

FIGHTING THE COLD WAR ON THE HOME FRONT: AMERICA, BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA AND CANADA

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'Are you in pain, dear mother?'

'I think there's a pain somewhere in the room', said Mrs. Gradgrind, 'but I couldn't positively say that I have got it.'

Dickens, *Hard Times*

The decade following World War II was the formative period of post-war alignment in international relations, the point of congealment for the Cold War. There is a vast literature on the international aspects of the events of this decade. Yet one of the striking characteristics of this era was domestic: 'a tightening of controls within the capitalist and communist camps, a construction of military blocs, a repression of those suspected of sympathies for the other side (persecution of Titoists in Eastern Europe, McCarthyism in the USA)'. This process of internal political repression was an element in the primordial division of the post-war world into two armed and relatively disciplined camps. It also had profound implications for the politics of the countries involved. The sharpening of ideological conflict and the deployment of coercion to consolidate a quasi-wartime national 'consensus' could not leave unmarked the practice of pluralist and competitive politics in capitalist democracies. It was in the United States, the leader and organiser of the Western bloc, where the impact of McCarthyism on liberal democratic practices was most evident. As a consequence, there is a large literature, often of high quality, on the domestic impact of the Cold War on the USA. There is, however, very little written about the domestic impact on the other English-speaking countries, where the lesser public impression of McCarthyism has generally been taken as notice of its absence. Yet the Cold War was launched in other Western nations allied to the US. The domestic implantation of the Cold War obviously differs according to the specific conditions of individual countries. The American variant—McCarthyism—has no privileged status as a model by which other countries must be judged.

There is a spectrum of domestic responses to the Cold War which requires some specification. Here I will offer an interpretation of the significance of the American experience, followed by a survey, based mainly on secondary sources, of Britain and Australia, and a summary of my own findings, based on extensive research in archival sources, docu-

ments obtained under Access to Information and interviews, of the Canadian experience.²

In analysing the national experiences of Cold War repression, I wish to make a distinction at the outset between *state repression* and *political repression*. By 'state' repression is meant forms of coercive control exercised through the official state apparatus—the 'legitimate' use of force in the classic Weberian definition. 'Legitimate' of course refers only to the existing legislative and constitutional framework and to actions sanctioned by state authority. 'Political' repression on the other hand, refers to the exercise of coercion outside the state system proper, but originating in the wider political system (parties, pressure groups, private associations). McCarthyism as a generic term describes the spread of repression outside the state system to the political system (e.g., a public smear of an individual by a politician leading to sanctions against that individual such as dismissal by an employer or informal harassment in the community, or the purge of left-wing trade unionists carried out not by the state but by the unions themselves). Although it was McCarthyism in its highly visible American form which raised the most concern among liberals, it is important to realise that state repression was, and is, an integral part of the domestic implantation and reproduction of the Cold War in all Western countries. The greater concentration among America's allies on the repressive apparatus of the state has misled many observers into the false conclusion that domestic repression was a peculiarly American aspect of the Cold War.

Any discussion of the excesses of political repression in the capitalist democracies must begin with a clear disclaimer. The same period marked by McCarthyism in the West, the late 1940s and early 1950s, were also the years of intensified purges and repression in the Soviet bloc. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of political violence, there is scarcely any comparison between the blocs: the communist purges were far more extensive, brutal and bloody, than anything contemplated by the most extreme witch-hunters of the West. It has been estimated that in Eastern Europe alone, over one and a half million Communist Party members were purged; in some countries, top leaders were shot. At the same time in the Soviet Union, Stalin was whipping up anti-semitism, anti-intellectualism, anti-cosmopolitanism, as themes in a purge which 'had Stalin survived. . . would most likely have assumed the horrendous proportions of the ones in 1936-38'.³

Yet however much the two blocs differed in their political practices, it is striking how the tempo of repression (if not the intensity) rose and fell as if orchestrated under the common baton of Cold War discipline. Stalin's passing and Senator McCarthy's political demise in the early 1950s were symbolic watersheds marking both a renewed willingness of both camps to negotiate differences and a declining level of domestic discipline and

repression. Even at the height of repression, there are haunting similarities: the American discovery of an ubiquitous Red menace within, a 'conspiracy so immense, an infamy so black', was matched on the other side by the discovery of the ubiquity of the Titoist enemy: 'as is characteristic of such operations, the purges transcended any conscious or half-rational purpose of weeding out the anti-Russian or even potentially intransigent elements'.⁴ In both camps, repression was *irrational*, uncontrolled, and eventually threatened internal stability. Even if self-destructive and thus self-limiting, repression was also functional to the Cold War, defining in sharply constricted fashion the limits of political dissent and permissible levels of conflict within the two blocs. If the renewal of Cold War competition in the late 1970s and early 1980s has not been marked by a level of repression equivalent to that of the earlier period (again, quite unevenly as between the two blocs), this may only indicate that the first Cold War repression served to congeal domestic political practices in forms appropriate enough that renewed waves of repression are scarcely necessary.

The United States

The main lines of the post-war repression in America are familiar. Coincident with the emergent commitment to global confrontation with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, a conservative anti-New Deal trend became evident in domestic politics. Republican control of Congress in the 1946 elections was only the tip of the conservative iceberg. A major counterattack against the post-war upsurge in labour militancy was capped by the repressive anti-labour Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The same year saw the declaration by the Democratic administration of the Loyalty-Security Programme, the basis for a purge of alleged left-wing civil servants; the federal example was followed in turn by state and municipal jurisdictions. By the mid-1950s, tens of thousands of public employees had been fired or resigned under fear of being fired. 1948 saw the publication of the Attorney-General's list of 'subversive' organisations—in effect a public proscription of free association which was updated and expanded from year to year. 1948 also witnessed the public spectacle of the Alger Hiss-Whittaker Chambers confrontation, and the circus-like proceedings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in Hollywood. The upset re-election of Harry Truman the same year did nothing to quell the fires of right-wing repression, which grew ominously along with the deterioration of the American position in the Cold War, with the Soviet take-overs in Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, the 1949 victory of the Communists in China, and the testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb.

By the early 1950s, with American ground forces in action in Korea, the pattern of internal repression was clear. The federal government led the way, with its internal purge, its widespread use of the FBI to carry out domestic spying and undercover operations, its across-the-board use

of immigration and passport regulations to control the movements of its own citizens, deport 'undesirables', and to keep out of the country visitors judged dangerous. The atmosphere of suspicion spread downwards through the structures of civil society. Universities and schools were swept by purges, censorship and enforced loyalty oaths. The media were cleansed of dissenting opinions. Persons suspected of disloyalty were fired from jobs far removed from the state, or from classified information. Above all, a distinctive American form of repression became familiar: the Congressional Investigation Committee which hauled witnesses before the television cameras, accused them of treason and disloyalty, and demanded as the price of forgiveness that they publicly recant and 'name names', which is to say, turn public informer on their friends and associates. Those who failed to do so were often jailed, and almost always blacklisted from their professions or employment. The image of the 'witch-hunt' has been often applied to this process, and the name of the most politically successful practitioner of the technique, Senator Joseph McCarthy, became an identifying label: McCarthyism.

The spectacular demagogic talents of McCarthy having lent the entire period the epithet of the 'McCarthy era', has led to a tendency to focus too exclusively on the Senator and his personal phenomenon. The process of internal political repression began well before McCarthy even appeared on the scene, and must be explained in broader terms than the career of one man alone. By and large, however, it did not really survive the political demise of McCarthy in 1954. McCarthy stretched the limits of political intolerance further than anyone else, and when his demagoguery finally consumed itself by attacking a Republican president and the US Army, there followed an apparent exhaustion of the repressive drive, in its highly politicised aspect, at least.'

The first, contemporaneous, attempts to explain the repression tended to be limited by two factors. First, McCarthy overshadowed the larger phenomenon of repression; second, explanations of McCarthyism came mainly from American liberals who were themselves deeply implicated in the emergent Cold War consensus. Part of the post-war reformulation of liberal ideology was the delegitimation of Marxism (tolerated to an extent on the margins of the New Deal in the 1930s and war years), and the identification of 'Communists' as beyond the protection of liberal freedoms. Given the near pervasive acceptance of a selectively illiberal consensus on freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of thought, Cold War liberalism reacted with considerable revulsion, but also with much intellectual and political confusion, when repression was taken up by right-wing anti-New Deal Republicans like McCarthy as a blunt instrument against liberals.⁶ The problem was formulated as being 'McCarthyism' rather than Cold War repression, and explanations were as much expression of the ideological and intellectual crisis of American

liberalism at the end of its New Deal hegemony as they were scientific analyses of the phenomenon of repression.

The Cold War liberal response was summed up in a collection by liberal 'stars' of political sociology, edited by Daniel Bell.⁷ Bell's stable of academic liberals, ranging from Talcott Parsons to Seymour Martin Lipset, provided weighty and elaborate deployment of some then fashionable themes. McCarthyism was not a product of economic or class forces, nor even of ideology. Instead it reflected status anxieties in mass society. Indeed, it represented the dark side of democracy first revealed by de Tocqueville, the illiberal face of populism. American liberals who in their New Deal days had seen themselves in direct continuity with the Jacksonian and Populist movements of the past, now saw themselves as an embattled and privileged elite under attack by the authoritarian and intolerant masses led by a demagogic tribune of the people.⁸

This explanation, with various nuances, stood more or less unassailed for a number of years. By the late 1960s, however, the decline of Cold War liberalism in the wake of the Kennedy-Johnson fiasco in Vietnam, led to some rethinking of the first Cold War experience. Michael Paul Rogin's *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: the Radical Specter* brilliantly demolished much of the earlier argument.⁹ By detailed empirical analysis, Rogin showed that McCarthyism had no links with earlier agrarian and radical populist movements, as the mass society theorists had claimed. An earlier study by political scientist Nelson Polsby had attempted to measure mass support for McCarthy and found it concentrated in areas of traditional Republican strength; McCarthy, Polsby suggested, was 'more dependent on his party, and personally less effective at the grass roots, than has been commonly supposed.'¹⁰ Rogin noted Polsby's findings that the party was the variable most strongly associated with support for McCarthy, and took it further: McCarthy had mobilised one wing, the small town mid-west isolationists, in a divided Republican party. His campaign was enlivened in the context of the Cold War: the 'loss' of China, the inability to win in Korea, and the consequent search for scapegoats within reach, as well as resurgent anti-New Deal sentiments. But rather than representing radicalism, McCarthy reached as far as he did through the manipulation of traditional political institutions and the failure of the Democratic and liberal elites to confront him. This was really a failure of liberal will in the Cold War era. McCarthy lost his purchase on influence when he took on a Republican president, the Senate, and the US Army. In short, 'as McCarthy became "radical", he lost his hold on American politics'.¹¹

One of the extraordinary observations to be drawn from the empirical data on public attitudes during the McCarthy era is not the generalised evidence of illiberalism elicited by leading questions—which in any event remains remarkably level over time, both before and after McCarthy—but

rather the lack of effect on the public of the highly publicised themes of subversion and fifth column threats. When asked an open-ended question in the summer of 1954 about what worried them most personally, less than one percent of a national sample of Americans mentioned communism (or civil liberties). The first massive quantitative study of voting behaviour in an American national election, in 1952, yielded the surprising finding that despite 'the enormous furore over internal subversion', the issue 'appealed so little to the public that it was scarcely mentioned to our interviewers—indeed, it was of less salience to the decision to vote Republican than the fact that Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson had been divorced!¹² There was nothing approaching a mass mobilisation around extreme anti-communist demands. The idea that McCarthy might have constituted an American Hitler nipped in the bud is a paranoid fantasy; there were no American mass politics of the extreme right. There were, however, extreme right politics played out in the leading institutions of American government, which is a somewhat different matter.

It is important to recognise the specific issue at hand here. Theorising about 'the authoritarian personality' or 'working-class authoritarianism' fails to indicate why the anti-communist issue erupted in the political arena at the particular conjuncture of the late 1940s, and why it died down again in the mid-1950s. This is even more the case with the son of 'national character' explanations of an anthropological type proffered by cultural critics. It is not that such explanations are necessarily wrong, or lacking in interest. It is simply that by explaining everything, in general, they explain nothing, in particular.¹³

The bias of liberal explanations is further elucidated by recent revisionist history of the origins of political repression in the Cold War era. Kenneth O'Riley has shown in well documented detail that it was, in fact, an agency of the United States government, J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, which beginning in 1946 masterminded a vast anti-communist drive throughout government and the media. The FBI fed the House Committee on Un-American Activities, McCarthy and other congressional witch-hunters with the information without which they would have been unable to operate.¹⁴ This was a bureaucratic, top-down operation. Other work, particularly that of Athan Theoharis, has demonstrated the crucial role played by the Truman administration in bringing on the repression. It was the Democrats who instituted the Loyalty-Security Programme to root out Communists and 'disloyal' employees from the government: state and municipal jurisdictions followed later. It was the Democrats whose Attorney-General raised the rhetorical level concerning the threat of subversion and first published the infamous Attorney-General's List of subversive organisations. It was the Democrats who perfected the art of the Red smear and guilt-by-association in their violent attack on

Henry Wallace's Progressive Party campaign in 1948. Even as late as 1954, after the **Democrats'** loss of the White House and at the zenith of **McCarthyism**, it was the liberal Democrat Hubert Humphrey who was instrumental in the passage through Congress of the Communist Control Act, in intention one of the most repressive of all the McCarthy-era laws.¹⁵

It has sometimes been argued that the Democrats were merely responding to intense right-wing pressure by attempting to appease, and thus pre-empt it.¹⁶ Yet it must be kept in mind that the Truman administration was itself part of the source for the rightward pressures. The Cold War began under Democratic auspices. The Republicans were the party associated with isolationism and fiscal conservatism. With the Truman Doctrine, a peacetime rearmament programme, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, and finally the commitment of American ground forces to combat in Korea, a Democratic president was moving America into permanent military, political and economic intervention on a world scale, at enormous cost. The consolidation of the home front meant the securing of a bipartisan consensus on foreign and defence policy. Early on, especially with the Republican-controlled Congress in 1947-48, there was some difficulty in gaining spending approval. Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a key Truman ally in Congress representing the old isolationist wing, had advised the President to 'scare hell out of the American people'. His advice was taken. The early history of the Cold War ~~commitments~~ of the United States abroad was punctuated by the orchestration of the Red scare at home. This served not only to bring Republican isolationists and penny-pinchers inside, but also to undermine and discredit potential left-wing dissent from within the old Roosevelt Democratic coalition. The latter succeeded with the expulsion of the Henry Wallace wing into the political wilderness, and the Cold War within the CIO against the elements of a labour Left associated with the communist Party.

The Truman administration did not of course invent the demons of right-wing repression which rose up in the leading institutions of American life. But by pandering to them, by encouraging them, it gave credence to the idea that there were 'Communists' in high places wreaking havoc with the national interest. In short, it lent legitimacy to an issue which could only advantage the Democrats' opponents. The Truman administration believed its pre-emptive repression had worked when Truman was re-elected in the face of a Republican-Dixiecrat-Progressive challenge in the 1948 election. But this was only a brief pause, as the fires of the witch-hunt quickly flared yet higher. With the appearance of **McCarthy** on the scene in 1950, the vultures came home to roost with a vengeance. Some leading figures from the New Deal civil service were consumed. The State Department, that centre-piece of Truman's new 'international-

ism', became a special target of the witch-hunters, particularly after the 'loss' of China. Athan Theoharis has ably summarised the connections between the external and internal Cold Wars under the Democrats:

The Cold War did not merely influence US foreign policy; it also created a climate that influenced domestic legislation and politics. McCarthyism was not an aberration. It dramatized the acceptance of an anti-Communist rhetoric basic to the Cold War and the shift in focus and tactics of those partisan or conservative Republicans bitterly opposed to the New Deal. Foreign policy gave those Republicans an opportunity to discredit the progressive ideas of the New Deal and a challenge to assail the extended, complex international responsibilities basic to the Truman Administration's containment policy.

What emerges then is a picture of a national government moving to commit America to a permanent 'peacetime' war footing and exploiting the alleged domestic communist threat as a means both of eliminating enemies to its left and gaining the assent of the Right. The issue of internal subversion and the need for repression was then transformed by the Republicans into an instrument of partisan attack on the Democrats. As such, it was largely wielded by the mid-west isolationist wing but tolerated by the Eastern internationalist wing so long as it seemed an effective partisan tactic. Thus there was a period within which the Cold War strategy of the state combined with the dynamics of the party system to foster domestic political repression. When the repression began to turn on the Democrats themselves, they were singularly defenceless against it given that they shared in its fundamental assumptions. Finally, the repression, in the person of McCarthy, threatened to turn on the Republicans, now established in state office. It had become counter-productive, and the major conservative institutions of American government, such as the Senate, the Presidency, and the Republican party itself, rejected McCarthy. The media followed, and the Senator was henceforth excluded from public attention. Repression was taken out of the public political arena and returned to its traditional place in the state system. The McCarthy era came to an end.

Although the period was marked by political, as opposed to state repression, there is, as I have noted, very little evidence of a mass politics. The peculiarities of the American political system, with its division of powers, lack of party discipline, and the diffusion of power and influence across a quasi-feudal complex of committees, subcommittees, chairmanships, bureaux and agencies, etc., obviously provided an institutional framework conducive to the exploitation of the Red scare as a political issue. In such a system, the mobilisation of mass movements may count for a great deal less than the mobilisation of key elites and interest groups. The inattention and apparent indifference of the general public to the issue of communist subversion may have provided the background for the

dissipation of the issue following the counter-attack of the Republican establishment, but they did nothing to prevent the freelance witch-hunters of Congress, and those who aped them at the state and local levels, from wheeling and dealing on the basis of political capital essentially drawn from the internal resources of the political system and the political elites themselves.

To be sure, despite its complexity, American politics is democratic in the narrow sense that politicians must get themselves elected, and operate on some sort of popular bases. The question of which specific 'public' offered support has ~~been~~ one which has inspired the considerable efforts of American political scientists. Traditional Republican supporters, especially of the more conservative, isolationist and small town type, seem to have formed the backbone of sympathy for McCarthy in the electorate. The partisan concentration had, at the same time, distinct drawbacks. Two elements of the electorate in particular, Roman Catholics and Southerners, might have been expected to have shown exceptionally high support for McCarthyism. Catholics, responding not only to McCarthy's own Irish Catholicism, but also to the fierce anti-communist ideology then prevalent throughout the Catholic church worldwide, did support McCarthy more than Protestants, by about 8-10 per cent on average. However, this was countered by other factors, most importantly party factors: Catholics predominantly supported the Democrats, and partisan identification undermined a potential mass Catholic base.¹⁸ Southerners tended to display attitudes generally appropriate to the McCarthyite ideology, and Southern politicians were consistently among the most bellicose Cold Warriors and repressive reactionaries on issues of civil liberties. Here again, party intervened—in this case dramatically. McCarthy was especially unpopular in the South, which was solidly, even monolithically Democratic.¹⁹

There is one further 'public' which warrants examination. What was the response of the working class to McCarthyism, given the prevalence of 'working-class authoritarianism' and the 'revolt of the masses' in standard liberal explanations? Here the answer must be nuanced. Unionized workers tended to show lower than average support for McCarthy and in McCarthy's own state they voted against him more strongly than they voted Democrat. The AFL tended to neutrality, with some unions pro-McCarthy but more being hostile. The CIO unions were anti-McCarthy perhaps more out of Democratic partisanship than because they viewed the Senator as a threat to American institutions.²⁰

Working-class or union support for McCarthy, as such, is a much less interesting question than how the issue of anti-communism and the Cold War was played out *within* working-class life. American labour had emerged from the war with pent-up demands for foregone wage increases further encouraged by high post-war inflation. A strike wave followed.

The rightward trend exemplified by resurgent Republicanism was especially virulent in its anti-unionism. The Taft-Hartley Act was one prong of state intervention in labour relations and in the internal affairs of unions; another was the extension of the government's Loyalty-Security programme to industries holding defence contracts; a third were Red-hunting congressional investigations of labour.

The unions were by no means passive victims of attack by the state and the employers. In some cases, right-wing unions actively called in state intervention to assault their more left-wing rivals. The CIO willingly carried out a virulent internal purge. The attack on such unions as the United Electrical Workers, Mine, Mill and Smelter, and the Fur and Leather Workers was successful in drastically depleting their strength. Moreover, large numbers of left-wing officials in other unions were purged. The Communists had never been a crucial element in American labour, but the importation of the Cold War into the heart of the labour movement not only weakened labour unity at an important juncture, but had measurable effect on the blunting of new initiatives of unionization into non-union sectors (white collar occupations and the South) and contributed to the deunionization of sectors where the purges were most concentrated (electrical and textile trades).²¹

There is a broader context yet within which to situate labour. The Cold War was in itself a massive Keynesian programme of spending of which labour was a beneficiary. The Truman administration paid off its union supporters by trading full employment for relatively low wage levels guaranteed by the defence budget. The unions themselves acted as willing conduits of anti-communist ideological hegemony. Lacking autonomous working-class institutions encouraging class consciousness, the American workers were especially vulnerable to the penetration of nationalist, chauvinist, and authoritarian values: values which commended themselves by their association with a system which seemed to pay off. This may be the most significant element in the overall triumph of Cold War anti-communism in America, much more so than the better publicised ravages of **McCarthyism** among the ranks of intellectuals, civil servants, and other middle-class groups. The Cold War penetrated directly into working-class life and its organisation, and it did so by a combination of selective coercion and material incentives. Ideologically, the effect was devastating for progressive politics in America.

This raises a further question concerning the source of political repression against left-wing unions and unionists. Was this a power play by American capital, a pre-emptive strike against militant working-class demands? Leaving aside **controversies** about the sources and origins of the Cold War itself and the role of American business in the global confrontation with the Soviet Union, there is actually very little convincing evidence that the internal Cold War was planned and executed in the

boardrooms of corporate America. Indeed, big business executives appeared uncomfortable with the demagogic excesses of McCarthy and the other witch-hunters.²² Small business was another matter, as were the organised local voices of small business such as Chambers of Commerce, the American Legion, service clubs and the like, which often did function as agents of repression. But small business could not on its own mastermind a concerted and successful assault on the American labour movement. Corporate capital on the whole appeared willing to deal with 'responsible' labour leaders, and to the extent that the responsible leaders were willing to purge their own ranks of radical and unreliable elements, a moderate level of repressive pressure from the state and investigative politicians served its purpose. McCarthyite excesses of repression were more a product of the dynamics of the political system and the partisan needs of right-wing Republicans.

Britain

In his massive study of the anti-communist repression in America, aptly called *The Great Fear*, David Caute notes that 'Britain also committed itself to a political and military alliance against the Soviet Union, but without the corollary of domestic Red-baiting and witch-hunting.' He also writes that 'American liberalism failed to sustain the authentically liberal values and standards of tolerance that persisted in Britain despite that country's. . . general posture of confrontation with Russia. The British of the Attlee era, unlike the British of the Pitt era or of the sixteenth-century confrontation with Catholic Spain, kept their heads. . .'²³ Caute is here expressing the conventional wisdom. So pervasive is this wisdom that there is no study of the domestic impact of the Cold War on British politics, as such; the picture has to be pieced together from fragmentary information from disparate sources. The conventional wisdom may not be wrong. Certainly among the four countries examined in this study, there can be no doubt that the British experience is the furthest removed from that of the Americans. But it should come as no surprise that Britain is another country which does things differently from the Americans. More to the point are the specific effects of the Cold War on Britain itself. Here, the experience may turn out to be more significant than the conventional wisdom allows.

It is well known how Britain emerged from the war as a second-rank power. In the crucible of the post-war realignment of the world, Britain, caught between the two superpowers and constricted by severe economic decline, opted for an alliance with America which not only ensured subordinate status in diplomacy and defence but also tied British economic recovery to American dollar aid and meant the subordination of British capital to the American plan for post-war economic reconstruction under the hegemony of American capital.²⁴ There were alternatives to

this strategy, mainly issuing from the left-wing of the Labour Party. That they were marginal and easily defeated, and that there was no Gaullist-style national capitalist strategy issuing from the right-wing of the Tory Party, are themselves indications of how profoundly the fundamental ideological assumptions of the Cold War penetrated the central institutions of British politics. On the other hand Britain was a principal power only recently evicted from her imperial residence and perhaps not fully aware of her changed circumstances. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that Britain did not contribute directly to the international policies which led the wartime Allies into the great fissure which was the Cold War; indeed, in a certain sense the British government was at least as determined, perhaps initially more determined, than the Americans to confront the Soviet Union and put the worst face on Soviet interests and intentions, at least in the early phases of the developing Cold War.³⁵ That this took place under a Labour government with a massive electoral mandate for domestic reforms, is of crucial significance in understanding the internal impact of the Cold War on Britain.

Part of this impact, and the most difficult to document, is the interpenetration of the American state with key sectors of the British state apparatus. At the military level, even the Labour government made an attempt to maintain autonomy through the development of the British nuclear deterrent. This was not welcomed in Washington, which had tried to undercut Britain's capacity to become a nuclear power through control of strategic materials, but in any event, the specific application of the British bomb to the day-to-day practice of diplomacy was dubious at best.³⁶ The most important American influence was through the security-intelligence apparatus which America was building on a global scale. To be sure, **MI5** needed no American cousins to instill an anti-communist passion so strong as to be turned against even elected governments: the case of the notorious forged 'Zinoviev letter' used to defeat the first Labour government in 1924 is illustration enough of the British security service's impeccable anti-communist lineage. There were specific treaty obligations which further linked Britain directly into the American security-intelligence network, most particularly the UKUSA Agreement, under which the USA, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand integrated their electronic surveillance and cryptological capacities worldwide. This still secret treaty of 1947 brought in its wake not only US access to electronic surveillance within the signatory countries, as well as to the Soviet bloc, but it also brought with it a level of integration so close that the right-wing journalist and **MI5** mouthpiece Chapman Pincher averred that 'dependence is so great and cooperation so close that I am convinced security chiefs would go to any length to protect the link-up'.³⁷

State repression took official form within Britain early in 1948 when

Clement Attlee announced his government's intention to introduce a British version of the Truman Loyalty-Security programme in the civil service. Inspired in part by the Gouzenko spy affair in Canada (see below), and in part by American pressure, the British purge was on a considerably lesser scale than the American and marked by a less savage attitude toward offending employees (from 1948 to 1955 almost two-thirds of 135 permanent civil servants named as security risks were apparently given transfers to positions without security requirements; the remainder were dismissed or resigned). Non-judicial appeal procedures were developed so that it was possible, although very unlikely, that an employee wrongly declared a risk could be reinstated. This system was extended by the introduction of 'positive vetting' in 1952 under a UK-US-France agreement, whereby some 10,000 posts would require an extensive field investigation of 'the whole background of the officer concerned'. The security screening process was also extended to employees of companies with defence contract work, who could face dismissal or the termination of the company's contract were they not to satisfy the security service.²⁸

If the British purge does seem mild compared to the American orgy, the principle involved is, at the same time, of considerable significance. Communism as a set of beliefs, and association with known Communists or alleged communist organisations were made criteria for dismissal from public posts. As late as 1956 a special study of security by a Conference of Privy Councillors concluded that 'chief risks are presented by Communists and by persons who for one reason or another are subject to communist influence. The communist faith overrides a man's normal loyalties to his country'. They added that the risk extended to 'sympathisers with communism'. 'Character defects' such as drunkenness, drug addiction, homosexuality, or 'any loose living' were also to be sought out by the security service as grounds for risk. An employee against whom damaging allegations had been made, never had recourse to the courts and the actual appeal procedures did not allow a person to be accompanied by counsel or to cross-examine sources of damaging information, or even to know on what particulars the case against them was built. One scholar suggests that the British purge procedure 'is, in truth, only a faint approximation to the long-recognised procedural form of natural justice', while another writer asks 'why should a person charged with treason be allowed to confront his accusers, and yet a person about to be dismissed because he is likely to commit treason be denied these minimum judicial rights?' These important questions of illiberal procedure mask another, perhaps more crucial, question.

The purge was in fact not all that effective, nor apparently is it now, even taking it on its own terms. As Harold Macmillan told the House of Commons in 1961 after the disclosure of yet another spy scandal, 'such cases. . . by reason of their very nature. . . are very difficult to detect or

prevent by any security procedures. No such procedures can guarantee to catch a man who changes his allegiance and skilfully conceals his conversion'. Yet the purge went on. Might we not conclude that the ideological functions of the purge were at least as important as the possibility of detecting a potential espionage agent? What the purge did accomplish was the official proscription of certain political beliefs and political associations, as a 'legitimate' exercise of liberal democracy. The state was setting an example, *pour encourager les autres*. The actual numbers affected are not then so important as the public notice that certain ideas and associations are no longer considered legitimate. The politicised excesses of McCarthyism are only ugly and unnecessary excrescences on this system. The British establishment had no need of them.³⁰

Nor was there any lack of support within Labour ranks for Attlee's civil service purge. Over forty Labour MPs resolved that the purge was 'regrettable', but in the event only five actually voted their regret; 31 Labour members formally congratulated the Prime Minister. The Trade Union Congress approved the move. Like the Truman Democrats in the US, Labour was presiding over an official proscription of certain left-wing tendencies, and with few apparent misgivings.³¹

Inevitably, state repression spread out beyond the civil service and defence industries. The Special Branch, the internal intelligence agency whose business was described by the Metropolitan Commissioner of Police as keeping 'a watch on any body of people. . . whose activities seem likely to result sooner or later in open acts of sedition or disorder', set about under Home Office order in 1946 to compile and collate lists of communist and 'front' supporters—even to enlisting corner newsgagents to provide names and addresses of persons ordering the *Morning Star*. Special Branch agents also infiltrated trade unions. A notorious example occurred during the dock strikes in Merseyside and London in the late 1940s when agents secretly recorded the discussions of an ad hoc organising committee and passed details on to Arthur Deakin, the right-wing General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) who promptly expelled the organisers. In 1951 seven dockers went on trial under a wartime act forbidding incitement to strike: 'the bulk of the evidence against them was speeches recorded by Special Branch officers'. Ian Taylor notes that after the severe political reverses of 1947, the Labour government began to rely on the police 'politically' at the very moment that the removal of controls and the retreat from planning was taking place.³²

There could, however, be no equivalent in Britain of Taft-Hartley or political assaults from the outside on 'Communist' trade unionists. The working class was too strong, the unions too united, and their political expression, the Labour Party, too popular. State repression of left-wing

unionism was not absent, as the above example indicates, but it was not the main focus. Instead, attempts at political repression were made through the trade unions themselves, and through the political mechanism of the Labour Party by appeals to social democratic solidarity.

The Communists did have some strength in the unions, certainly more strength than the Party ever demonstrated in the electoral arena. In the high tide of the British-Soviet wartime alliance, the TUC had been forced to withdraw its 'Black Circular' of 1934 which **forebade** Communists being accepted as delegates to trades councils. Communists had then consolidated old strongholds (Scottish and Welsh miners' unions), and made new breakthroughs into the Fire Brigades Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) and the TGWU. 'It is no exaggeration', **Pelling** remarks—with considerable exaggeration—to say that they were very nearly in charge of the trade union movement.' The facts scarcely suggested anything like communist control of a movement firmly attached as a whole to the Labour Party. However, as the Cold War deepened in the late 1940s, there were elements within the movement which sought to expunge whatever communist influence did ~~exist~~.³³

The major offensive was opened up at the end of 1947 when the Labour Party Secretary, Mr Morgan Phillips, issued a circular calling on trade unions to sack all communist officials. Warnings of 'a campaign of sabotage', the fomenting of discontent in the factories and 'destroying the labour movement from within' struck all the right Cold War notes. The government's own civil service purge quickly followed. Arthur Deakin hastened to bring the TGWU into line by issuing his own call for the rank and file to carry out local purges. Apart from the worsening international situation and the fissures opening up during 1947 between Western social democratic parties and the Soviet-line CPs, another motive has been suggested for the anti-communist offensive launched at this time. The government was moving toward a policy of wage restraint and the attack on 'communism' has been construed as an attack on militant opposition from the unions. As **Panitch** suggests, however, the CP had not been opponents of a national wages policy from 1945 to 1947. Before the White Paper of 1947 the Communist-led ETU had supported such a policy on the TUC General Council. Coincidental with the government's new turn to restraint, however, was the CP switch to militant Cold War opposition. From then on, communist unionists became the most vociferous enemies of restraint. The anti-communist offensive may have been more ideological than material in its origins, but once underway it also served to undermine what had now become the major source of anti-government opposition within the unions. Yet the ideological blinkers of the Cold War were such that the right-wing leadership may have unwittingly magnified the extent of communist influence by tending to

identify all militant opposition after 1947 as being Red—a considerable simplification of reality. A final irony is that strike activity in Britain was at its height when the Communists were in their cooperative phase and then fell sharply after the CP went militant.³⁴

The TGWU finally passed a formal exclusion of Communists at its 1949 conference, its campaign to rouse rank and file anti-communism having failed. The National Union of Municipal and Government Workers passed a similar expulsion. Others, such as the ETU and the AEU, rejected such moves. Cracks in international trade union solidarity widened with the 'political' opposition of the CGT unions in France to the Marshall Plan, and finally in early 1948 the TUC, in concert with the AFL and the American State Department, pulled out of the World Federation of Trade Unions, later to form the CIA-backed Confederation of Free Trade

The record of anti-communism in the British trade unions is spotty at best. It is clear that most of the battles were largely elite manipulations by union bureaucrats. Little shop floor enthusiasm for purging Communists could be roused; by the same token, little enthusiasm for communist issues was apparently generated among the rank and file of unions allegedly under communist influence.³⁵ The TUC as a whole was in fact able to maintain its strong links with the Labour government, even in the face of austerity and wage restraint, and the British trade union movement was lined up behind the broad Cold War foreign and defence policies of the American alliance. On the other hand, there is no sense in which it can be said that the Cold War was a device for integrating the British working class into the capitalist state as one can say about the American experience. If America's new imperial role could pay off the American working class, Britain was divesting itself of its old imperial role precisely on the grounds of penury. The American alliance could not offer the British working class a real material pay-off, apart from the prevention of outright national bankruptcy. The Cold War thus had limited ideological purchase over the British working class.

The Labour Party did have a direct stake in using the Cold War to discredit opinion and activity on its Left. As a government it wished to encourage working-class solidarity behind its projects, as a party it hoped to kill off its historical rival for working-class support, and as the architect of the anti-Soviet American alliance it wished to maintain as much national unity and consensus behind its defence and foreign policies as possible. In the process, the Party sometimes lent itself to activities not without effects on the practice of liberal democracy.

As a political rival the British CP seemed insubstantial enough. In the great Labour landslide of 1945, and following four years of pro-soviet official wartime propaganda, the CP managed to elect only two MPs under its name (there were perhaps a handful of 'crypt~'Communists who

sneaked in under Labour colours—itself a sign of weakness). In 1950 both communist **MPs** were defeated; within that five year period the Party suffered heavy losses in membership.³⁷

In the Labour Party Conference of 1945 a communist request for affiliation (in the spirit of the wartime popular front) was defeated, but quite narrowly. The Labour Party executive was unhappy with the degree of pro-communist sentiment. In 1946 Harold **Laski** published *The Secret Battalion*, a strong attack on the CP as illiberal, authoritarian and subversive of all freedoms. Communists, **Laski** argued, could not be taken at their word but were secret, disciplined conspirators seeking to undermine and destroy the Labour Party. The same year the Party Conference turned back another affiliation bid, this time by a heavy majority. However understandable its refusal to allow a rival party to exist within its own structures, it was not content with simple exclusion of the CP but went to more questionable lengths. Since the 1920s Labour had maintained a list of proscribed organisations, membership in which could be grounds for expulsion from the Party. This list, constantly expanded and amended, was in fact a kind of party version of the infamous US Attorney General's List. Given the hegemony of the Labour Party over the British Left and the trade union movement, the proscription list usually prevented the organisations named as communist fronts from gaining any significant membership. This had specific political consequences. In the years before the rise of the CND, peace organisations were banned by the Labour Party as Soviet fronts. Thus at the very moment when a Labour government was making the fateful decision not only to support the American nuclear 'deterrent' but to build a British nuclear threat under British control, popular mobilisation against nuclear weapons from within the ranks of Labour supporters was made more difficult by active repression of the peace councils, the main organisational focus of peace campaigns in this period. When the Labour Party abandoned the list in 1973, Chapman Pincher reported that the event, accelerating Labour's 'lurch to the Left', 'horrified the security authorities'. Well it might, for as long as it lasted and was effective, the list accomplished a great deal of what might otherwise have had to be undertaken by direct state repression.³⁸

The uses of anti-communism were particularly evident to the Labour leadership on the matter of party support for **Bevin's** Cold War foreign policies. Although Labour's ardour for confronting the Soviet Union was characterised by considerably less ideological passion than the evangelical anti-communism of American policymakers, the party leadership, and **Bevin** in particular, were never loath to invoke the Red smear to undermine opposition. As a series of sketchy, fragmented and sometimes excessively idealist alternatives—a 'socialist foreign policy', the 'third force', and finally 'Bevanism'—flickered uncertainly across the Party stage in the first

years of the Cold War, **Bevin** treated every vote at party conferences on foreign policy implicitly as one of confidence, warning of those who would stab him in the back. Again and again the executive won, and by **1949** **Bevinite** foreign policy had been overwhelmingly endorsed, its broad lines not to be challenged again while Labour remained in office. What is more surprising in retrospect is the ease with which the executive and the right-wing trade union leaders invoked the threat of communism as lurking behind the various efforts of the Labour Left to articulate an alternative foreign policy. The maintenance of Cold War unity under explicitly anti-communist rhetoric no doubt helped assure suspicious American congressmen that British socialists were safe, albeit eccentric, but the rhetoric had its uses domestically as well.³⁹

Opposition which in the view of the leadership went too far—which was not perhaps so far at all—could be met with quite savagely. Such was the experience of certain **MPs** who were actually expelled from the Party for challenging Cabinet foreign policy. One left-wing **MP** was expelled for his part in sending a telegram of support to Pietro Nenni, the Italian Socialist leader who refused to adopt the blanket anti-communism being forced upon the non-communist Left in Italy by the Americans in **1948**. Among the grounds for expulsion were the **MP's** membership in the proscribed British-Soviet Friendship Society. The opposition to NATO led by **MP** Konni Zilliacus, a left-winger but certainly not a CP fellow traveller, was tacitly supported by the abstention in Parliament of over **100** Labour members. Only Zilliacus and one other Labour **MP** actually voted against the NATO motion, and both were expelled and not allowed to address the **1949** Party Conference. The Zilliacus insurgency, tiny, isolated, and ineffective as it was, was treated by the party as a subversive Fifth Column to be smashed.⁴⁰

The Korean War under the erratic and belligerent auspices of the American military began to drive a wedge into Anglo-American Cold War solidarity, but this did not really penetrate the Labour Party until after it was returned to opposition. Aneurin **Bevan's** resignation in **1951** over National Health charges to pay for rearmament highlighted just how far the Labour government had gone down the Cold War road: indeed, the government had actually committed itself to a possible war with China over Korea, without prior consultation with Party or Parliament. Yet **Bevanism** itself as Howell comments, was 'not an alternative to official policy. . . **Bevanism** was rather a symptom of the tensions produced within the Party by its acceptance, in practice, of existing economic relations'. **Bevan's** own erratic later course from criticism of the nuclear deterrent to becoming the executives' chief spokesman against unilateral nuclear disarmament, is evidence enough of the lack of coherence in **Bevanism**.⁴¹

The weakness of the successive Left challenges to Labour foreign policy

should not be allowed to obscure the significance of the triumph of Cold War social democracy. The defeat of the Labour Left meant much more than a short term resolution of factionalism. The dread charge of 'fellow travelling' in the tense and brittle atmosphere of the time served to discredit left-wing socialism in general. **Bevin** believed standing up to Russia was necessary to preserve social democracy; he succeeded in establishing Britain as part of the American sphere of influence, where American credit and American conditions pre-empted a distinctive social democratic policy at home. As **Hinton** writes: 'Without a fundamental break from Bevin's foreign policy there could be no sustained socialist offensive at home.' Yet as **Miliband** suggests, 'what above all caused the retreat of the Labour Left was the exacerbation of the Cold War'. It was a classic vicious circle. Jones notes the symbolic significance of **Orwell's** 1984 whose publication **Orwell** naively believed would strengthen social democracy, but was instead used as a right-wing bludgeon by Cold Warriors: 'The reason was partly that socialism and Russia *were* interrelated ideas and the discrediting of one damaged the other, and partly that Cold War reactions to Soviet pressure strengthened the Right and weakened social democracy all over the world.' The discrediting of left-wing socialism was evident in the 'rethinking' of Labour policy in the 1950s which was dominated by the right-wing of the Party (the Healeys, Gaitskells and Daltons). The anti-communist onslaught of the early Cold War years left a truncated Party and an intellectual vacuum on the Left for a decade at least.⁴²

If anti-communism had definite effects on the Labour Party, its wider ramifications within British society were much less obvious than they were in **McCarthy's** America. There is little evidence of widespread political repression. The dismissal of a lecturer at the London School of Slavonic Studies on political grounds, the declaration by a local council that Communists would be banned from teaching—such examples are not lacking, but they are very few in number. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that more Britons suffered the invidious workings of the US **McCarran** Act when attempting to visit America in the early 1950s than they ever suffered any form of political repression at home.⁴³

To understand why the Cold War repression was limited in the way it was, the role of the Tory Party must be examined. There were a number of elements present in the Britain of the late 1940s which might have suggested a **McCarthyite** strategy to the Tories. Britain was under a Labour government committed to a socialist-reform programme bitterly resented by British business which was mounting a concerted anti-socialist **campaign**. Labour was presiding over the beginnings of the dissolution of the Empire, communism was sweeping over Central Europe and the Far East, and by 1951, with the defection of **Burgess** and **Maclean**, it was known that there were high level Soviet agents operating within the civil service.

Why not a campaign to blame Britain's decline on a communist fifth column aided and abetted by a pink Labour Party rife with fellow travellers and dupes of Stalin? Certainly the Tories had been happy to connive with the Foreign Office, the secret service, and the Tory press in **1924** to drive the first Labour government out of office in a Red scare created by the forged Zinoviev letter. On occasion, right-wing Tory candidates were not adverse to a spot of Red baiting in constituency contests, and there were sometimes calls at Tory conferences for outlawing communism, but on the whole the Conservatives did surprisingly little with the issue. Anti-communism was the Tory dog that never barked.⁴⁴

Indeed, it is a startling irony that it was Churchill who in **1950** suggested a summit conference with the Soviets to avert the dangers of war, while the Labour government dismissed the idea and publicly worried that the Tories might upset the American allies. If anything, the Tories showed more flexibility on relations with the Soviet bloc and slightly more critical distance from the American policies. The Tory leadership had its own good reasons for discouraging the right-wing of the party. In his infamous 'Gestapo' election speech of **1945**, Churchill himself had set the very worst example. His crude attempt to link socialism with totalitarianism was a 'pivotal event' in the election, according to Messrs. McCallum and Readman—but not at all in the manner intended. Instead, Attlee capitalised on it to divest Sir Winston of his wartime image of *national* leadership. The Tories compounded their error by attempting to Red bait Harold Laski, a tactic which 'left the great mass of the electorate surprisingly uninterested'. The popular tide for Labour and the degree of working-class consciousness were simply too high for the Tories to make any Zinoviev-style points. Churchill never forgot this lesson and made sure that Red scare tactics were kept well muffled. Moreover, there could be no question of the Tories charging Labour with harbouring traitors in the government service. The 'traitors' were largely from the same class milieu in which the Tories themselves were situated; the Kim Philbys were protected not by Labour but by upper-class solidarity. Finally, the highly centralised and disciplined nature of parties under the parliamentary system ensured that the Tory leadership could easily control the potential excesses of their right-wingers, unlike the Republican leadership's difficulties with its McCarthy wing.⁴⁵

There was another, deeper, force at work as well. The very strength of the Labour victory in **1945** had impressed the Tories so profoundly that they themselves quickly adopted many of the goals of **1945**. What became known as 'Butskellism' was a compound of welfare state assumptions with an emphasis on the liberty of the individual. While one side of Butskellism was a fundamental national consensus behind the American alliance and the Cold War abroad, the other side was the reluctance of the Tories to attack Labour on grounds of disloyalty at home. All the more so when

British middle-class opinion became aroused by the excesses of McCarthyism in America, which by the early 1950s became a safe way to vent resentments of American domination, traditional feelings of cultural superiority, and mild British patriotism, without in any sense unsettling any of the basic links which bound Britain to the American empire. The Tories pitched much of their appeal in 1950–51 to this 'liberal and independent opinion'. Later the Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers, which sought out and condemned British examples of McCarthyite injustice, featured a number of prominent Tories as well as Labour and Liberal members among its sponsors. Given the convergence of the parties, then, it comes as no surprise that Churchill should have found the 1950 election campaign 'demure', nor that this same campaign should have begun with a church service attended by leaders of all the parties where the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered a sermon setting 'the amicable conflict of the election in the shadow of the deeper world conflict of Christianity and materialism'.⁴⁶

Britain then lined up behind the Cold War under social democratic auspices. It would be an exaggeration to say that this process was unaccompanied by domestic repression, certainly at the state level, and—particularly within the Labour Party itself and the trade unions—at the political level as well: yet by comparison with America, the repression was relatively mild. The dynamics of the party system in the post-war conjuncture had much to do with this result. And behind the party system lay the balance of class forces, and the momentary power of the British working class.

Australia

Australia stands between Britain and America on a continuum of domestic repression. 'In Australia', according to one recent account, 'as in America, the Cold War provided the backdrop for a virulent anti-communist crusade that damaged the nation's free institutions and the careers of many innocent individuals. Ironically, the ugly and excessive example of the hysterical anti-communist crusade in America provided the main check on similar tendencies in Australia.'⁴⁷

Australia was in the process of being brusquely drawn into the Cold War as a strategically significant piece of real estate for American military and intelligence operations in the Far East. One imperial connection gave way to another during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Not surprisingly, this realignment along the lines of the great East–West fissure could not take place without profound domestic repercussions. As Robin Gollan writes:⁴⁸

What happened in Australia in these years. . . cannot be understood except in the context of the world contest. Every great issue in society, whether of political policy, ideological stance, or cultural commitment, was measured and judged, in

some degree, by its relation to the issues raised by the world-wide conflict. Reactionaries and communists were prepared to be so involved. The rest of the community, who were the majority, were involved whether they liked it or not.'

Like Britain, Australia was governed by a Labour government during the formative period of the Cold War. As in Britain, social democracy presided over the defence, security and intelligence sharing and integration with the Americans which came with the Cold War. As in Britain, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) soon went into the political wilderness—for almost a decade longer in fact than British Labour. But in Australia, the Cold War came home with much more of a vengeance and with more lasting damage to social democracy, both within the ALP and within the labour movement. The ALP government was in fact significantly weaker domestically than Labour in Britain, while the Australian Right was both stronger and less inclined toward compromise on socialism and the welfare state than the British Conservatives. This mix, under conditions of the burgeoning Cold War, encouraged considerable recourse to the Red scare as a political tactic of the Right and, as a result, much confusion and disarray within the ALP and the unions.

Connell and Irving speak of the late 1940s as a 'ruling-class mobilisation' of white collar, ununionised middle class and the self-employed against socialism. As it turned out, this mobilisation was also accompanied by a split within the unions and within the ALP itself on the communist issue. The Labor government tried briefly for a post-war reconstruction policy of full employment by asking the voters in a 1944 referendum for a permanent transfer of powers over prices, production and employment from the states to the Commonwealth (powers exercised during the war-time emergency) Labor lost the referendum and went into retreat, a retreat which turned into a rout when an aroused business community successfully mobilised a mass propaganda campaign to defeat proposed bank nationalisations, and the doctors masterminded a campaign to undermine and destroy 'socialised' health care. These campaigns successfully mobilised mass support behind the new conservatism, and the Red scare was an integral part of the ideological appeal.⁴⁹

Beset on the Right, the Labor government found itself attacked from the Left as well, and at the same time the Australian Communist Party went into the hard-left Cold War line of the late 1940s. A devastating coal strike in 1949 was widely portrayed as a communist conspiracy coinciding with the fall of China. Although communist union officials were not necessarily the most militant, the Labor government accepted the right-wing interpretation and broke the strike by arresting its leaders and freezing union funds. 1949 also saw a series of prosecutions against leading Communists for sedition. The Party Leader went to prison for three years for stating that Australian workers would welcome Soviet

troops as liberators. Another leading member followed him, and then a series of prosecutions, especially of communist trade unionists, took place amid 'considerable protest' over 'trumped up charges' and clear threats to freedom of speech. A Victoria Communist defected, sold his story to the sensationalist press, and inspired a state Royal Commission on Communist Subversion. The Labor government responded much as the Truman Democrats did at the same time, by joining in the pack of Red hunters to deflect criticism of their own softness. They were no more successful, not least because the Red scare appealed to isolationist and racist elements within the Australian working class: once encouraged, they set loose divisions which caused long term harm.⁵⁰

The Liberal and Country Parties were eager to smear the ALP as communist dupes. Even before the end of the war, Robert Menzies, the Liberal leader, moved a resolution in Parliament censuring the Labor government for its 'encouragement of communist activities in Australia'. On the eve of the 1946 election, an opposition newspaper told its readers that 'a vote for Labor is a vote for communism'. And in a joint statement in 1949, the leaders of the Liberal and Country Parties promised that if elected they would declare the Communists an illegal party, give the Attorney General the power to declare any associations communist and thus illegal, and ban Communists from trade union office. They then proceeded to closely identify Labor with communism in the successful election campaign which followed.⁵¹

When the Menzies government came to office in 1949, it was already stepping into a situation in which McCarthyism had made considerable inroads. As early as 1946 an attack had begun on the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research for allegedly harbouring communist and pro-Soviet scientists. Questions were raised by the Americans and other allies over Australian 'reliability' with regard to atomic research and other classified information. Right-wing ALP members were much in the forefront of the smears, and when the Labor government reorganised the Council, its distinguished head, who had defended the body and warned against the 'sinister' campaign to destroy freedom of inquiry, quit. The Approved Defence Projects Act in 1947 imposed penalties of up to a year's imprisonment on anyone 'who by speech or writing advocates or encourages the prevention, hindrance or obstruction' of any improved defence project.⁵²

The Menzies government was as good as its word, introducing in 1950 the Communist Dissolution Bill which, among other things gave the state the right to 'declare' persons or associations communist, and place the onus on the accused to prove their innocence. The idea of dissolving the CP was not seen as effective, even by some cabinet ministers—in the sense of actually getting rid of a party which could go underground, as it had during a period of illegality during the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939-41. It

was, however, seen as electorally effective, and as a brilliant device to divide the ALP. Initially, it did just that. The Labor Executive wanted the main thrust of the legislation accepted. The caucus in the House was divided, but after various amendments had been rejected by the government, a majority was found against acceptance—and was then overruled by the Executive, which had an eye on polls showing two-thirds of Australians favouring the **Bill**.

The unions were aghast at the powers for state intervention. Menzies on introducing the Bill had 'named' some 40 trade unionists as Communists. At least half a dozen of these names were so blatantly incorrect that Menzies later had to retract them. Ten unions and the Communist Party contested the constitutionality of the Bill in the courts, and secured the services of leading ALP politician Herbert Evatt to argue their case before the High Court. Evatt won, and the Bill was declared outside the powers of the Commonwealth. Shortly thereafter, Evatt succeeded to the leadership of the ALP. With a man considered by the government as a virtual fellow traveller now leading Labor, Menzies secured a double dissolution of both houses of Parliament in 1951 and ran on a Cold War, anti-communist campaign. Despite marginal losses in the House, the governing coalition won control of the Senate. Menzies thereupon called a referendum to amend the constitution to give the Commonwealth 'powers to deal with Communists and communism'. Australians thus had an opportunity unique to the English-speaking countries during the Cold War—they could democratically pass judgment directly upon a repressive piece of anti-communist **legislation**.⁵³

A pamphlet was distributed to all voters laying out the case for a 'yes' vote in the government's words ('the chief instrument' of communist aggression against Australia was the 'fifth column' of secret agents who had wormed their way into 'key places') and the case for the 'no' vote contributed by the ALP, which began by declaring that Labor was 'utterly opposed to communism' and ready to take 'effective action to combat communism in Australia', but was just as opposed to the Menzies proposals which were 'unnecessary, unjust and totalitarian'. At the outset of the campaign, polls showed 80 per cent support for the 'yes' side, which was almost unanimously supported by the newspapers. Dr Evatt threw himself wholeheartedly into the campaign against official **McCarthyism**, even cooperating with Communists on occasion. Yet despite the repressive atmosphere of the time, deepened by the fact that Australian troops were battling Communists in Korea, the passionate anti-McCarthyite leadership of Labor found resonance in the working class and liberal middle-class opinion. The tide was dramatically reversed by voting day when 51 per cent voted 'no'. True, the Australian electorate has historically shown great caution in accepting constitutional amendments, yet at the same time it was also the case that the 'no' vote ran ahead of Labor

support in the general election earlier the same year. One possible interpretation of this result is that had Labor been consistently willing to take a leading position against the repressive excesses of the Cold War, instead of attempting to pre-empt the Right, the overall picture of Cold War Australia might have been less sorry than it in fact was.⁵⁴

Defeat of the Communist Dissolution Bill was a victory for civil liberties, yet it was in many ways a merely symbolic victory. The machinery of repression was well in place under existing legislation—and had already been used to effect by Labor. The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) had been set up in 1949 under Labor auspices. ASIO was an important conduit for the integration of Australian security and intelligence into the wider Cold War network—initially set up with the close assistance of MI5, it later developed intimate linkages with the CIA. At the core of ASIO was a small self-constituted elite intelligence group with a mission to save the nation from the irresponsible excesses of democracy and politics. The 'gnomes of Melbourne' as they were dubbed by Dr John Burton (the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs under Evatt, who attempted to pursue an independent foreign policy and drew the wrath of the Right), took full charge when the chief gnome, Sir Charles Spry, was put in charge of ASIO by Menzies in 1950. From this point on, military intelligence was in charge of civilian security, with strong views on foreign and defence policy and machinery at their disposal to ensure that governments acceptable to them were elected. ASIO's controversial if shadowy interventions in politics have continued to be a matter of concern. State Special Branches were co-ordinated with ASIO as subsidiary Red squads which compiled voluminous files on the political opinions and political activities of private citizens. The FBI were direct mentors of the Special Branches, encouraging them to target Labor supporters and engage in fishing operations among even moderately progressive bureaucrats and politicians, precisely along American witch-hunt lines. As a later judicial inquiry found, 'like the Maginot line, all defence against anticipated subversions, real or imagined, were built on one side'. Another mechanism for linking Australia into the American security-intelligence network were the UKUSA secret agreements of 1947 to which Australia was a junior party. These were the wedge for a vast array of American electronic surveillance installations built on Australian territory but largely under American control, with considerable potential for American snooping into domestic Australian politics (and for sharing of this information with the 'safe' network of ASIO and the Special Branch, although not necessarily with elected governments).⁵⁵

McCarthyite attacks on alleged communist subversion in the civil service and fears that America would consider Australia an unreliable ally led the Labor government in 1948 to direct security checks of public

servants with access to classified information. Alarm was expressed by the Chairman of the Public Service Board to the Prime Minister about the standards of judgment used, citing adverse reports on 'sympathisers' who discussed 'foreign affairs' or 'left-wing ideologies'. Undaunted, the Prime Minister actually widened the scope of the security screening. With the arrival of Menzies in office, the scope was 'dramatically' widened yet further to include all applicants for positions within the public service, whether classified or not. In 1953, a cabinet directive insisted that no one about whom ASIO had 'some doubts' should have access to classified material. 'Doubts' were garnered by recourse to the voluminous files of ASIO and the Special Branch on political activities and beliefs of citizens, association with organisations considered 'subversive' by the police (apparently including the Council for Civil Liberties), affiliations of relatives and friends, and other information amassed by a network of spies, informers, paid agents, and other such. There was no appeal procedure for persons whose careers might be adversely affected, no recourse to the courts, no opportunity to confront and cross-examine sources of adverse information. Above all, the right-wing political bias of the security service was in *effect* given official sanction and enforced upon the public service, and on anyone who might wish to serve in the *bureaucracy*.⁵⁶

Another major area for state repression was in immigration controls. Apparently, the fear of security risks among the displaced persons from Europe who began arriving in Australia in the wake of the war was one of the major reasons for the establishment of ASIO. Under the Menzies government in the 1950s ASIO became a 'virtual foreign service operating under the cover of the Immigration Department' eventually extending to sixteen countries. Liaison was maintained with local security forces to detect and bar 'Communists' among applicants for immigration. As Hall comments, 'leaving aside the question of possible injustice to individuals, the sinister aspect of the operation is how it linked ASIO with the Secret Police of other countries', including exchange of information with some very repressive and undemocratic regimes (of the Right, needless to say). The Menzies government also tried to impose passport restrictions on its own citizens who travelled to countries which the government did not like (Soviet bloc, that is), including on the wife of the Chief of Justice of New South Wales who was active in the Australian Peace Council. This proved difficult to enforce, however, and following the defeat of the Communist Dissolution referendum, the attempt was largely abandoned.**

Apart from the Communist Party itself, the main target of the state's repressive apparatus in the early Cold War years was the Australian Peace Council, founded in 1949, and *labelled* a communist front, not only by ASIO, the police, and the Liberal-Country Party government, but by the ALP leadership as well. Legitimate fears of nuclear war among the population inspired considerable public support for the Peace Council, which was

the only organisation mobilising a disarmament campaign at this time. Menzies, during his attempt at banning communism, assiduously whipped up war hysteria around Korea, publicly praising General MacArthur's call for an invasion of China and the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. In this context, the Peace Council was a rallying point for opposition to war. Alastair Davidson, in his careful and fair study of the Australian Communist Party, notes that while Communists had been influential at the founding of the Peace Council, by the 1950s it 'had become a genuine mass movement in which various Christian denominations were also prominent' and that 'it was not controlled by the Party as much as the Party would have liked'. The security service made no such fine distinctions, and local Peace Councils were infiltrated by spies and agents, their supporters harrassed, their motives denounced. The ALP in opposition joined enthusiastically in the witch-hunt, proscribing membership for party faithful, and withdrawing endorsement of Dr John Burton as an ALP candidate after he attended a peace conference in Peking. A conference in Australia in 1953 organised by ten churchmen was condemned not only by Menzies, but by Evatt as well, on a guilt-by-association basis. Passport harrassments were used against Council members. The effects of this repression in truncating and distorting the debate within Australia on the central question of the threat of nuclear catastrophe in the Cold War and of the implications of Australia's foreign and defence role for war and peace should be obvious.⁵⁸

Undoubtedly the greatest coup for the Liberal-Country government/ASIO nexus was the Petrov affair of 1954. Induced by an ASIO secret undercover agent, a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy defected with alleged 'secrets' of widespread Soviet espionage linked to Australian Communists. The dramatic 'rescue' of his wife from the clutches of two KGB heavies on a plane back to Russia was played out in the fullest possible glare of publicity. As Whitlam and Stubbs in their book-length analysis of the affair conclude, the government 'had superbly stage-managed the Petrovs' defection as a Cold War extravaganza'. There are shadowy elements concerning ASIO's collaboration with the government of the day on the very eve of an election, and on the timing of the defection. A Royal Commission was called, sat for three days to air sensational charges of Australian traitors spying for the Soviets, then promptly adjourned until after the election. The ALP had been standing at 52 per cent in the polls; ten days after Mrs Petrov's 'rescue' the Menzies government had shot up to 57 per cent. In the ensuing election, Labor fell victim to a concerted Red baiting campaign in which the press fully participated. Whitlam and Stubbs conclude that a 'strong reason for the return of the government was the communist scare, a scare created by the government itself'. This became clear when the Commission resumed its inquiries. In the end there was very little substance indeed, but much

McCarthyite Red smearing and widely publicised damage to reputations and careers. The Commission was openly partisan, setting the ALP and, in particular, Dr Evatt, as its target as much as ~~communism~~.³⁹

If the Petrov affair represented McCarthyism in close collaboration with the state, some of the most bitter battles of the Cold War in Australia were fought almost entirely outside the state, within the trade unions and the ALP. Well organised and determined movements of anti-communist political repression were launched under the ideological and sectarian banner of Roman Catholicism. Although connections were undoubtedly made with the state security forces, it must be emphasised that the Catholic anti-communist movement was very much a self-directed force with a mass base.

The Australian trade union movement had harboured for some time two divergent and perhaps irreconcilable forces within its bosom. Communists, never successful in any way in electoral politics in Australia, did experience considerable success in the unions, especially during the war. Estimates vary, but perhaps somewhere between a quarter and a half of Australian trade unions were under CP direction by the end of the war. At the same time, the closely-knit Catholic minority in Australia, largely of Irish origin, was 'under-represented in the most esteemed suburbs and occupations' and over-represented in the working class and among ALP voters (in 1954, Catholics accounted for 16 per cent of the Australian electorate, but almost one-third of ALP votes). A small, upwardly mobile new middle class gave ideological leadership to Catholic workers whose class consciousness was often combined with a strong religious identification of an expressly anti-communist definition. During the Spanish Civil War, echoes of the right-wing role of the Church were strongly felt in the Australian Catholic community. A zealous Catholic lay activist with the unlikely, if fitting, name of Bartholomew Augustine Santamaria became a leading figure in Catholic Action and the Catholic Social Movement, or simply, the Movement, which went into high gear in the Cold War era. Like its communist enemies, the Movement was secretive, organised on a cell basis, and exercised tight control and discipline over its members. Parish priests contributed to the climate of fear among Catholics with tales of imminent Red takeovers, and the Movement organised everything from combat training to surveillance and 'exposure' of alleged under-cover ~~Communists~~.⁴⁰

It was in the unions that the militant Catholics made their greatest gains. Under the name of the 'Industrial Groups', or commonly, 'Groupers', they set out to destroy communist influence by, to all intents and purposes, following communist-style tactics for taking over and emphasising zeal above labour unity. At first the ALP leadership seemed content to use the Groupers as battering rams against the Communists, but eventually they became a threat to the ALP itself and were denounced

by Dr Evatt. For one thing, certain Catholic ALP members of Parliament were by the early 1950s emerging as rabid and reckless McCarthyites (one charged that the Australian National University was a 'nest of Communists') who played directly into the hands of the Liberal-Country government. Divisions were opening up publicly and embarrassingly within the caucus. For another, the union movement was being split asunder. Once the ALP intervened against the Groupers, it was inevitable that the divisions would extend into the ALP itself. In Victoria, a strong Catholic movement within the ALP had backed the Menzies side in the referendum on Communist Dissolution and this formed the nucleus of a breakaway Anti-communist Labor Party which contested the state elections of 1955. Finally in 1957 the Democratic Labor Party was formed as a rival to the ALP. This has not been a very successful alternative to Labor, although it undoubtedly assisted in keeping the Liberal-Country coalition in power for a generation. In the end, Catholic anti-communism was self-limiting and self-defeating. As Ormonde comments, many Catholic workers were never attracted to the Movement, and others ultimately rejected it because its leaders 'abandoned their radical criticism of the capitalist economic system to concentrate all their physical and intellectual energies on the communist problem'. Anti-communism could not in the last analysis serve as a substitute for working class consciousness. But its destructiveness in the labour movement, in working-class politics, and in the practice of liberal democracy in Australia, should not be underestimated.⁶¹

In summary, then, Australia came close to America in terms of state and political repression. The two factors which seem most important in explaining this experience were the willingness of the Australian Right and its political expressions in the Liberal and Country Parties to adopt anti-communism as a club with which to beat their social democratic opposition, and the deep divisions within the ALP and the labour movement over the issue and the inability of the leadership to consistently confront the strategy of the Right. In the event, Australia was firmly drawn into a subordinate position under American hegemony, and the Australian Left suffered a devastating defeat and long exile into the political wilderness.

Canada

Canada entered the Cold War early and with as much apparent enthusiasm in official circles as was evident in America and Britain. The late 1940s witnessed a series of steps such as US-Canada defence sharing agreements, security-intelligence agreements and liaison (UKUSA Agreements, FBI-RCMP links), diplomatic and military pacts (NATO and later NORAD), economic arrangements (sharing in the Marshall Plan), and the encouragement of large-scale direct capital investment in Canada by American business, which had the net effect of moving Canada firmly and apparently

irrevocably into the American economic, military and diplomatic orbit. The ideology of anti-communism and the defence of free enterprise and the free world figured strongly in the public rhetoric of the period, as did more emotionally restrained opinions of Canada's realistic options and the limitations of autonomous action in the private discussions of the politicians and bureaucrats making the key decisions. There was some early debate within the Department of External Affairs over the question of whether Canada should pursue a hard or conciliatory line toward the USSR. The doves were routed early on, however, as external events closed off conciliatory options. Canada's close allies, Britain and America, in effect determined the narrow limits on Canadian action. At the same time, Canadian policy makers shared in the dominant assumptions of their allies. Ironically, it was the Soviet Union itself which set the seal on official Canadian anti-Sovietism, as early as 1945-46.⁶²

The event which had so much to do with sweeping Canada up into the centre of the Cold War maelstrom was also one which defined the Cold War as one fought on both the external and domestic fronts. The defection of the cypher clerk Igor Gouzenko from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa in the autumn of 1945 with documents implicating Canadian Communists and communist sympathisers in a Soviet espionage network was an international sensation when made public early the next year. It was, in a certain sense, the first public shot fired in the Cold War (private manoeuvrings among the wartime Allies were, of course, rife). The lessons drawn by the Canadian government were that the USSR was an unfriendly power, and that its unfriendliness extended into controlling a disloyal fifth column within Canada. The cry of treason, soon to be brandished about the political stage of America with rough abandon, was in fact first heard in Canada. How it was handled is itself an interesting study in the differences between Canada and the United States.

Close consultation with the British and American governments (much of which remains classified information today) and with elements of the British and American security and intelligence apparatuses led to an elaborate three-country counter-espionage operation. An atomic scientist, Nunn May, was arrested in Britain and eventually sentenced to ten years under the Official Secrets Act. In Canada, a secret order in council empowered the RCMP to arrest a number of Canadian suspects under the War Measures Act. This extremely repressive piece of emergency legislation, still in place after the end of the war, allowed arrest without charge, without counsel, and without habeas corpus. Interrogated at length in the RCMP barracks with no idea of what was happening to them, the suspects were then hauled before a Royal Commission and questioned about their activities in government employment, their past associations, and their political beliefs. The Royal Commission then published its findings, naming eighteen Canadians as Soviet espionage agents, including

the Communist Member of Parliament, Fred Rose.⁶³

The fact that in subsequent criminal proceedings about half the persons charged were acquitted has led to considerable speculation over the years. There can, however, be no doubt that Soviet espionage operations were taking place in Canada and that Canadians ideologically sympathetic to communism were indeed being utilised. This is hardly surprising, of course, but what is important is the use to which these facts were put. First, the readiness of the Canadian government to use extraordinary war powers in peacetime and to dispense altogether with the civil liberties of the individuals suspected of espionage, set the tone for subsequent Cold War practice of state repression. Secondly, although the Canadian government hastened to maintain proper, if cool, diplomatic relations with the USSR, it made no secret of its intention to exploit the Gouzenko affair to the full for its domestic political value. The point was made clearly in the Royal Commission Report, in the statements of government officials, and in the media, that the ideology of communism was at the root of disloyalty to Canada. The Communist Party had been declared an illegal entity during the war, and about a hundred of its supporters interned as enemies of the war effort. Even after the Soviet Union had become an ally after the Nazi invasion in 1941, official protestations of approval of the gallant Red Army were matched by continued hostility on the part of the state and the police towards Canadian Communists. Gouzenko was the signal that the era of 'popular front' alliance (the CPC had supported the Liberals in the 1945 election against the social democrats) was definitely over. That this point was being made in the midst of a post-war strike wave, in which communist trade unionists were prominent, may be only a coincidence—but from the point of view of both the state and capital it was a very happy coincidence.⁶⁴

Gouzenko himself became the first of a series of post-war defectors who were built up by the media as exemplars of courage who chose 'freedom' over totalitarianism (ironically, the mirror-image of the communist traitor who betrayed his country to the USSR). Everything from a best-selling autobiography to a Hollywood movie (improbably starring the dapper Dana Andrews as the squat Gouzenko) publicised the image, as did Gouzenko's elaborate procedures to avoid alleged Soviet assassination squads (the bag over the head in public appearances being the most notable). Interestingly, recent documents acquired under the Access to Information Act indicate that Gouzenko himself advised the Canadian government at a very early stage after his defection about selling a glamorous and highly ideological image of himself through the media. There is no doubt, in short, that the Gouzenko affair was employed deliberately and effectively to launch the Cold War in Canada.⁶⁵

The initial reaction of public and politicians was mixed. There were protests against the methods of the Royal Commission (some of those

who protested later found themselves in difficulty with 'security' problems), and there were also calls for witch-hunts and cleaning out the traitors by any and all methods. The response of the Canadian government to this situation was to establish a far reaching and elaborate security screening system within the federal government. Beginning in 1946 a system under the supervision of a Security Panel of senior civil servants employing the RCMP security branch as an investigative agency, 'vetted' tens of thousands of civil servants and applicants for posts in the public service each year. Extensive RCMP Red lists, dating back to the time of the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919 and based upon information from agents and informers, were employed as were extensive inquiries among neighbours and associates. Adverse findings, including not only political information, but also 'character defects' such as alcoholism, homosexuality, or socially aberrant habits, would be fatal to a civil servant's career advancement, and perhaps to his or her job. There would, however, be no appeal **procedures allowed**, no opportunity for a person affected to confront hostile sources of information, or even to know what the case against him or her was. The demands for security screening were so insistent that the RCMP were chronically unable to keep up with the flow. The political implications were clear for public sector workers: as a cabinet directive of 1952 (in force until 1963) put it, 'a person who is a member of the Communist Party, or who by his words or actions shows himself to believe in Marxism-Leninism, or any other ideology which advocates the overthrow of government by force, should not be permitted to enter the public service'.⁶⁶

The ideological uses of security screening were particularly evident in the witch-hunt at the National Film Board. Here American pressures emanating both from the repressive apparatus of the state (FBI and defence intelligence) and from the Hollywood film industry, seeking to crush a small rival in a branch plant market, combined with Canadian Cold War hawks (particularly the Defence Department, willing conduits for American demands) and private sector branch plant capital, to destroy the political independence of an innovative and creative group of documentary film-makers. Built up by the progressive Scottish film-maker John Grierson during the war, the NFB had gained a considerable international reputation. Grierson himself was peripherally smeared in the Gouzenko investigation and banned from the United States by J. Edgar Hoover. The NFB was attacked as harbouring Communists (as many as thirty to forty persons were claimed to be Reds), the liberal head of the Board was forced to resign, and three permanent employees dismissed as security risks, along with many others who fled rather than be fired. Artists and creative persons were put on clear notice that progressive views were no longer safe. It was the Canadian version of the Hollywood inquisition by the Un-American Activities Committee, but it took place

within the state sector ~~itself~~.⁶⁷

The security system extended outside the state sector. The RCMP were called in to vet the political reliability of persons employed by private companies with defence contracts, and workers who failed the test were to be removed from work of a classified nature. Soon private security units attached to defence industries began their own screenings. More bizarre was the extension of screening to seamen on the Great Lakes. This was at the direct insistence of the Americans who were terrified lest Red seamen might infiltrate American ports on weekend leave. It was also at the insistence of the Seafarers International Union (SIU), a gangster American union imported to crush the communist Canadian **Seamens** Union (CSU). In fact the CSU had already been destroyed by the time the Great Lakes security regulations came into force, and in any event the SIU's control over hiring halls rendered the state's security apparatus superfluous. Eventually, when American **McCarthyite** paranoia waned, the Canadian authorities dropped this cumbersome and unnecessary intervention into the private ~~sector~~.⁶⁸

Another prime area for the security apparatus was in immigration. The post-war era saw not only the arrival of large numbers of refugees and displaced persons from Europe, but a more prolonged period of **large-scale** immigration into Canada of relatively cheap labour which helped fuel the great post-war boom. Identifying and barring 'security risks' among this vast flow of uprooted humanity became a prime concern for state security officials. Working entirely behind the scenes amid elaborate secrecy, plans were drawn up and implemented for screening out possible Communists and other left-wingers (former Nazis and Italian fascists were included as well, but the political thrust was unmistakable). RCMP agents posing as immigration officials were placed in all Canadian visa offices abroad and liaison was established with local security forces and police, as well as with the international operations of the CBI and British security, for access to political and criminal files. Applications rejected on security grounds were never to be told why, nor were sponsoring relatives in Canada, and there was no appeal. Perhaps most important for the RCMP were the invaluable links established with security forces in numerous countries (including those of regimes such as fascist Spain and the Portuguese and Turkish dictatorships).

There were some peculiar distortions created by this security underside to immigration, including the cloaking of anti-semitism and other racial prejudices under the guise of 'national security'. Certain countries were treated unequally due to the existence of large indigenous Communist Parties (France and Italy for example). Perhaps the most peculiar distortion, however, was with regard to prospective immigrants from Soviet bloc countries. Instead of encouraging anti-communist refugees to swell the ranks of right-wing ethnic organisations within Canada, the RCMP

(reflecting the then current wisdom of American intelligence) opposed all such immigration on the grounds that anyone who was let out of these regimes must be a Soviet agent. It was only with the Hungarian refugees of 1956–57 when the government itself stepped in and overrode security objections, that the flow from Eastern Europe began to step up, thus ending what can only be described as a bizarre extreme of Cold War irrationality.⁶⁹

The other side of immigration security was the exercise of passport controls against Canadians, which were tried with intermittent success, and the revocation of citizenship for previously naturalised citizens who offended Cold War rules of behaviour. The latter was the case for a large number of Yugoslav-Canadians who emigrated back to their homeland to help in socialist reconstruction under the Tito regime. As in the United States, special controls were exercised to bar temporary visitors from abroad judged to be engaged in politically suspect activities—under this rubric, visiting speakers for left-wing and disarmament meetings were routinely barred, and 'look-out lists' were maintained at ports of entry (some of these read like a who's-who of world celebrities in the arts and sciences, from Sartre to Picasso). The United States and Canada co-operated in barring at the border temporary working visits by organisers and officials from what were believed to be communist-led international unions: a curious mutual exclusion of 'outside agitators'.⁷⁰

As the security mania of the Cold War developed, so did the role and the influence of the RCMP. Anomalously both a state security agency and a regular police force, the RCMP was of course the beneficiary of the semi-mythological prestige of the Mounties. At the same time, like ASIO in Australia, the RCMP security branch was very much a junior partner to their American and British counterparts. The crude right-wing bias typical of all Western security forces was in this case deepened by the RCMP's close relationship with the McCarthy-era FBI and US State Department. State Department documents reveal, for instance, that the RCMP routinely provided American diplomatic and consular representatives in Canada with voluminous material from their files on Canadian 'subversives', access to which was denied Canadian cabinet ministers. Special files were compiled on civil servants and politicians believed to be potentially suspect. In short, the RCMP acted in many ways as an instrument of American Cold War policy, and was an arm for the American security-intelligence apparatus in a peripheral, but not unimportant, country on America's border. There were other sinister aspects to the RCMP's files on subversives. Emergency planning for war in this period included plans for concentration camps for immediate internment of persons considered dangerous, including Labour leaders. This had been done during World War II, but now the lists seemed much longer and more comprehensive.⁷¹

It was a characteristic of state repression in Canada that it was generally exercised with the utmost secrecy. For example, no public indication was given, even in parliament, of the effects of the security screening in the civil service. Questions about security risks were met with an unbending silence. The immigration and passport screening was wrapped in impenetrable bureaucratic fog. All this was in sharp contrast to the American scene, where every effort was apparently made to maximise public exposure of security matters, to publicise, in headlines, even on live television, the names and numbers of 'security risks' fired from state positions. Indeed, the Canadian government even discouraged the dismissal of permanent civil servants on security grounds and favoured their transfer to non-sensitive positions (although numerous temporary positions were terminated), largely out of fear of publicity surrounding such firings. There were fledgling **McCarthys**, including the leader of the official Opposition in Parliament, who did attempt to politicise the security issue, but the government simply invoked ministerial privilege and the national interest, and weathered the storm in silence. This was a Canadian style of state repression, not unlike that of Britain in the same period, and is certainly important in assessing the Canadian experience.

The party system provides a key to understanding the Canadian experience. With social democracy a relatively underdeveloped third party strain in Canada (lacking institutional links with the weak and fragmented labour movement), Canadian federal politics were dominated by the Liberals, in uninterrupted office from **1935 to 1957**, and in symbiotic relationship with the powerful senior civil service and the major centres of corporate power in Canada. The Liberals, as well entrenched as they were, were quite unprepared to allow the communist issue to be used against them by their right-wing opponents, the Conservatives. In this way they may in historical retrospect appear more perceptive and intelligent in their own self-interest than the Truman Democrats in the same period: they survived the domestic repression of the Cold War while the Democrats were consumed in the fires which they themselves had stoked. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the Liberals did not face the necessity of persuading a Republican Congress of the need to vote for huge sums for a global military, diplomatic and economic commitment. Moreover, they held a crucial trump card over their Conservative opponents: near complete political domination over the province of Quebec, and French Canada in general. Catholicism was a strong basis for anti-communist ideology in America and Australia, and Canada was the most Catholic of all three countries. The province of Quebec was under a reactionary, and very repressively anti-communist regime, and French Catholics were generally a political force favouring a **McCarthyite** stance. Yet for historical reasons, they were prisoners of the Liberal party in national politics. The Conservatives, on the other hand, were

based in anti-Catholic and anti-French Protestant Ontario. No national right-wing anti-communist alliance was possible, and the Liberals, under a Quebec Catholic Prime Minister, were able to steer Canada into the Cold War American alliance while maintaining repression for the most part within the secrecy-shrouded bounds of the state—and at the same time preserving their own skins from the potential right-wing backlash, which did erupt in America and Australia.

Although there was, and is, a great deal of self-congratulation in Canada about the more 'liberal' and 'tolerant' political culture as contrasted to the United States, this seems dubious on a number of counts. First, there is the uncomfortable fact that public opinion data show Canadians to be no more tolerant, and no less authoritarian in their attitudes than Americans. If McCarthyism was, as argued earlier, not a mass phenomenon but an elite and party dynamic, then it was a different conjuncture of elites and parties which made the difference in Canada. Nor does it make much more sense to attribute greater attachment to liberal values to the Canadian elites, who in the past had shown considerable intolerance of dissent and great illiberality in dealing with radicalism.⁷² Enlightened self-interest might better describe their motives in the Cold War era. Finally, it should not be forgotten that the zealous attempt by governmental and bureaucratic elites to monopolise the means of repression may be no evidence at all of liberality. On the contrary, the exercise of state repression in Canada, and in particular the activities of the RCMP security service, have been continuing sources of controversy and complaint since the beginnings of the Cold War.⁷³

Nor would it be fair to suggest that McCarthyite political repression was absent in Canada, even if it never reached the levels of McCarthy's America, or Menzies' Australia. One clear example, with its origins in the state but ramifying into the political system, was the campaign to discredit and destroy the Canadian Peace Congress. Affiliated to the World Peace Council, and under the charismatic leadership of Dr James Endicott, a former church minister and missionary in China who had espoused the cause of the Communists in the Chinese Revolution, the Congress achieved some remarkable successes in mobilising Canadian opinion against the threat of nuclear war in the late forties and early fifties. The Canadian government, busy enlisting Canada in NATO and offering troops for Korea, and integrating beefed-up Canadian forces into continental defence under American direction, was in no mood to allow a free debate among Canadian citizens on the merits of the nuclear balance of terror. The state came down hard on the Congress in what amounted to an officially-inspired McCarthyite attack on the legitimacy of a private association of citizens. The Minister of External Affairs, and later recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, Lester Pearson, castigated Dr Endicott in public speeches as a disloyal agent of communist totalitarianism. The

media took up the cry and soon individual members of the Congress were suffering harassment, mass meetings were attacked physically by gangs of organised thugs (virtually cheered on by Pearson), Endicott's home was bombed, halls were denied: in short, the full panoply of political repression unfolded. When Endicott travelled to China and gave support to the claims of American germ warfare in Korea and Southern China, the Cabinet actually discussed at length laying charges of treason against him. Ministers were dissuaded only by the enormity of the penalty—death. The real comment on Canada in the Cold War era is that the Cabinet actually discussed treason charges against a Canadian for statements made not about Canada but about the United States! The campaign to discredit the Peace Congress did largely succeed in its objective of amputating the peace movement from the body politic, at least for a few years. Thus it can be said that the Canadian state, when faced with a potentially popular movement of dissent from Cold War policy, was ready to encourage political repression when state repression seemed *insufficient*.⁷⁴

The uses of political repression were particularly evident in the impact of the Cold War on the Canadian labour movement. The Liberal government, with a long history of attempted co-optation of trade union bureaucrats (and the largest share of the working-class vote across the country), had no intention of carrying out aggressive legislative interventions into union matters (à la Taft-Hartley in the US). The ingredients were there—a minority of militant communist trade union organisers and a few unions under communist leadership, along with a post-war strike wave and pent-up demands for wages and union recognition—but the Liberal government preferred to let the unions purge themselves of radical elements. In this they could rely on the fundamental conservatism of much of the trade union leadership, on American anti-communist influence through the mechanism of the international unions, and also on the dawning recognition among some elements of the trade union leadership that the Canadian working class could be a beneficiary of rearmament and the high employment offered by participation in the warfare state (even if at a lesser level than the Americans). They could also rely upon the influence of the social democratic supporters of the CCF party to carry on a struggle with the Communists which they had been waging since the 1930s.

Despite social democratic imprecations, Communists were often effective, dedicated organisers who helped advance the movement significantly (and sometimes let their political line get in the way, as between 1939 and 1941). The CCF and its union supporters were already pioneering Cold War social democracy by the late 1930s and the war years, particularly in the CCL (Canadian Congress of Labour) where Communists were active organisers. Communists were purged from the United Steel Workers and later the United Auto Workers. Also paralleling American post-war purges, the Fur and Leather Workers were purged of their strong com-

munist leadership. The Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers resisted the purge and were raided in a long struggle for decertification which left only one, albeit large, local branch of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in operation. A particularly concerted attack by the CCL, the CCF, the international headquarters, and the American state on the Communist leadership of the International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia in the late 1940s succeeded completely. The United Electrical Workers, on the other hand, under particularly able communist leadership, survived expulsion from the CCL and outlasted a rival union created by its enemies. This was the exception.⁷⁵

In the rival Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) with stronger craft union components, anti-communist purges also were the order of the day by the late 1940s and early 1950s. The most violent and bloody of all the purges was the warfare on the waterfront which finally crushed the Canadian Seamens Union. The apparent collusion of the Canadian state in granting citizenship to the notorious American labour thug, Hal Banks (who much later had to flee back to the US to avoid criminal prosecution), was only one of the questions raised concerning the state's complicity in the armed destruction of the CSU, although the tactical and strategic mistakes of the CSU itself cannot be underestimated. The state gave sanction to the affair when a Labour Relations Board ruled that the CSU could not be considered a legal union since it was Communist controlled.⁷⁶

The great loser in all this was of course the unity, already derisive in Canada, of the labour movement. Militant trade unionism became suspect, loyalty was valued over ability, the movement went into a period of relative quiescence only to be broken in the 1960s. The social democrats won in the long run, as the adherence of the Canadian Labour Congress (representing the merger of the CCL and the TLC) to the CCF's successor, the NDP, in 1961 demonstrated. But in Canada, as well as in Britain and Australia, the self-destructive limitations of Cold War social democracy were every bit as apparent as the limitations of Cold War liberalism in America. Tarr'd with the indiscriminate brush of guilt-by-association and the reactionary atmosphere of the times, the CCF itself fell victim to the Cold War which it had so enthusiastically assisted, and was virtually paralysed as a political party. The Liberals were the winners, as of course were the employers.

Nor did the incidents of political repression end with the trade union purges. Canada in this era witnessed numerous incidents of McCarthyism in the professions, in schools, in local communities. It was not uncommon for local school boards to bar 'Communists' from teaching; a leading physicist of progressive views was hounded out of the country, and later stripped of citizenship, for spending a sabbatical in Poland; a graduate of law school in British Columbia was refused admission to the bar on the sole grounds that he was a communist supporter (a decision upheld by

the Supreme Court of the province); a number of musicians in the Toronto Symphony Orchestra were dismissed because US Immigration officials had barred them from a US engagement on the grounds that they were 'security risks'. The examples could be multiplied. Yet the fact remains that Canada was different from the United States: political repression never became a partisan issue of any significance, and no politician at the national level was able to make a career on Red baiting.

The final act of the **McCarthyite** phase of the Cold War was played out for Canadians in 1957 in far away Cairo. Here the Canadian ambassador to Egypt, the distinguished Marxist scholar of Japanese history Herbert Norman, committed suicide after old and discredited Red baiting charges were resurrected once again by a US Senate committee. Official Ottawa was deeply angered; Canadian public opinion was outraged; even conservative newspapers expressed deep bitterness against the Americans. Relations between Canada and the US were at their 'all time low', according to the diary of the Canadian ambassador to Washington. Norman's death shocked the Canadian establishment, and defined for many Canadians the ugly excesses of McCarthyism. Yet at the same time, the identification of McCarthyism with America masked the extent that Canada too had travelled down the same road. The strengthened apparatus of state repression would remain as the legacy of the Cold War in **Canada.**⁷⁷

Conclusion

All four of the countries examined here lined up against the Soviet Union and espoused enthusiastic Cold War ideology on the international front; all four locked themselves into warfare economies and closely integrated defence and security-intelligence networks. American hegemony over the Western alliance ought not to obscure the very considerable degree to which Britain, Canada and Australia willingly chose sides and maintained them.

The Cold War was clearly seen by all participants as a war on two fronts: abroad and at home. All four stepped up their internal controls over dissent, especially dissent from the political and military logic of the Cold War itself. All purged their state apparatus of 'security risks' of doubtful 'loyalty'. By decisively targeting left-wing opinion and activities as 'subversive' and potentially connected to the enemy abroad, all four states intervened in a very specific way into their domestic political communities, delegitimizing certain ideas while strengthening others. All four states encouraged, either actively or passively, the extension of state repression into the political realm, especially in the key sector of the trade unions, where anti-communist purges were attempted by unionists themselves.

Political repression outside the state system was most characteristic of America, and to a lesser extent of Australia, with Canada and Britain

following at a greater distance. The extent of political repression was most crucially a function of the party system and of the balance of class forces which underlay the party system. Where the working class was weakest and both social democracy and communism virtually non-existent, the anti-communist witch-hunt reached its most feverish intensity; where the working class was strongest and social democracy most **hegemonic** the sway of anti-communist hysteria seemed most restricted. On the other hand, the ideological bias of the Cold War cut one way, and social democracy itself suffered considerable damage from its attempts to ride the anti-communist tide, as did the liberal New Deal wing of the Democratic Party in America.

A striking feature of all four countries is the relative lack of mass enthusiasm for the Cold War crusade undertaken by national leaders, although that must be balanced against an equivalent lack of mass opposition as well. The domestic battles of the Cold War were battles fought largely by and for competing elites. Given the assumptions of the Cold War it was always obvious which elites would come out on top. Those who tried to pursue anti-communism as a single-minded ideological crusade themselves became destabilising elements in the end and were suppressed. But by the **mid-1950s**, all four countries were governed by conservative Cold War regimes no longer in need of excessive domestic repression because backed by extensive state apparatuses with considerable control over internal political dissent and with the major forces on the Left blunted and confused by the Cold War itself. That was the legacy of the first decade of the Cold War.

NOTES

1. Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, (London 1983), p. 8.
2. This project will issue in a book, tentatively titled 'The Cold War in Canada, 1945-1955', in collaboration with Gary Marcuse. Time and expenses involved in this project were provided by grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet bloc: unity and conflict*, (NY 1961), p. 91-97; Roy Medvedev, *Let History judge: the origins and consequences of Stalinism*, (NY 1972), p. 484-97; Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, (NY 1974), p. 466.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 467-8.
5. By 1968, even Republican vice-presidential candidate Spiro Agnew could react with horror when accused of McCarthyism. If he had only known, said Agnew, that his remarks 'would in some way cast me as the Joe McCarthy of 1968, I would have turned five somersaults to avoid saying it'. Quoted in Richard M. Fried, *Men against McCarthy*, (NY 1976), p. 345.
6. Mary Sperling McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American liberals 1947-1954*, (Amherst, Mass. 1978), is the best account of the development of Cold War liberalism. For contemporary expressions of the new orthodoxy see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center*, (Boston 1949), and for how

- far in the direction of repression even ex-Marxist liberals could go, see Sidney Hook, *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No*, (NY 1953), and *Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment*, (NY 1957). An anti-McCarthy tract by James Rorty and Moshe Decter, *McCarthy and the Communists*, (Boston 1954) was sponsored by the American Congress for Cultural Freedom, a largely liberal organisation later revealed to be a CIA front.
- Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right*, (NY 1955), revised and updated as *The Radical Right*, (Garden City, NY 1964).
- One of the contributors to the Bell collection, Richard Hofstadter, went on to write a long essay on *Anti-intellectualism in American Life*, (NY 1963) to explain the deep cultural roots of McCarthyism.
9. Cambridge, Mass. 1967.
 10. 'Towards an explanation of McCarthyism', *Political Studies* 8, (October 1960), p. 268.
 11. Rogin, p. 260.
 12. Sam Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, (NY 1955), p. 59, 88. Angus Campbell, et al., *The American Voter*, (NY 1960), p. 50–51. Stouffer also found that at the height of the nationally televised Army–McCarthy hearings two-thirds of the American public could not name a single Senator or Congressman who had been investigating communism (88).
 13. On working class authoritarianism see S.M. Lipset, *Political Man*, (Garden City, NY 1963), p. 87–182.
 14. *Hoover and the Un-Americans* (Philadelphia 1983). See also Athan Theoharis, *Beyond the Hiss Case: the FBI, Congress and the Cold War*, (Philadelphia 1982).
 15. Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression*, (Chicago 1971), and Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, (NY 1972). An early statement of this view, focussing on McCarthy's own political origins in Wisconsin is John Steinke and James Weinstein, 'McCarthy and the liberals', *Studies on the Left* 2:3 (Summer 1962), reprinted in James Weinstein and David Eakins, ed., *For a New America*, (NY 1970), p. 180–196.
 16. Fried, *op. cit.*, 28 ff.
 17. Athan Theoharis, *The Yalta Myth*, (Columbia, Mo. 1970), p. 4.
 18. D.F. Crosby, *God, Church and Flag*, p. 228–51.
 19. Stouffer, *op. cit.*, p. 116–117. Fried, *op. cit.*, p. 311 fn. David Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense*, (NY 1983), p. 498. Ironically, Southern politicians discovered the communist issue in the late 1950s after it had been largely discredited on the national scene. McCarthy tried to build bridges to the Southerners by championing a states rights position, but what might have been a powerful reactionary alliance in the early 1950s was a nonstarter in the latter half of the decade.
 20. David Oshinsky, *Senator Joseph McCarthy and the American Labor Movement*, (Columbia, Mo. 1976), p. 108–9.
 21. See Mike Davis, 'The barren marriage of American labour and the Democratic party', *New Left Review* 124 (November–December 1980), p. 43–84.
 22. A survey by *Fortune* of 253 top executives in 1954 showed a strong majority opposed to McCarthy and little positive support. Charles J.V. Murphy, 'McCarthy and the businessman', *Fortune*, (April 1954), p. 156–92.
 23. Caute, p. 30, 20.
 24. The most decisive statement of this interpretation is in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, (NY 1972), p. 11–90.
 25. It may be argued that it was precisely the combination of expanded British commitments abroad and inability to pay for these commitments which contri-

- buted to the sudden rush of American dollars and power into the European and Third World theatres at the end of the war. See Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *op. cit.*; M.R. Gordon, *Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy*, (Stanford 1969); Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951*, (London 1983). Elisabeth Barker, *The British Between the Superpowers 1945-50*, (Toronto 1983); F.S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism*, (London 1982), p. 103-136.
26. On atomic 'co-operation' see Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, (NY 1982).
 27. Pincher, *Inside Story*, (NY 1979), p. 38. The best account of US-UK co-operation in this area is James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace*, (NY 1983), p. 392-425.
 28. The purge is discussed in David Williams, *Not in the Public Interest*, (London 1965) and in H. Street, *Freedom, the Individual and the Law*, (Harmondsworth 1977) and Tony Bunyan, *The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain*, (London 1977).
 29. Williams, p. 170-1, 197; Street, p. 246.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
 31. David Childs, *Britain Since 1945*, (London 1979), p. 36; Bob Jones, *The Russia Complex*, (Manchester 1977), p. 183-4.
 32. Bunyan, *Political Police*, p. 123-7; Taylor, *Law and Order*, (London 1981), p. 68-9.
 33. Pelling, *The British Communist Party*, (London 1958), p. 137.
 34. J. Goldstein, *The Government of British Trade Unions*, (London 1952), p. 259-60; Jones, p. 198-9; Pelling, p. 153-9; M. Harrison, *Trade Unions and the British Labour Party Since 1945*, (London 1960), p. 132-3, 143-5, 153-5, 182-6. Harrison also notes that the Association of Scientific Workers managed to remain unaffiliated with the Labour Party during the Cold War era despite criticism of its 'fellow travelling' executive often voiced by the rank and file (327). Similar left-wing scientific workers unions in Canada and Australia were broken by the atom spy scare and state and political repression in the late 1940s.
 35. During the anti-communist drive in the unions, Britain produced at least one example of the ex-communist expose of the Red menace: C.H. 'Bob' Darke's *The Communist Technique in Britain*, (London 1953) written by a lapsed Communist busman in London, gave the predictable picture of the Soviet octopus, although in rather less lurid tones than some of the American examples of this genre.
 36. Pelling, *op. cit.*
 37. Pelling, *op. cit.*, p. 131-2.
 38. Childs, p. 2-9; Harrison, p. 215-16; Laski, *The Secret Battalion*, (London 1946); Pelling, p. 146-7; Pincher, *Their Trade is Treachery*, (NY 1982), p. 256. At times, right-wing Labour leaders could sound almost McCarthyite in their intolerant denunciations of all internal opposition as 'Communist'. After the 1952 Conference Hugh Gaitskell told the *Times* he was disturbed by the number of resolutions which were 'Communist-inspired'. He went on to estimate that one out of six constituency delegates were Communist or Communist-inspired. Even if the proportion were merely one in twenty, Gaitskell opined, 'it is a most shocking state of affairs to which the National Executive should give immediate attention': Ralph Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism*, (London 1973), p. 326.
 39. Jones, *Russia Complex*, makes the perceptive point that Bevinite 'realism' refused to recognise the legitimate interests in security which the USSR required in Eastern Europe, while simultaneously using evidence of Soviet power politics to buttress its anti-Soviet policies. To the idealists of the 'socialist foreign

policy' school, on the other hand, Soviet policy had ironic lessons to teach: 'the foreign policy of the Soviet Union itself conformed so closely to the principles of the realist school that, it is ironic to reflect, the best mentor of the Labour left in this subject was probably Stalin himself. (190). Elisabeth Barker, *The British Between the Superpowers*, recounts instances when the Foreign Office and later the Defence Chiefs put forward plans for waging the Cold War as a highly ideological anti-communist crusade on all fronts; Bevin apparently was unimpressed (47, 177-78). On the struggle between the leadership and dissidents within the party see M.R. Gordon, *Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy*, (Stanford 1969), p. 102-64; Harrison, p. 217-8; D. Howell, *British Social Democracy*, (London 1976), p. 140-159; D. Coates, *The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism*, (London 1975), p. 68-9.

40. Miliband, *op. cit.*, p. 306; Jones, *Ibid.*, p. 183, 202-5; R.J. Jackson, *Rebels and Whips*, (London 1968), p. 65-71, 203-11.
41. Miliband, *Ibid.*, p. 312-3, 329-36; Howell, p. 187-90; Childs, p. 63-64.
42. Hinton, p. 174-5; Miliband, *op. cit.*, p. 306; Jones, p. 216. Colin Leys notes another long term legacy of anti-communism. The Labour Party adopted a blanket opposition to the political use of industrial action which the Communists advocated after 1947. This greatly strengthened the parliamentarism of Labour. *Politics in Britain*, (Toronto 1983), p. 182.
43. Pelling, *op. cit.*, p. 161-2.
44. L. Chester, S. Fay and H. Young, *The Zinoviev Letter*, (London 1967). H.G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950*, (London 1951), p. 222; D.E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1951*, (London 1952), p. 120-21, 199.
45. Gordon, p. 151-2; Northedge and Wells, p. 125-9; R.B. McCallum and A. Readman, *The British General Election of 1945*, (London 1947), p. 142-9.
46. Andrew Gamble, *The Conservative Nation*, (London 1974), ch. 3; Miliband, *Parliamentary Socialism*, p. 308-9; Leon Epstein, *Britain-Uneasy Ally*, (Chicago 1954), p. 182-3; Henry Pelling, *America and the British Left*, (London 1956), p. 153-4; Nicholas, p. 90; Bunyan, p. 166-7; Williams, p. 172-9.
47. Dennis Phillips, *Cold War Two and Australia*, (Sydney 1983), p. 31-2.
48. Gollan, *Revolutionaries and Reformists*, (Canberra 1975), p. 206.
49. R.W. Connell and T.H. Irving, *Class Structure in Australian History*, (1980), ch. 5; Gollan, p. 214-222; Nixon Apple, 'The rise and fall of full employment capitalism', in *Studies in Political Economy* 4, (Autumn 1980), p. 17-8.
50. Gollan, p. 244-8; Kylie Tennant, *Evatt: Politics and Justice*, (Sydney 1970), p. 248-53; Alastair Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia*, (Stanford 1969), p. 108-10; Enid Campbell and Harry Whitmore, *Freedom in Australia*, (Sydney 1973), p. 327. A maverick ALP anti-communist crusader in Parliament, Jack Lang, combined anti-semitism, isolationism, and opposition to immigration with Red scare hysteria, asserting for instance that the arrival of Jewish refugees from Europe was a plot by the Communist International to dump its agents in Australia. Noting that anti-communism drew on 'indirectly related attitudes, prejudices and fears' typical of the labour movement, one writer rather perversely suggests that Labour's pre-emption of the issue 'occurred too slowly and too reticently': John Iremonger, 'Cold War Warrior' in Heather Radi and Peter Spearritt, eds., *Jack Lang*, (Neutral Bay NSW 1977), p. 227.
51. Gollan, *Ibid.*, p. 178, 152; Davidson, *ibid.*, p. 110-11.
52. Brian Fitzpatrick, *The Australian Commonwealth*, (Melbourne 1956), p. 236-8; Richard Hall, *The Secret State*, (197), p. 41; Davidson, p. 107-8.
53. Phillips, p. 3941; Hall, p. 50; Leicester Webb, *Communism and Democracy in Australia*, (Melbourne 1954).

54. Webb, p. 127-56, 178-85.
55. Nicholas Whitlam and John Stubbs, *Nest of Traitors*, (Brisbane 1974), p. 13-28; Hall, p. 42-57; Desmond Ball, *A Suitable Piece of Real Estate*, (Sydney 1980). ASIO was given formal legal basis in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act of 1956, which defines 'security' as the 'protection of the Commonwealth and the Territories of the Commonwealth from acts of espionage, sabotage, or subversion, whether directed from or intended to be committed, within the Commonwealth or not': Campbell and Whitmore, p. 334.
56. Phillips, p. 38; Hall, p. 58-64; Campbell and Whitmore, p. 337-8.
57. Fitzpatrick, p. 126-7; Hall, p. 67. Information on Australian passport controls was found in diplomatic dispatches of the Canadian High Commission in Australia: Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Privy Council Office Records 1952, file C-22-1.
58. Hall, p. 45; Davidson, p. 104-6; Gollan, p. 260-78.
59. Whitlam and Stubbs, p. 94, 168 and *passim*. Hall suggests that the Petrov Affair was a 'watershed' in relations between Labor and ASIO; Labor believed that ASIO had at best 'connived' with Menzies, and at worst 'conspired to rig documents'—in any event, relations were henceforth adversarial. (50). On Evatt's role see Tennant, *Evatt*.
60. Davidson, p. 126; K.S. Inglis, 'The Australian Catholic Community' in Henry Mayer, ed., *Catholics and the Free Society*, (Melbourne 1961), p. 8; R.N. Spann, 'The Catholic Vote in Australia' in *ibid.*, p. 117; Gollan, p. 174-5; Paul Ormonde, *The Movement*, (Melbourne 1972).
61. Robert Murray, *The Split*, (Melbourne 1970); D.W. Rawson, *Unions and Unionists in Australia*, (Sydney 1978), p. 80-122; P.L. Reynolds, *The Democratic Labor Party*, (Milton Queensland 1974); Louise Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society*, (Melbourne 1968); Ormonde, p. 66. Even during the referendum on Communist Dissolution, it was apparent that class and party could to an extent override the anti-communist ideology of Catholicism: in a poll on voting intentions Catholics split down the middle while other religious denominations showed majorities in favour of a 'yes' vote; on the other hand, Catholics voted in much higher numbers for the ALP in the 1949 and 1951 elections than they voted for the 'no' side in the referendum (Webb, p. 96-9). One factor which certainly slowed the progress of the Groupers in ousting Communists from union leadership was the simple fact that communist unionists were generally perceived by the rank and file as good militant trade unionists. Even the Victoria Royal Commission on Communism of 1949-50 was forced to conclude that 'where strikes have occurred under communist leadership or influence, the purpose has been really, in the first place, to gain the advantages sought in the men's demands' (quoted in Gollan, p. 257). Catholic ideology could go only so far in the face of this.
62. See for instance Don Page and Don Munton, 'Canadian images of the Cold War 1946-47' in *International Journal* 33, (Summer 1977).
63. Merrily Weisbord, *The Strangest Dream*, (Toronto 1973) contains many interesting interviews with the Communists implicated in the affair.
64. The Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate Certain Facts, etc. (Ottawa 1946); Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, eds., *The Gouzenko Transcripts*, (1982). *I am* still in the process of trying to have certain key documents in the case declassified, almost forty years later.
65. The Gouzenko reference is to reports on interviews with Gouzenko in 1945-46 recently released from the Department of External Affairs under the Access to Information Act.
66. Reg Whitaker, 'Origins of the Canadian government's internal security system

- 1946-1952', in *Canadian Historical Review* 65:2 (1984).
67. Whitaker, 'Origins', p. 171-3.
 68. Documents relating to Great Lakes security were found in the records of the Privy Council Office and the Department of Transport and Labour, Public Archives of Canada.
 69. Information based mainly on documents from the records of the Departments of Immigration, Labour and the Privy Council Office.
 70. Social democratic politicians and right-wing trade unionists sometimes quietly supported the state's intervention against communist trade union organisers through immigration controls.
 71. American consular and embassy correspondence, Department of State records, US National Archives. On the RCMP in general, see John Sawatsky, *Men in the Shadows*, (Toronto 1980), and *For Services Rendered*, (Toronto 1982).
 72. This includes the prosecution of radicals under the draconian section 98 of the Criminal Code in the 1930s, mass deportations of radicals and labour organisers in the same decade, and the internments and police harrassment of Communists and other dissenters during World War II.
 73. See for example the furore which led to the McDonald Royal Commission on RCMP 'wrongdoing'.
 74. Stephen Endicott, *James G. Endicott: Rebel Out of China*, (Toronto 1980). I have also been given access to the Endicott Papers by Dr. Endicott, which include much material on the Peace Congress.
 75. Irving Abella, *Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour*, (Toronto 1973).
 76. TLC material based on research by Gary Marcuse for our joint study of the Cold War in Canada (see note 2, above).
 77. Norman is the subject of Roger Bowen's forthcoming *E.H. Norman, His Life and Scholarship*, (Toronto 1984).