

RETARDED CAPITALISM IN TANZANIA*

Susanne D. Mueller

Tanzania: Narodism and the Articulation of the Modes of Production

To accuse an African ruling class of retarding **capitalism** and its principal classes is virtually unheard of. However, this is what has happened in Tanzania, where state capital has consistently acted to forestall the development of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat by basing accumulation on the expansion of middle-peasant household production. The reactionary utopianism of Russia's **Narodniks**** has actually been institutionalised here and labelled socialism. Lenin's predictions have come true; labour and capital have been confined to their most primitive state, and middle peasants are increasingly squeezed as the State intensifies the production of cash crops which demand more inputs and must conform to rigid quality and quantity controls.' From the perspective of the market, middle peasants are expected to act like capitalists while constrained by both their smallness and their lack of capital, and like labour without any of the benefits of fully socialised labour. With the intensification of commodity production, middle peasants are simultaneously subject to all the horrors of producing for an increasingly demanding market and none of the benefits of capitalism over previous modes of production. By forestalling 'the direct separation of household producers from their means of production', the State has fettered 'the accumulation of indigenous capital within smallholding **production**'.³ (Cowen, 1977: 4.) This fettering plus the continuous expansion of smallholdings forecloses the possibility of significantly developing the productive forces. The result is overwork and underconsumption, the continuation of hand production, and the re-assertion of **backward**, semifeudal relations of **production** as **middle-peasant** producers who are unable to reproduce themselves **under** these conditions become informal tenants for others and whole families

¶ I wish to thank the following for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper: Grant Amyot, Michael Cowen, Jane Guyer, Colin Leys, Ralph Miliband, Phil Raikes and Nicola Swainson.

The term 'Narodnik**' and 'Narodism' are here used metaphorically insofar as a) no exact parallel with the material conditions in Russia at the time Lenin was writing is suggested; b) the Narodniks were a movement and not a state; c) the **ruling** class in Tanzania became 'populist' after becoming dominant in the State and not before. The metaphor applies in the sense that many of the Narodniks' populist ideas have been institutionalised in Tanzania with the results predicted by Lenin.

(including children) become part of this overworked and underfed work force.

In theory, the very considerable injection of international capital in Tanzania since 1974 should counteract the regressive effects of Narodism. In contrast to state capital, international capital enters as the advanced capital of a different form and period, acting to **rationalise** commodity production and to raise the productivity of labour through improved inputs and higher producer **prices**.³ However, international capital (like all other capitals, as Marx noted) initially takes labour as it finds it and only later transforms it. By entering on the back of a state capital that has organised labour within a Narodnik framework, international capital is itself limited by the contradictions of attempting to transform the value of labour power within this framework. Consequently, improved inputs are used which theoretically increase the value produced by labour, but extraction on the basis of absolute rather than relative surplus value still predominates, as the formal and real subordination of labour to capital is inhibited by the confines of middle-peasant household production. Improved seeds, insecticides, and fertilisers are either counterbalanced by the effect of the hand hoe or demand more labour than can be supplied by a household which is too poor to hire in. Smallholdings limit the degree of mechanisation, resulting in outcries for so-called 'appropriate technologies' to stabilise Narodism in the face of its contradictions.

As Lenin and **Kautsky** predicted, the middle peasant's land becomes his fetter under such circumstances. The formality of the land may mask his 'precarious position' of 'half **peasant/half** worker' (Lenin, I, p. 223), his eventual proletarianisation, and his interim status of 'wage labour equivalent' (**Banaji**, 1977: 33-34). However, once the laws of motion of capital predominate and become generalised, the middle peasantry is compelled 'to expand commodity production to reproduce the means of subsistence', (**Cowen**, NCCHP: 19) and it is this compulsion which determines its status.

The question of why the middle peasant's land in Tanzania has become his fetter is not to be answered by referring to some mythically resilient pre-capitalist peasantry. The middle peasantry is not pre-capitalist. It has been subjected to the laws of motion of capitalism and gets none of its progressive benefits. Its fetter is not itself, but the State which has legally restricted its freedom of movement, confined it to villages, and re-introduced minimum acreage requirements from the thirties. (**Raikes**, 1975, 1978; **Coulson**, 1975, 1977). Capital at the level of exchange is not articulating with some mysterious pre-capitalist mode of production. The laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production predominate with labour chained by the State to the most backward organisation of production, the most primitive productive forces, and thereby forced into the most primitive relations of production. The authority comes from

capital. The limitations derive from the State and not a resistant pre-capitalist formation. To understand why capitalism is still so poorly developed and the reasons for the limitations on formal and real subordination that effectively institutionalise Narodism and pauperise a trapped peasantry, one must look to the State and its ruling class as the resistant class rather than to some resistant pre-capitalist formation. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the class itself is not pre-capitalist, but capitalist and petit-bourgeois. As such, the State is not against capitalism *per se*, but simply big capitalism out of its control as opposed to small capitalism within its control.

Why Narodism Became the Tanzanian Way

In Kenya, a nascent big bourgeoisie controlled profits as early as the 1930s, while in Tanzania, teachers, traders, and clerks were the mainstay of the independence movement, with kulak farmers participating (Awiti, Bienen, Hyden, Maguire), but never predominating as a class 'to the extent where they could become an important political force at the national level' (Shivji, 1976: 50).⁴ In contrast to Kenya, Tanzania was not a settler colony⁵ and had a lower priority for Great Britain. This junior status was reflected by its comparatively underdeveloped infrastructure, industrial and manufacturing sectors at independence in 1961.⁶ Europeans in Tanzania alienated less than 1 per cent of the land, few restrictions were placed on what Africans were allowed to grow, and the official policy was to promote cash-crop production by expanding the number of middle-peasant household producers (Brett: 217; Iliffe, 1971: 36-37). Proletarianisation was minimal by comparison with Kenya, where the imposition of settler estate agriculture often necessitated separating the producer from his means of production, resulting in landlessness.⁷ Unlike Kenya, where a future big-bourgeoisie berated the colonial state for being 'communist' (Njonjo) and not differentiating between them and the rest by allowing the 'better farmers' to plant coffee and have individual title to the land, Tanzania's kulaks did not face the same impediments and were perhaps less insistent about controlling the independence movement. Although Kenya's nascent big bourgeoisie found its sphere of operation circumscribed by the colonial state, capital invested relatively heavily in this settler colony, creating ample opportunities to accumulate through trade and distributorships as well as by producing agricultural commodities which were less attractive to settler capital. Because Tanzania was, from the earliest times, a dumping ground for Kenya's developing industrial and manufacturing sector, opportunities for accumulation were more limited in Tanzania and a non-productive petit bourgeoisie predominated, with only a small number of kulak farmers emerging in the fertile areas of Kilimanjaro, Ismani, and Lushoto, alongside the European estates. These 'yeoman' farmers, as they were called, were not favoured by the colonial State against the 'peasant

cultivator' until the mid-1950s when the State attempted to encourage ' "the transition from native customary tenure into freehold in appropriate areas"' (Iliffe, 1971: 38). By this time, the independence movement was in full swing and this policy, which clearly acted to stabilise kulaks in a class, was roundly attacked by Nyerere, who claimed:

If we allowed land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanzania. . . We would be faced with a problem which has created antagonism among people and led to bloodshed in many countries of the world (Nyerere in Iliffe, 1971: 38).

Kenya's big bourgeoisie came to power to strip capital of its racial fetters and proceeded to smash its petit-bourgeois opponents who saw the situation somewhat differently. Tanzania's ruling 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', as it was later called (Shivji, 1976: 66-99),⁹ lacked the material base to act like its Kenya counterparts and was not prepared to continue to support land policies that would develop capital (out of its control) and proletarianise a middle peasantry. Hence, while Kenya devised policies to support the further development of a big bourgeoisie,¹⁰ its poorer sister chose Narodism to institutionalise a petit bourgeoisie and small capitalism.

Narodism Phase I: Ujamaa

Tanzania's Narodism has developed in two phases (1967-1973 and 1973-present) with tendencies to reproduce two different forms and periods of capital. During the first phase, Nyerere presented his version of 'socialism', attempted to institutionalise it in the now famous *ujamaa* (familyhood) villages, and began his attack on big capital.

Socialism, Nyerere argued, was 'an attitude of mind', and the immediate task after independence was for Tanzanians to 're-educate' themselves and 'regain (this) former attitude of mind' (Nyerere in Clark, 1978: 42). Capitalism, exploitation, classes and class struggle were all presented as the unique product of a foreign, Western colonialism, rather than as a distinct period in the development of commodity production. Nyerere therefore insisted that Tanzania's task was to become 'self-reliant' and to develop its traditional economy, which was already socialistic (Nyerere, 1968: 337-356; 1966: 195-203).

The argument was not new. Almost one hundred years earlier Lenin spent volumes attacking Russia's Narodniks who believed that socialism there could be based on the *mir* (village **commune**) and its naturally communistic peasantry (Lenin, I-IV especially). Lenin saw the Narodniks as utopian, petit-bourgeois reactionary nationalists whose support of Russia's 'small producer' was 'opposed to the interests of labour in general' and was not an attack on capitalism, but simply big foreign capital (Lenin, I: 440-441). Lenin roundly chastised the Narodniks for inventing 'a fiction

of the pre-capitalist order' (Lenin, II: 517), for their false assumption that Russia was still 'pre-capitalist' (Lenin, I: 384-385), and for their insistence on incorrectly seeing the Russian small producer as an independent **proto-socialist** rather than as a petit bourgeois engaged in the hopeless task of trying to stabilise himself as a small producer in the face of a developing capitalist economy (Lenin, I: 341-381). To prefer capitalism in its 'least developed' form, where both labour and capital are backward, was in Lenin's opinion to prefer capitalism in its 'worst form' (Lenin, I: 436). In designating 'independent undertakings', which depended on all sorts of personal exploitation, *moral*, and 'wage labour', which stripped 'exploitation of all its obscurities and illusions' *immoral* (Lenin, I: 384-385), Lenin accused the Narodniks of opting for 'stagnation' over 'capitalist progress' (Lenin, II: 519), and of fettering labour to the land rather than pressing for its freedom as a socialised commodity off the land, where it would be capable of confronting capital in its most advanced form (Lenin, I: 414).

In spite of its historical antecedents, Nyerere's radical populism had an initially strong domestic appeal and even more so abroad. Intrinsic to its success was the argument that socialism could develop apart from classes and class struggle, that everything could be improved without drastic change, that the peasantry was the 'natural fighter for socialism' (Lenin, I: 275) and that so-called traditional life would be preserved rather than destroyed. Even now, critics attacking the results of Tanzania's policies tend to defend the theory **and/or** the class behind these policies as 'progressive' (Shivji, 1976: 98; Saul, 1974: 362; von Freyhold, 1977: 85; Raikes, 1975: 36; Raikes, 1978: 269) with alternative positions branded 'pseudo-Marxist determinism' (Saul, 1974: 364). The historical analogue appears once again with reminders of Lenin's attacks on Narodnik reformism, their belief that Russia was 'exceptional' (Lenin, II: 518) and their underlying assumption that they, as intellectuals, could choose Russia's future apart from 'the independent trends of the various social classes which were shaping history in accordance with their own interests' (Lenin, II: 523).

Irrespective of the support it garnered from intellectuals and its own bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the Narodnik content of Tanzania's policies in this first phase was obvious enough. After repeated failures to attract foreign aid, the 1967 **Arusha** Declaration announced that Tanzania would base its socialism on 'self-reliance' at both the national and individual level. Banks, large companies, and big private estates were nationalised, with less than half of the transport and manufacturing sector left in private hands (Clark, 1978: 68). Shortly afterwards, the political party TANU passed a set of 'Leadership Guidelines' which prohibited members of the government, party and parastatals from holding more than one job, having directorships or shares in private companies, or from renting private houses to others. The agrarian policy was spelled out in two position papers: 'Socialism and Rural Development', and 'Education for Self-Reliance'. In the former, the

state encouraged peasants to join *ujamaa* villages and farm communally in exchange for promises of increased social services. In the latter, proposals were made to dismantle the colonial educational structure and include agricultural work as part of the primary school curriculum so that peasant children would be prepared for their future with a realistic, relevant education. Somewhat afterwards, in 1971, **TANU's** 'Mwongozo' Guidelines theoretically opened the way for workers' participation and control by forbidding 'arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive leaders' (Clark, 1978: 48).

Different classes in different parts of the country handled these promulgations **differently**;¹¹ however, it would be a mistake to treat them as mere theory. The attack was against big capital and the development of wage labour as a commodity. The effect was to level class formation and simultaneously to introduce the more perverse sorts of differentiation predicted by **Lenin**. With state employees prohibited from engaging in private enterprise, personal accumulation did not stop, but depended on surreptitious business activities that were often unproductive (**Shivji**, 1976: 80-84; Raikes, 1978: 301-307; Fortmann, **1978c**: 20) and on increasing the size of the state bureaucracy and the salaries of its upper echelons. In spite of the 'Mwongozo' Guidelines, the State clamped down hard on workers after a series of strikes in 1972-1973 (Mihyo, 1975: 64-84; **Shivji**, 1976: 23-45) revealing the anti-labour petit-bourgeois content of its socialism. With capital itself formally stymied, the size of the official working class also decreased (Raikes, **1978**), in part the result of a cutback in sisal production (Rweyemamu; Clark, 1978: **55**), in part a predictable consequence of Narodism. Furthermore, 'Education for Self-Reliance' appeared to apply only to the poor as differentiation continued (Mbilinyi, 1974; 1976) and other classes went on for secondary and university studies.

In the agrarian sector, this first phase attempted to halt the development of a politically and economically competitive class of capitalist farmers and to exert greater control over the sphere of realisation by encouraging communal production in *ujamaa* villages. Producer prices for agricultural commodities barely changed over a seven-year period, one example of state appropriation by unequal exchange. Another was its tendency to mimic merchant capital as it simultaneously entered the sphere of production sporadically **and** unevenly without transforming the productive forces, without decreasing the value of labour power and by appropriating through the extraction of absolute surplus value (**Boesen**, b; Coulson, 1975; Raikes, 1975; **Shivji**). Hence the predictable attempts by the ruling class to idealise the land, the village, and the hoe.

Kulak farmers responded in kind. Living in the most productive parts of the country on the periphery, they reacted by selling across the border to neighbouring Kenya and Uganda, where producer prices were **often** higher and the shilling was harder, following the dissolution of the unified

East African currency in 1966. Kulaks also used their control of the cooperative societies, through which credit was distributed and crops were marketed, to accumulate at the expense of both smallholders and the State (Raikes, 1978: 301-307; Migot Agolla in Widstrand; Fortmann, 1978c: 20; Cliffe et. al., 1975; Matango) and even managed on occasion to attract state resources to establish *ujamaa* villages (von Freyhold, 1977: 88; Raikes, 1975: 45-46). While the relationship between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and individual kulaks remained somewhat ambiguous, the official policy of expanding middle-peasant household production fettered their ability to accumulate as a class. The thrust of the State's policies attempted to stymie the development of a class of competitive appropriators. Although the State might favour individual kulaks from time to time, as a class they became the scapegoat for the State's failures and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie mounted attacks on those farmers who could potentially become a 'focus of opposition against measures which affected the peasantry as a whole' (von Freyhold, 1977: 88).

During this period, *ujamaa* villages were voluntary and kulak farmers rarely joined with the exception of those who used the opportunity to attract State funds. *Ujamaa* villages were directed towards poor peasants; however, the much promised social services rarely came, no more than 15 to 20 per cent of the population ever joined, efforts to promote communal production were generally unsuccessful, and active political participation was discouraged to the point where one group of villages known as the Ruvuma Development Association was deregistered and banned (McHenry; Coulson, 1975; Raikes, 1975; Fortmann, 1978c). Although recruitment into villages was supposed to be voluntary, force was often used to relocate peasants to sites where there was no water, no seeds for planting, no food during the relocation period, and where the land itself was poor, medical facilities were unavailable, and the lengthy distance from the market made it impossible to sell what was produced. Furthermore, with wage labour officially prohibited or discouraged, more perverse social relations of production appeared (Musoke, Bakula, Daraja, Mashauri, Mboya in Proctor). Leaders often had more land than others, penalised those who refused to work on communal plots, and used the labour power within villages as their personal servants (Proctor; Fortmann, 1978c; 42-43).

In short, the prohibitions on wage labour simply resurrected the various types of *corvée* labour described so well by Lenin in his critiques of the Narodniks (Lenin, DCR: 189, 605; Lenin, I: 216-217). While estate labourers had been relatively better off, as they were protected by a minimum wage (Fortmann, 1978b: 3), one Area Commissioner prohibited members of an *ujamaa* village from working in a nearby tea factory (de Vries and Fortmann, 1974: 15), and in another case the hiring of migrant wage labour was stopped. In Ismani, after capitalist farmers had their land

appropriated and turned into *ujamaa* villages, the state used and 'directed' the labour of secondary school children and members of the National Service (Raikes, 1977: 306, 322) in preference to wage labour. In a village in Tanga, members became the 'personal servants' of the manager and were punished with double work loads if they did not perform the communal work assigned to them (Fortmann, 1978c: 42-43). Not surprisingly, 'labour organisation' was often perceived as 'problematic' during this period. However, the resistance of the peasantry could not be termed pre-capitalist. Given the choice between '*ujamaa* and working as a paid labourer, they chose the cash' (de Vries and Fortmann, 1974: 15); however, often the choice was not theirs. Decisions stemmed from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that an 'idle and loitering' poor peasantry 'should be participating full time in agricultural production' (Boesen, b: 6) for the State. Predictably enough, with labour exploited by the State both in the sphere of realisation and exchange, agricultural production declined. Furthermore, the failures of this period were not the unfortunate mistakes of a 'well-intentioned' (Raikes, 1978: 269) socialism, but the predictable consequences of Narodism, which is anti-labour and reactionary where it appears. As Lenin noted,

compared with the labour of the dependent or bonded peasant, the labour of the hired worker is progressive in all branches of the national economy (Lenin, DCR: 605).

Not a single worker would ever consent to exchange his status for that of a Russian 'independent' handicraftsman in 'real', 'peoples' industries (Lenin, I: 216-217),

or, one might add, with a member of an *ujamaa* village.

The result by 1974 was stagnation in agriculture (Tabari, 1975: 90). With so few peasants in *ujamaa* villages and cooperatives still holding their own, state capital still had little control either in the sphere of production or exchange. Outside a few estates, the productive forces were still underdeveloped to the point of being backward (Boesen, b: 10, 7), inputs were not widely used, and surplus was largely appropriated on the basis of absolute rather than relative surplus value. With agricultural commodities forming one half of Tanzania's GDP and almost all of her exports, the consequences of a stagnating agrarian sector could not be overlooked. Peasants had to be kept on the land and producing to support a burgeoning state and insure its reproduction. The anti-proletarian content of Narodism was likely to become starker. The State needed to harness the labour power of the peasantry without creating surplus populations that 'could not possibly be absorbed' (Marx, *Capital*, I: 734). Furthermore, State capital itself was too poorly developed to support a large proletariat and was unwilling to allow a competitive capitalist class to accumulate at its expense.

Narodism Phase II: Villagisation

Faced with these crises, Tanzania embarked on a second phase characterised by the forcible villagisation of the majority of the population and a massive re-entry of international (mainly World Bank) capital of a different form and period. Villagisation had its greatest impact on weak and scattered populations in the poorest parts of the country. Here labour was uprooted and regrouped into legally constituted villages. Villagisation is best understood as the initial crude reorganisation of labour; as the formal subordination of labour to state capital. As such, it has more in common with Marx's description of early capitalism prior to mechanisation¹² (Marx, *Capital*, I: chapters XI-XIV, especially p. 322) than it does with the expansion of simple commodity production within the confines of a so-called 'peasant economy'. What has been described as the 'Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production' (Hyden, 1978) exists only in the realm of mythology.

While the ideology of *ujamaa* was projected as a kind of sentimental Narodism, villagisation was presented in terms of modernisation theory. Peasants were no longer seen as proto-socialist, but as thorns in the State's side, whose 'problems were based fundamentally on their traditional outlook and unwillingness to accept change'. Ideologues argued 'the State had... to take the role of the "father"' and move its citizens to 'a better and more prosperous life' (Mwapachu, 1976: 3). In 1973, Nyerere announced that 'to live in villages is an order', and justified coercion by a further notation that 'It's partly compulsory... so is vaccination', (quoted in Nsari, 1975: 116). From the standpoint of the State, the main objective of villagisation was

... to make possible a better use of the existent and often underemployed rural labour. By working together... peasants are expected to engage in specialisation of functions and divisions of labour as well as increase their work and discipline. It is hoped that this together with the emanating village organisation would eventually lead to an increase in agricultural production and labour productivity (Maeda, 1977: 6).

One could hardly have asked for a better rendition of chapters XI-XIV of Marx's *Capital*, vol. I.

The State instituted its policy of forcible villagisation between 1973 and 1976. Communal production was largely abandoned and 13 million people were herded into nucleated villages with individual block farms, representing 85 per cent of the population and some 8,000 villages (Coulson, 1977). Regardless of intention, the initial impact of villagisation was not to produce primitive rural factories of organised labour. It was instead radically to disrupt rural life and to create a food crisis.¹³ Government agents who ranged from the militia to TANU youth league officials to agricultural extension officers stripped peasants of their land,

food, and possessions, burning their houses and crops along the way. Scattered populations were moved, in many cases from fertile to barren land, out of permanent dwellings, away from water, and to areas devoid of social services. Populations which had once been scattered were now concentrated. Ecologically sound land practices were dismantled. Land that was formerly cleared and kept under control through scattered dwelling patterns returned to bush. Villages were overpopulated and over-concentrated. Land began to erode under the pressure of too many animals and people, with sanitary conditions deteriorating rapidly. Whereas a farmer's field had once been close by his dwelling, the concentration of populations into nucleated villages now sometimes meant a five- to seven-mile walk prior to cultivating. Much of that land either returned to bush or, when it was farmed, was too far away to be protected from devastation by wild animals, bad weather, pilfering, etc. Consequently, a kind of illegal feudal subtenancy occurred with farmers who had land closer to the village subletting to those who had land further away, thereby creating 'a previously non-existent landlord class' (Fortmann, 1978c: 56). Villages were arbitrarily located near roads even when it was the least fertile land in the area. In practice, this meant that in some areas peasants were forcibly evicted from fertile hilltops to barren plains or vice versa depending on where the road was. The result in one instance was a 50 per cent decline in agricultural production (Operation Songeza, p. 6). Tanzania, which had been a net exporter of food between 1968 and 1971, was forced to import over 500,000 tons of maize between 1973 and 1975 to avert starvation (Lofchie, 1978: 453-455).

At the same time that villagisation was occurring, the State restructured its authority to deal with these new units of production. Freedom of movement was curtailed and minimum acreage requirements from the colonial period were introduced. Prior to the massive move, Government was **de**-centralised to the Regions in 1972 with a heavy concentration of administrative and legal authority directed to villages and village production. A hierarchy of command was established from the Prime Minister's Office (**PMO's**) to the village, and agricultural extension officers (*bwana shambas*) were only to report to the Ministry of Agriculture on technical matters, with the administrative authority (*i.e.* promotions, hiring, firing, orders) transferred to the PMO. In 1975, 'Villages and **Ujamaa** Villages (Resignation, Designation and Administration) Act' was passed to define what constituted a village and how its political and administrative affairs should be regulated. Village Chairmen and Secretaries became paid employees of the political party and assumed a greater responsibility for agricultural production at the village level. In 1976, cooperative societies were disbanded with agricultural credit (*i.e.* applying for, receiving, unending, and recouping credit for improved inputs) and crop-buying arrangements filtered through the village as the legally liable unit, thereby eliminating the role previously enjoyed by

kulak farmers. Parastatal crop-buying and marketing authorities were simultaneously established for almost every crop, again curtailing the kulak sphere of influence in an attempt to increase state accumulation. A year later, the political party TANU joined with Zanzibar's ASP to become CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi—the Party of the Revolution). With its new radical nomenclature, the party role nevertheless increasingly came to resemble that of the State's policeman in the countryside, as it assured a greater responsibility for agricultural production and the distribution of credit to the village level. However, the State decided not to leave village production to popularly elected officials and in December 1977 created the post of Village Manager (**VM**) and Village Management Technician (**VMT**) who were to be paid and accountable to the central government and responsible for the 'socio-economic take-off of the village as a production unit' (**Maeda**, p. 11). The position has been accurately described as 'the final stage of government penetration of the countryside' (Fortmann, **1978b**: 19). However, with villages regarded by state officials as a kind of Siberia, few have reported for duty.

One must naturally distinguish between the State's vision and attempts at subordination and the reality which followed. Although in certain respects, villagisation as a classic form represented the 'enlargement of scale' (Mandel, 1977: 1023) which Marx felt was critical to greater formal and hence real subordination, the degree of formal subordination itself varied, creating various types of villages. Furthermore, even within classic nucleated villages, household production remains the dominant form, with the State doing little beyond supplying **inputs** to transform the value of labour power. The result in both cases is that there is a limit to the degree of subordination which can occur, thereby accentuating extraction by absolute surplus value, giving rise to the Narodism of an earlier period, and leading to certain contradictions for both state and international capital.

In the wealthy, densely populated, richer parts of the country, villages are often nothing more than legal composites of individual landholdings which are still scattered, sometimes unconsolidated, and cannot be visibly identified as villages. Following the assassination of a state official who tried to villagise the wealthy maize growers of Ismani, the State made no further attempt to move capitalist farmers and reorganise their production. Instead, the State's legal redefinition of these unconsolidated holdings as villages was directed towards subordinating the sphere of exchange by making it impossible for individual farmers to receive agricultural inputs outside of their village governments and making these governments the legally liable organs if they failed to recoup credit. Nevertheless, the State's policy of expanding household production and officially frowning on the hiring of wage labour both increases the difficulty of accumulating and concentrating rural capital and the likelihood that poorer middle peasants (themselves the product of the contradictions of Narodism) will

be hired formally.

A second type of village is like the first, atypical, but in a different sense. Its population produces little for exchange value and really approximates a rural proletariat rather than the more common middle peasant wage labour equivalent—subordinated to capital, fighting to reproduce itself, and yet unable to sell its labour for the wage versus the equivalent. Such villages have little independent economic viability and are most accurately described as 'bedroom communities' to the large State or expatriate estates which they border. A number of such villages are new creations of the massive villagisation campaign. Typically, they have been sited on marginal land with poor productive potential; they are not considered creditworthy and produce little or nothing for exchange value. It would be difficult to say whether such villages are the result of bad planning or a strategic way of providing cheap labour for nearby estates. In the past, a number of attempts were made to recruit labour for state farms. When that failed, vagrants in town who could not show they had work were forcibly moved and trucked out to government estates. As most of the vagrants ran away, a more successful policy has been to relocate the peasantry to uninhabitable land, control movement between villages, and create a captive labour force.

A third type of village is also marginal, but unlike the second, there is no way the population can engage in wage labour. Here, the middle peasantry is experiencing the classic symptoms of Narodism and stands with 'one foot already in the swamp of pauperism' (Marx, *Capital*, I: 642). The population is too far away from the estates to sell its labour, too likely to be evicted from the towns if it tried, and too uneducated to succeed if it were not thrown out. The biggest problem of peasants in such villages is to ensure their own continuous reproduction—that is, to produce enough to eat. Normally, they grow two seasons of maize before they sell any because they fear starvation. As they generally have been relocated to uninhabitable land, their surplus is marginal, and they are no longer considered suitable credit risks. To the extent that freedom of movement has been curtailed by villagisation (and it is unclear how successful the State has been in its attempts to restrict migration), the land is likely to become increasingly marginal, leading to a situation in which poor middle peasants are less and less likely to be able to reproduce themselves. At present, these villages produce very little and sometimes nothing for exchange value. Hence, the essential condition which prompted capital to provide famine relief during the colonial period (**Bryceson**)—to ensure the continuous production for exchange value—does not arise. Nevertheless, to avert starvation, the importation of food and the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves,¹⁴ it is still important to the State that such peasants are able to reproduce themselves. State and particularly international capital have encouraged the growth of food crops through a variety of mechanisms including more favourable producer prices and by supplying inputs of credit for the

production of food crops through programmes such as the National Maize Programme, which was jointly sponsored by the World Bank and AID. However, since the crisis of 1974, credit for the production of food crops is mainly given where cash crops are produced so that necessary labour time relative to surplus labour time will be reduced, thereby increasing the productivity of labour power from the standpoint of state capital. As these villages neither produce cash crops nor generally for exchange, they are by definition not creditworthy. Although credit was given to some of these villages experimentally following the food crisis of 1974, the result was either that credit was not repaid, or that the land was so marginal that the inputs had either no impact or a negative one (Fortmann, 1975).¹⁵ It seems then that the continuous reproduction of this peasantry is not important for exchange value, but simply to avert starvation and/or the development of surplus populations. To ensure both, the State, in conjunction with the ILO and the UNDP is proposing to begin a 'Special Labour Intensive Public Works Programme in the Arusha, Dodoma, Rukwa, and Ruvuma Regions', which are some of the poorer parts of the country. The point of this project is to 'engage deployable surplus labour to build irrigation and water supply facilities, schools, health centres, housing, feeder roads and to carry out land reclamation' (UNDP, pp. 27-28). Labour power will either be paid below its value or compensated by 'food for work'. One is reminded of the German colonial periods when

famine was made into a useful occasion for the administration to gain labour for its many 'projects of civilization'. The policy of 'quid pro quo' was proudly proclaimed 'The governor does not intend to distribute the food free of charge, but rather to sell it cheaply or to exchange it against work performance. He hopes to generate some good results from this approach and to considerably increase the contribution of the local people to useful endeavours like road construction' (Kjekshus, 1977: 140-141, partially quoted in Bryceson, 1978: 17).

Whatever the initial reasons for moving scattered peasants off one piece of marginal land and concentrating them on another, it is clear that although these peasants produce nothing significant for exchange value, it is far easier for the State to subordinate and deploy rural labour from villages than from scattered settlements. From the standpoint of state capital, villages have many of the same attractions that factories did in comparison to scattered handicraft 'industries'. One is accessible, whereas the other is less so; one has functionaries (members of the village government, village managers, etc.) whose chief responsibility is to 'direct, superintend, and... adjust' (Marx, Capital, I: 330) the work process, whereas the other does not. Again, the fact that labour is not fully proletarianised, that it is in some sense still tied to the land but unable to reproduce itself off it, that it is paid below its value and subsidises this low payment by what it produces on the land is not the sign of a pre-capitalist

peasantry. This middle peasantry is experiencing the classic symptoms of Narodism. It is being squeezed, trapped, and exploited by a poorly developed state capital attempting to transform itself without creating capitalists, workers, or surplus populations.

A fourth type of village has greater productive potential than those just described, primarily because of its location on arable land. Such villages have a special status for state and international capital. They are the focus of rural credit and 'integrated rural development' schemes and of programmes to expand the production of certain cash crops. However, even here peasants have received few increases in social services and little that would transform the quality of the productive forces. While the State views the village as a unit of production with stated targets, it has done little but to regroup labour. The **middle-peasant** household continues to remain the sub-unit of production, sometimes scattered, sometimes on individual block farms within nucleated villages. The hoe is still the main instrument of production, most villages are poorly connected by roads, many have no water, and the quality of extension services is often poor (Coulson, 1977). A climate of chronic uncertainty faces potentially productive peasants in potentially **productive** villages. A peasant may produce for exchange value only to find that the market does not provide for the purchase of use values, raising the obvious question of why produce if there is nothing to buy. Crop prices are variable, marketing is unreliable, and transport and storage are generally unavailable. Crops sometimes rot waiting for the State to market perishable produce, or prices suddenly change to the disadvantage of the peasant producer, putting him into debt or forcing him to underconsume. Liberal market incentives are too unpredictable to give rise to the degree of specialisation in production that one might expect. Instead, as a hedge against the State's poor prices and marketing, potentially high producers tend to diversify rather than specialise in one commodity and sometimes move more heavily into food production. Although special seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, and other improved inputs are supplied to such villages, the realisation of value still tends towards the extraction of absolute rather than relative surplus value, because the productive forces are so backward and their transformation is limited by the existing organisation of production. With minimum acreage requirements of the colonial period having been resurrected and the coercive apparatus of the State well developed down to the village, there is little direct confrontation of State authority. Instead, peasants engage in activities which are interpreted by the State as devious, stupid, uneducated or irrational, which give rise in turn to a further concentration of state authority at the village level. These activities are, in fact, the symptoms of Narodism—the contradictions of attempting to force out an increase in surplus value within the confines of **middle-peasant** household production.

Narodism and International Capital

This fourth type of village is the focal point for international capital, which now supplies Tanzania with 60 to 80 per cent of its annual development budget. It is directed primarily towards the promotion of certain cash crops or institutions and programmes which indirectly support that production. Continuity in production as well as quality and quantity controls are important aspects of supplying international markets with particular commodities. Both increasingly depend on the expansion and rationalisation of commodity relations in general. Hence, international capital is promoting projects to improve storage facilities for both food and cash crops, devise training programmes for village officials and agricultural extension officers, start small businesses within villages, improve the distribution of fertilisers and other inputs, and develop technical packages which are specifically designed to suit certain agro-economic zones.

To insure sufficient quantity and quality controls, it is necessary to force out an increase in the productivity of labour by using improved inputs. Tendencies towards a further extraction of relative surplus value depend on increasing the size of holdings, the hiring of wage labour, and the introduction of machinery, all of which are inhibited by middle-peasant household production. As the use of inputs increases and demands more labour than can be supplied by small households, a counter-tendency towards the extraction of absolute surplus value appears, in spite of the fact that international capital does enter as an advanced form of industrial capital with *tendencies* to produce higher yields of a specified quality. To insure a continuous supply of a commodity, there must in the first instance be a guarantee that peasant producers are able to reproduce themselves. In the second instance, commodity relations must be sufficiently generalised either to result in the ideal situation where producers purchase rather than produce the means of subsistence or where conditions encourage peasants to increase what they produce for exchange value and decrease production to reproduce the means of subsistence. To decrease necessary relative to surplus labour time necessitates supplying improved inputs for both food and cash crops, thereby increasing yields per hectare, decreasing the amount of land and labour time which must be used for production to reproduce the means of subsistence, and increasing production for exchange value, whether of food or cash crops. However, within the confines of middle-peasant household production, the tendency to force out an increase in the value of labour (*i.e.* the extraction of relative surplus value) is counteracted by the constraints of household production, resulting in a tendency towards the intensification of labour, overwork, and under-consumption, and the extraction of absolute surplus value. This is further heightened as producers are paid too poorly (below the socially necessary cost of labour) for what they produce for exchange. If they are paid too poorly for what they produce for exchange value, they will either go into

debt as they attempt to pay for inputs received on credit, be unable to reproduce themselves, switch from one commodity to another in search of better prices, or attempt to retreat into production for consumption. In all cases, the continuous production of commodities for exchange value is threatened. Hence, in Kenya, according to **Cowen**, international capital fought against earlier forms of capital (in particular, estate capital) in their attempts to 'maintain producer prices' and sought to raise those prices to the international prices. **Cowen** demonstrates how estate capital as an earlier form extracted value on the basis of absolute surplus labour (by lengthening the working day, decreasing consumption, **and/or** paying value) and in doing so invited the pauperisation of the producer in contrast to international capital (**Cowen, 1977**).¹⁷

In Tanzania, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has used the State as a vehicle of accumulation for itself as a class, with inflated salaries and numerous perks substituting for their inability to accumulate in the sphere of production. Furthermore, as real producer prices decrease relative to inflation, the salaries and costs of administering crop-buying parastatals have increased over time. The result has been that international capital has transformed the value of labour power with improved inputs at the same time that state capital has put a lid on producer prices, with the margin between producer and international prices increasing. Coupled with the obvious limitations of increasing the extraction of surplus value on small household units, international capital has mainly generated increased value for exchange through the expansion of the number of households engaged in the production of a particular commodity, rather than in any genuine transformation in the value of labour power.¹⁸ While international capital has attempted to pressure for higher producer prices in some cash-crop commodities, it has simultaneously helped to support programmes that effectively increase the pressure on the small producer.¹⁹ It has **also** effectively propped up the State and its ruling class during periods of economic crisis by supplying large amounts of capital and in some cases cancelling bilateral loans which have come due. Coupled with the obvious limitations of increasing the ratio of necessary relative to surplus labour time on small household units, international capital has compensated for the contradictions by generating increased value for exchange through the expansion of households engaged in the production of a particular commodity rather than in any genuine transformation of the value of labour power. However, the strategy itself may now have reached its logical limit. With overall agricultural production in stark decline, the IMF has recently insisted that Tanzania devalue its currency and introduce other stringent economic measures as a condition for future loans. (*New African*, 1980: 33-35). International capital, then, is like all other capitals faced with the law of values as its adversary and with the inherent contradictions of the Narodism it has subsidised. Nevertheless, to the extent

(and it is in some respects quite considerable) that international capital can transform the value of labour power within the confines of household production, it postpones other confrontations—in particular, the confrontation with either indigenous capital or labour.

Faced with strong big bourgeoisies in various parts of Africa and elsewhere in the third world, international capital is finding its sphere of operations increasingly circumscribed (Swainson, 1977: 39-55). Hence, to the extent that production can be organised simultaneously to extract greater surplus value and forestall the development of a big bourgeoisie, it does not *immediately* go against the interests of international capital. The expansion of household production does this 'by tempering rather than accelerating the concentration of land within the hands of the indigenous class' and 'by eclipsing the growth of sources of wage labour power' (Cowen, NCCHP: 13). The evident sympathy of international capital should not be surprising given its recognition that either organised labour or, more especially, unemployed or poor landless people, may be politically destabilising and hence threaten longer term interests (Feder, 1977: 56-78). In some cases, this has led to demands by international capital for 'land reform' (Halliday, 1979: 26-27) and 'redistribution', while in other cases, the existing social formations are more hospitable to this advanced Narodism and its international development packages of 'appropriate technology' and 'nonformal education'. While at one level these packages stymie the development of capital and the socialisation of labour, at another they alter the value of labour power and reduce the most glaring contradictions of Narodism.³⁰

Tanzania is quite hospitable to Narodism in a certain sense, because even prior to the massive re-entry of international capital, the material base of the ruling class led to its adopting policies which effectively acted both to curtail the development of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat and to base state accumulation on a landed middle peasantry. However, as Cowen has argued in another case, 'the *preponderance* of the middle peasantry has been *secured* by the action of international capital at the economic level. . .' (Cowen, NCCHP: 5; my emphasis). Ironically, then, international capital in Tanzania cannot be accused of having turned Tanzania away from its 'socialist' path towards capitalism. Tanzania has already embarked on the capitalist road. Instead, international capital has bolstered the existing petit-bourgeois capitalism by entering with capital of a different form and period. This has effectively worked further to expand household production, and thereby to perpetuate the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and its efforts to forestall a competitive capitalist class.³¹ If international capital is to be correctly accused, it cannot be for having created a class of kulaks, but rather for helping temporarily to cement Narodism, which Lenin noted 'stands for levelling out the peasantry and is "regressive" because it desires to keep capital within those medieval forms that combine

exploitation with scattered, technically backward production and with personal pressure on the producer' (Lenin, I: 485). The fact that international capital can to some degree transform the value of labour power and **rationalise** commodity relations (by raising food prices, grain storage projects, etc.) does not mean that the middle peasantry can be secured indefinitely. The middle peasantry is, after all, a fragile petit-bourgeois class within the confines of capitalism itself. Efforts to solidify the middle peasantry and curtail the extremes of bourgeoisie and proletariat cannot surmount the law of value, which in turn generates contradictions that point to the inherent instability of the middle peasantry as a class and the logical impossibility of its indefinite perpetuation. Furthermore, in the face of developing commodity production, it would be only realistic to view the middle peasantry as a trapped proletariat in the face of one mode of production and totally inappropriate to see it as a pre-capitalist formation. This is a continuation of the arguments put forward by **Cowen and Banaji (1977)**, who maintain that where the state subjects household commodity producers to quality and quantity controls and supervises their labour, producer prices are equivalent to wages and the household producers themselves become wage labour equivalents. However, as both Lenin and Marx noted on numerous occasions, there are clear and significant differences between a trapped equivalent and labour power as 'free' commodity (Capital, I: 169).

Conclusion

Narodism stifles class formation and gives birth to a repressive state. It cannot be the vehicle for a transition to socialism, and no such process of transition is occurring in Tanzania. Narodism in that country has instead been the vehicle for pauperisation both at the economic and political level.

Economically, Narodism has led to stagnation and starvation. By now there should be no mistake concerning causes. The recent war with Uganda and the impending drought have simply tipped the scale on an inherently precarious system which was doomed from its conception. The logical contradictions of Narodism have matured and can only become starker amidst the developing commoditisation of the economy. Here, socialism has not triumphed over capitalism. Nor is the Tanzanian system preferable to more ostensible and advanced types of capitalism. In Tanzania one is only viewing capitalism in its 'least developed' and 'worst' form (Lenin, I: 436), capitalism 'containing greater relics of medieval, semi-feudal forms of capital and nothing more' (Lenin, I: 380). In addition, it is false that the Tanzanian way provides for a greater degree of internal 'self-reliance' and autonomy from international capital. The economic stagnation induced by Narodism has actually increased Tanzania's dependence on external forces, verbiage to the contrary notwithstanding.

Politically, the results of Narodism are equally chilling. With the

extraction of relative surplusvalue precluded under this system, compulsion is the only way the State can squeeze greater surpluses from its poor and demoralised peasantry. This necessitates an increasingly repressive political and administrative system, which in turn reduces the opportunities for popular expression and political participation. It is no accident that one working-class area in Dar es Salaam is commonly called '**Soweto**' and that Tanzania's Special Branch is nervously referred to as 'Savak'. Furthermore, Tanzania's 'small is beautiful' Narodnik underpinnings have other undesirable political results as well. Class differentiation has been stifled. The State still holds legal title to the land, wage labour in the countryside is either frowned upon or actively prohibited, and the middle peasantry has been perpetuated through the enforcement of minimum acreage requirements and restrictions on its freedom of movement. There is no reason to applaud this 'victory' of the small peasant enterprise over big capital. Exploitation continues, but with fewer avenues of regress for the exploited. A backward parasitic capital continues to oppress poor and middle peasants; their produce is often shortweighed, they do not receive prices for their commodities which cover the full costs of their reproduction, and they are thereby forced to overwork and underconsume. Politically, the legal perpetuation of the middle peasantry has effectively reduced the socialisation of labour and thereby increased the authority of the State. Peasants cannot legally organise against the capital which exploits them on a daily basis because formally speaking they are not wage labour. Hence, they are reduced to subverting the State individually at the point of production and exchange. Such action creates periodic crises for the State as agricultural commodities are the mainstay of the economy and the principal source of foreign exchange. **However**, this repressive state and these crises do not in themselves provide the basis for revolutionary action or for a transition to socialism. In a country with little history of organised mass political struggle in either the colonial or the post-colonial period, Narodism has effectively cemented political as well as economic backwardness. Elsewhere in Africa, this sort of economic stagnation and political repression have paved the way for military intervention rather than for progressive change.

Under these circumstances, there is no point in speaking of socialism or the transition to socialism in Tanzania. To use the word 'socialism' here is to empty it of all content. Furthermore, to invoke the euphemism of the 'transition to socialism' and to **analyse** the existing situation in terms of setbacks and difficulties, incorrectly assumes that the process is still going on and that socialism in Tanzania is still on the agenda. Given the existing material and class forces and the implantation of Narodism, this was never the case. In addition, it would only be possible to speak of such a process if one moved from the world of dialectical materialism into the realm of voluntarism. It is more difficult to say exactly what is on the agenda in

Tanzania One of the principal forces at work remains shrouded in mystery. The ruling class itself is awkwardly termed and poorly understood; it continues to mouth 'socialist' rhetoric and the ideology of Narodism has become its legitimator. Beyond this it is more difficult to describe this class or to understand its divisions and tendencies. The repressive state apparatus itself makes it impossible to determine whether this class is simply enriching itself, **engaging** in a process of capitalist accumulation, or something else altogether.

The broader question of what is to be done in circumstances where commodity relations have been poorly developed historically, where the productive forces are backward, and where the social relations have themselves been stifled is disturbing indeed. However, one thing is clear. Revolutionary situations have not emerged by mystifying the present or by supporting Narodnik social formations. Any further mystification concerning Tanzania's Narodism can only support its ruling classes against its popular classes. Certainly, these illusions have helped to attract the outside funds and liberal support which have buffered the contradictions of this inherently unstable **system** and have solidified its ruling class. In this sense, it is no different from many other systems. However, elsewhere Narodism is not embraced as socialism and self-styled 'leftist' analysis has not become the ideological enemy of the popular classes.

NOTES

1. See Lenin, DCR, **Vols.** 1-11, IV-VI.
2. **Cowen's** discussions concerning the expansion of middle-peasant household production in Kenya and the role of international capital in buttressing this expansion critique—the populist notion that the effect of this intervention is to support accumulation by a domestic bourgeoisie. Although some of my findings differ from **Cowen's**, his writings have been an inspiration.
3. In his discussions of Kenya, **Cowen** argues that international capital enters as finance industrial capital with a consequent propensity to extract by relative surplus value in contrast to the estate merchant capital of a previous era which extracted by absolute surplus value. **Cowen** demonstrates that while estate capital sought to maintain producer prices, international capital attempted to raise producer prices as part of a more general attempt to raise the value of labour. As such, he maintains in contrast to populist writers, no instance of pauperisation resulted. **Cowen**, D.C.: 1977.
4. There is a need for a study of the relationship between the kulaks and the bureaucratic class which took over at independence. Since there is little solid evidence on this point, one must rest with the generalisations that exist at present.
5. Tanganyika was a German colony until the end of **WWI**, when it became a British Protectorate under the League of Nations. How much or whether its status as a Protectorate **influenced** Britain's policy here is an open question.
6. Clark, pp. **30-34**.
7. Clearly proletarianisation was not uniform in Kenya
8. The nascent big bourgeoisie in Kenya could be said to have been fighting the colonial state's Narodism in trying to better indigenous accumulation in refusing

to give title deeds to the few.

9. Use of the term 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' has been criticised. See Saul, von Freyhold, Nabudere. Tanzania's ruling class is in fact awkwardly termed and poorly understood. While one can describe the negative historical conditions which prevented the rise of a strong capitalist class taking control of the State, it is more **difficult** to discuss this class in positive terms. In general, it appears in the literature as a faceless class. To understand more about it, the following questions need to be investigated: **a)** what are the historical and material roots of this class and what was its role and relationship to the nationalist movement; **b)** what is and has been its relationship to rural capitalists; **c)** is this class using its salaries and perks simply to enrich itself or to transform itself into a class of capitalists; **d)** who controls the 50 per cent of the economy which has been in private hands since the Arusha Declaration of 1967.
10. In many respects, the colonial state could be said to have done the dirty work for Kenya's big bourgeoisie. First, it separated the producers from the means of production by alienating land. Second, it smashed 'Mau Mau' and made it impossible for the landless to regain that land. Third, it loaned the Kenyan **ruling** class the money to buy out British settlers and thereby gave this class the proper excuse to create a land market and sell the land rather than redistribute it to the landless.
11. This is a history that awaits further research, especially that concerning the relationship between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the kulaks.
12. Marx noted, '**A** greater number of labourers working at the same time (or if you will in the same field of labour) in order to produce the same sort of commodity under the mastership of one capitalist, ~~constitutes~~ both historically and logically the starting point of capitalist production... With regard to the mode of production itself, manufacture in its strict meaning is hardly to be distinguished in its earlier phases from the handicraft trades of the guilds other than by the greater number of workmen simultaneously employed by one and the same individual capital' (**Marx, Capital, I: 322**).
13. The food crisis coincided with a drought. However, the legacies of an earlier period of Narodism meant that there were no reserves and the process of villagisation disrupted existing patterns of production. The actual process of villagisation has been discussed more extensively by Boesen, Coulson, **Fortmann**, Raikes, Tabari, von Freyhold.
14. Prior to 1971, Tanzania **had been** a 'net exporter' of food. Between 1973-1975, 500,000 tons of maize was exported, foreign exchange reserves were exhausted and the balance of payments deficit increased threefold by 1974 (Lofchie, **pp: 453-55**).
15. Coulson (1977) has shown that most of the agricultural advice given peasants from the colonial period up to the present has been incorrect, including the question of **whether** inputs **should be used** at all on certain types of land and, if ~~so~~, what types.
16. The World Bank and the Marketing Research Bureau have pushed for an increase in food prices and devised plans for a grain storage project. A continuous production for exchange can only be assured if the peasantry is not prey to famines in the face of natural disasters. Higher producer prices encourage the production of food crops for exchange, while storage facilities insure the retention of buffer stocks and increase the likelihood that over time food commodities will be circulated for exchange in the rural areas.
17. In Tanzania, one could not argue that pauperisation is averted by the intervention of international **capital**. It is **true** that through its greater rationalisation and expansion of commodity relations it can attenuate the very worst contradictions.

of middle-peasant household production, including starvation; nevertheless, limited to household labour, overwork and underconsumption are conspicuous features of middle-peasant household production even following this intervention, in part because of the class which controls the State, in part because of the inherent contradictions of **Narodism** both in its backward and 'advanced' forms.

18. A genuine transformation would involve transforming the productive forces beyond improved **inputs**.
19. For example, the World Bank is supporting the development of a programme for village management and a number of other international agencies are supporting other programmes to 'deconcentrate' state authority to the village level (Boesen, N.D.). Furthermore, deductions for inputs received on credit remain high and the general approach to recouping credit, both by state and international agencies, is to put more pressure on the producer at the same time that he increasingly receives less for what he produces
20. The most glaring contradiction is starvation.
21. As **Cowen** notes in another case, 'It is not the indigenous bourgeoisie which has been created by the interventions of international capital. Rather that the formation of the indigenous bourgeoisie in the countryside has been deflected by phases of expansion of household production where the expansion has been directly set in motion by the intervention of international capital' (**Cowen**, NCCHP: 2).

REFERENCES

- Awiti**, Adhu, 'Economic Differentiation in **Ismani**, **Irigina** Region: A critical **Assessment** of Peasants' Response to the **Ujamaa Vijini** Programmes', University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Seminar Paper, 1972.
- Banaji**, Jairus, 'Modes of Production in A Materialist Conception of History', *Capital and Class*, 3 (August 1977), 1-44.
- Bernstein, Henry, 'Tanzania' in *New African Yearbook* 1980, London, 1980.
- Bienen, Henry, *Party Transformation and Economic Development*, Princeton, 1969.
- Boesen, Jannik, 'Tanzania: From **Ujamaa** to Villagization', unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Dar es Salaam, n.d.
- Brett, E.A., *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change*, 1919-39, London, 1973.
- Bryceson, Deborah **Fahy**, 'Peasant Food Production and Food Supply in Relation to the Historical Development of Commodity Production in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Tanganyika', Bureau of Resources **Assessment** and Land Use Planning (**BRALU**), the University of Dar es Salaam, May 1978.
- Clark, W. **Edmund**, *Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania, 1964-73*, Toronto, 1978.
- Cliffe**, Lionel, *et. al.*, *Rural Cooperation in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
- Coulson, Andrew, ed., *African Socialism in Practice: The Tanzanian Experience*, London, 1979.
- Coulson, Andrew, 'Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania', *Review of African Political Economy*, 10 (1977), 74-100.
- Coulson, Andrew, 'Peasants and Bureaucrats', *Review of African Political Economy*, 3 (1975), 53-58.
- Cowen**, MP, 'Notes on Capital Class and Household Production', (NCCHP), unpublished paper, n.d

- Cowen**, MP., 'On Household Production in the Countryside', Section **III** of Michael **Cowen** and Karibu **Kinyanjui**, 'Some Problems of Income Distribution in Kenya', Nairobi I.D.S., 1977.
- De **Vries**, J.L., Fortmann, and A.C. **Sharma**, 'A Study of **Ujamaa** Villages in **Iringa** Region', unpublished paper, Department of Rural Economy and Extension, Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry, University of Dar es Salaam, December, 1974.
- Feder**, Ernest, 'Capitalism's Last Ditch Effort to Save Underdeveloped Agriculture', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 7, 1 (1977), 56-78.
- Fortmann, L.P., 'An Evaluation of the Progress of the National Maize Project at the End of One Cropping Season in Morogoro and **Arusha**', unpublished paper, **USAID**, Tanzania, November 1976.
- Fortmann, L.P., 'The Road to Maendeleo: Issues Involved in Tanzanian Village Development', unpublished paper, September 18, 1978 (b).
- Fortmann, L.P., '**Ujamaa** Villages: Tanzania's Experience with Agrarian Socialism', prepared for **COPAC/FAO**, unpublished paper, February 1978 (c).
- Halliday, Fred, *Iran*, London, 1979.
- Hyden, **Goran**, *Political Development in Rural Tanzania*, Lund, Sweden, 1968.
- Hyden, **Goran**, 'The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania', unpublished paper, University of California, Berkeley, 1978.
- Iliffe, John, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika*, Historical Association of Tanzania, Paper No. 10, Nairobi, 1971.
- Iliffe, John, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge, (UK), 1979.
- Kjekshus**, Helge, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950*, London, 1977.
- Lenin, **V.I.**, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, Moscow, 1974.
- Lenin, **V.I.**, *Collected Works, I-IV (1893-1901)*, Moscow, 1972.
- Lofchie, Michael F., 'Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 16, 3 (1978), 451-474.
- Maeda, Dr. J.H.J., 'Managing the **Ujamaa** Village Development in Tanzania: An Assessment of the Implementation of the Rural **Ujamaa** Policy', Sixteenth Inter-African Public Administration and Management Seminar on 'Managing Rural Development', Banjul, the Gambia, November 28-December 3, 1977.
- Maguire**, Andrew, *Towards Ujamaa in Tanzania*, Cambridge, 1969.
- Mandel, Ernest, ed., *Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I*, New York, 1977.
- Marx**, Karl, *Capital, Vols. I & III*, New York, 1967.
- Mantango, R.R., 'The Role of Agencies for Rural Development in Tanzania: A Case Study of the Lushoto Integrated Development Project', Economic Research Paper 76.3, University of Dar es Salaam, March 1976.
- Mbilinyi**, Marjorie, 'Peasants' Education in Tanzania', Paper No. 12, The 12th Annual Social Science Conference of East African Universities—1976, University of Dar es Salaam, December 20-22, 1976.
- Mbilinyi**, Marjorie, 'The Transition to Capitalism in Rural Tanzania', Economic Research Bureau paper 74.7. University of Dares Salaam, November 1974.
- McHenry**, Dean E. Jr., 'A Report, Communal Agricultural Production in **Ujamaa** Villages', unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of

- Dar es Salaam, 1977 (subsequently published in *African Studies Review*, December 1977, pp. 43-59; pagination from original paper).
- Mihyo, 'The Struggle for Workers' Control in Tanzania', *Review of African Political Economy*, 4 (1975), 62-84.
- Mwapachu, Juma Volter, 'Operation Planned Villages in Rural Tanzania: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development', *The African Review*, 6 (1976), 1-16.
- Nabudere, D. Wadada, 'Imperialism, State, Class and Race', a critique of Shivji's *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, *Maji Maji*, 27 (1976), 1-22.
- Njonjo, Apollo, 'The Africanization of the 'White-Highlands': A Study in Agrarian Class Struggle in Kenya, 1950-1979. PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1977.
- Nsari, K., 'Tanzania: Neo-Colonialism and the Struggle for National Liberation', *Review of African Political Economy*, 4 (1975), 109-118.
- Nyerere, Julius K., *Freedom and Socialism*, Dar es Salaam, 1968.
- Nyerere, Julius K., *Freedom and Unity*, Dar es Salaam, 1966.
- Operation Songeza, n.d.
- Pratt, Cranford, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968*, Toronto, 1976.
- Proctor, J.H., ed., *Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, 1971; articles by Musoke, Bakula, Ntirukigwa, Daraja, Mashauri, Mboya
- Raikes, P.C., 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism', *Review of African Political Economy*, 3 (1975), 33-52.
- Raikes, P.C., 'Rural Differentiation and Class Formation in Tanzania', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 5, 3 (1978), 285-325
- Raikes, P.C., *State and Agriculture in Tanzania*, unpublished manuscript, forthcoming.
- Rweyemamu, J.F., 'Some Aspects of the Turner Report', Economic Research Bureau Paper 69.20, Dar es Salaam, University College, 1969.
- Saul, John, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, New York, 1979.
- Saul, John, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania', *The Socialist Register*, London, 1974, 349-372.
- Shivji, Issa G., *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, New York, 1976.
- Swainson, Nicola, 'The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya', *Review of African Political Economy*, 8 (1977), 39-55.
- Tabari, Ayoub, 'Review of *Freedom and Development* by Julius K. Nyerere', in *Review of African Political Economy*, 3 (1975), 89-96.
- von Freyhold, Michaela, 'The Post Colonial State and its Tanzania Version', *Review of African Political Economy*, 8 (1977), 75-89.
- von Freyhold, Michaela, *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*, New York, 1979.
- UNDP, *Country Programme for the United Republic of Tanzania: UNDP Assistance Requested by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Period 1978-1981*.
- Widstrand, Carl Gosta, *Co-operative and Rural Development in East Africa*, Uppsala, 1970.