothing in Southern Africa can ever be quite the same again, whatever machinations South Africa and the West, and recalcitrant members of Zimbabwe's own petit-bourgeoisie, may contrive. For the Zimbabwean example is already alive and well in South Africa 'where Robert Mugabe's election victory. . . is still a daily source of consciously inspirational news.' 'Mugabe pledges support for the freedom movement in South Africa' said a front-page story on Monday in the newspaper *Post* about what, to a non-South African, looked like a routine and formal promise by the Zimbabwean prime minister to help the Organisation of African **Unity**.¹⁵

Indeed, 'Zimbabwe's independence is mentioned repeatedly as a factor in the new wave of African unrest (in South Africa). "People look at Zimbabwe and see violence used creatively", says (Zwelakhe) Sisulu. "After the riots of 1976, there was a mood of despair in **Soweto**. That's been completely removed by Mugabe's victory", says Fanyana Mazibuko, secretary of the **Soweto** Teachers' Action Committee.* Whatever the difficulties, we can expect more progress in Zimbabwe itself. But such reports document that Zimbabweans have also made a major contribution to the future of the region as a whole. A future which in any case is, self-evidently, their own, since the eventual toppling of powerful, parasitic South Africa will magnify the opportunity for all countries there, including Zimbabwe, to shape their destinies for themselves. A *luta continua*; one struggle, many fronts: for few areas of the world are these sayings as true as they are for Southern Africa.

*This last statement may, in turn, overstate the exclusive impact of specifically Zimbabwean developments since South Africa's growing internal contradictions and dramatic ANC actions (the sabotage at SASOL, for example) are of at least equal significance, but this is an important reality nonetheless

NOTES

1. See Colin Stoneman, 'Foreign Capital and the Reconstruction of Zimbabwe', *Review of African Political Economy*, 11 (January-April 1978); Michael Bratton, 'Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonisation of Kenya', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15, 4 (1977); and Duncan Clark, *Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe* (Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), London, 1980); see also Financial Times (London), Special Supplement: Zimbabwe (22 April, 1980).
2. Roger Riddell, *The Land Question* (CIIR, London, n.d.); much of the data used in this section regarding the land question is drawn from this excellent pamphlet.
3. Sean Gervasi and James Turner, 'The American Economic Future in Southern Africa: An Analysis of an AID Study on Zimbabwe and Namibia', *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 3, 1 (1978).
4. Frederick Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany* (International Publishers, New York, 1966), pp. 135-6.
5. Doris Lessing, *A Proper Marriage* (Panther, London, 1966), pp. 220-1.
6. Colin Stoneman, *Skilled Labour and Future Needs* (CIIR, London, 1978).
7. Marcelino dos Santos, interviewed by Joe Slovo, in *The African Communist*, 55 (1973).
8. Lionel Cliffe, 'Zimbabwe Independent: View From the Grass Roots', *Canadian Dimension*, 14, 7 (June 1980); further detailed documentation of these and other points is to be found in the papers on the Zimbabwean elections presented to the Leeds Conference by Cliffe, Barry Munslow, Joshua Mpfu and Barne Mazanzu.
9. Michael Bratton, *Beyond Community Development* (CIIR, London, 1978).
10. Information on labour as well as on many other relevant aspects of Zimbabwe is presented usefully in *Zimbabwe: Notes and Reflections on the Zimbabwean Question*, prepared by the Centre for African Studies, University of Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, in 1977.
11. See Clyde Sanger, 'Trade Unions in Zimbabwe: A Report to the Canadian Labour Congress' (27 April 1980), which is useful both for the information it contains and the assumptions it reveals.
12. 'Interview with Mugabe', in *TCLSAC Reports* (Toronto, April-May 1980).
13. 'Transforming the Struggle in Zimbabwe', first published in *Southern Africa* (February 1977) and reprinted as chapter 5 in John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (Monthly Review Press and Heinemann Educational Books, New York and London, 1979).
14. Terence Ranger in making some of these points in a recent unpublished paper attacking both Cliffe and myself ('Politicians and Soldiers: the re-emergence of the Zimbabwe African National Union') runs the risk of going to the other extreme in uncritically hailing the 'old guard' to a man, in effect disposing of the need for any on-going manifestations of class struggle within ZANU itself. One hopes this is not a foretaste of the kind of **celebrationism** all too familiar from the Tanzanian literature and reaching its apogee in rather similar terms, in Cranford Pratt's *The Critical Phase in Tanzania* (Cambridge University Press, 1976).
15. This and the following quotation are from Jonathan Steele, 'Why Soweto is holding its fire', *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (8 June, 1980); I am grateful to Jonathan Barker for drawing this article to my attention.