

ANTI-COMMUNISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

William D. Graf

Anti-communism is the most powerful political force in the world. Endowed with an imposing ideology, and a set of vivid images and sacred dogmas, it commands the psychic and material resources of the most potent industrial-military arsenal in the history of mankind. Its forces are deployed on every continent, its influence is felt in every major region, and it is capable of acts which—when ascribed to the communists—are considered violent and venal. Our fear that communism might someday take over most of the world blinds us to the fact that anti-communism already has.

—Michael Parenti¹

The Communists at least talk about the problems. We too often just talk about the Communists.

—Richard Nixon²

It is scarcely an exaggeration to state that the ideological foundation of the West German partial state has been, and is anti-communism. Although anti-communism in the FRG performs substantially the same social functions as it does in advanced capitalist countries elsewhere—ersatz ideology, social discipline, rationale for class domination—the special conditions prevailing there since 1945 have formed and developed it in specific, distinguishable ways. And like the other elements of class domination, it is dynamic, evolving and hence constantly being reproduced and transformed. It is these special conditions and this dynamic quality (which for now might be summed up as the post-fascist society, the country's position as 'front line' in the Cold War, the 'internalization' of class conflict and the 'successful' capitalist political economy) that lend West German anti-communism its peculiar shape and substance. In what follows, an attempt is made to analyse and comprehend both the 'specificity' and the 'universality' of anti-communism in the FRG.³

The context of West German anti-communism

Total defeat following upon total war, devastation and destitution, and four-power occupation produced, in the weeks and months after the capitulation of the Third Reich, a peculiar constellation of forces in Germany which seemed to point to rapid socio-economic change, if not to a *pre-revolutionary situation*. Subjectively, there now developed a popular anti-fascist and hence anti-capitalist mood which penetrated deeply even into the bourgeois classes⁴ and which was based on a realisation that the

former ruling classes and the pre-war socio-economic system had produced—or at least failed to anticipate, to resist—fascism and war. And objectively, the class power of the National Socialist elite and its class allies had been diminished—temporarily and by outside military power, to be sure. The power of the Junker elites in the East was finally broken by the incorporation of much of their territory into Poland and the Soviet Union and the expropriation and redistribution of their lands in the Soviet occupation zone. Business elites, the captains of industry and finance, found their assets sequestered and their leading members imprisoned. With the collapse of the Nazi state, the judiciary and civil service, to say nothing of the government, were deprived of any institutional power base. And more generally, perhaps two-thirds of the former middle classes had been (again temporarily) proletarianised economically⁵ and their ranks were swollen by an influx of *declassé* refugees and expellees from the East.⁶

Although the popular mood of this period was at least as much one of shock, bewilderment and apathy as of political *engagement*,⁷ and although a mass socialist consciousness had not been developed by a preceding period of galvanising anti-Nazi struggles—a situation reminiscent of the 'ersatz revolution' of 1918—nevertheless the overwhelming majority of politically aware and politically active Germans did advocate a socialist reordering of society and economy. Practically all public discourse, including party programmes and pronouncements, major issues of contention between Germans and occupiers, constitutional debates and the substantial themes in the communications media (though these were subject to direct Allied control until 1947), revolved around proposals for expropriation, socialisation and communal ownership coupled with the protection and extension of civil liberties.

This tendency toward *democratic socialism* was best exemplified by the unified anti-fascist movement (or *antifa*), a popular, left-wing organisation which arose spontaneously at the local level in all four zones of occupation. The *antifa* movement was significant for a number of reasons, all of which bear directly on the subsequent development of anti-communist ideology in the FRG. First, it derived its leadership and mass support from the anti-Nazi *elite*,⁸ a category encompassing mainly the Left: leftist Social Democrats, communists, members of radical socialist organisations and trade unionists, including returning exiles and former concentration camp inmates, who had been early and consistent opponents of the Third Reich.⁹ Second, its central programmatic tenet was the unification of the socialist movement to overcome the old controversy between 'democratic socialism' and 'proletarian dictatorship' that had prevented the KPD and SPD from establishing a common anti-fascist front during the Weimar Republic.¹⁰ Third, its ideology was uncompromisingly and irreducibly democratic socialist, with neither of these principles realisable

in isolation from the other; not merely politics but society and economy as well would be the objects of democratisation and **socialisation**.¹¹ And fourth, the **antifas** not only championed radical socialist programmes such as the nationalisation of mines, banks, big industries and other key economic sectors,¹² they also began to effect concrete socialist measures like the formation of *Aktionsgemeinschaften* of SPD and KPD members in many centres, occupation of plants belonging to war criminals, cessation of arms-related production, etc.¹³

This mass indigenous movement toward democratic socialism represented a threat to all four occupation powers who in April (in the Western zones) and May (in the Soviet zone) 1945, banned it. In the Soviet case, the main reasons for suppressing the **antifas** were probably tactical: to enhance the relative strength (and therefore bargaining power) of the KPD before allowing it to merge into a unified socialist party.¹⁴ But in the Western zones—which, under American domination (Marshall Plan aid, relief and rehabilitation of allied countries), would shortly be incorporated into an anti-Soviet Trizone—the threat posed by the **antifa** movement was of a much more fundamental kind. From the perspective of maintaining and reinvigorating the world capitalist system, 'containing'—and later 'rolling back'—communism on an international scale, and asserting the US arrival as a world power and defender of liberal democracy, the anti-capitalist orientation of the anti-fascist groups was positively dysfunctional. From the outset, American policy was guided by an 'anti-communist impulse' (Parenti) which lay at the centre of the 'range of interests' posited by John Gimbel:

Besides wanting to denazify, demilitarize, decartelize, democratize and reorient Germans and Germany, Americans were also interested in seeing to their own security, bringing about the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Europe, and guaranteeing the continuance of free enterprise. They wanted to frustrate socialism, to forestall Communism, to spare American taxpayers' money, to counteract French plans to dismember Germany, and to contain the Soviet Union in Central Europe.¹⁵

Thus US Directive JCS 1067 imposed a quarantine on all political activities in the Western zone and dissolved the **antifas**, prohibited political parties, rejected *Land* constitutional provisions calling for socialisation of key economic sectors and suspended trade union activities including proposals for worker co-determination. When parties and trade unions were readmitted several months later, they were officially licenced and regrouped along pre-1933 party lines, and their leaders appointed by military government at first from the non-Nazi (as well as, in some measure, the non-socialist) elite groups, but as the Cold War intensified, increasingly from among former NSDAP members and others prominent in the Third Reich.

Hence a substantial proportion of the leaders chosen to guide the 'New Germany' were in orientation and outlook much like the pre-war elites. Ideological vindication for this dual process of *restoration* of pre-war elites and *renazification* was also furnished by JCS 1067, which advanced the thesis of collective guilt, an undifferentiated concept that held the entire German people responsible for the crimes and aberrations committed 'in the name of the people' by the ruling classes of the Third Reich. Like its counterpart, 'the sole responsibility of Hitler' (which would be invoked by the restored German elites), this thesis had the effect of exonerating those individuals and classes who had in fact actively collaborated in the Nazi seizure of power and were involved in the formulation and execution of their policies.

Through the interstices of the collective guilt edifice, all but the most flagrant and brutal elites of the Third Reich, in the judiciary, state bureaucracy, educational system, military and, not least of all, business entered into the elite structure of the Second Republic: almost all the representatives of big business labelled as war criminals by the American Kilgore Commission in 1945 were back in their former positions by 1948; and of roughly 53,000 civil servants dismissed on account of their Nazi pasts after 1945, only about 1,000 remained permanently excluded, while the judiciary was almost 100 per cent restored as early as 1946.¹⁶

Their presence of course contributed, and was intended to contribute to the 'economic offensive' needed to wage the Cold War. Restored capitalism, with its ideologically tenuous anti-communism and its objective need to forestall the imminent 'historical turn' in the FRG, required quick and tangible results in the form of economic improvement. This in turn necessitated the abandonment of the economic conditions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, just as renazification signified the negation of its political provisions. Thus (token) decartelisation measures and reparations were halted and replaced by currency reform and Marshall Plan aid. Not only did this policy effectively consign to East Germany the burden of reparations for all Germany—since the devastated Soviet Union, as the chief victim of Nazi aggression, was bent upon exacting the reparations assigned to it by the Potsdam accords—but the shedding of the relatively underdeveloped agrarian areas in the East amounted to a gain for the now more export-oriented West German economy: 'as soon as [West] Germany could find the exports with which to pay for substitute imports of food, she stood to gain by the switch.'" A grossly undervalued Deutschmark, a reservoir of cheap mobile labour furnished by the mass of unemployed and refugees from the East, and the massive tasks of reconstruction which absorbed total productive capacities completed the formula of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. Without prior socio-economic change, of course, the beneficiaries of post-war economic recovery and development would have to be the restored elites.

Herein lies the source of yet another apologetic myth, namely that German leaders in the post-war period somehow surmounted 'the burden of the past' and 'ideological barriers'; they 'did not agonize over questions of collective guilt, overcoming the past, or the Weimar tradition, but got right to work on building the new state'.¹⁸ Naturally. All this was accomplished on *their behalf* by the Western military governments and rationalised by the 'exigencies of the Cold War' as well as the need to 'contain' the 'communist menace'.

Thus, the context of West German anti-communism was in considerable measure co-determined by Allied, particularly American, foreign policy. Military government's initial role was basically passive: to delay popular reforms until 'normal' conditions could be restored. With the intensification of the Cold War, Allied policy was increasingly based on active interventionism which ranged from military threats to restoration and renazification in the unified Western zone.¹⁹ The anti-communist orientation of American policy developed into a multi-front offensive that would involve the subordination of the German people's interests in practically every sphere of social interaction. Militarily, it would require a degree of militancy and willingness to sacrifice on the part of a war-weary population. Politically, it would mean the repression of the pervasive social democratic tendencies and compulsory adherence to a formally liberal democratic system underpinned by a restored capitalist economy. Economically, it appeared to jeopardise the reconstruction and rebuilding programme—though the ensuing *Wirtschaftswunder* and remilitarisation helped to assuage this reservation. Socially, it would mean in essence the reestablishment of class domination despite the new spirit of egalitarianism. And in terms of foreign policy, the anti-communist offensive, given Germany's strategic location and the East-West constellation of interests, would produce national division.

To make this comprehensive violation of (West) German interests palatable, a powerful legitimating and vindicating ideological conception was required. Here anti-communism presented itself as ideally suited to American goals in particular. For it was sufficient merely to 'translate' an already well-developed and proven doctrine into the German idiom; local socio-economic conditions and newly re-emerging interests would provide its direction and momentum. Not surprisingly, therefore, 're-education for democracy', facilitated by military government monopoly over curriculum content, the mass media and all political and social organisations, very quickly became re-education in the spirit of **anti-communism**.²⁰

American appeals to freedom and democracy in the name of militant anti-communism of course corresponded with certain concrete fears and longings abundantly present in post-war Germany. Even prior to the capitulation, the German masses who, on hearing the Allied demand for

total surrender, had feared the worst, and who had certainly been at least vaguely aware of the Nazis' crimes against humanity—as witnesses to the brutal round-up of Jews and other 'undesirables', through rumours of genocide, daily contact with forced labourers, etc.—had supported the war effort to the very end. Anti-communism provided a point of common cause with the Western victors and hence, even at this late date, a means of avoiding being called to account for their complicity. Moreover, the Soviet Union—against whom many of the Nazi war crimes had been perpetrated—was actively engaged, as already mentioned, in realising the provisions of the Potsdam agreements, including *inter alia* the fixing of Germany's Eastern boundary at the Oder-Neisse Line, the exaction of reparations, comprehensive dismantlings and the like. Refugees and expellees arriving by their thousands in the Western zones brought with them a variety of resentments and horror stories. An anti-communist alliance with the Western powers thus appeared vastly preferable to having to undergo an accounting for the destruction wrought by the Third Reich.

In any case, anti-communism—unlike, say, liberal rights or even social rights—was already firmly imbedded in German popular thought. It was merely an extension of traditional anti-social democratism which had been pursued, during the Second Reich, with equally traditional German methods: censorship, persecution, political ban and *Berufsverbot*.²¹ And during the Third Reich, anti-communism was of course an integral part of the total Weltanschauung of racism and *Volksgemeinschaft*; indeed it could be argued that anti-communism represented the essential *raison d'être* of National Socialism.²² Thus, the German people after 1945, subject to the trauma of a (second) lost war accompanied by the unambiguous realisation of total defeat and shared responsibility, conditioned by twelve years of Nazi propaganda under the control of the SS State, and encumbered by an awareness of their complicity in all this, seized the ideological rope of anti-communism extended to them by the Western occupation powers who for their part needed a capitalist, liberal-democratic and anti-communist (West) Germany to complete their new international economic order.

Christian democracy and clerical anti-communism

But here again, a one-sided reading of the role of Western intervention in West Germany can too readily be used to coin a further apology based on the notion of the 'omnipotence of the occupation authorities' which sees Germany as the 'helpless object' of four-power policies²³ or asserts that the occupation relieved the German people of the 'last direct responsibility' for political developments.²⁴ No doubt, as Rolf Badstubner argues, the presence and intervention of the occupation powers were 'indispensable pre-requisites' to and a 'condition of the success' of the restoration of

capitalism and with it the success of anti-communism. But:

If the [imperialist bourgeoisie] had not been successful in recreating, through its policies, a mass political base for its political line. . . , then the bayonets of the imperialist occupation powers, however numerous, could not have prevented the historical turn in all Germany for any length of time.²⁵

It would be simplistic and rather misleading, however, to regard West German Christian Democracy—the *Christlich-Demokratische Union* or CDU in the North and Southwest, the *Christlich-Soziale Union* or CSU in Bavaria—as a mere agent of the military governments in the Trizone and of the USA in the FRG. True, the Christian Democratic parties, at the head of a bourgeois party coalition, proved most capable of operating within the parameters set by the occupation powers (including militant anti-communism). But the Union was also able to extend and improvise upon the given limitations to transform the West German partial state into one of the leading anti-communist advanced capitalist countries in Europe, and to place its own stamp on it.

In the 1945-1949 period, no political party aspiring to mass support could dispense with a socialist programme. By the same token, every party seeking to derive that mass support from popular elections had to be licenced by the military government and thus had to function within the liberal democratic rules of the game. Not only did this situation preclude a unification of the labour movement, as has been shown, it also prevented any reversion to undemocratic beliefs or practices on the right—with the singular exception of anti-communism. Since capitalism was for the moment utterly discredited, the conservative forces needed other ideological rallying points with which to 'begin again'. Here Christianity presented itself as both amenable to the occupying powers and conducive to 'moderating' and mitigating the radical-socialist programmes of the SPD and KPD.

The surviving churches provided an institutional anchor for Christian Democracy. For, despite their strong involvement in the old authoritarian state as well as in the Third Reich,²⁶ because they had co-existed with the Nazi regime and indeed, had benefited from it for so long—the well-publicised struggles between church and state had not developed until very late in the Third Reich—they were relatively prosperous and intact in 1945 and surrounded by an aura of anti-fascism which then enabled them to exert a disproportionate influence on politics and society. Their pronounced pre-political appeal and anti-socialist tradition were essential latent qualifiers of such initially necessary CDU/CSU political statements as the 1947 Ahlen Programme which, among other things, demanded the abolition of the capitalist system and championed 'a new social and economic order'. ••

Christian Democracy, formulated in this period as 'Christian Socialism', represented the provisional ideological foundation of West German conservatism—until it could be replaced by clerical anti-communism, as will be discussed presently. Like much else about the CDU/CSU, the party was no mere updated version of, say, the old Centre Party based on Catholicism. Rather, it was supra-denominational and, in religious matters, entirely undogmatic. Indeed, more than any other West German party, it was a product of its time and conditions. The negative precedent of the fragmentation of the bourgeois camp during the Weimar Republic, the strong apolitical-authoritarian tradition of modern German history and the success of the NSDAP in attracting support from all social classes—albeit disproportionately from the middle classes—surely played an important role in the establishment of the CDU/CSU.

Ideologically, apart from anti-communism and the free West, the party has never committed itself to a single consistent and logical programme after Ahlen, but instead has confined its pronouncements to generalised slogans and adapted its platforms to suit changing socio-economic conditions. In this way, it has managed to gain mass support from all classes: at election time roughly all occupational and income groups vote in more or less equal proportions for the party. In other words, the CDU/CSU, the Volkspartei par excellence, 'plays a mediating and integrating role between the social partners which is hardly different from the state itself.'* In fact, the coalition sustaining the CDU/CSU has been basically the same as that upon which the Third Reich relied; the difference is that while the latter resorted to enforced 'coordination' of these groups, the former has been able to 'pluralise' them into a paternal conservatism. Dynamic, adaptive, capable of concessions to its 'labour wing' and other distinct social minorities, not predisposed against limited reforms, the CDU/CSU was the first 'aggregate' or 'conglomerate' party in post-war politics in the FRG. And what it, like other modern conservative parties, 'really "aggregates" are the different interests of the dominant classes.'²⁹

Consequently, the CDU/CSU has been able to present itself as reformist, progressive, representative of the general will, religious, modern, above-party, anti-communist, or whatever the exigencies of the current situation demanded; and this it could do with some justification, for it was simultaneously all and—with the exception of anti-communist—none of these.

From this mass basis and these ideological propensities, and given the system-immanent function of Christian Democracy, the consolidating dominant classes were able to forge the CDU State³⁰ as the chief instrument of West German anti-communism. This state had several dimensions. Politically, a strong state was necessary to guide popular opinion away from the prevalent anti-capitalist mood and to contain opposition to the new course. In contrast to the 'dual executive' of the

Weimar Republic, the new government structures provided for a strong executive and entrenched it by immunising it from popular pressures (e.g. 'Five Per Cent Clause' to restrict parliamentary representation of new parties, exclusion of plebiscites and referenda, 'constructive vote of non-confidence' to replace the executive). The socio-economic dimension meant, more than anything else, the *Wirtschaftswunder* whose very successes were tangible reinforcements of the 'free market economy' and 'social partnership' proclaimed by the CDU/CSU. The rapid return to pre-eminence of the business classes, their close collaboration with the CDU State, and the extreme income disparities which the 'miracle' produced served to further the process of restoration and renazification begun under military government.

Thus pending reforms in education, social services, 'morality laws' (abortion, equal rights for illegitimate children, etc.) were deferred or removed from the political agenda, at least partly under pressure from the churches' 'moderating influences'. Thus too, the return of former Nazis to prominent positions in public life: Dr Hans Globke, Adenauer's State Secretary in the Chancellery and close confidant, had not only helped to write the authoritative commentary to the Nuremberg Race Laws, but had been instrumental in drafting these laws in the first place. Indeed, Adenauer's first cabinets were permeated with ex-Nazis: Theodor Oberlander, Minister of Refugees; Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of the Interior; Hans-Christoph Seebohm, Minister of Transportation—a full one-third of Adenauer's first cabinet in all. Many more former National Socialists were absorbed by the diplomatic service, the judiciary (as already discussed), the *Länder* governments, the *Bundeswehr*, at the top levels of business and government service and the educational system.³¹ Therefore, in Professor Kiihnl's words, since

. . . important positions of leadership are in the hands of groups who consorted with fascism, who profited from fascism and were intellectually affected by it, it is not surprising that authoritarian and fascist tendencies are at work here in a variety of forms.³²

Nor is it surprising that during the 1960s even the highest representatives of the Federal Republic, President Lubke and Chancellor Kiesinger, were both nominated by 'groups who had had important functions in the fascist period',³³ and had themselves been closely associated with National Socialism, Kiesinger as party member and functionary in Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry and Lubke as builder and alleged (but not definitively proven) constructor of concentration camps.

And finally, the supra-national dimensions of the CDU State are a crucial factor in explaining the nature of West German anti-communism. For, established on the foundation of an aggressive anti-communist policy,

the Western partial state in a sense owed its continued existence to its ability to function as a bulwark against communism. This involved several things. The issue of rearming the Federal Republic first came up in late 1947, in connection with the policy of containment, and gained further impetus with the outbreak of the Korean War. But due to popular opposition, no headway was made until 1955 and 1956 when a series of laws was promulgated providing for voluntary military service, production of war materials and universal conscription. Just as the *Wirtschaftswunder* restored much of the lost prestige of business, so rearmament helped immensely to make the military more respectable again, and encouraged even more active German identification with the 'policy of strength' and the 'rollback of communism'. Moreover, defence spending, as a form of public expenditure without redistribution, tends to produce economic growth favouring the status quo, thus sealing class interaction between business and military elites.

Rearmament also served to harden the front lines of the Cold War and encourage the GDR to remilitarise as well. If until 1956 there had been any prospect for reunification, the rearming of the FRG meant that henceforth national unity could only be achieved by an act of war. Western integration merely reinforced this situation. West German entry into NATO, its membership in the EDC, the OECD, the Customs Union, the ECM, the Council of Europe, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—these were all stages toward comprehensive political, economic, social and military interdependence, each another reinforcement of the Cold War and a de facto move away from the officially proclaimed goal of national reunification. The trade-off for West German subordination to the interests of 'the West' was the final return of political sovereignty, a sovereignty which Ekkehard Krippendorff describes as having been attained '... by means of the most complete and comprehensive "integration" imaginable for any country in recent history (with only the GDR as its logical counterpart)'.²⁴

This (necessarily rather lengthy) analysis of the CDU State in its several dimensions reveals several crucial ideological compulsions built into Christian Democracy's structure of domination. At its very core, CDU CSU policy was profoundly irrational. It aspired to be nationalist even as it anchored 'its' partial state in the Western alliance. It proclaimed peace while entering into an anti-communist military alliance expressly aimed at revising the post-war status quo in Middle Europe. It presented an image of security and continuity even while precluding any realistic security for a generation or more. Its image of conciliator and aggregator was palpably belied by its restoration of class domination and its preference for business interests.

These contradictions and social antagonisms could only be mediated by strong, socially effective ideological tenets which, paradoxically, would

have to be put across in the guise of 'apolitical' truths acceptable to broad sectors and classes⁵—a loose conglomeration of popular resentments, apprehensions and generalised, ritualised beliefs. These ideological elements would have to be asserted in a militant, aggressive form and removed from susceptibility to criticism in proportion to their basic irrationality,³⁶ not at all unlike the crusader quality of American anti-communism.

What was distinctive about the prevailing ideology of the CDU State can thus be summed up in the formula, *clerical anti-communism*: a combination of politicised religious notions which enter into and shape the dominant ideology to an extent unique among advanced capitalist countries, and an intensive, irrational anti-communism (but with a very rational social function) comparable in style and substance to American McCarthyism—with the important difference that the West German anti-communists were not attempting to expose or undermine the government; they were part of it.

But before considering the import of clerical anti-communism, it is worth recalling that anti-communism in the FRG, in the immediate post-war period, did at least have a rational basis. There existed well grounded reasons for criticism of Soviet policy in occupied Germany as well as the strategy, tactics and beliefs of the KPD and, after February 1946, the SED in the Soviet zone. This point will be developed further in the following section. So long as the other parties—including the Christian Democrats—offered alternative proposals and programmes, the level of inter-party debate was comparatively objective. But with the intensification of the Cold War in 1947 and the establishment of the Western fragment state in 1949, the quality of West German anti-communism, nurtured and fostered by the CDU/CSU, became increasingly emotive and irrational, reaching its apogee in the 1950s. It is argued here that this irrationalisation of anti-communism can be traced to both the *premises* and *social functions* of Christian Democracy.

Concerning these premises, the clerical basis of Christian Democracy, sustained by the relative pre-eminence of the churches already alluded to, in many respects merely revived the old notion of the 'struggle for the West' against the 'anti-Christian' forces at work in communism and socialism. For example, the idea of a 'decisive battle' between the 'Christian West' and 'Asiatic Bolshevism' has always been an integral part of the churches' political Weltanschauung. This fixation on 'the West' functioned in part as an ersatz nationalism in the CDU State, a kind of consolation for the national unity that had to be sacrificed to restore capitalism and maintain class domination; whereas rational internationalism would have had an exiguous mass appeal, a cultural-religious invocation of *das Abendland*, Christianity, etc. provided a regressive substitute.

Even when the churches have not actively propagated expressly anti-

communist ideas or emotional appeals, the basic ideological predisposition which they have helped to produce has frequently lent itself to application by professional anti-communists. Let one example stand for many: when rightist circles began calling for atomic weapons in 1956, they declared, among other things, that the choice for the atom bomb was more than a military decision, that it was also a Christian decision; the soldiers supporting the policy were said to 'believe that the destruction of physical existence is little against the ravage of the soul and conscience by an absolute ideology. They have already learned how dead one can be while one's body is still *alive*'.³⁷ Statements such as these were almost never challenged by the churches; on the contrary, they were the stuff of 'pastoral letters', sermons and the like.

And concerning the social functions of anti-communism, the conversion of West Germany into an extension and instrument of American (anti-communist) foreign policy also necessitated the production of a corresponding mythology. The 'theory' of totalitarianism performed this necessary function with remarkable economy and efficiency and, like much else about Cold War ideology in the FRG, was preformulated and pretested by the major occupation power. In its cruder initial form, the concept of totalitarianism rested on a simplistic notion—first advanced by George Kennan in an influential article in *Foreign Affairs*—of the 'Russian national character' as aggressive and expansionist, thus inevitably leading to 'Soviet imperialism' which the West was bound to resist. By 1949, the thesis was further refined by a joint study group, called together by the American Departments of State and Defense whose mandate was to analyse the implications of Soviet possession of atomic weapons. The results of its deliberations, National Security Council Paper NSC-68, argued that totalitarianism practised domestically in the Soviet Union leads to expansionism abroad. The Soviets, unable to tolerate the existence of free societies elsewhere (which by their very being would undermine Soviet stability), were bound to conquer and subordinate the rest of the world. Hence, 'diplomacy with the Soviet Union was out of the question because they could never choose—their internal character would drive them to expand *everywhere*'.³⁸ This view, typically, resonated through official West German thinking throughout the fifties. Returning from a visit to Moscow in 1955, for example, Konrad Adenauer declared:

I learned at first hand that the Kremlin leaders are firmly convinced that Communism under Moscow leadership will one day rule the world. And . . . although I only travelled a few kilometers through the country, I could see on the faces of the men I met that they had lost their souls. People in Russia can no longer laugh or cry. They are without souls. Such a regime, I am more than ever convinced, is fatal to mankind.³⁹

Indeed. Adenauer himself was at the forefront of the anti-communist

vanguard. For him, 'the issue is whether Europe will remain Christian or whether it will go heathen'; therefore 'God has endowed Germany with the task of saving Western Europe and Western Christianity'.⁴⁰

Totalitarianism, in its later sophisticated versions, 'successfully'—meaning in terms of its mass effectiveness—posited an identity between fascism and communism and in this way was able to transfer existing popular feelings of anti-Nazism, revulsion at the scope of war crimes and genocide, and other negative attitudes towards the just-defeated enemy onto the newly emerging 'rival' for global influence and hegemony. In order to do so, not only did Stalinism have to be styled as communism per se, but the very different starting points, mass bases, social functions and goals of communism and fascism had to be ignored or downplayed⁴¹ while certain temporal, external similarities (purges, single ideology, monopoly over the media and means of coercion, etc.) was absolutised and essentialised, and posited as the 'basic nature' of the two systems.⁴² Above all other things, a fundamental antagonism was proclaimed between 'freedom', attainable alone in and through liberal democracy, on the one hand, and 'totalitarian bondage' on the other. The inference is evident: the real line of social choice was said to run between 'liberalism' and 'dictatorship' rather than between social interests and/or social classes. Even as the ideological phenomenon of totalitarianism addressed a deep and justified post-war longing for democratisation and participation, therefore, it negated the socio-economic reforms which would have been pre-requisite to any meaningful exercise of liberal rights and the concretisation of abstract 'freedom'.

The theory of totalitarianism corresponds with the 'totalisation' of the communist 'enemy' into the source and bearer of all evil, the agent of sinister forces and the embodiment of every conceivable negative attribute—entirely analogous to the role of the Jew in National Socialist ideology. The exaggeration of the 'bolshevist threat' or the 'world communist conspiracy' onto a comprehensive emotional plane, beyond the bounds of normal credibility, transformed ideological anti-communism into an article of faith, subject to examination only in terms of total acceptance and commitment—or rejection and thus exclusion from practically every facet of social life. This exclusive quality of anti-communism helps to account for its near-total hegemony, since 'the most powerful ideologies are not those which prevail against all challengers, but those which are never challenged because in their ubiquity they appear more like "the nature of things"'.⁴³

How was it possible then, for this 'totalised' or 'reified' anti-communism to emerge so rapidly and thoroughly in less than half a decade? In addition to mass complicity in the excesses of the Third Reich and a general fear of the Soviets' desire to settle accounts, as well as the anti-socialist aspects of the German political culture, already mentioned, post-war anti-

communism was in part 'successful' as a result of conscious manipulation by the groups who stood to gain from its acceptance: the elites in government, business, the state bureaucracy including the military, and former Nazis at all levels of society. This has already been alluded to in terms of the legitimisation of the Bonn Republic. Indeed, 'official' communist accounts of anti-communism persist in viewing the phenomenon almost exclusively in terms of a conspiracy by the 'most aggressive groups of the imperialist bourgeoisie' who further it by means of 'resurrecting the most reactionary philosophical, ideological and political conceptions'.⁴⁴ Although this partial interpretation by and large holds, it fails by itself to account for all the dimensions of the syndrome, namely its mass support and its special appeal. Nevertheless, it can be established, e.g., that the major representatives of West German business, the BDI (League of German Industry) and BDA (Association of German Employers), have consistently been a leading force in the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda. While styling business as the creator and maintainer of the 'liberal market economy' and thus of freedom and democracy as such (and at the same time promoting renazification and restoration, and tenaciously opposing the extension of democracy into the workplace), these associations have mounted an unprecedented anti-communist offensive using the substantial resources available to them. Hence,

. . . the invocation of the communist peril assumes such a prominent place in the ideologies of the employers' associations because it fulfils two functions at once: because it expresses an agreement with popular views and at the same time serves entrepreneurs' interests, or in short, because it provides universally accepted arguments for the promotion of particularist interests.⁴⁵

Similarly, West German rearmament and renascent militarism, and the huge expenditures of resources and energies they entailed, were rationalised by anti-communism. But once established, the national defence system developed its own ideological corollaries: siege mentality, war readiness, dependence on 'the West'. Whole networks of vested interests, from suppliers and contractors to banks, universities and conservative politicians in this way acquired an interest in the perpetuation of anti-communism.

The manipulative aspect of West German anti-communism is further underlined if one briefly considers its *main techniques and domestic functions*.

Apart from the 'ordinary' techniques of anti-communism as practised in most advanced capitalist countries—guilt by association, accusations of being objectively in agreement with communist designs, one-sided polemical defamation, criminalisation or threat of criminalisation, etc.⁴⁶—that of moral discrimination is particularly invidious. To be anti-communist is to be free, Christian, moral; to be 'soft' on communism is to be unfree,

atheistic, immoral. Framed in such terms, the dichotomy could not be subjected to rational discussion, since morals are absolutes. In practice, the technique could be made to work against any group or individual who did not support the anti-communism-induced social consensus.

For example, opponents of atomic armaments were accused of an over-riding opportunism in so far as they were said to hope that a coming victory of communism would bring them certain advantages. Furthermore, it was immoral to partake of economic prosperity and to attack it at the same time; if one was against the FRG's social order, then one ought to go live in the GDR. The—desired and intended—results of the application of such methods was a great pressure toward social conformity. Accusations of anti-communism needed only to be levelled, not supported; the onus of proof then automatically went over to the accused who, even if s/he could prove his/her innocence, was 'tainted' by the charge. Political proposals or policies were judged not according to their intrinsic merits but by the degree to which they were associated with communist objectives or by the number of 'Eastern contacts' which their proposers were said to have had.

The actual practice of clerical anti-communism, almost incidentally, infringed upon the liberal rights of freedom of information and expression, and upon the ideals of peace and coexistence which it was supposed to be upholding. Freedom tended to be defined negatively, in terms of the state's relationship to communism: the *defence* of 'freedom and democracy' became itself 'freedom'. Similarly, advocating peace and coexistence was equated with supporting communism. According to the extreme rightist *Rotbuch*, 'peace' for the communists meant world revolution, and hence those in the West desiring peace were 'fighters for the world revolution'.

From all this, it is now possible to infer the central domestic function of anti-communism, namely *social discipline*. Clerical anti-communism in the FRG fulfilled, and was intended to fulfil this specific task: what Reiche and Gang have termed the 'externalisation of the class struggle'⁴⁷ or, in the words of the late Werner Hofmann, 'the transposition of the vertical intra-societal conflicts onto the horizontal level'.⁴⁸ By means of involving a potent external enemy, actual domestic class conflict is transformed into an ostensibly international one. At the same time, this foreign enemy, who is attempting to sow dissension through its 'agents' in one's own free society, must be combatted with every means. In the US, this syndrome produced the concept of un-American activities. In the FRG it led to the *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* or the claim of the Western state to represent the German nation and the German 'essence'. 'Germany' is thus defined as the area where the traditional social order remains with its old values, norms and modes of behaviour, while 'the Zone' is where foreign powers rule through local agents. Implicitly, therefore, the latter has a

certain right or mandate to restore unity by 'liberating' the oppressed fragment and integrating it into its own just, authentic system.⁴⁹

This task of maintaining national integrity requires a massive effort to achieve a unity of purpose. It means, first, persevering with the status quo, since—according to the 'avalanche' myth popularised by the BDA—any social reform, however insignificant, might set off a whole chain of socio-economic change that could work to the advantage of the communists. Second, it means ruthlessly exposing and eliminating all threats to the enforced consensus: war-resisters, Easter Marchers, pacifists, critical intellectuals, mavericks in the established parties and, in particular, alleged communists. And thus, third, it means ideological cohesiveness or a predominant orthodoxy within the framework of which every individual or group is under compulsion to prove itself the best anti-communist; 'orthodoxy magnifies itself into monomania'.⁵⁰

To sum up, the import of this section on the forms, functions and significance of clerical anti-communism can be concretised with a brief discussion of the actual treatment by the CDU State of the German Communist Party.⁵¹

The KPD of the early 1950s, hampered by an excessive dependence on the GDR as well as being the focus of anti-communist sentiments and discrimination by official laws and government measures, found itself with a very limited mass following. On the other hand, it remained the consistent articulator of a number of popular interests which were not, or not adequately represented by, the major parties. Its continued advocacy of an anti-fascist, socialist front, its opposition to rearmament and atomic weapons, its resistance to authoritarian trends such as restrictions on free speech and emergency laws, and its demands for a greater measure of economic democracy were aims shared by members of a great range of groups, including neglected interests within the established parties. It was evident, in the climate of anti-communism just described, that to discredit or even criminalise the KPD would also be to reduce the appeal of all groups that shared any of its aims. During the first half of 1951, as the Federal Government continued its negotiations toward rearmament over growing opposition, the first legal persecution of communist organisations began, resulting in the banning of the Communist Youth Movement and the Union of Persons Persecuted by the Nazis. In September, decisive moves were made toward the incorporation of the FRG into the EDC, and within a week the government made a formal application for the banning of the party. When subsequently the question of a West German contribution to the European defence system was shelved, so too were proceedings against the KPD. When in 1954 the government moved again toward rearmament and membership in NATO, the trial against the KPD also resumed. In 1956, Adenauer articulated his 'policy of strength' and called for universal conscription; and about the same time repressive

measures were taken against a communist-sponsored organisation and several of its members made to stand trial for treason. As the popular St. Paul's Church movement against militarisation acquired mass support, the Federal Constitutional Court decreed the official suspension of the KPD.

The correspondence between the growth of opposition and the promulgation of anti-KPD measures may or may not have been as direct as their temporal sequence seems to suggest. But the ban did bring with it a number of implications for liberal democracy and its concomitant ideology, clerical anti-communism. First, after **1956**, KPD party functionaries and members were the victims of a wave of arrests, interrogations and trials. These applied not only to party members but also to their families, so-called substitute organisations and persons or groups suspected of sympathising with communist views. A comprehensive apparatus was developed to undertake surveillance of all these individuals and organisations. Third, the ban of the KPD was also an offensive against the broader socialist Left. Not only did it result in the suppression of criticism aimed at specific government policies (rearmament, Western integration), it virtually precluded any kind of criticism based on a questioning of the capitalist socio-economic order. If the KPD's programmes for socialism and peace were 'criminal', so too were by extension those of the SPD and DGB.

The KPD ban also rehabilitated and vindicated anew the military and bourgeois classes, and opened the way for all manner of traditionalist organisations, military clubs, and neo-Nazi associations. When the **1952** banning of the Social Reich Party, a neo-fascist formation, is cited as evidence that the Federal Government was impartially dealing with 'extremists' on both sides, then it must be recalled that, unlike the KPD, the SRP was permitted to develop successor organisations (e.g. former SS members' clubs, veterans associations) which were not subject to further persecution. And where former Nazis could join other political parties, the very presence of former communists in a party frequently meant that the party was designated as 'communist infiltrated' and therefore subject to legalised persecution and/or counterinsurgency measures.

Social Democratic anti-communism

In a sense, the SPD 'ought to have' been the predominant party in post-war Germany. Not only did it consistently reflect the popular current of the time, democratic socialism, and incorporate by far the majority of proven anti-Nazi individuals and groups from the pre-war era, it also—in a reunited Germany and free from Allied intervention—would have secured a majority in nation-wide elections. (In retrospect, one can only speculate about the extent to which this demographic fact contributed to the respective political elites' decisions to create separate states from out of

the Western and Eastern zones.) From this perspective, SPD party policies under Kurt Schumacher were logical and purposeful: reunification before external alliances ('national' socialism), relentless opposition to both occupation powers' attempts to intervene in German politics (national sovereignty and self-determination), indivisibility of socialism and democracy ('der Sozialismus wird demokratisch sein, oder *er* wird gar nicht sein!') and therefore no compromises with either 'communist authoritarianism' or 'capitalist reaction' ('*gegen Kommunismus und Kapitalismus mit gleicher Harte*').

However, what was a viable and competitive programme of democratic socialism for the post-fascist society was transformed, virtually overnight—with the creation of the separate Western state, formation of the bourgeois coalition, West German involvement in the Cold War and onset of the restoration—into a programme of fundamental or categorical opposition. Despite the changed constellation of forces after 1949, the party determined, in its Bad Diirckheim Sixteen Points of August 1949, to pursue an 'as-if' policy: proceeding as if it were about to gain political power, as if reunification was imminent, as if the occupation were ended and Germany entirely independent^{s2}—and as if the KPD in the Western state were still the rival it had been in the Eastern zone in 1946 when it overwhelmed the SPD and established the SED.

Here, a brief *excursus* is needed in order to achieve some conceptual clarity for the argument that follows. In an abstract sense, a distinction can be made between rational or irrational anti-communism. Rational anti-communism bears at least some relation to empirical communist theory and/or practice and therefore is in some measure concerned with the content of its pronouncements or the effects of its acts. Irrational anti-communism, on the other hand, deprives anti-communism of its rational basis (or 'transcends' it) and is more comprehensible in terms of the goals of those propagating it and the psychological traits of those espousing it. Similarly—and this is admittedly rather more tenuous—it is possible to speak of progressive and regressive anti-communism. The latter's social function is the preservation of a class-divided social formation and the forestalling or negation of socialist reform. Progressive anti-communism, on the other hand, need not be the contradiction in terms that it first appears. There are, after all, a number of dissonances between any consistent theory of democratic socialism and the praxis of state socialism, particularly the GDR after 1945. The UAPD (Independent Labour Party), one of the independent leftist parties which surfaced briefly during the 1950s, suggested some differentiating criteria. Whereas the 'bourgeois combats what is still revolutionary' in communism, independent socialists criticise its non-, or anti-revolutionary aspects: absence of internal democracy, subservience to Soviet interests, ideological opportunism, etc. But 'our main enemy is and remains the capitalist

system, and we oppose the KPD only because it is waging the struggle against capitalism on the wrong basis. . . .¹⁵³ Similar conclusions can be derived from Crusius and Dutschke's class distinction of anti-communism:

Whereas the anticommunism of the bourgeoisie is based on its interest in defending its political and economic power positions, the anticommunism of the wage-dependent classes has a different motivation. For them it is a matter of maintaining their higher standard of living, their freedom of opinion, their freedom of movement, in short all those things that are results of the struggles of the German labour movement.⁵⁴

Of the Schumacher SPD—to return to the main line of argument—it could be said that its anti-communism was consistently progressive, in the above sense, but frequently irrational in its attacks on the 'Red Fascists' and 'Soviet dupes' against whom it sought to profile itself. Though Schumacherian anti-communism was therefore grounded in a progressive premise, when invoked irrationally it led to a number of wrong tactics. Its shrillness, for instance, often matched that of the CDU/CSU and, being indistinguishable from it to the unsophisticated observer, merely reinforced it. Intransigent opposition directed 'with equal severity' against communism and capitalism, overlooked the salient reality that an anti-communist campaign was already being waged by the resources of the CDU State with the backing of foreign trend-setting powers; the real 'enemy' of democratic socialism, in the Western partial state, was capitalism.

Moreover, even while the federal SPD was practising its fundamental opposition, whole groups of SPD members were entering into elected positions (e.g. the 'mayors' wing' in the major cities) and appointed offices (civil services and other state institutions) at the local and Land levels, in part on the strength of an anti-communism that was neither progressive nor rational. A final tactical problematic for the post-1949 SPD arose from an almost Lassallean tendency to equate 'democracy' with parliamentarism (*Nur-Parlamentarismus*), which in time evolved into an inability to envision other than strictly constitutional solutions to the problems—NATO, rearmament, restoration, renazification—which were in part created by 'extraparliamentary' class power and outside intervention, and which the SPD attacked in radically phrased speeches and writings.

After Schumacher's death in 1952, these mounting contradictions produced, inter *alia*, a mediocre leadership, an ossified party structure, a decline in membership and a desperate search for a way out of the '33 per cent ghetto' which the electoral successes of the CDU/CSU—with its absolute majority in 1957—left it mired in. Lacking a collective will to realise a programme of democratic socialism, the party, through several conventions and an extended 'programme debate', increasingly emulated

the basic ideology and catch-all nature of Christian Democracy. Anti-communism was seen as the most available and attractive bridge to this policy of 'embracement'. Social Democratic anti-communism, as propagated by its *Ostbüro*, the party organs and the party leaders, was increasingly used to threaten dissident members with expulsion, or actually to expel them—e.g. the left-wing trade unionists around Viktor Agartz or the editors of the radical newspaper, Die *Andere Zeitung*—and to coerce the loyalty of those who remained. In its concern to make the party more acceptable and to open it to the 'new middle classes', the party leaders failed to comprehend that the total, irrational anti-communism they now began to espouse was an ideology formed by and for the CDU State and its beneficiaries and hence worked mainly to the advantage of the SPD's political opponents:

[The SPD] will never be in a position to represent the interests of big industry more plausibly than big industry itself, to echo the legends of the 'Christian West' and the 'Free West' better than the qualified authors of this ideology, the CDU. It cannot relate anti-bolshevist horror stories in a more gruesome manner than the professional anti-bolshevists of the stamp of Taubert and his consorts from the school of Herr Dr. Geobbels.⁵⁵

The outcome of the programme discussion was the 1959 Bad Godesberg Programme that proclaimed the SPD a Volkspartei, rather than a class party, which now addressed the middle class groups previously immune from socialist appeals, accepted the socio-economic order established by the CDU State (including Western integration), abandoned all references to Marx and defined socialism in terms of material benefits and 'anti-totalitarian' freedom. If the Godesberg Programme amounted to the SPD's surrender of an independent domestic policy, Herbert Wehner's 30 June 1960 speech to the Bundestag accomplished the same thing in foreign policy. Henceforth, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Defence Community and the policy of 'reunification on the basis of strength' would characterise the SPD's foreign policy.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the 'pragmatic' wing of the party—led by Willy Brandt, Fritz Erler and Herbert Wehner—with its image of 'moderate reform' and 'modernity' had gained ascendancy. Under its guidance anti-communism was further developed into an integrating factor in as much as the party could now set itself up as a collection of anti-communist, social democratic and leftist elements, claiming that any party or movement to the left of it was bound to become communist, or at least a communist tool. This being the case, such groups could a priori be defamed as just that; the self-fulfilling prophecy nature of anti-communism was re-enacted by the SPD in this way. The principle was further applied to 'leftist deviationists' within the party,⁵⁷ which led to another series of expulsions and resignations from the party in the early sixties. The further removed

the SPD's praxis became from its former socialist goals, the more prominent became the role of anti-communism as a method of discipline and integration.

This increasingly irrational, regressive anti-communism was quite functional, in terms of the policy of *Angleichung* or the process of disposing of the past, de-emphasising ideology and defining programmatic principles in terms of 'values' rather than goals. It had the twofold purpose of facilitating the SPD leaders' bid for power within the framework of existing state and society, and of integrating the party, its membership and its supporters into this changed social perspective. The absence of binding principles, it is evident, gave the leaders a greater scope or freedom of movement and the ability to alter policies as circumstances **changed**.⁵⁸

Having thus foregone the goals to which political power had been a means, and forced to rely on anti-communism as an ideological ersatz and instrument of intra-party discipline, the SPD leadership instigated a wave of expulsions of individuals and groups who, for the most part, continued to espouse nothing more than pre-Godesberg party policies. For instance, the Socialist Students' League (SDS), which advocated detente with the East and recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's Eastern boundary (an integral part of Willy Brandt's later Ostpolitik!) and public discussion of the 'brown' pasts of highly placed judges, politicians and civil servants (a campaign in part documented with materials originating in 'the East'), was expelled in July 1960.⁵⁹ Then the SFG or Society for the Promotion of the SDS, a group of SPD intellectuals and socialists who had come together to assist the SDS' efforts to remain an effective force outside the party, was forced to choose between it and membership in the SPD. Most, e.g. Wolfgang Abendroth, Ossip Flechtheim, Heinz Brakemeier and Fritz Lamn, chose to remain in the SFG and were therefore **expelled**.⁶⁰ Other attempts to form a political grouping to the left of the SPD—for instance the Socialist League (SB) or Union of Independent Socialists (VUS)—were similarly defamed and denied by the SPD.

The first large party founded on the single issue of peace, namely the DFU or German Peace Union—whose supporters happened to include a pumber of communist or communist-associated individuals—was subject to especially vehement attacks by the SPD. In fact, Social Democracy, as one of the 'pillars' of the CDU State, now had an interest in the elimination of the DFU for many of the same reasons the CDU/CSU had had in banning the KPD in 1956. And it employed many of the same methods, including irrational anti-communism. For the SPD, the DFU was an 'agency of communist infiltration', a 'collection of useful idiots' for the CPSU and SED, and 'the vanguard of communist takeover' tactics.⁶¹ The party executive then declared membership in the DFU incompatible with membership in the SPD.⁶²

This analysis of Social Democratic anti-communism, as part of the co-optation process of the labour movement in advanced capitalism, suggests several things. For one, it demonstrates the process by which the SPD, like all other Western social democratic parties, has evolved an ideology of 'labourism' which John Saville defines as 'the theory and practice of class collaboration'.⁶³ As the social democratic party accepts, and attempts to gain a share in the class hegemony of the capitalist state, it produces a number of conflicts within itself. For instance, while the party leaders are actively collaborating in a 'party cartel' assuming a basic ideological consensus both within the party and among parties—which in the SPD's case was expressed by 'concerted action' as its version of the 'social partnership' thesis—actual economic struggles at the party bases (for higher wages, more codetermination, less armaments, etc.) tended to undermine the strategy of labourism. In the absence of a system-transforming mission or even of a coherent programme of opposition, then, anti-communism appears initially as a highly functional ideology, (1) to rationalise the surrender or 'postponement' of the party's socialist goals, thus preventing an outward drift by the traditionally supportive working classes; (2) to discipline the party left and strengthen the party leadership; and simultaneously (3) to increase the party's attractiveness to the middle classes in whom it sees an extension of its mass base. The assumption underlying this strategy is that the capitalist social system itself has undergone a transformation into some variation of an 'em-bourgeoisied society' or a 'levelled-off middle-class society', thus making class struggle obsolete in any case.

To assume this, however, is not to wish away wage disputes, the fact of subordinate work or capitalist relations of production, all of which proceed independently of the SPD's will. Anti-communism can only obscure, not eliminate this fact. To adopt anti-communism in its bourgeois-irrational form—'whose specific quality, in contrast to the relevant leftist critique of the Soviets, is its undifferentiated and total demonisation of socialist structures together with their Leninist and Stalinist deformations'*—is to see that anti-communism's essence is that of an interest-motivated ideology of the dominant classes aimed at discrediting *all* class actions and movements, including the 'moderate' and 'reasonable' demands advanced by Social Democracy, who, by espousing it, objectively carries 'labourism' to its outermost, absurd limits.

Ostpolitik and Berufsverbot: A 'double strategy' of anti-communism

It is ironical that even as the SPD was completing its embracement of the CDU State a series of developments not only rendered many of the CDU/CSU's post-war power sources obsolete but also partly vindicated many

of the SPD's now abandoned policies.

Economically, the salient tendency of the early and mid-1960s was the rapid slowing down and increasing crisis-susceptibility of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. The factors making for economic prosperity and expansion—Marshall Plan aid, the Korean War-induced export boom, rearmament, state-subsidised partiality to private enterprise, trade focus on the West—now began to give way to market satiation, production slowdown and less 'social peace'. As this phase of post-war expansion came to an end, important sectors among German business increasingly looked Eastward for new (or, more precisely, the revival of traditional) markets for manufactured goods and sources of raw materials, a trade relationship of vital importance to the export-dependent sectors of German industry, particularly steel. But the anti-communist premises of Adenauer's foreign and domestic policy—which, as has been shown, were both essential for popular support and 'total' and hence immutable—presented a hindrance to trade with the East.

Against what he saw as the 'particularist' interests of certain manufacturing and industrial sectors, Adenauer constantly posited the 'national interest', patriotism and anti-communist solidarity, and this policy was upheld by the powerful BDI. Where irrational political policy opposed economic interests, as far as the exporters (represented by the *Ostausschuss* or Eastern Committee as their main lobby) were concerned, either the 'national interest' had to be redefined or trade with the communist countries had to be 'depoliticised'. This was especially so as other Western European countries (notably Britain and France), affected also by similar economic imperatives, were increasing trade relations with Eastern Europe even as the FRG's share was declining.⁶⁵

Thus, irrational, regressive anti-communism, while still partly functional in domestic politics, became an obstacle to economic development. Foreign policy in turn represented a hindrance to economic policy; but a number of factors were at work to force it to adapt as well—despite the SPD's recent total embracement of it in all its essentials. For one, American foreign policy, which continued to 'guide' and impose the parameters of West German policy, shifted to an emphasis on detente and coexistence under the Kennedy administration, thereby depriving Adenauer of his resolute ally, John Foster Dulles. Pressure was automatically placed on the CDU/CSU to do away with the now most obviously dysfunctional aspects of its foreign policy, e.g. the *Alleinvertretungsanspruch* and Hallstein Doctrine; but to do this would undermine both the class basis and internal unity of Christian Democracy.⁶⁶ A temporary solution was sought in the hastily constituted Adenauer-De Gaulle partnership based on hard-line anti-communism, but the Franco-German Friendship Treaty made little impact on a public opinion increasingly in favour of improved relations with communist countries.⁶⁷ The erection of the Berlin Wall, as

the logical response to the 'policy of strength', demonstrated further the bankruptcy of aggressive foreign policy and indicated that the status quo in Middle Europe was likely to remain fixed for some time. (Incidentally, the 'Anti-Fascist Protective Wall' also put, or should have put paid to the myth of 'communist aggression'; whatever else it might have signified—ideological inadequacies, loss of regime legitimacy—the Wall was aimed at holding on to the status quo, not at external aggression.)

Adenauer and his foreign minister Heinrich von Brentano were more or less compelled to retire in 1963. The Ludwig Erhard government appointed Gerhard Schroeder foreign minister with a mandate to carry out a limited Ostpolitik on the basis of a 'policy of motion'. But apart from the establishment of several trade missions and cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe, the policy was unable to move beyond its anti-communist premises: Hallstein Doctrine and non-recognition of the GDR. The CDU/CSU could not develop a coherent economic or foreign policy toward the communist states so long as the party remained divided between its Eastern and Atlanticist/Gaullist wings.

Beyond this, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition had attempted since the late 1950s to enact a series of 'emergency laws' which, however, had not managed to obtain the required 2/3 legislative majority. This legislation, which was reminiscent of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution—press censorship, banning of the opposition, suspension of the right to strike, ambiguous definition of 'state of emergency', etc.⁶⁸—was transparently directed at potential domestic opposition, particularly trade union demands, anti-nuclear groups, leftist anti-system opposition, etc., which might be expected to increase as the economic miracle subsided, for:

The laws legalise the establishment of a complicated bureaucratic machine whose finely meshed gears can only function if the verbally invoked 'external emergency' and the atomic catastrophe do *not* occur. Patently conceived for 'times of peace', they can only be aimed at securing the social status quo against social crisis.

In this situation, the SPD, which had abandoned in principle its opposition to such emergency measures, declared its solidarity with the CDU/CSU's foreign policy and became more attractive as a possible coalition partner. Moreover, the SPD's willingness to undertake economic planning and state intervention corresponded with big business' plans for economic growth; the Erhardian neo-liberal economic policies were increasingly seen as less adequate than Karl Schiller's concept of 'overall economic guidance' (*gesamtwirtschaftliche Steuerung*).⁷⁰ Thus Erhard too, as a remnant of the Adenauer line, had to be dropped and replaced in 1966 by Kurt-Georg Kiesinger before the Union could enter into a Grand Coalition.

The SPD, for its part, was also vitally interested in a Grand Coalition.

Beset by growing intra-party dissent, unable to function even as a 'loyal opposition'—for instance by calling attention to the 'Spiegel Affair' of 1962 or the telephone tapping, Fibag and HS 30 scandals of the early sixties—fixed on a strategy of image-making and poll-chasing, and lacking alternative policies and programmes in all vital areas, the SPD leadership desperately needed a share of power to vindicate its post-Godesberg course and demonstrate its 'responsibility' and 'governing capacity'. This the Grand Coalition of December 1966 provided.

A full accounting of the import of the Grand Coalition cannot be undertaken within the scope of this paper. But in terms of its central focus, anti-communism, several points need to be made. The SPD's participation in the *Grosse Koalition* self-evidently led to an erosion in its traditional working-class support. The economic crisis of the late sixties was mainly overcome, within the framework of Schiller's policy of 'concerted action', by positing business as the driving force of economic recovery, so rationalising the relationship between it and the state (more planning, more coordination, guaranteed profits) and consciously furthering its capital accumulation by means of more tax write-offs, subsidies and the like. Naturally, the representatives of organised labour, in particular the militant metalworkers' union, found themselves increasingly in confrontation with the SPD leadership. In all the *Land* elections of 1967 and 1968 the SPD's share of the popular vote declined, in some cases drastically.

Furthermore, the formation of the Grand Coalition can also be seen as the final catalyst for the development of the Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) from out of the hitherto diffuse groups who no longer saw the state as capable of responding to their needs: the student movement (with the SDS as its centre!), the peace movement, disillusioned and expelled Social Democrats, various single-issue movements from the anti-emergency laws *Notstand der Demokratie* to the Easter Marchers, pacifists, neutralists, more or less radical Marxists, etc. The intensity of the APO's opposition to basic trends in the West German social order—blind anti-communism, emergency laws, Vietnam, militarism, the 'party cartel', anti-abortion legislation, stagnation of political life, etc.—at the very least indicated some of the problems associated with the SPD's policy of unqualified embracement of the Right.

The SPD leadership's reaction to these developments was ambiguous. On the one hand, APO demonstrations and mass rallies merely confirmed the need for the emergency laws that they had collaborated on in passing into law. Anti-communism still functions as an instrument of intra-party discipline, as the expulsion of the Student University League (SHB) in mid-1968, as well of many individuals and entire party constituency organisations, demonstrated. But on the other hand, the party leaders, faced with the problem of declining mass support and fundamental

opposition from the Left, were compelled to search for a means of profiling the party within the coalition and, armed with their new image of 'respectability', to develop an effective electoral appeal. An alternative foreign policy, which need not entail basic domestic reforms, offered itself as the most efficient means of accomplishing this. Crucial to the success of an independent SPD foreign policy would be the support of business (whose relative pre-eminence, as has just been suggested, had been considerably enhanced by the SPD's participation in the Grand Coalition).

True, the Grand Coalition had managed to 'depoliticise' East-West trade and to work out commercial agreements with some East European countries, notably with Romania in 1967. But trade was still subordinate to political considerations. The *conditio sine qua non* of further progress was recognition of the GDR, which the CDU/CSU could not do, not even within the coalition, without dismembering itself and renouncing the ideological foundation on which it rested. It was evident that the CDU/CSU could not cope with this admixture of business interests and emotionally charged anti-communism, that is, was incapable of operating between the extremes of 'export interests and the primacy of foreign policy, between patriotism and profit'.⁷¹

But the Social Democrats could. For in the conservative, irrational, anti-communist climate of the FRG under the CDU State, merely to advocate a foreign policy that corresponded with popular opinion and economic necessity—even while tenaciously opposing radical change—was to acquire an image which accorded with the party's post-Godesberg 'moderate reformism' profile. But before Ostpolitik could be made the basis of an SPD bid for electoral power, several conditions and concessions were necessary.

First, the Social Democrats would need a coalition partner. Despite the party's total focus on system-immanence and respectability, its share of the popular vote, in the 1961 and 1965 elections, had not risen beyond what *Genosse Trend* (a combination of demographics and social change) probably would have produced in any case. And, as just suggested, the party's participation in the Grand Coalition was actually causing considerable 'voter drift'. At this juncture, a coalition with the Free Democrats appeared most attractive. The FDP, like the SPD, was not encumbered with a hard core of 'cold warriors', clerical anti-communists and other groups with a vested interest in the old-style anti-communism. (It did contain a small expellee faction as well as many anti-clerical former Nazis; but these could be dispensed with and 'equalised' with the expected new 'liberal' voters defecting from the other parties.) The FDP was also not committed to any working class constituency and was thus entirely free to champion middle class interests, the same interests that the SPD also sought to attract. Although since 1949 the FDP had been the CDU/CSU's

more or less constant coalition partner, as the more 'pure' representative of business, its policies had always been more rationally and clearly in favour of the 'modern' sectors of the capitalist economy.

A second precondition for the SPD's Ostpolitik was the removal of the ban on the KPD. After all, a policy of suppressing and demonising communists domestically does not accord with 'normal' trade and political relations with foreign communist states. In any case, a decriminalised communist party, after years of persecution, represented no threat to the basic constitutional order; on the contrary its existence could be displayed as evidence of a new tolerance. Even within the framework of the Grand Coalition, the SPD was able to effect the relegalisation of German Communism, reconstituted in 1968 as the DKP (German Communist Party).

Third, business support was essential, not merely from the *Ostausschuss* and manufacturing sectors, but beyond these, the 'progressive' elements of the financial and productive sectors as well. This was obtained in part by a calculated appeal to the long-range interests of business as a whole, an appeal which can be summed up in the notion of *Modell Deutschland*.⁷² The *Modell Deutschland* advocates took seriously Franz-Josef Strauss' current aphorism about West Germany having been too long an economic giant yet still a political dwarf. The FRG had now advanced to the rank of the world's second or third greatest capitalist power, but in foreign policy was subordinate to the interests of the other Western powers. Now, however, the FRG had to prepare for its 'world-political responsibilities', which would involve accepting international realities—Oder-Neisse Line, national division—and adopting a more flexible foreign policy. Business' cooperation would be crucial here. Since the export sector had historically been the motor of economic development, its well-being—ensured by a more amenable international climate—would develop the economy as a whole. State and business would complement each other, and their collaboration would underpin the FRG's enhanced position in the world society and economy. Integration into the 'open' and 'free' international economy would replace 'economic nationalism' and immobilism. Keynesian public planning and spending, predicated on continuous economic growth, would provide optimal conditions for accumulation. The SPD/FDP bias toward technology and modern management would enhance the FRG's export capacities. At the same time, labour peace would be guaranteed by the presence of the SPD—who, better than the CDU/CSU, could 'moderate' and contain worker demands—while at the same time 'socialist excesses' could be averted by the corrective presence of the FDP. In any case, the 'humane side' of the new coalition would work to labour's advantage: continued economic growth would bring larger welfare benefits while normal relations with the GDR would ease tensions and reunite families.

Fourth, finally, a mass electoral basis had to be ensured and funda-

mental opposition reduced on both right and left. This involved a dual strategy. On the one hand, Ostpolitik, and all the developments associated with it, had to address a wide range of interests: to the Right it offered enhanced national power and prosperity and to the Left it held out a more rational foreign policy, dialogue with the East, and a promise of ultimate detente and peace; for the Right Karl Schiller embodied technocratic efficiency, social partnership and state support of business interests, while for the Left Willy Brandt was the symbol of peace, liberalisation and compassion. In Ostpolitik, therefore, the 'non-material' interests of politically separated families and friends combined with the 'post-material' interests of the peace and anti-nuclear movements to constitute a mass basis for the very 'materialist' interests of the more 'dynamic' sectors of West German business.

The Small Coalition, assembled in 1969, was remarkably successful in ensuring the latter: intersystem trade between East and West more than doubled between 1955 and 1973,⁷³ the FRG's trade surplus with Eastern Europe went from DM 0.7 bn in 1970 to almost DM 8 bn in 1975,⁷⁴ and West German exports of DM 1.6 bn in 1971 to the Soviet Union amounted to DM 4.8 bn by 1974.⁷⁵ Despite virulent anti-communism-founded attacks from the CDU/CSU—freed now, by being thrust into opposition, of its intra-party tensions between the Atlanticists and the Easterners—the Social-Liberal coalition was able, between 1969 and 1972, rapidly to 'normalise' relations with the East through binding treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., as well as regularise intra-German relations by recognising the GDR and the Oder-Neisse Line. For this the Small Coalition realised a significant electoral victory in 1972 and Chancellor Willy Brandt was accorded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.

Although this section so far has emphasised the objective and subjective factors tending to *transform* clerical anti-communism, this should not be taken to mean that anti-communism as such was *reduced* or done away with by Ostpolitik (though in a sense it did deprive it of its rational basis). On the contrary, its essential social functions remained, even as the faces of its main beneficiaries in the political realm changed. To begin with, the disparate groups, whose support was required for these dramatically shifting foreign policy orientations, needed a common and non-specific ideological cohesive force. Once in power, the first Social-Liberal coalition rested on a bare and unreliable majority that was subject to a virulent anti-communist campaign from the Right: not only the CDU/CSU but also their allied mass media, interest associations, many of the state agencies, and a number of business sectors. And within both SPD and FDP, vocal minorities continued to oppose this or that aspect of Ostpolitik. Domestically, therefore, anti-communism was still essential to counter the opposition, enforce social cohesion and maintain intra-party discipline in both SPD and FDP. For these reasons,

... the architects of Ostpolitik felt compelled to emphasize over and over again that international cooperation with communist regimes did in no way imply a weakening of the resistance offered to communist groups at home. That is how Ostpolitik rhymes with Berufsverbot.⁷⁶

What was needed, was a new *form* of anti-communism, more differentiated and sophisticated than clerical anti-communism, to be sure, but nevertheless consistent and potent. This was accomplished by the Berufsverbot.

Although as a result of Amnesty International Reports, the findings of the Russell Tribunal and a multiplicity of petitions, protests and the like by various national organisations concerned with civil liberties, the basic features of the Berufsverbot are well known, it is worth briefly reconsidering them here in order later to relate them to their anti-communist functions. In popular usage, Berufsverbot refers to the Anti-Radical Decree of 28 January 1972,⁷⁷ a joint declaration by the Federal Chancellor and the *Länder* premiers banning from public service, at the federal, *Land* or local level, persons defined as 'extremists', 'radicals' or 'anti-democrats', whether on the left or right. It was signed into law, at the peak of the Ostpolitik 'offensive' and shortly before the (crucial) 1972 elections by Chancellor Brandt (who later admitted that it had been a mistake^{T8}). And since then it

... has had the active support of a legislature that provides a broad network of legislation authorizing political repression, of a judiciary that is frighteningly cooperative and pliant, and, most alarming, of a trade union movement that with only few exceptions collaborates to the point of—admitted and documented—'cooperation' with the Special Branch.⁷⁸

Etymologically, the term Berufsverbot (ban on practising one's occupation) alludes to the fact that, in a nation where well over one-tenth of the working force are public servants—from railway workers to university professors—to be barred from the public service is *de facto* to be excluded from one's profession, particularly in the case of teachers, administrators and others who cannot expect to find a post outside the state agencies. Probably about 1.5 million Germans have been exposed to investigations in the years since its inception and perhaps two thousand have lost their jobs or not been hired as a result.

Critics of the Berufsverbot have rightly made much of its continuity with the *Obrigkeitsstaat* tradition in Germany. Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Law, the Nazi complex of political justice and Adenauer's 1960 Anti-Radical Law are all self-evident precedents. The comparison with National Socialism is particularly instructive. For then as now anti-communism was depersonalised and bureaucratised thus in a sense dehumanising individuals affected by it and facilitating the repressive measures taken against them.

(Though the parallel cannot be taken too far, it is noteworthy that the system of concentration camps and mass genocide had to be thoroughly bureaucratised and depersonalised to be effective,* a phenomenon most succinctly captured by Hannah Arendt's coinage, 'the banality of evil.'") Conceptual, even linguistic continuities abound. For instance, the **1933** Law Respecting the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, in its **1937** version, stated that 'the civil servant must at all times and without reservation serve the National Socialist State' (loyalty to the state principle), while today's Federal Civil Service Law requires public employees 'to provide an absolute guarantee of their loyalty to the free democratic principles in accordance with the Basic Law' (loyalty to the constitution principle).⁸²

In the ambiguity of terms like 'loyalty to the state' and 'loyalty to the constitution'—as well as the whole gamut of West German anti-communist legalese, such as unconstitutional activities, guilt by association, crimes against the constitution, libelling the state, contacts with persons accused of any of the above, etc.—is revealed the special 'genius' of the *Berufsverbot*. On the one hand, obviously political issues and problems are ostensibly depoliticised and objectivised by their removal from the narrowly political arena of legislatures and political parties and their transposition into the legal system where they are treated 'dispassionately' by 'experts'. By 'legal system' is meant not only the entire court structure, from local to federal level, but the whole range of secret service and enforcement agencies, the several levels of the Office for Constitutional Protection, the Special Branch, Military Intelligence, the police force, etc. These agencies may interview individuals, gather information about them at their discretion, consult experts, requisition credit or personnel records, and so forth.

But on the other hand, the veneer of objectivity is belied in a number of ways. Without exception, all the agencies of the 'legal system' (as just defined) are shot through with former National Socialists, though nowadays, due to attrition, less than ten and twenty years ago. As Franz Hegmann writes:

Considering the fact that the 'Neo-Nazi' network includes or has included at various times high ranking government officials in the Office of the Federal Presidency, the Federal Administrative Court and even the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (the West-German FBI). . . incidents of political bias become somewhat more plausible. The Nazi network within the ranks of the civil service is complemented by the members of the old Nazi elite in private industry, who disappeared more or less from the open political scene only to acquire a substantial foothold in the upper economic-industrial power complex.

He adds that:

It is somewhat intriguing in this context that former servants of the Nazi state and active members of the largest 'terror organization' in human history are now engaged in the prosecution of so-called student radicals.⁸³

The 'incidents of political bias' to which he refers relate to the consistent use of *Berufsverbot* against the Left in stark contrast to the law's favourable treatment of neo-fascist organisations. This observation points to the extreme subjectivity and arbitrariness with which it can and has been applied, which in turn demonstrates the role of 'the legal system' in generating and enforcing anti-communism. For instance, constitutional interpretation, in the hands of ex-Nazi legal experts, has increasingly been (re-)oriented to its Hegelian and authoritarian antecedents. Thus Theodor Maunz—the same constitutional expert who once wrote the definitive commentary on the National Socialist legal system and who now does the same for the FRG, in a work approaching its 22nd edition—has carried on the struggle against 'legal positivism' and 'parliamentary absolutism' which he would replace by a 'state in itself' whose 'servants owe it a 'state-consciousness'.⁸⁴ At the same time, the constitutional-protection agencies have expanded the list of 'reasons for doubt', i.e. pretexts for undertaking an investigation into an applicant's or civil servant's loyalty to the constitution.⁸⁵ And the latter concept, nowhere codified, is left to judicial discretion.

Not only has the *Berufsverbot* affected pre-eminently the Left, therefore, but the definition of (leftist) 'hostility to the constitution' has been steadily extended to include not only communists (a legal party since 1968) and their sympathisers, but also pacifists, Greens, practitioners of alternative lifestyles, members of GDR-oriented groups, militant trade unionists, radical journalists, critical teachers, and so on. Even SPD members and supporters have been affected, as will be discussed in the next section. If necessary, exceptional legal sophistry can be used to rationalise this anti-Left bias. For example, the Federal Administrative Court—two of whose members were active in the service of the Third Reich⁸⁶—ruled that the neo-fascist NPD was a legally constituted party according to Article 21 of the Basic Law and that membership in it was not grounds for rejection or dismissal from the civil service. Yet the same principle did not apply to DKP members since their party was anti-constitutional (*verfassungswidrig*) even though not actually hostile to the constitution (*verfassungsfeindlich*) as stipulated by law as a pre-requisite to imposing a formal ban.⁸⁷

In any case—and this too is part of *Berufsverbot*'s 'genius'—the ban is directed at individuals rather than organisations as such. In this way, it has been able to penetrate through 'formal' legal safeguards and remove individuals from public employment even while upholding the right of their party or association to exist. This in a way dismembers and atomises

the collective goals of the party/association and reduces them to individuals' problems: 'the big cauldron of hostility to the constitution was replaced by thousands of little cauldrons of constitutional hostility'.⁸⁸ As such it is an ersatz ban on the affected (constitutionally protected) parties/associations by means of 'administering' away their key members. More important, the Berufsverbot thus acts as a deterrent to potential recruits and supporters of oppositional movements or even to those who might consider signing a petition or attending a rally sponsored by such a group.

This represents a stage beyond the old clerical anti-communism which 'merely' blacklisted identifiable organisations according to specified criteria (before proceeding to persecute all manner of persons remotely associated with such groups). Henceforth, individuals from the whole spectrum of leftist opposition could at any time be declared hostile to the constitution and deprived of their livelihood. And the definition of hostility to the constitution, it has just been shown, is set by the Right. Thus despite the apparent constitutionalism in which the Berufsverbot is ensconced, it is subject to certain 'higher' or 'overriding' norms. CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate Rainer Barzel addressed his parliamentary party in 1973 with these words:

If existing legal bases are not sufficient to exclude DKP members from public service, the CDU/CSU is prepared, together with the other democratic parties, to create this legal basis. In the process, an amendment to the Basic Law must be taken into consideration.⁸⁹

The anti-communism embodied by the Berufsverbot and the complex of constitutional deformations surrounding it distinguishes West Germany not only from its Weimar predecessor but also from other capitalist liberal democracies. What is specifically and qualitatively new about all this, as summarised by Friedhelm Hase, is

. . . that [today, unlike in the Weimar Republic] the West German state lays claim, and this claim is based on the law, to the competence politically to eliminate certain political currents in general, to ban them once and for all from the political stage. Political repression has here pushed aside the aspects of situation and occasion, which characterised it in the past; it has cut itself free from the concrete circumstances and risks of specific, changing situations and is largely independent of determinate dangers and any political evaluation of them, quite different from normal states of emergency, exceptional situations and police-defined dangers. The 'free democratic basic order' legitimates its acts of repression not with certain situations and circumstances, but at a universal, ideological level.⁹⁰

Once again, therefore, the defence of the 'free democratic basic order' overrides the civil rights anchored in that order, from freedom of speech and association to the freedom to choose one's profession. Coining the

term *Gesinnungsschnüffelei* (nosing into people's thinking), Herbert Wehner, himself a major formulator of SPD policies in this period, said of the Berufsverbot: 'I don't see any point in wanting to protect the free democratic basic order by taking a first step toward doing away with it.'⁹¹ The concept of militant democracy—developed for compelling historical reasons—becomes militant defence of the existing socio-economic order. Protection of a set of norms and rules to guide political life becomes protection and enforcement of the ruling ideology. What is being defended and enforced, therefore, is advanced capitalism whose major justification remains anti-communism, but an anti-communism elevated now to a legal norm and practical imperative.

Ersatz anti-communism: law and order

So far, the concept of ersatz has figured prominently in this analysis of anti-communism in the FRG: clerical anti-communism as ersatz ideology, Social Democratic anti-communism ersatz for socialist policies and goals, Berufsverbot as ersatz ban on oppositional politics, the 'legal system' as ersatz for political controversy. This section will add a final substitute-metaphor: law and order as ersatz anti-communism.

The Berufsverbot in fact represents an initial attempt to make the law a substitute for more explicitly political anti-communism, as the preceding section has argued. Nevertheless, the Berufsverbot in itself was not sufficient to prevent—though it did help to turn around—anti-communist-grounded defamation campaigns against the SPD from the Right. Once West German relations with Eastern Europe had been normalised and rationalised—and it had become apparent that Ostpolitik could not progress beyond the regularisation of East-West relations to develop, e.g. a separate all-European identity or present an alternative to the arms race—there was a real possibility of a conservative reaction to these rapid changes in foreign policy, despite the Small Coalition's increasingly repressive domestic measures. This reaction was facilitated by the SPD's continuing strategy, developed for purposes of intra-party discipline, of insisting that 'illegality' or 'criminal' politics begins to the immediate left of the party, or indeed at the extreme left within the party itself. Not only does this strategy deprive Social Democracy of a political buffer for apologetic purposes, it actually reinforces what the Christian Democrats had claimed all along, namely that the SPD, however well-intentioned, borders on the criminal, anti-constitutional forces, and even harbours many of them in its own ranks; the true guardian of the constitution and the most reliable safeguard of law and order is therefore the CDU/CSU.

For these reasons, it has frequently been possible for the Berufsverbot to be turned against its formulators. In several CDU/CSU-governed *Länder*, it has been deployed against Social Democrats already in, or seeking entry to the civil service,⁹² and (less frequently) against Free Democrats as

well.⁹³ Indeed, among the salient 'reasons for doubt' (as described above) in deciding whether to investigate a civil servant or applicant were often participation in demonstrations on behalf of the SPD's Ostpolitik, belonging to the SPD youth organisations SHB and Jusos, and—at least in Bavaria—trade union membership. Social Democratic scholars of international reputation were denied, or dismissed from, university posts not only because they advocated a union of the Left (sociologist Horst Holzer) but also because they had taken part in the anti-emergency laws campaign and the peace movement (mainstream SPD member and political scientist Wolf-Dieter Narr).⁹⁴ Many SPD school teachers, public administrators and other state employees were similarly affected.

The SPD leadership, in this situation—lacking the will to effect the kinds of political reforms that might have deprived the Berufsverbot of its social functions—was forced to operate between two increasingly antagonistic constituencies: *progressive intraparty forces* and the party's perceived *sources of mass support*, particularly 'its' new groups among the middle classes and dynamic sectors of business.

(1) The comparatively small, but highly visible and articulate inner-party anti-Berufsverbot grouping—made up largely of feminists, jurists, left trade unionists, Jusos, remaining SHB members—did manage to pass resolutions as early as the 1973 Party Convention in Hanover, reinforced at the 1974 Munich Convention, to the effect that an individual's membership in a legal political party ought not to affect his/her employment opportunities in the civil service and that reasons for denial of employment should be stated in writing and must not be based on the testimony of anonymous witnesses. That these resolutions were framed so comparatively modestly is a reflection of the leadership's successful strategy of formulating the issues innocuously and proceeding cautiously. But at the same time, intra-party discipline was invoked to prevent members from consorting with (legal but) 'anti-constitutional' organisations and from becoming involved in extra-parliamentary actions.

The Presidium of the SPD repeats, for good reason, its urgent recommendation to all party members not to take part in the transparent campaign against ostensible 'Berufsverbote' and to stay away from events where there is a pressing suspicion that they are guided by the DKP or largely influenced by it.⁹⁵

Violations of this intra-party anti-communist and 'moderate' consensus were then penalised all the more severely. The increasingly radicalised Jusos, for instance, though too large and important a grouping to be disciplined en masse, saw many of their members ostracised and expelled during the 1970s. Particularly threatening, from the party leadership's perspective, was the 'stamocap wing' within the Young Socialists whose core theoretical concern evoked the concept of state monopoly capitalism

which was said to have originated in the East. The party leaders therefore expelled the leading stamocap representatives and distanced themselves from their doctrines. In 1977, for example, Klaus-Uwe Benneter was deprived of his party membership for writing that:

The SPD, on account of its tradition and its programme, is obliged to regard the party system as a class-specific spectrum. From this viewpoint, the CDU and CSU are the parties of the class opponents, while the Communists, who are our political opponents, are not the class enemy.⁹⁶

Thus, the *Berufsverbot* which, though hazardous, remains functional, has never been repealed nor repudiated by the SPD. It has only been allowed to wither partially away. In 1975, the Federal Government presented a bill, based on the 1973 and 1974 party resolutions, which would have made membership in a 'radical organisation' alone insufficient grounds for removal from the civil service; but the legislation was vetoed by the CDU/CSU dominated Bundesrat. In May 1976, the Federal Government issued directives, in substance identical to the 1975 bill, which however applied only to the Federal civil service. By the late seventies, some SPD Land governments (Bremen, Berlin, Hesse) did away with automatic checks on applicants, and in 1979 the Saar, as the first CDU Land government, also abolished such checks. The Federal Government did the same. Nevertheless, the substance of the *Berufsverbot* remains, in as much as applicants and officials can still be investigated and rejected 'for cause', thus retaining its 'deterrent' effect. And its social function—pressures toward conformity and social discipline—has not changed at all. A major reason why the most contentious techniques of the *Berufsverbot* could be gradually mitigated, was related to the growing importance, during the seventies, of another form of anti-communism—counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism—a motif which will be examined presently.

(2) To return to the main line of argument, the SPD leadership, whose power rested on its ability to integrate the party into the advanced capitalist society and political economy, could not simply dispense with the *Berufsverbot* if it wished to hold together the mass voting base of workers, new middle classes and dynamic business sectors that kept it in power. On the contrary, developments reinforced the objective need for social discipline and ersatz ideology. For by now it was evident that *Ostpolitik* had run its course and that the constantly growing economy—the foundation and key assumption of the Keynesian social partnership theory of *Modell Deutschland*—was more and more susceptible to crisis.

With the signing of the treaties with the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as agreement with the GDR on the formula 'two German states in one German nation', the limits of *Ostpolitik*—namely those imposed by the existing world order—were reached. Far from overcoming the

tension between two hostile political and ideological blocs, Ostpolitik had in fact presupposed a prior 'Westpolitik' involving a retrenchment and fortification of the Western Alliance with its anti-communist *raison d'être*. Ostpolitik, having formalised the East-West status quo and facilitated an upsurge in intersystem trade, therefore list its momentum as the front lines of the Cold War rapidly reossified, particularly after the Reagan administration assumed office in the USA in 1980.

Immobilism in foreign policy more or less coincided with the series of economic reverses and crises said to have been precipitated by the formation of OPEC as the first successful producers' cartel of Southern states. Social tensions rose as the FRG experienced strike waves in 1971 and 1973, while at the same time promised reforms in parity codetermination, education, tax law, abortion laws, etc. were deferred, diluted or done away with. To be sure, the SPD could point to the FDP's 'countervailing power' within the Small Coalition, to the CDU/CSU's pre-eminence in the Bundesrat, or to the conservative bias of the courts and civil service, to exculpate itself in some measure from its failure to 'deliver' on the reforms. But its policies and measures clearly aimed at triggering economic recovery by exacting 'restraint' and 'temporary sacrifices' on the part of the party's traditional supporters in the blue collar classes rather than its 'new' voters. Among these policies and measures were wage freezes or if necessary wage rollbacks, cutbacks in social security programmes, petrol rationing (not however coupled with measures to combat profiteering by the big concerns), new incentives for business, especially the export sectors (which had produced one-fourth of total GNP and demand for which now declined by 10 per cent),⁹⁷ revaluations of the Deutschmark, etc.

Changes in the leadership of the Small Coalition facilitated the shift from (system-immanent) reformism to crisis-management and efficiency. Helmut Schmidt, a central figure on the SPD Right and Schiller's apparent successor as the party's special friend of business, replaced Willy Brandt (who, however, remained party chairman) on the latter's resignation following the 1974 'Guillaume Affair'; while Hans-Dietrich Genscher became FDP leader when Walter Scheel moved into the Federal President's office. The Schmidt-Genscher government, not so closely identified with reformism and detente, had a freer hand to deal, 'pragmatically' and with 'no nonsense', with the escalating problems of the West German state. The new leadership 'team' was well placed to call for unity and solidarity to overcome labour unrest or intra-party conflicts over defence spending, nuclear power uses, arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and the like, while at the same time developing more direct ties to business and the conservative parties.

'Law and order' here appeared as an opportune ideological tenet to assert the 'unity' and 'solidarity' of this resurrected *Volksgemeinschaft* (or at least *Znteressengemeinschaft*), even as economic reverses and political

ossification were producing both 'material' (strikes, lock-outs) and 'non-material' (peace demonstrations, citizens' initiatives, opposition to nuclear generator sites, ecology movement, anti-Berufsverbot actions) class conflict. Of course the Berufsverbot itself represented an initial campaign to reduce political issues to apparently legal ones, and, on the strength of the reduction, to criminalise, ban and delegitimize all political opposition. The previous section has demonstrated this.

These methods, and the great apparatus of the 'legal system' that had been put in place to carry them out, could then be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the emergent ideology and praxis of *counter-insurgency* and *anti-terrorism*.

To be sure, individual acts of terrorism did take place in the FRG throughout the 1970s which collectively furnished the necessary pretext for an anti-terrorist law-and-order campaign. From the early actions of the 'Baader-Meinhof Gang' at the start of the decade, to the 1972 Munich Olympics tragedy and the 1975 kidnapping of Peter Lorenz by the 2nd June 1967 Movement, to the mid-1970s 'executions' of BDA President Hanns-Martin Schleyer, Federal Prosecutor Friedrich Buback and banker Jürgen Ponto, up to the freeing of 93 hostages from the Lufthansa aircraft held in Mogadishu, the well-publicised actions of the 'terrorists' and the state's draconic counter-measures eclipsed practically all other popular political dialogue. The subjective feeling of 'a nation at bay' was reinforced by the international wave of similar incidents (activities of the Italian Red Brigades, the Vienna kidnappings of OPEC officials, repeated aircraft hijackings, attempts on the lives of Ronald Reagan and Pope John-Paul II) which evoked a mood of 'the West under siege'.

Like a number of governments of other advanced capitalist societies, the ruling coalition of the FRG found in the terrorism issue an opportunity to restore much of its declining legitimacy. It recognised early the 'peculiarly obscene, evocative meaning'⁰⁰⁰ that terrorism triggered in popular thinking and dwelt on this image to style terrorists as irrational, bloodthirsty crazies and misfits bent on sublimating their individual neuroses and pathologies through sabotaging society as a whole and 'its' state.

Anti-terrorism, when used as an ideology ersatz to marshal public support and justify social discipline, requires, like anti-communism, a 'total' undifferentiated version such as this individual-psychological interpretation. If the concept's propagators are successful in this, as they have been in the FRG, then two domestically 'destabilising' aspects of the terrorist phenomenon can be excluded. First, the demands and programmes of the terrorist organisations can be rendered irrelevant by ignoring or denying them. Few West Germans knew that, for instance, the 2nd June 1967 Movement arose in reaction to the police murder of a Berlin student demonstrator on that day and gained impetus from the attempted

assassination of Rudi Dutschke by a young rightist who had gained his inspiration from reading *Bild-Zeitung*, a conservative-extremist tabloid published by the quasi-monopolist Springer Press. Fewer still were aware of the Red Army Faction's critique of the 'party cartel' in the FRG, of escalating armaments, of fading detente, of law-and-order politics, of the Berufsverbot and of advanced capitalism in general. Seldom was the symbolic significance of the terrorists' targets considered: Buback as the zealous administrator of anti-constitutionally defined crimes and political justice aimed at the Left, Ponto as a powerful and conservative banker, Schleyer (a former Nazi) as the head of the most powerful, consistently anti-communist interest association of West German business. Even where individual terrorist ideas were publicised, this was in the form of caricature or *a priori* rejection, so that they were discredited in any case.

Second, terrorism is treated as a strictly isolated phenomenon. Nothing is said about its socio-economic context. No distinction is made, for instance, between 'state terrorism' and 'individual terrorism',⁹⁹ for if it were, it would be revealed that the former normally precedes the latter.¹⁰⁰ Hence the professional anti-insurgents need not confront the *administrative terror* of a Berufsverbot which, lacking any objective criteria of 'hostility to the constitution', devoid of constitutional safeguards against its abuse, and governed by an entirely arbitrary procedure, potentially affects all aspiring civil servants and hence terrorises them.''' There is no discussion of the *structural terror*, integral to capitalism, of inadequate diet, poor housing or greatly reduced life-chances for the poor, handicapped or disadvantaged. No mention is made of *police/military terror* in general that not merely forcibly suppresses demonstrations and occasionally causes the death or injury of participants, but also, as a presence, inhibits non-conformist social action.

Rather, individual terrorists, decried by the media, all the government parties—who try to outdo each other in intensity and vehemence—and state agencies, become the vilified, dehumanised *outgroup* and all the rest of society the injured, attacked group. The siege mentality is transformed, via the manipulation of people's fears, into a revenge mentality, which in turn not only prepares the population for a more repressive state, but leads them to advocate it.¹⁰² Thus, from 1970–74, police expenditures rose from DM 2.56 bn to DM 5.16 bn, while the budget for the Criminal Investigation Department grew sixfold; at the same time the police forces were reorganised and centralised.¹⁰³ The technological, modernising orientation of *Modell Deutschland* was extended to the fields of national security, counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist techniques. At least in part for this reason, the state of siege did not produce any updated version of the *Freikorps* or *Geheimbündler*—or for that matter any vigilante groups or death squads. Anti-terrorist actions could be contained and developed entirely within the systemised and computerised state agencies.¹⁰⁴ Indeed,

by the late seventies the West German security system had become one of the world's most observed, admired and emulated such systems.

All these developments—hard line against terrorists, irrationalisation of the object of resentment, inflation of state repressive apparatus, etc.—are in substance not much different from those occurring in similarly situated capitalist democracies (though the thoroughness and comprehensiveness with which they have been carried out are in themselves typical of the FRG). But what is 'specifically German' about the anti-terrorist campaign is its use as a starting point for much further-reaching measures, ensconced in and legitimated by law, extended again (like the communist ban and Berufsverbot) to encompass any and all opposition to the dominant socio-economic order, whether actual or latent.

The 'legal system' is deployed in two main ways to effect the criminalisation of politics and to enforce law and order as a means of social discipline. Existing laws are interpreted broadly and 'with licence' by the politically responsive agents of law enforcement and adjudication. Any publicly expressed reservations about, e.g., official versions of events surrounding the Baader-Meinhof actions, are penalised as 'defamation of the state'. Indeed, so intense had official paranoia become that the federal law enforcers decided to run checks of all 1,500 mourners at the funeral of Ensslin, Baader and Raspe who, it will be recalled, ostensibly committed suicide in Stuttgart-Stammheim **prison**.¹⁰⁵ Moreover,

in trials of demonstrators, squatters and occupiers of building sites, in charges of 'defamation of the state' or 'breach of the peace', in Berufsverbote or action to preserve 'industrial' or 'communal' peace—resistance is labelled terror. Criticism, information and protest are punished as 'subversion' and publicity if necessary reduced to what is officially published.¹⁰⁶

Then, as the next stage, further-reaching laws—in most cases prepared long beforehand—are passed and executed with haste and zeal. The Law for the Protection of Communal Peace, promulgated unanimously by the Bundestag in January 1976, goes beyond penalising actual 'criminal' acts to define individual motives and attitudes as criteria for sentencing offenders. Persons guilty of 'giving support and approval to violence' in any manner likely to 'disturb the public peace' are liable to lengthy jail terms.¹⁰⁶ 'Threatening, rewarding or approving criminal acts' as criteria mean that guilt can be established if an accused expresses (even the most vague and artificially construed) agreement with what subsequently are determined to be 'terrorist acts'. Even to advocate violence in any way, for any reason, can render an individual culpable, since such statements are 'socially harmful and dangerous to the community'. However:

Obviously there will be no action, nor is any intended, if a police chief or interior minister explains why it was 'necessary and unavoidable' for his officers to move against pickets to clear the way into a factory for strike-breakers.

Obviously there should be no action when the Federal Chancellor 'welcomes in the name of the Free World' the US army's 'defence' of 'our freedom' in Vietnam or elsewhere with genocide.

Obviously no case will be brought if a mayor tries to explain to his fellow citizens why a speculator has the right to have his house cleared by the police, the tenants put out on the street, and the house then demolished to make way for a lavish office block.¹⁰⁷

As interpreted by the High Court, 'guilt' arises not only from thinking in similar categories as 'terrorists', it is also present if one 'approves' 'crimes' committed abroad, by foreigners, which in no way affect the FRG. For such approval can be construed as 'contributing to the growth of general readiness for criminal activity at home'.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, the complex of regulations that make up Section 129 of the Penal Code is formally directed at 'terrorism', but in reality affects the entire left spectrum. (The law is rarely applied against the Right—since 'dog won't eat dog'¹⁰⁹—not even against expressly violent neo-fascist organisations who are by and large treated as basically right-thinking but impatient individuals who merely need time to cool down.) The Left, for the law-makers and law-adjudicators, is engaged in a broad, sinister conspiracy based on an ingenious division of labour. Thus, the High Court pronounced that:

One participant practices an activity whose anti-constitutional character is immediately obvious, while another carries on agitation disguised in general political aims and a third engages in tasks of a purely technical nature."

It is almost **superfluous** to add that, on the basis of a court judgment such as this, huge numbers of people can and have been investigated, interviewed, scrutinised—indeed terrorised—not because of their acts, their writings, their contacts (though these count as well) but because of the ideas they are presumed to hold or the passages they might be inclined to write, or even the general predisposition they might have.

By way of summary, then, one need only reiterate the premise of this section: law and order, in the sense depicted here, has become an ersatz for anti-communism in the FRG. With Sebastian Cobler, we can state that the courts have become organs of justification rather than justice,¹¹⁰ and that the police-militarist values of conformity, *Ordnung* and obedience have come to prevail as leitmotifs in the dominant ideology of the Federal Republic. The *Rechtsstaat*, mediated by the 'legal system', increasingly proximates the *Polizeistaat*; and where the two converge, the *Obrigkeitsstaat* is their necessary product.

Conclusions: Anti-communism in ideology and praxis in the FRG

It was always somewhat incongruous that the SPD should have emerged

as the party of law and order and the apparent main beneficiary of anti-communism. To be sure, in order to do so it had to abandon every vestige of socialism—save, perhaps, a residual social orientation which however was coupled with a much more consistent business orientation—and adapt to a post-war social, economic and political constellation shaped by American foreign policy interests and developed by Christian Democracy. In this sense, the occasionally conjured 'SPD State' is nothing more than an extended and rationalised CDU State. This is especially evident if the composition and orientation of all the other state institutions is recalled, in particular the continued CDU/CSU domination of the Bundesrat, many Lander and hundreds of municipalities. The more Social Democracy emulated and 'modernised' the CDU State, therefore, the longer it was able to stay in power. Anti-communism, together with its several ersatz variants, was the ideological vehicle of this *Angleichung*. Yet anti-communism—meaning here anti-socialism, anti-reformism, indeed anti-democratisation—amounts to an acceptance of the ground rules laid down by the most conservative interests in society, enacting political competition/conflict on their terms and hence ultimately working to the advantage of the Right.

True, even after the waning of Ostpolitik and the shattering of the Keynesian equation of business prosperity and worker welfare by the post-1973 economic crisis, the Small Coalition was able to maintain a tenuous hold on federal political power. But this was due in part to its willingness and capacity to propagate anti-communism and anti-terrorism more virulently and systematically than the Right. (Would the CDU/CSU have been capable of enacting a Berufsverbot or a Law for the Protection of Communal Peace?) Anti-communism enabled the SPD to govern without having to face the socialist policy implications on the basis of which it had been elected by the working classes, and it provided ideological vindication for abandoning its original anti-capitalism. Further, it smoothed the way to collaboration with business interests and the wooing of middle class voters. But at the same time, the competition between Christian Democracy and Social Democracy to outdo one another—in proposing legislation, making speeches, influencing the public—in the direction and intensity of anti-communism undoubtedly produced a more durable and intense anti-communism than would have occurred in, say, a CDU/CSU led state. In any case the SPD, like the CDU before it, ceased to be a consciousness-producing party and was transformed into an opinion-reflecting one; beyond a broad resistance to change, it, again like the CDU/CSU, cannot be said to have a clear direction or *raison d'être*, not even after its 1983 electoral reverse.

The Small Coalition also owed some of its staying power to Christian Democracy's tardiness in coming to grips with the changing, 'modernising' environment of political life in the FRG. For the many voting-research

studies carried out over the past three decades clearly demonstrate a well-established mass sense of 'regime legitimacy' and 'system legitimacy'.¹¹³ Crude, undifferentiated anti-communism no longer quasi-automatically deters potential SPD supporters. Whereas the SPD took the lead in refining and adapting anti-communism—e.g. by combining Ostpolitik and Berufsverbot—the CDU/CSU persevered, throughout the 1970s, in essentially Adenauerian anti-communism. Having unsuccessfully attempted to wage the 1972 campaign by defaming Ostpolitik and all those 'tainted' by it, the Christian Democrats, inspired by the then Party Secretary Kurt Biedenkopf, adopted a strategy of even less sophisticated anti-communism suggesting that the SPD, like the Communists, was bent on a 'collectivist society' and a 'total state' which would destroy initiative and liberty.¹¹³ Translated into electoral slogans for 1976, the strategy was formulated as *Freiheit statt Sozialismus* (CDU) and *Freiheit oder Sozialismus* (CSU).¹¹⁴ The old 'all roads of socialism lead to Moscow' argument was basically revived in an explicit equation of the SPD with 'actually existing socialism'. In the words of now Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl:

Socialism is by no means merely a condition prevailing in the Soviet Union or the GDR. Socialism occurs everywhere where the state, ostensibly seeking the well-being of all, takes more and more rights unto itself thus pre-empting the citizen. In this connection, Max Weber has painted the monstrous picture of the totalitarian welfare state as 'the comfortable dwelling of obedience'. Socialism—that is not only Communist dictatorship, the Wall and the Gulag Archipelago. Socialism—that is also the creeping dismantling of liberal society by means of tax laws, economic policies hostile to private property, collective school system, etc., etc. So-called democratic socialism is creating, in innumerable individual spheres, the very dependent society which must then re-elect it. Many countries in the Free West are already on the road to this obedient society. We in Germany must resist its beginnings.¹¹⁵

In 1980, the Christian Democrats chose Franz-Josef Strauss, the spokesman for the most conservative elements, the most implacable anti-communists in the party, as their chancellor candidate. His invocation of an imminent communist takeover was also unsuccessful with the (marginally) more sophisticated electorate.

Despite the CDU/CSU's belated adaptation to popular sentiments, the SPD, in its role of 'manager' of the CDU State and vanguard of anti-communism, was increasingly debilitated by mounting contradictions on the left, right and centre.

The party's centre—the trade union contingent and its working class supporters—has been gradually defecting since the Grand Coalition. As already suggested, in a situation of limited growth where public spending could not ensure both business profits and higher wages, the basis of the social partnership has crumbled. The SPD consistently directed its measures aimed at recovery towards business prosperity, which to some extent was

achieved, but without higher wages and full employment. Although limited reforms have been registered—notably in education, unemployment insurance, rent control, legalisation of abortion—these have been halted at the point where they came up against the interests of business and the wishes of the middle classes, i.e. delayed and diluted.

On the right, even the most dynamic sectors of business have increasingly moved away from the notion of a social partnership toward a more frank acceptance of social conflict and an indifference toward the once highly touted 'entrepreneurial social conscience'. Analogous developments have produced Reaganism in the US and Thatcherism in the UK. In the FRG it initially led to a fundamental cleavage with the Small Coalition. The FDP saw a monetarist economic policy, a reduced state role in the economy and a more direct reliance on market forces as the solution to stagflation and economic immobility. But the SPD party conventions continued to advocate more public spending (to stimulate business activity, not to ameliorate the workers' situation), while the top leadership emphasised austerity and wage restraints. This was opposed by both centre and left.

From the left, the critique of the SPD has been bitter and protracted, mainly over the issues of nuclear energy and disarmament. Disoriented by the conflict between (1) the need to placate its supporters on the right, the party accepted the (anti-communist-grounded) NATO logic of deterrence, thus permitting the stationing of US medium-range missiles on German territory and increasing the West German contribution to the Western Alliance; and (2) the desire to forestall growing opposition on the party left as well as the rapid rise in support for the anti-nuclear Green Party, it surrounded these actions with considerable rhetoric about the need for peace, detente, etc. Calling the SPD 'the party of moderate exterminism', Rudolf Bahro saw it as 'trying to master the difficult feat of harmonizing its faith in a deterrent with its own credibility as a party of peace'.¹¹⁶ And members of the SPD left, demonstrating in front of the 1982 Party Convention, summed up a decade of the party's peace policy development, as they chanted:

SPD 1972—mehr Demokratie wagen

SPD 1982—mehr Panzerwagen

At some point, therefore, all the contradictions of the Social Liberal coalition, resting as it did on the (updated) post-war anti-communist consensus, had to crystallise and induce a fresh 'Wende' in the politics of the FRG. The coalition's advantages to the conservative forces—ability to coopt the trade unions, creation of conditions for East-West trade, maintenance of labour peace, technological and managerial innovativeness—declined in importance with the re-intensification of the Cold War, the

growth of fundamental opposition (the Greens), the rise of social indiscipline (protests, demonstrations in favour of peace, disarmament, social justice), and above all the shrinking national economy (wages versus profits). Under the circumstances, the CDU/CSU appeared as the more adequate instrument of confrontational, class conscious politics: a more reliable ally in the Western Alliance, more willing to hold the line on labour demands (e.g. the 35 hour week), more expressly monetarist in fiscal policy, more willing to cut back the welfare state, and now more able to foster the anti-communist ideology that will be needed in coming years to make permanent structural employment palatable, to induce the population to accept lesser social benefits, and to overcome popular resistance to nuclear reactors and growing arms arsenals. It is the mandate of the Christian Democratic/Free Democratic coalition, negotiated in 1982 and electorally legitimated in 1983, to do just that. The SPD, having played out its role in the evolution of West German anti-communism, has been thrust, internally divided and ideologically confused, back on to the periphery of political life.

An analysis of anti-communism in the FRG, as in other advanced capitalist states, demonstrates anew the ideological paucity, the absence of vision that characterises these societies. It reveals liberal democracy to be a new and militant orthodoxy. It panders to, dredges up and manipulates the basest fears and resentments in the population and canalises them into an irrational, aggressive apology for the status quo. Indeed, it deprives people of their very hopes and their futures: 'the place that would be occupied in public opinion by a better future order, is today occupied by a negative image, the apparition of communism.''' In particular, anti-communism, as a largely self-fulfilling prophecy, undermines hopes for disarmament and peace. Its logical end is war.

NOTES

1. Michael Parenti, *The Anti-communist Impulse*, (New York, 1967), pp. 3-4.
2. From a speech delivered to the New York Economics Club in May 1984, here quoted from *Sunday Star*, (Toronto), 27 May, 1984.
3. In preparing this study, I have relied in part—particularly in the first three subsections—on research carried out for and concepts developed in my *The German Left Since 1945: Socialism and Social Democracy in the German Federal Republic*, (Cambridge, UK and New York, 1976).
4. Gerhard Stuby, 'Bürgerliche Demokratietheorien in der Bundesrepublik', in Reinhard Kuhn (ed.), *Der bürgerliche Staat der Gegenwart. Formen bürgerlicher Herrschaft II*, (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1972), p. 91.
5. Thomas Wellmann, 'Die soziologische Lage der Bundesrepublik', in *Deutsche Rundschau*, LXXXIX (1953), p. 591.
6. By contrast, the church hierarchy had emerged relatively unscathed (the implications of which will be discussed presently) and, due to the decimation and levelling of the middle classes, the owners of industrial machinery and real

- property—though temporarily in disarray—were now in a relatively better position than they had been during the Third Reich, at least in the Western occupation zones.
7. In March 1946, one-third of the respondents to a poll said they were no longer interested in politics and felt it safer to stay out, while three quarters had no intention of joining a political party. (Lewis J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behaviour*, (Stanford, 1965), p. 76). Seventy per cent of the respondents to an OMGUS (i.e. Office of the Military Government of the United States) poll of October 1947 said they would refuse to assume responsible political office (*OMGUS Public Opinion Survey*, Series I, No. 88); and between February 1947 and August 1949 six in ten Germans said they would choose a government offering economic security in preference to one guaranteeing civil liberties (*OMGUS Public Opinion Survey*, Series I, No. 175, 6). In November 1945, 80 per cent declared themselves not personally interested in political affairs and preferred to leave them to others; by January 1949, however, this figure had declined to 60 per cent (*OMGUS Public Opinion Survey*, Series I, Nos. 100 and 175).
 8. A term coined by Gabriel A. Almond, 'The Social Composition of the German Resistance', in G. Almond and W. Kraus (eds.), *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany*, (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1949), p. 107.
 9. 'Apart from a few prominent writers and intellectuals. . . exiles not belonging to the left-wing groups played a very minor role in the anti-Nazi exile movement. . . The political life of the anti-Nazi movement thus revolved primarily around the various left-wing groups', (Lewis J. Edinger, *German Exile Politics*, (Berkeley, 1956), p. xi). At least 90 per cent of all prison sentences handed down for political reasons between 1933 and the outbreak of WW II were to supporters of the labour movement (Wolfgang Abendroth, *Sozialgeschichte der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung*, (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 176).
 10. See Albrecht Kaden, *Einheit oder Freiheit? Die Wiedegründung der SPD 1945/46*, (Hanover, 1964), p. 46.
 11. See, e.g., the 'Buchenwald Manifesto' reproduced in Hermann Brill, *Gegen den Strom*, (Offenbach, 1946).
 12. *Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Series III, Vol. 1, (E. Berlin, 1956), p. 267.
 13. *Ibid.*, also see Rolf Badstubner, *Restauration in Westdeutschland 1945-1949*, (E. Berlin, 1969), p. 118; and G. Mannschatz and J. Seider, *Zum Kampf der KPD im Ruhrgebiet für die Einigung der Arbeiterklasse und die Entmachtung der Monopolherren 1945-1947*, (E. Berlin, 1962), pp. 57-58.
 14. Abendroth, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
 15. John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany. Politics and the Military 1945-1949*, (Stanford, 1968), p. xiii.
 16. Arnold Brecht, 'Personnel Management', in Edward H. Lichtfield (ed.), *Governing Postwar Germany*, (Ithica, New York, 1963), p. 264.
 17. Michael Balfour, *Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946, I. Germany*, (London, 1956), p. 175.
 18. A myth perpetuated by David P. Conradt, *The German Polity*, (New York and London, 1982), p. 88, following a well established tradition in West German social science.
 19. Although this is not the place to assign 'responsibility' for the Cold War, it is worth mentioning that all the important measures which made irreversible the division of Germany were initiated by the Western occupation powers, particularly the American military government. This is as true of the formation of the Bi- and Tri-zones, the imposition of currency reform and the propagation of

- anti-communism as it is of the establishment of a Western separate state and the NATO alliance.
20. On this, see H.-J. Brauns, U. Jaeggi, K.P. Kisker, A. Zerdick, B. Zimmermann, *SPD in der Krise. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie seit 1945*, (Frankfurt, 1976), p. 39.
 21. And antisocial democratism in turn can be traced back to reactionary anti-republicanism as the German feudalist answer to the French Revolution; see R. Crusius and M. Wilke, 'Der Antikommunismus als Legitimationsproblem der deutschen Linken', in R. Dutschke and M. Wilke (eds.), *Die Sowjetunion, Solschenizyn und die westliche Linke*, (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1975), p. 73.
 22. If, that is, one places the analysis of fascism in the context of an analysis of capitalism. This is done, e.g., in Francois Chatelet *et. al.*, *Elements pour une Analyse du Fascisme*, (Paris, 1976); Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, (London, 1977); and in the work of Reinhard Kiihnl, notably *Texte zur Faschismuskussion: Positionen und Kontroversen*, (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1974).
 23. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik. Deutschland im Widerstreit der aussenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft*, new ed. 1981, p. 11.
 24. Sigmund Neumann, 'Einführung' in Max-Gustav Lange (ed.), *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik*, (Stuttgart and Dusseldorf, 1955), p. xxiii.
 25. Badstubner, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
 26. For the churches' role vis-a-vis the Third Reich, see Friedrich Baumgartel, *Wider der Kirchenkampfflegenden*, (Neuendettlersau, 1959); Hans Müller, *Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus*, (Munich, 1963); Gunter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*, (London, 1964).
 27. Mimeographed copy available from CDU party headquarters, Bonn. The Bavarian CSU, from the outset the CDU's coalition partner, never really espoused the notion of Christian Socialism; early documents in sekretariat der CSU in Bayern (ed.), *10 Jahre CSU in Bayern*, (Munich, 1955).
 28. Gerhard Schutz, 'Die CDU—Merkmale ihres Aufbaues', in M.G. Lange (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 123.
 29. Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society*, (London, 1969), p. 187.
 30. A term borrowed from the title of the excellent collection of essays, G. Schaffer and C. Nedelmann, *Der CDU-Staat. Studien zur Verfassungswirklichkeit der Bwundesrepublik*, (Munich, 1967).
 31. The presence of former Nazis at all levels of West German society has been amply documented, and the fact has long been accepted by all social sectors.
 32. Reinhard Kiihnl, 'Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Faschismus in BRD und DDR', in Gerhard Hess (ed.), *BRD-DDR. Vergleich der Gesellschaftssysteme*, (Cologne, 1971), p. 269.
 33. *Ibid.*, pp. 262-263.
 34. Ekkehard Krippendorff, 'Introduction' in E. Krippendorff and V. Rittberger (eds.), *The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents*, (London and Beverly Hills, 1980), p. 2; or as Konrad Adenauer would put it, in a 1954 aside to French High Commissioner Francois-Poncet: 'Don't forget that I am the only German Chancellor who has preferred the unity of Europe over the unity of his own country'.
 35. Gordon Smith, among others, evidently accepts this line of reasoning. He writes that although these three elements—anti-communism, christianity, free market economy—'help to characterize the party', '. . . they fail to inject into its policies a strong ideological content which, say, nationalism would supply'. (*Democracy in West Germany: Parties and Politics in the Federal Republic*, (London etc.,

- 1979), p. 91.
36. Hans Beyer rightly emphasises the militant-aggressive quality of West German anti-communism which he documents extensively; see 'Der Hauptinhalt unserer Epoche und seine Auswirkungen auf die antikommunistische Strategie und Ideologie des Imperialismus', in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Vol. 31, no. 4 (1983), esp. pp. 406-407.
 37. Major Mauer, *Deutsche Monatshefte*, no. 3, 1960, p. 12.
 38. Quoted by Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus*, (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 13; for discussion and analysis of these developments, see pp. 10-20 and *passim*.
 39. Quoted in Rudolf Augstein, *Konrad Adenauer*, (W. Wallich, trans., London, 1964), p. 39.
 40. Quoted in Beyer, *op. cit.*, p. 407.
 41. This is the fruitful line of critique of totalitarianism theories developed by Reinhard Kuhl in, e.g., the two volumes of *Formen bürgerlicher Herrschaft*, *op. cit.*
 42. An interpretation later fully developed and set out by C. Friedrich and Z. Brzezinski in the several editions of their *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*; further see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York, 1956).
 43. Parenti, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
 44. Authors' Collective under the direction of Ludwig Elm, *Konservatismus in der BRD: Wesen, Erscheinungsform, Traditionen*, (E. Berlin, 1982), p. 5.
 45. K.O. Hondrich, *Die Ideologien von Interessenverbänden*, (W. Berlin, 1963), p. 168.
 46. As summarised and discussed, e.g., in Heinrich Hannover, *Politische Diffamierung der Opposition im freiheitlich-demokratischen Rechtsstaat*, (Dortmund-Barop, 1962), pp. 2-3.
 47. Reimut Reiche and Peter Gang, 'Vom antikapitalistischen Protest zur sozialistischen Politik', in *Neue Kritik*, no. 41, April 1967, p. 18.
 48. Werner Hofmann, *Stalinismus und Anti-Kommunismus. Zur Soziologie des Ost-West Konflikts*, (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 152-153.
 49. On all this, see *ibid.*, pp. 153-154.
 50. Parenti, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
 51. A discussion which basically follows Graf, *op. cit.*, ch. IV(3).
 52. Kurt Schumacher, *Turmwächter der Demokratie*, (Berlin-Grünwald, 1953), Vol. II, p. 167.
 53. B.L., 'Der Antisowjetismus und wir', in *Freie Tribune*, 9 September, 1950.
 54. Crusius and Wilke, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
 55. Wolfgang Abendroth, *Antagonistische Gesellschaft und politische Demokratie. Aufsätze zur politischen Soziologie*, (W. Berlin, 1967), pp. 76-77.
 56. Wehner's speech reprinted in *Vorwärts*, 8 July 1960, 5 et seq.
 57. As will be elaborated presently.
 58. Stuby, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
 59. 'Abbruch der Beziehungen zwischen SPD und SDS', Party Executive Committee Resolution of 19 July 1960, in *Jahrbuch der SPD 1960/61*, (Bonn, 1961), p. 452.
 60. Here see Kurt Kusch, 'Forderung des SDS', in *Sozialistische Politik*, 10 October 1961, p. 5; further see 'Gegen "Sozialistische Forderergemeinschaften"', Party Executive Resolution of 6 November 1961, in *Jahrbuch der SPD, op. cit.*, p. 477; and the Party Council's confirmation of this decision reprinted in the same volume, p. 477.
 61. See, among others, SPD (ed.), *Über das Wesen und die Absichten der 'Deutschen*

- Friedens-Union: Informationsmaterial*, (Bonn n.d., 1961); *Die Freunde Ulbrichts*, SPD Documentation series, (Bonn, 1961).
62. 'Abgrenzung zur "Deutschen Friedens-Union" ', Party Executive Committee Resolution of 9-10 January 1961, in *Jahrbuch der SPD 1960/61*, p. 463.
 63. John Saville, 'The Ideology of Labourism', in R. Benwick, R.N. Berki and B. Parekh (eds.), *Knowledge and Belief in Politics: The Problem of Ideology*, (London, 1973), p. 215.
 64. Fritz Vilmar, 'Gesamteuropäische Koexistenz und innersozialistische Kritik', in Dutschke and Wilke (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 34.
 65. See Michael Kreile, *Osthandel und Ostpolitik*, (Baden-Baden, 1978), ch. 3.
 66. This argument parallels that of Claudia von Braunmühl, *Kalter Krieg und friedliche Koexistenz: Die Aussenpolitik der SPD in der Grossen Koalition*, (Frankfurt, 1973), esp. pp. 146-156.
 67. For a summary of opinion polls, see K. Baker, R.J. Dalton, K. Hildebrandt, *Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics*, (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1981), p. 119.
 68. The 26 May 1965 version is published, in mimeographed form, as: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Notstandsgesetz), special publication of the *Presse- und Funknachrichten*, n.p. 1965.
 69. H.J. Blank, and J. Hirsch, 'Parlament und Verwaltung im Gesetzgebungsprozess', in Schaffer and Nedelmann (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 96.
 70. See 'Das Hamburger Strategiepapier', in Freimut Duve (ed.), *Der Thesenstreit um 'Stamokap': Die Dokumente zur Grundsatzdiskussion der Jungsozialisten*, (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1973), ch. A(2).
 71. Kreile, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
 72. The concept of *Modell Deutschland* has become a central one during the past decade or so, and the relevant literature is enormous. Two good accounts in English are W.E. Patterson and G. Smith, *The West German Model. Perspectives on a Stable State*, (London, 1983); and Frieder Schlupp, 'Modell Deutschland and the International Division of Labour', in Krippendorff and Rittberger (eds.), *op. cit.*, ch. 2.
 73. Kreile, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
 74. Michael Kreile, 'Ostpolitik Reconsidered', in Krippendorff and Rittberger (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 138.
 75. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
 76. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
 77. Reproduced in Claudia von Braunmühl, 'The Enemy Within: The Case of Berufsverbot in West Germany', in *The Socialist Register* 1978, p. 58.
 78. R. Steinke, W. Suss, and U. Wolter, 'His Refrain is Heard Around the World: An Initial Assessment of the Bahro Congress', in Ulf Wolter (ed.), *Bahro: Critical Responses*, (White Plains, New York, 1980), p. 218.
 79. Von Braunmühl, 'Berufsverbot. . .', p. 67.
 80. Still the best comprehensive study of the workings of the extermination programme, Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, (New York etc. 1961).
 81. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (New York, 1963).
 82. Franz Hegmann, 'Toeing the Line in West Germany', in *CAUT Bulletin*, February 1982, p. 12.
 83. *Zbid.*, pp. 13-14.
 84. Dieter Deiseroth, 'Kontinuitätsprobleme der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre(r)? Das Beispiel Theodor Maunz', in D. Deiseroth, F. Hase, and K.-H. Laduer (eds.), *Ordnungsmacht? Über das Verhältnis von Legalität, Konsens und Herr-*

- schaft*, (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 103.
85. See the huge catalogue of 'reasons for doubt' given in von Braunmühl, 'Berufsverbot..', pp. 64-65.
86. Wolfgang Abendroth, 'Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Berufsverbote im öffentlichen Dienst', in *IMSF Informationsbericht Nr. 22: Berufsverbote in der BRD, eine juristisch-politische Dokumentation*, (Frankfurt, 1976), p. 31.
87. *Ibid.*
88. Theo Schiller, 'Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung dienstrechtlicher Vorschriften', in *ibid.*, p. 38.
89. 'Die Stellung der CDU/CSU', in *ibid.*, p. 80.
90. Friedhelm Hase, ' "Bonn und Weimar": Bemerkungen zu der Entwicklung vom "okkasionellen" zum "ideologischen" Staatsschutz', in Dieseroth *et. al.*, (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 70.
91. Quoted in Detlef Lehnert, *Sozialdemokratie zwischen Protestbewegung und Regierungspartei 1848-1983*, (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 205.
92. Hans Kremendahl, 'Die Freiheit-Sozialismus-Diskussion im Bundestagswahlkampf 1976 und das Verhältnis von Konsens und Konflikt im Parteiensystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Gerhard Gohler (ed.), *Politische Theorie. Reglungszusammenhänge in der Politikwissenschaft*, (Stuttgart, 1978), p. 119.
93. Union of Democratic Jurists in the Federal Republic, 'Zusatzbericht der VDJ über die Berufsverbote an die UNO und die nationalen Sektionen des IVDJ vom Januar 1975', in *IMSF Informationsbericht no. 22, op. cit.*, p. 26.
94. These and other cases abundantly documented in *ibid.*, 50 *et seq.*
95. Press release of SPD Party Executive Committee, 11 June 1975, reproduced in *ibid.*, p. 88.
96. Quoted in Kremendahl, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
97. Kreile, *Osthandel und Ostpolitik*, p. 165.
98. Eleonara Cebotarev and Jorge Nef, 'Economic Development and Terrorism: Some Empirical and Theoretical Generalisations', paper presented to 16th annual meeting of Canadian Peace Research and Educational Association, Halifax 1981, mimeo., p. 4.
99. A distinction made by Jorge Nef and David Moore, 'The Terrorist Weapon: An Appraisal', in *Laurentian University Review*, special issue on 'Politics and Violence', Vol. XIV, no. 1, (November 1981), pp. 27-37.
100. Cebotarev and Nef, *op. cit.*
101. In a letter to then Federal President Walter Scheel, Amnesty International wrote that West Germans were singularly hesitant to sign petitions, even those opposing genocide and torture: 'The reason given to us is that the person approached worked in the public service, or intended to apply for a position in the public service and was afraid that signing a petition would work to their disadvantage.' (Sebastian Cobler, *Law, Order and Politics in West Germany*, (trans. Francis McDonagh, Harmondsworth, 1978), p. 66.
102. John Dornberg, 'West Germany's Embattled Democracy: the Anti-Terrorist Threat from the Right', in *Saturday Review*, 10 June 1978, p. 20.
103. Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blond: The International Terrorist Network*, (New York, 1977), pp. 233 and 255.
104. Again without pushing the parallel too far, precisely the same could be said of the Third Reich which also practically eliminated anti-state terrorism.
105. Cobler, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
106. *Ibid.* ch. 4(4). The arguments contained in this, and the subsequent paragraph closely follow Cobler's well-documented case.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
112. Several of these studies are summarised in Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt, op. *cit.*, p. 27.
113. See Hermann Scheer, 'Der Mythos des Privaten: Kurt Biedenkopfs Funktion für die "neue" CDU', in Martin Grieffenhagen (ed.), *Der neue Konservatismus der siebziger Jahre*, (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1974), p. 183.
114. Slogans which prompted one's colleague and friend to affix a bumper sticker to his car which read *Sozialismus ist Freiheit*—thus earning him hostility from supporters of all three parties!
115. Quoted in Kremendahl, op. *cit.*, pp. 111-112.
116. Rudolf Bahro, 'The SPD and the Peace Movement', in *New Left Review*, no. 131 (1982), p. 21.
117. Hondrich, op. *cit.*, p. 172.