

## BEYOND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN WEST GERMANY?

William Graf

### I

The theme of transcending, bypassing, revising, reinvigorating or otherwise raising German Social Democracy to a higher level recurs throughout the party's century-and-a-quarter history. Figures such as Luxemburg, Hilferding, Liebknecht—as well as Lassalle, Kautsky and Bernstein—recall prolonged, intensive intra-party debates about the desirable relationship between the party and the capitalist state, the sources of its mass support, and the strategy and tactics best suited to accomplishing socialism.

Although the post-1945 SPD has in many ways replicated these controversies surrounding the limits and prospects of Social Democracy, it has not reproduced the Left–Right dimension, the fundamental lines of political discourse that characterised the party before 1933 and indeed, in exile or underground during the Third Reich. The crucial difference between then and now is that during the Second Reich and Weimar Republic, any significant shift to the right on the part of the SPD leadership,' such as the parliamentary party's approval of war credits in 1914, its truck under Ebert with the reactionary forces, its periodic lapses into 'parliamentary opportunism' or the right rump's acceptance of Hitler's Enabling Law in 1933, would be countered and challenged at every step by the Left. The success of the USPD, the rise of the Spartacus movement, and the consistent increase in the KPD's mass following throughout the Weimar era were all concrete and determined reactions to deficiencies or revisions in Social Democratic praxis.

Since 1945, however, the dynamics of Social Democracy have changed considerably. Each successive move by the SPD away from a socialist, anticapitalist course has at best invoked isolated, but never mass, sustained opposition on the Left. Until the emergence of the Greens in 1980, in fact, no alternative political organisation had been able to establish itself beyond Social Democracy. Allied occupation and intervention, the Cold War climate, and the spectre of the East German communist state have imposed narrow political parameters on the Federal Republic, placing the SPD in practically unchallenged occupation of the entire Left position and hence investing it with a quasi-automatic rightward tendency. It is symptomatic of this state of affairs that in the postwar period names like

Helmut Schmidt, Herbert Wehner, Heinrich Deist, Erich Ollenhauer, Carlo Schmid, Fritz Erler, Ernst Reuter and even Willy Brandt have come to symbolise the party's substance and direction, while leftists such as Viktor Agartz, Gerhard Gleissberg, Wolfgang Abendroth, Fritz Lamm and Arno Behrisch remain mere footnotes in the party's history.<sup>3</sup>

The absence of a political alternative to the left of the SPD has also meant that the West German political economy has not, on the strength of its inner constellations and alignments, been able even to pose the question: after Social Democracy, what? Apart from the situationally generated, spontaneously developing antifascist movement in the postwar period—which the respective Military Governments suppressed or administered away<sup>3</sup>—the West German Left since 1945 has been constrained, mediated, coopted and conditioned by the Social Democratic Party. In the Federal Republic, therefore, unlike elsewhere in Western Europe, the relevant question for the Left has been: what is and ought to be *the relationship between socialism and Social Democracy*? Even the posing of this question during the late forties and through the fifties was extremely problematic, since the conservative coalition headed by the Christian parties (CDU/CSU), supported by the restored and 'renazified' business and state elites, and propelled by the legitimacy conferred by the Economic Miracle, was able to consolidate its mass basis at successive elections and gain an absolute electoral majority in 1957. Integration of the West German partial state into a capitalist common market and an anti-Soviet military alliance combined with a 'total' ideology of 'clerical anticommunism'<sup>4</sup> to submerge real class conflict and social contradictions. This completed the formula for the all-embracing, anti-socialist CDU State.

In this context, the SPD was subject to powerful system-immanent pressures (1) to broaden its electoral appeal by expanding its social base beyond the working classes, (2) to defend itself against charges of communist tendencies or at least of being 'useful idiots' in the Soviet cause, and (3) to use every means to create intra-party solidarity to ensure that party members and followers would be prepared to adapt to the leadership's changing strategies. In particular, the post-Schumacher party leadership determined to 'modernise' Social Democracy, not by means of working through an anticapitalist, socialist programme corresponding to the specific development of the FRG, but by a strategy of initially *ad hoc*, and by 1959 conscious proximation of the CDU State. The party's platform thus increasingly amounted to a mere negation of the bourgeois coalition's tangible achievements and a vague assertion that, once in office, the SPD would expand and extend (or 'modernise') the existing state and economy. This policy of *Angleichung* involved abandoning or renouncing the party's traditional socialist 'ballast' and de-emphasising its essentially working-class base in an endeavour to adapt to perceived changing voter expectations and socio-economic conditions, a process

which would transform the SPD into a 'pragmatic', 'moderate' and 'non-ideological' mass party employing the latest advertising and public relations techniques and basing its bid for power on image-making and the personalities of its leaders. This dual strategy of moderation (to attract voters from the 'progressive centre', especially the 'new' administrative and managerial classes) and *modernisation* (to stake a claim to be able to manage the CDU State more efficiently than the Christian Democrats and to **win** over the dynamic, export-oriented sectors of West German business) evolved, under the growing influence of the 'pragmatic' party grouping around Wehner, Erler and Brandt, into Western Europe's most comprehensive statement of 'Social *Democratism*'<sup>5</sup> which may be summarised as a maximalist, system-immanent bid for political **power** within the logic and limits imposed by the capitalist state. The necessary corollary of Social Democratism is anticommunism—or in the West German case, the taking over and further 'modernisation' of clerical anticommunism—which both acts as a means of inner-party discipline to ensure acquiescence in pursuit of the new strategy of adaptation, and provides the necessary currency to purchase an image of responsibility and respectability.

The Bad Godesberg Programme of 1959, which formalised the SPD's renunciation of an alternative domestic policy (particularly 'socialist solutions'); Herbert Wehner's June 1960 Bundestag speech which proclaimed a 'mutuality' between the foreign policies of the SPD and CDU/CSU; Social Democratic support for **pending** emergency legislation in the mid-sixties; the party's failure to operate even as a democratic opposition in the face of such government violations of civil rights as the 1962 'Spiegel Affair'; and the formation of the Grand Coalition in December 1966; each of these developments was a further move toward what has been variously termed 'the party cartel', the 'amorphous middle-class society', and the apparent 'end of the opposition'.

The question of political alternatives also became more intense with every stage of the SPD's integration into the CDU **State**.<sup>6</sup> The already discredited and ineffectual KPD had been persecuted and banned in 1956. The sole attempt to create a political party to the left of the SPD, namely the Independent Labour Party (UAPD), was unable to attract mass support and simply disintegrated. The Trade Union Federation (DGB), like the SPD, had been deradicalised by the American Military Government and, by means of a 'Unified Trade Union' (Einheitsgewerkschaft) and the illusions of 'political party neutrality' and '**partial** codetermination', integrated into a capital-dominated 'social partnership' sustained by rising economic prosperity. The intra-party Left, who in most cases merely persevered in advancing traditional socialist aspects of Social Democracy, were therefore constrained to choose between two equally bleak strategies: (1) 'hibernating' in the party or trade union while working and agitating from within, i.e. acting as a 'motor' to promote reforms and discussion

on the one hand, and functioning as a 'brake' against even more substantial shifts to the right on the other; or (2) drawing the consequences of the anticommunist-motivated attacks and party discipline to which they were subjected and resigning or, in most cases, awaiting formal expulsion. In the first case, diminishing influence (Fritz Lamm and the *Funken*) or progressive cooptation (Peter von Oertzen and his *Sozialistische Politik* or *SoPo*) were the consequences. In the second case, isolation, defamation and alienation from the labour movement altogether were the results (Viktor Agartz and his *WZSO-Korrespondenz*, Gerhard Gleissberg and Rudolf Gottschalk's *Die Andere Zeitung*). Even the fate of the socialist opposition to the Godesberg tendencies, embodied in Wolfgang Abendroth's 'Anti-Godesberg Programme',<sup>7</sup> was indicative of the 'misery of the German Left': the Programme was in fact passed by a huge majority at the party conference.

During the period of official SPD opposition in the CDU State, then, prospects of the intra- and extra-party Left for gaining even a share in the formulation of Social Democratic programmes and policies were remote. The '*material*' opposition<sup>8</sup> lacked a coherent organisation, a minimal consensus-producing programme (as Abendroth's draft might have been), capable leaders, and—above all—a mass basis. 'Is it not deeply sad and perhaps also characteristic,' Viktor Agartz wrote in 1959, 'that today not the party, not the trade unions are in motion, not in action, but intellectuals, professors, free professionals and students?'<sup>9</sup>

In Agartz' rhetorical but nevertheless pointed question is contained an initial statement of the core of an emerging, specifically West German type of opposition: the issue-oriented, heterogeneous and rapidly mobilised (and demobilised) *Sammelbewegung*. Within the highly conformist, transnationalised and prosperous context of the postwar Federal Republic, the one issue still sufficiently sensitive to catalyse a popular '*post-material*' *oppositional movement* was that of rearmament and remilitarisation. This was so for a number of reasons. Popular opposition to rearmament rested, first, on immediate and direct historical experience of the war, the four-power occupation and the extensive anti-militarist propaganda disseminated as part of the Allied denazification programme. Secondly, it brought together oppositional forces from a variety of political or even 'pre-political' persuasions, such as pacifist and anti-conscription groups, neutralists from Left and Right, SPD members still supporting the Schumacherian primacy of reunification within bloc neutrality, religiously motivated anti-war groups, independent intellectuals, a critical minority within the media, and those who had suffered directly from the war and its effects. Third, rearmament was a relatively straightforward and comprehensible issue which could be defined in terms of a stark alternative: acceptance or rejection, and which affected the vital interests of most of the population. And fourth, no political party or labour organisation had made peace a

central part of its programme, although public opinion polls consistently showed a large majority opposed to rearmament in any form. For these reasons, the peace movement became the central focus and rallying point for most of the oppositional forces, in particular the Left, in this period. As primarily a reaction to official government policy (and absence of alternatives on the part of the 'loyal opposition'), its development can be described in two important stages: *resistance to rearmament and conscription*, and *opposition to nuclear arms*.

Ironically, in view of its later adaptations, the SPD leadership itself had an important share in the formation of the peace movement in the Federal Republic. As the FRG under Konrad Adenauer moved towards making a German contribution to the 'defence of the West' in 1954 and 1955, a group of scholars, trade unionists, theologians and politicians, including SPD leader Ollenhauer, convened a meeting in St. Paul's Church, Frankfurt which, in a mildly worded 'German Manifesto',<sup>10</sup> appealed to the government to avoid precipitate rearmament. The contemporary Left correctly argued that the 'movement' merely 'divert[ed] increasing radicalism among active party members and trade unionists into legitimate channels'" and that it in any event failed to prevent the Bundestag from ratifying the Treaty of Paris in February 1955. But this is to miss the importance of the incipient peace movement. For the first time it demonstrated that a variety of disparate groups, acting in concert on a single issue, could penetrate beyond the official consensus and influence the thinking of broad sectors of the population. The real significance of the St. Paul's Church movement was as a consciousness-provoking phenomenon.

Much the same can be concluded from the 'Gottingen Manifesto', a public appeal against the perceived intention of the government of the FRG to acquire nuclear weapons. On 12 April 1957, eighteen prominent scientists and scholars, with a 'non-political' self-image and careful to qualify their pronouncements with references to freedom 'as upheld by the Western world today against communism', appealed to the public to support the 'explicit' and 'voluntary' rejection of all forms of nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic. Within hours and days of its announcement, the appeal was joined by municipal councils, student bodies, women's leagues, church groups and prominent individuals such as Albert Schweitzer and his 'Appeal to Humanity' from Africa. The salient difference between the Gottingen appeal and the St. Paul's Church movement was that the former arose more or less spontaneously, unmediated by institutions or official organisations. Indeed, it proceeded mainly without them and even against their opposition. Resistance to atomic weapons went over to *ad hoc*, spontaneous and issue-focused organisations: the German Peace Society (DFG), the Union of Persons Persecuted by the Nazi Regime (WN), the West German section of the War-Resisters International (IdK) and sectors of the Lutheran and Evangelical Churches.

This was followed by a further 'Appeal of the 44' professors and scholars calling for a nuclear arms-free zone in Middle Europe.

The SPD again sought to coopt the peace movement to overcome its own downward popularity trend. Together with the DGB and representatives from academia, the arts, and the churches, it instigated the Fight Atomic Death or KdA movement in Frankfurt in March 1958. Although the presence of the SPD and DGB provided some organisational coherence to the peace movement, it also affected the latter's strategy and tactics. Since the movement's goals contradicted government policy, they could only be realised by means of *consistent extra-parliamentary opposition*. Official protests, petitions and assemblies were no doubt effective ways of gaining popular support and producing mass awareness, but in themselves could not reverse a government decision, namely the Bundestag resolution of 25 March 1958 to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. The realisation of the KdA's goals implied anti-parliamentary, anti-government and indeed anti-constitutional measures such as carrying out a national plebiscite, or instigating a political or general strike. As these extra-parliamentary implications became evident during the mass campaign and both SPD and DGB rank-and-file members became increasingly radicalised in favour of one or another form of direct, 'illegal' action, the leaderships of both organisations—for whom the KdA had in any case represented rather more an advertising campaign than a vital labour issue—withdraw from direct involvement, motivated not least of all by the anticommunist resentments invoked by the bourgeois coalition.

This discussion of the course of the peace movement in the CDU State is interesting not only in as much as it reveals obvious parallels with today's New Social Movements, but also because it suggests an abiding problem of what has been termed 'issue saliency' in contemporary politics. Popular support for Christian Democracy was scarcely affected by all this 'postmaterial' opposition. Its massive and historically unprecedented absolute majority of 1957 was registered while the Gottingen appeal was at the peak of its effectiveness. And during the Fight Atomic Death campaign the CDU gained a substantial victory in the North Rhine-Westphalia *Land* elections. How was the CDU/CSU, despite its pursual of unpopular policies, able to maintain its electoral hegemony? One useful explanation—though of somewhat less relevance in today's context, as will be explained below—is Hans-Karl Rupp's thesis of 'the secondary importance of non-economic and social motives' in voting behaviour.<sup>12</sup> So long as the Economic Miracle brought concrete and growing benefits to the great majority, issues of national survival and international peace, according to this theory, had to assume a secondary role in popular political action. In a word, therefore, *there was not yet a sufficient 'material' basis to sustain 'post-material' politics.*

Yet the Fight Atomic Death movement and its predecessors were not, for these reasons, insignificant. They demonstrated that ostensibly non-political groups could mobilise large numbers of people in support of vital, closely delimited issues. By their existence they showed the decline in the established labour organisations' theory and *praxis*. Further, they contributed to the development of a mass critical awareness. And finally, they may well have prevented the FRG from actually acquiring atomic weapons. After 1959, the peace movement appeared to have waned, but it re-emerged again in the sixties as part of the renewed campaign against nuclear weapons (Easter March Movement) and would figure in the growth of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (**APO**) of the late 1960s.

## II

As the SPD's policy of *Angleichung* carried it toward a Grand Coalition, the 'material' and 'post-material' opposition it helped to generate increasingly coalesced into three interrelated but analytically separable currents, *viz.* a 'material', mainly traditional *democratic-socialist opposition*, a specifically *youth-oriented opposition*, and a greater *Sammelbewegung* concentrating on the issues of peace and evolving toward some form of party structure.

(1) The emergence of youth as a political factor imbued the opposition with new forces and new concerns. And here again, Social Democratic obsessions with probity and an image of respectability, rather than 'leftist factionalism', underlay this development. The SPD's Socialist Student League or SDS, long a reliable training school for higher party functionaries such as Helmut Schmidt and Erich Lohmar, contained a left wing which (implicitly) challenged the assumptions of party orthodoxy with its espousal of new currents in neo-Marxism (Frankfurt School, Third World liberation theory, etc.), its links with *konkret* magazine (edited by Klaus-Rainer Rohl and his then wife Ulrike Meinhof, a glossy periodical aimed at a young, anti-authoritarian and *sexually* liberated audience), its campaigns against former Nazis in high positions, its active involvement in the peace movement, its foreign policy that in every essential paralleled Willy Brandt's later *Ostpolitik*, and its willingness, under certain conditions, to undertake joint actions with communist organisations. For these reasons, the SPD leadership capitalised on an intra-SDS dispute in early 1960 to distance itself from the Left, support the Right's move to form a new, party-conforming group, and recognise and encourage the resulting Social Democratic University League or SHB. While the SDS then continued to operate outside the party (and to produce the theory and leadership of the West German 'New Left' as well as important elements in the Easter March Movement), the SHB in turn, pushed by the growing radicalisation of the student body and the popular awareness of the crisis

in higher education, adopted almost all the politics and concerns of the banished SDS. It was also eventually expelled from the SPD in the seventies.

(2) The socialist 'material' opposition, by contrast to the New Left, was unable to constitute itself into a mass movement. From the Society for the Promotion of the SDS (**SFG**)—a group of SPD members such as Abendroth, Flechtheim, Brakemeier, et. al. expelled from the SPD because of their continued support for the student movement—to its successor the Socialist League (**SB**) and the Union of Independent Socialists (**VUS**), these groups were unable to overcome the anti-communist propaganda, official sanctions and public indifference that prevailed in the Cold War-conditioned society of the FRG.

(3) The successes of the peace movement and growing popularity of the Easter Marchers led in **1960** to the formation of a single-issue party, the German Peace Union (**DFU**). Its minimal programme concentrated on foreign policy: military neutralisation of the FRG, peaceful reunification, disarmament, abolition of conscription, scrapping of the proposed emergency laws and removal of ex-Nazis from public office. Not unlike the Greens today, the DFU was thus essentially a protest movement and collection of various nationalist, neutralist, pacifist and some socialist oppositional groups, as well as most of the groups and individuals who had supported the St. Paul's Church and Gottingen movements. On this comparatively narrow basis, the party was able to register modest electoral successes of between one and two percent (**1.9** per cent in the **1961** federal elections). As the **DFU's** strength subsequently ebbed both as a result of internal disagreements and official hostility, however, other forms of 'post-material' opposition emerged. The Easter March Movement went well beyond the **KdA** and, far from alienating the multifarious groups that supported it, increased its nationwide mobilisation from about **1,000** marchers in **1960** to **100,000** in **1964**, to more than **150,000** in **1967**.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, the anti-emergency laws movement, made up of diverse scholars, intellectuals, media employees, as well as the student movement and most of the Left, culminated in a popular anti-authoritarian campaign with a mass congress 'Democracy in Distress' in Bonn in May **1965**.

Individually, the 'loss' of these oppositional groups was perceived as being of far less significance to the SPD leadership than the gain of supporters from the 'new' middle classes. Even collectively, the 'post-material' movements could be written off as a mere irritant—provided that the policy of adaptation could be vindicated by a share in state power. This the Grand Coalition of December **1966** furnished. But the agglutinating intra-party effect of shared opposition was also weakened by the **SPD's** new partnership with the **CDU/CSU** in a governing alliance. The coalition's programme of social peace and a 'tripartite alliance' of business, labour and the state so highly touted by SPD finance minister Karl Schiller,

found bitter and protracted opposition in the party wards and within the DGB. In all the Land elections following the formation of the Grand Coalition, the SPD's share of the popular vote dropped considerably. And in the trade unions there was a renewed movement to dissociate the labour movement from the SPD. Following the expulsion of the SHB, even the Young Socialists or Jusos (the totality of all party members under 36) was rapidly politicised in opposition to the coalition.

The formation of the Grand Coalition may be seen as the culmination of a series of structural contradictions in the FRG which together generated several pressures pointing beyond Social Democratism. The most salient of these were probably (1) the slowing down of the expansionist phase of the Economic Miracle and its first structural crisis, with a corresponding loss of the political parties' main legitimating factor—prosperity—and sense of purpose; (2) connected to this, a series of pathologies in the social and economic spheres which revealed the need for long-overdue reforms and the class nature of society; (3) a substantial shift in the front lines of the Cold War; detente between the superpowers and erection of the 'Wall' reduced the credibility of the spectre of a one-dimensional, expansionist communist foe and hence called into question the ideological underpinning of the CDU State; (4) increasing tendencies by the political elites in both parties to revert to authoritarian methods (emergency legislation, censorship, criminalisation of nonconformist groups) to enforce social discipline; and (5) a general sense of disillusion with politics and political parties regarded as monolithic, as parts of an all-embracing 'system' against which the individual was increasingly impotent and the object of powerful forces and interests.

From out of this multiplicity of structural contradictions emerged the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition. This qualitatively new oppositional form was based on a recognition that crucial vital interests, however defined, could not be realised within the existing political system and capitalist society which supported it. In particular, the SPD's entry into the Grand Coalition effectively ended any possibility of the parliamentary articulation and representation of the interests in preventing emergency legislation, in the anti-nuclear campaign, university reform, political justice, **renazification**, women's rights and an outmoded foreign policy regarded as a threat to peace. Spontaneity was the really striking feature about the APO's development. As though on a signal—the formation of the Grand Coalition—hundreds of groups and movements came together in demonstrations, actions, mass petitions, etc. Among these groups, four main types can be distinguished, each of which in its own way represented a logical reaction to Social Democratism: (1) a pacifist-neutralist current consisting of people, many of them former DFU members, who had supported the Easter March and the various congresses and actions against rearmament and the Western military alliance; (2) a more or less traditional Marxist

grouping, including members of the VUS, SB and supporters of *Die Andere Zeitung*, now generally referred to as the Old Left; (3) the New Left, which developed from the student movement and the SDS/SHB during the sixties; though divided into several factions, it constituted the real core of theorists, activists and mass basis of the APO.

This mass popular movement, as an anti-system opposition, mobilised hundreds of thousands of demonstrators and protesters for selected actions, triggered lasting reforms in the educational system, caused the established parties in some measure to rethink their tactics and, in the case of the SPD, their policies as well. Yet within three or four years it crumbled again, reverting to sectarian movements (R.A.F., Direct Action, Baader-Meinhof, etc.), dissolving into citizens' action groups, or re-entering mainstream political parties such as the re-legalised Communist Party, now called the DKP. In particular, many APO members found their way back to the SPD. (In fact, the speed with which the estranged Left returned to the SPD and the drastic rate of dissolution of anti-system opposition carry important lessons for the contemporary New Social Movements in the FRG and caution against a precipitate writing off of the staying power and mass basis of existing Social Democracy.)

Before this could happen, however, the SPD leadership, assailed by intra-party and extra-party, material and post-material opposition, deserted by traditional voters yet unable to balance these off with new supporters, was now forced to search for image-altering strategies to profile itself against its more successful coalition partner. These it found, having once achieved a share of national power, in the promise of Keynesian social reforms (education, pensions, 'limited co-determination, removal of 'morality laws', etc.) and above all in an alternative foreign policy—that is, precisely in those areas in which it had abandoned its independent stances with the Godesberg Programme and Wehner's speech!

With its participation in the Grand Coalition and its hard line against the socialist Left, the SPD could now use its image of respectability to address those social sectors who had hitherto remained immune to its 'modernising' appeal: the 'new' middle classes to whom it proffered a certain social orientation and the promise of a 'rationalisation' of the political economy, and the 'dynamic' export-oriented sectors of business who sought a more progressive *Ostpolitik* within the framework of which it could compensate for a lethargic world market by increasing trade with the East. A 'policy of domestic reforms' combined with a 'new *Ostpolitik*', made up the 'modern', technological image of a *Modell Deutschland* as one of the world's most successful capitalist economic and social systems.

In alliance with the also 'modernised' and 'rationalised' FDP under Walter Scheel, therefore, the SPD by 1969 was able to become the dominant partner in a Small Coalition based on an appeal to very diverse interests. As I wrote in last year's *Socialist Register*, *Ostpolitik* constituted

the central element in this *Znteressengemeinschaft*: To the Right it offered enhanced national power and prosperity, and to the Left it held out a more rational foreign policy, dialogue with the East, and a promise of ultimate detente and peace; for the Right Karl Schiller embodied technocratic efficiency, social partnership and state support of business interests, while for the Left Willy Brandt was the symbol of peace, liberalisation and compassion. In *Ostpolitik*, therefore, the "non-material" interests of politically separated families and friends combined with the "post-material" interests of the peace and anti-nuclear movements to constitute a mass basis for the very "materialist" interests of the more "dynamic" sectors of West German business—to which I should have added the equally 'material' interests represented by the trade union movement and the recipients of social welfare benefits.

This 'reversion' to pre-Godesberg political and social policy alternatives, which undermined the apolitical consensus of the Grand Coalition era, very quickly 'repoliticised' the electorate around the central issues of foreign and domestic policy. Contrary even to the SPD's basic intent of merely establishing a distinctive profile in order to attract 'new' voters and 'progressive' business sectors, the policy shifts produced a rapid re-ideologisation and polarisation in West German politics. During the last months of the Grand Coalition and, especially, in the period before the 1972 elections, the Christian Democrats—initially scarcely able to cope with their unexpected role as official opposition—reached back to Cold War terminology and anticommunist defamation tactics:

**Whether in [CDU General Secretary] Bienenkopf's elegant High German or in the vapid, beery Bavarian dialect [*Bierdunstbayrisch*] of a Strauss, the basic tactical pattern is the same: they appeal to resentments and prejudices, speculate on stupidity and count on a lack of democratic sensitivity in a country where there has never been a successful bourgeois revolution and which, in contrast to other Western democracies, has not been able to develop a real, politically functioning democratic public.<sup>14</sup>**

However, this strategy moved the CDU/CSU to the right, thus leaving important additional groups in the centre open to the Social Democrats. The illusion of a pending class struggle was reinforced by a corresponding 'information offensive' launched by the conservative sectors of business and their allied media, and supported by the 'old' middle classes. Mainly as a reaction to this conservative pressure, Social Democracy was compelled to assert its programme with a clarity and consistency dormant since the Schumacher era. For in addition to attracting mainstream managers, civil servants and technical intelligentsia, the SPD, in this polarising situation, had to retain its traditional 'material' support in the labour movement and attempt to win back its lost 'post-material' groups who had defected to the APO, DFU, or retreated into apathy. **The relation-**

ship between these groups and Social Democracy was highly nuanced as a result of the **SPD's** participation in the Grand Coalition.

Within the DGB there had been a sharp rise in organised militancy—the **1969** Steelworkers strike, the **1971** Metal Workers strike in **Baden-Württemberg**, etc.—in response to low wage settlements, economic priority to business recovery (investment incentives) and the general climate of social discipline created by the recession of the late sixties. At the same time, the trade union leadership, as a (subordinate) partner in the corporatist tripartism of 'concerted action', was increasingly alienated from its mass basis, who responded to reductions in their entitlements with wildcat strikes, protests, and the like. Fearing a mass mobilisation outside their control, the DGB leadership reacted with militant pronouncements even as it cooperated in such tripartite arrangements as reducing labour's negotiating autonomy by means of linking wage settlements to ostensibly 'scientific', 'objective' economic indicators and subjecting settlements arrived at in the public service to ratification by **parliament**.<sup>15</sup>

Yet even as labour attempted to resist cooptation into SPD-induced corporatist arrangements, the party registered a substantial increase in members, sympathizers and voters among the working classes as well as wage earners in general. This phenomenon, which has rightly been used to adduce the thesis that the SPD had become a 'class party against its will', can only be stated here in its ambiguity, in terms of a double contradiction. To begin with, the adoption by the SPD of the class-collaborationist Keynesian model of 'modernisation' conflicted with its continued reliance on a working class core for its mass basis. And second, the structural affinity of the SPD and DGB leaderships was undermined from two sides: economic recession and integration via corporatism into the capitalist state clashed with class-motivated worker actions whose goals led beyond the structural coordination implied by 'concerted action'. Hence:

**The Social Democratic-leaning functionary apparatus, in this situation, was confronted by the contradictory task of having to defend the workers' social accomplishments, from which they lived and which the workers, in their own interests, sought to maintain, but without allowing scope for their mobilisation, which could have destroyed the existing level of institutionalisation.**<sup>16</sup>

All these contradictions could be temporarily suspended, in a situation of economic growth and political polarisation, by a programme of domestic reforms. Prior to the **1972** elections, the unions engaged in a series of solidarity strikes, the so-called April Actions, to demonstrate labour support for the **SPD/FDP** coalition in the face of a non-confidence motion brought by the **CDU/CSU**. Not only did workers vote overwhelmingly for the SPD, therefore (one in two, cf. one in five or so among the 'new'

middle classes), they also resorted to extraparliamentary action to advance their class interests.

Similarly complex developments characterised the post-material Left within, or at least at the margin of the party. Many of the socialist elements in the APO, it has just been suggested, 'relocated' or returned to the SPD and operated within its youth organisation, the Jusos. Although the Juso organisation as such scarcely constituted a 'post-material' opposition,<sup>17</sup> its university-based, APO-influenced vanguard did. On the one hand, the Jusos were constrained to practise solidarity with the SPD and to support and, if possible, expand the relatively progressive policies of reform and detente. But on the other hand the Jusos were concerned with pushing beyond Social Democratism toward a post-capitalist democratic socialism. The tension contained in these essentially contradictory goals was expressed in the concept—first developed within the SDS<sup>18</sup>—of a 'dual strategy' of socialist opposition. This meant first, defending and extending existing rights and opportunities within the advanced capitalist system: cooperation with citizens' action groups on specific, vital issues (which will be examined presently), asserting and testing the limits of crucial liberal rights such as freedom of speech and assembly, acting as a 'core' and 'motor' of the left wing within the SPD, and mobilising popular support for socialist strategies at the workplace, neighbourhood or university. And second, it meant extra-parliamentary action to place pressure on the party and government, as well as the formulation of anticapitalist theories and programmes. Juso theory thus distinguished between 'system-immanent' reforms that merely shored up a declining capitalism, and 'system-overcoming' reforms whose cumulative effect would dismantle capitalist hegemony and in their ultimate effect 'transcend' that system. Like Harold Laski's 'revolution by consent' of the 1930s, the theory of system-overcoming reforms remained too subjective, too situation-dependent to be logically demonstrable; but it did suggest some of the central problems of evolving anticapitalist strategies from within Social Democracy. This theoretical ambiguity was also reflected in the **factionalisation** of the Jusos into a more or less Social Democratic wing, a socialist grouping, and a 'stamocap' (= state monopoly capitalism) faction, which during the seventies produced a lively discussion (and series of expulsions) within the Young Socialist organisation.

Paradoxically, however, the combination of *Ostpolitik* and domestic reforms—which pre-empted and/or reintegrated much of the 'material' and 'post-material' opposition, resulted in electoral victories for the Small Coalition in 1969 and 1972, and qualified Chancellor Brandt for a Nobel Peace Prize—at the same time clearly revealed the limits of Social Democracy in the advanced capitalist state, namely those 'given' by the Federal Republic's position in the capitalist world order and by the pattern of domestic socio-economic and political power distribution.

For *Ostpolitik* merely normalised and confirmed the *de facto* new international status quo which, objectively, ought to have been defined at the time of the formation of the two German states and, subjectively, had now penetrated into the consciousness of wide strata. Indeed, the SPD's own 1958 *Deutschlandplan*, renounced by Wehner's 1960 speech, had already contained all the essentials of Brandt's 1969 *Ostpolitik* (abolition of the Hallstein Doctrine, recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line, etc.). Besides, detente in Middle Europe was achieved entirely within, and as part of the respective bloc alliances. For the FRG, this meant in conformity with NATO and the Western Alliance as well as in the interests of the EEC and transnational business. Therefore, once these limits had been reached (and intersystem trade had been greatly enhanced), the progressive impulse *Ostpolitik* generated could not be developed into, for instance, the neutralisation and partial unification of all Europe or the demilitarisation of Middle Europe.

Similarly, the SPD's policy of domestic reforms, based on Keynesian 'modernising' and 'social engineering' premises, was unable to do more than respond to existing material needs and demands. To be sure, as a mere 'guest in power' in the peak institutions of the CDU State (i.e. legislature and chancellorship), the SPD was confined in its scope by the CDU-dominated Bundesrat, High Courts and most local governments as well as by the need to rake account of the veto power of its coalition partner, the FDP. But such reforms were mainly constrained by the SPD's strategy of adaptation and voter-maximisation. Social Democratic reformism reveals that 'neither bureaucratic-technocratic visions, nor nationalisation visions uncoupled from reality can effect a transformation of structural social inequalities'.<sup>19</sup> In other words, social reforms implemented as part of an existing, capitalist-formed delivery structure are both inadequate and reversible. 'Structure-changing' measures, on the other hand, according to Axel Murswieck, would have had to entail decentralisation, popular participation, correction of the mechanisms of distribution and new forms of extra-state care such as the use of laypersons in medicine or participatory types of non-state management. The specific example he cites is the health care system. Since social reformist policies left intact the private ownership principle as a foundation of health care—pharmaceutical industry, hospitals, doctors—and therefore the criterion of profitability, there has been no further scope for improvement beyond one-time legislated measures: 'Thus, e.g., the implementation of early-diagnosis examinations has become more a kind of financing for the middle class rather than an impetus toward the introduction of a broad system of preventive medicine extending into the workplace, which has everywhere been recognised as necessary.'<sup>20</sup>

From this perspective, Social Democratic reformism can be seen as finite and ultimately dysfunctional, if not framed in terms of a coherent

set of goals, a vision. The point has been made that the SPD's *Kulturpolitik* was incapable of dealing with the consequences of the 'modernisation' process it set in motion. Reforms in education (greater accessibility, improved infrastructures, etc.) ought to have simultaneously concentrated on inculcating democratic and rational values as against traditional hierarchical thinking and authoritarian values. Social Democracy had therefore

... not succeeded in destroying the hard core of sovereign-statist and authoritarian, pre-democratic traditions and attitudes characteristic of German political culture since even before fascism. Social Democratic modernization is an external process, not accompanied by a modernization of values, attitudes and forms of political association. Traces of an authoritarian, aggressive 'political naturalism' resting on categories of age, sex, nationality and race can be found as much today as in the Fifties.<sup>21</sup>

Since it did not or could not 'modernise' the political culture in this way, the SPD was a first victim when during the mid and late seventies the rightward *Tendenzwende* induced a rollback of 'welfarism'.

'Victim' here may be a less adequate term than 'architect'. The SPD's conscious policy of adaptation had led it to abandon the long-term goals for which it sought political power. From an opinion-making party it had transformed itself into an opinion-following organisation. In place of substantial social change, *Modell Deutschland* aspired merely to streamline and rationalise the CDU State.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, to argue that Social Democracy had somehow failed to seize a historical opportunity to effect social progress is to impute to it a set of goals it no longer espoused. At the very peak of its 'progressive' period in 1972, for instance, it initiated the Anti-Radical Decree (*Berufsverbot*) which banned from public service employment persons held to be 'extremists', 'radicals' or 'anti-democrats', and which has been used principally as a means of disciplining the Left.<sup>23</sup> The polarised election campaign of 1972, the temporary situation of being a 'class party against its will', a record turnout of issue-oriented voters (91.1 per cent), the mobilisation of mainly working-class voters despite the hesitant support of members of the 'new' middle classes, and the election itself which made the SPD the largest single party in the FRG—all these 'unforeseen' developments were not perceived as a mandate for social transformation but as an imperative to retrench, consolidate, 'depoliticise' and re-occupy the mainstream of the political system. In this context, not to deepen and link the reforms and to mobilise one's supporters behind them is to go over to the political defensive. Adam Przeworski writes:

The abandonment of reformism is a direct consequence of those reforms that have been accomplished. Since the state is engaged almost exclusively in those

activities which are unprofitable from the private point of view, it is deprived of financial resources needed to continue the process of nationalization. Having nationalized deficitary sectors, social democrats undermined their very capacity to gradually extend the public realm. At the same time, having strengthened the market, social democrats perpetuate the need to mitigate the distributional effect of its operation. Welfare reforms do not even have to be 'undone' by bourgeois governments. It is sufficient that the operation of the market is left to itself for any length of time and inequalities increase, unemployment fluctuates, shifts of demand for labour leave new groups exposed to impoverishment, etc.<sup>24</sup>

### III

These considerations touch directly on what is surely the primary contradiction of contemporary social democracy. To satisfy the material needs and expectations of workers and consumers it must continuously extend the range and quality of state services, particularly welfare measures. The expending state structure, which social democracy consciously fosters and benefits from, must be financed by constant economic growth and productivity improvements in the private sector. Generally, therefore, social democracy has a *prior* interest in creating and maintaining conditions for the enhanced profitability of capitalist enterprise, especially its dynamic, monopoly sectors whose growth is as a rule more rapid and more responsive to state interests. The contradiction implied here, between furthering the interests of labour and capital simultaneously, is suspended, in a situation of constant economic growth, by the Keynesian welfare state.

The 'Keynesian equation' of economic prosperity, combined with public spending (emphasis on policy 'outputs' or demands to transfer purchasing power to the subordinate classes, so stimulating production) and social partnership (state as mediator between capital and labour) was and remains the foundation of social democratic politics in advanced capitalism. Although social democracy has been better situated (closer links with labour, 'modemising' ethos, social orientation), all mass political parties have, in varying degrees, taken the Keynesian welfare state as given; contemporary politics revolves mainly around the relative positions (or shares) of capital, labour and the state, but until the most recent sustained economic crisis, has not been concerned with the central role of the Keynesian equation itself.

For the welfare state, although able to incorporate almost all social groups into its nexus by offering something for everyone, arises in response to, and *primarily serves the interests of capital*. In Germany, its precedent was the complex of pre-emptive welfare benefits that legitimated the ruling authoritarian economic and political order of the Second Reich summed up in the concept of 'Bismarxianism'. In the FRG, as elsewhere in Western Europe, the rise of the welfare state can be regarded as a means of resolving the root contradictions of capitalism in the interests of what Marx called the collective capitalist. Offe, invoking Marx, explains

the 'contradictions of the welfare state' in terms of a commodification/decommodification dichotomy,<sup>25</sup> which may be stated as follows. As capitalism moves from its *laissez-faire* and organised phases into advanced or monopoly capitalism, it tends increasingly to produce negative collective outcomes, such as environmental pollution, urban decay, intolerable income differentials and excessive unemployment. Particularised and segmented individual capitals are however unable to overcome these dysfunctional symptoms on their own strength. In other words, the continuous commodification of society, which capital needs, is undermined by the inherent development of capital itself. If these tendencies were left unchecked, they would produce decommodification in the sense of delegitimation, lack of a trained workforce, a society incapable of reproducing itself, counter-cultures and revolutionary movements.

The welfare state is implemented in order to resolve these contradictions: it selectively decommodifies, as it were, in order to maintain the commodified economy in new forms. As capitalism erodes the traditional social institutions that once ensured the reproduction of labour power—family, Church, charity organisations—the state increasingly assumes their functions, for instance by providing pensions, unemployment schemes, safety standards, housing construction, health care, and other 'catchment areas' for the old, infirm and unemployable. It introduces universal, compulsory education and underwrites a complex system of intermediate and higher education corresponding to the increasing division of labour in modern society. And it regulates and controls the interrelations among the various sectors of capital (anti-trust laws, fair competition) to ensure the coordination of the system as a whole. In each case, the primary objective, commodification, has long-term secondary effects: decommodification. Thus the measures intended to ensure reproduction of the labour force also create a certain autonomous sphere for individuals as citizens into which the capitalist mode of production cannot fully penetrate. Education and training do not only produce a skilled workforce, they also impart critical faculties and interests that remove individuals somewhat from the capital nexus (leisure time, private pursuits). The regulation of capital movements and powers creates certain legal safeguards for citizens.

The trade-off for this necessary decommodification is a far greater state involvement in the economy as a central actor. It not only subsidises the losses incurred by the capitalist economy (public services, infrastructures) and provides subventions, tax write-offs, etc. to facilitate private enterprise, it also moves into certain key sectors (defence, aircraft manufacture, telecommunications, nuclear energy) that drive the economy. The welfare state thus develops in several complementary directions: (1) It is a bigger state corresponding to the increased tasks it must perform in providing public services, propelling and coordinating the economy, and

furthering the process of commodification. (2) It becomes a technocratic state with a 'modernising' mission. To cope with its growing 'load' it emphasises planning, regulation, rationality and efficiency, and extends its technocratic orientation into an 'administered society' and a process of 'social engineering'. (3) And in the narrower realm of politics it tends toward 'depoliticisation' and 'rationalisation' of contentious issues and conflicting interests. Politics is generally reduced to controlled competition among organised interests, and solutions are sought through expertise and/or compromise. 'The decline of legislatures', 'the end of ideology', 'the party cartel', 'bureaucratisation', 'the technocratic society', and 'pluralism' are all current expressions of the quality and direction of politics in the welfare state.

To sum up (and again following Offe), the Keynesian welfare state does several things simultaneously: (1) it maintains the domination of capital, even as (2) it erodes and challenges its power, and (3) it compensates for its disruptive, dysfunctional effects.

#### IV

The *conditio sine qua non* of the Keynesian model is therefore continuous growth and prosperity, which facilitate an intricate *ordering* of social relations, including potential class conflict, and *stabilisation* of economic development, which in turn legitimates and vindicates the capitalist socio-economic system over time. In this section I want to argue that when growth is interrupted, as it has been by the stagflation crisis since the early and mid-seventies, then the assumptions of order and stability are also called into question. The state's logical response, in the first case, is repression, including 'administrative repression', and in the second case, a kind of technologisation (or 'depoliticisation') of social life in the form of collective arrangements ('corporatism') and selective interest perception.

The post-OPEC economic crisis showed West German Social Democracy to be particularly vulnerable to the contradictions of the welfare state. The traumatisation of the population as a result of experiences of the inflation/depression cycle of the twenties and thirties, combined with a postwar 'regime legitimacy' that has rested more on economic prosperity and ability to deliver goods and services than on popular ideals or affective loyalties, rendered the FRG more susceptible than other advanced capitalist countries to the social-psychological effects of the crisis.

The crisis has also revealed that, in the words of Alan Wolfe, '... the particular class compositions that enabled social democratic experiments to take place are decomposing *faster* than other political coalitions, making social democratic parties as a rule the single most vulnerable to possible *decomposition*.'<sup>36</sup> Wolfe's observation is borne out by the erosion in the SPD's mass basis after 1973/74. As the economic growth rate in

the seventies slowed to about one-third that of the 1950s<sup>27</sup> and became virtually stagnant in the early eighties, the resulting scarcity undermined the foundations of social partnership which quickly resorted to a Social Darwinian contest of strength among organised groups.

On the Right, capital has become less willing to accept Social Democracy's mediating role in the social partnership and has come to see the **recession/depression** as an opportunity to tighten social discipline. Eschewing the once popular notion of a posited 'entrepreneurial social conscience', it has reverted to a more expressly class-conscious, ideological offensive aimed at a recommodification of social relationships: intensification of anticommunism, calls for the dismantling of the welfare state, return to traditional values such as the work ethic, law and order, frugality and self-reliance, coupled however with an advocacy of stronger national defence, firmer control of dissent and nonconformity, and enhanced state incentives to business as a motor of economic recovery.

At the Centre, the 'new' middle classes of experts and administrators increasingly share with the 'old' middle classes of small businessmen, artisans and farmers an unwillingness to continue to pay for the costs of the welfare state and a desire to maintain status and income differentials which they see it as corroding. Where the former classes were essentially 'on loan' to the SPD during the period of social modernisation and foreign policy rationalisation, in times of economic reverse they tend to share with capital and the old middle classes an apprehension of economic 'levelling' and productivity decline, and therefore defect in increasing numbers from Social Democracy.

On the 'material' Left—the 'post-material' Left will be discussed in the next section—the labour movement becomes increasingly divided and marginalised. While the weaker, less organised unions continue to advocate labour solidarity and collective bargaining, the leaders of the stronger, more central organisations tend to favour corporate arrangements in order to maximise their particular interests:

**Even unions act as separate bureaucracies for managing interests. They are essentially busy defining and filtering out 'employee' interests so that they remain compatible with the capitalist modernization strategies and the structural changes determined by the world market—which means: representation of the wage interests of the (qualified, male, German) 'core employee groups' in the production and service sectors tied into the world market.<sup>28</sup>**

The unions are further fragmented between a leadership that for its own reasons is bent on continued collaboration, and a base directly affected by the decline of the social partnership provisions and hence increasingly militant. More and more divided between grass-roots pressures for a larger share of 'outputs' and systemic adaptation at the top, between the special interests of particular unions versus the need for labour

solidarity, and between organised and non-organised workers, many trade unionists have not been able to go beyond a strictly defensive strategy of attempting to uphold the status quo or—especially among the less skilled, less well paid—have retreated into apathy. Nevertheless, until the 1980s, workers have remained overwhelmingly loyal to the SPD in their voting behaviour, though increasingly critical and inclined toward industrial action **and/or** withholding their vote. Their general continued adherence to Social Democracy is explained by Andrei Markovits in this way: 'Faced with the choice of an SPD-led government that fulfilled fewer and fewer of their needs and the prospect of a **CDU/CSU** return to power, the unions chose to go with the lesser of two evils, thereby replicating the famous "hostage-to-a-friendly-government syndrome".'<sup>29</sup>

The crisis of the welfare state, in the FRG, is therefore at the same time a crisis of Social Democracy as the centre of a coalition of forces whose function is to commodify the capitalist state. Given the primacy of capital in the Keynesian equation and in the construct of *Modell Deutschland*, the SPD could hardly seek solutions that in any way countered the prevalent direction of the *Tendenzwende*. On the contrary, the party leadership, assumed in 1974 by Helmut Schmidt and a new 'management team', chose to abandon the party's reformist and foreign policies in favour of a strategy of 'crisis management' and 'pragmatic administration'. It moved from a demand-oriented economic polity to one of 'selected measures to restructure industrial production toward industries that are more competitive on the world market'.<sup>30</sup> In conformity with the dominant conservative theses of 'ungovernability' and 'system overload', it aimed at recommodifying the political economy by subjecting a greater part of it to market imperatives, e.g. by controlling unit wage costs, stimulating capital formation and encouraging productivity increases. In other words, the SPD turned to supply-side, monetarist economics as a way of breaking the impasse caused by stagflation. This policy was intended to

**... structure problems so as to make them manageable. Quantity and skill level of the work force, energy and raw materials, the price level at which labor power and natural resources are available, and the level and rate of technical change are the foci of economic policies that no longer merely respond to problems but that try to change the nature of problems so as to make future responses possible.**<sup>31</sup>

As analogous policy developments under Thatcher and Reagan have clearly indicated, monetarist economic policy is by no means merely a technical economic device; it is a conscious instrument to further the interests of capital. The stabilisation that it attempts to achieve is a stability of capital accumulation which, in a shrinking economy, necessarily takes place at the expense of the non-owners of capital. In fact, SPD monetarism

—or for that matter CDU/CSU-FDP monetarism; the policy effects are party-indifferent—has not only promoted an outflow of West German capital abroad (where wage demands are lower and labour discipline stronger), it has also led to capital intensification at home thus furthering structural unemployment<sup>32</sup> (or the 'natural rate of unemployment' as technocratic newspeak might put it).

In any case, crisis management and monetarism are comprehensible less in terms of their technical efficacy than as a means of 'depoliticising' a whole series of issues by placing them beyond the reach of liberal-democratic politics. Particularly, issues of redistribution and welfare entitlements, which are defined as the crux of the state overload problem, can be relegated to ostensibly technical problems to be dealt with by experts and therefore outside political debate. In this way economic policies directed toward business recovery can be passed off as in the interests of general economic progress. For instance, the 1973 system of price controls and wage freezes based on scarce money increased the relative strength of the financial sectors, did not harm big business, but had almost no redistributive effects at all. The 1974 programme of '*stabilitätsgerechter Aufschwung*' (recovery with stability) improved profits by means of tax and depreciation write-offs and government contracts (= subsidies) to business, but hardly reduced unemployment. And the 1975 public spending programme, which actually contained a reduced social welfare component, was spent mainly to aid business.<sup>33</sup> Austerity budgets, deflationary economic policies and an incapacity to generate jobs completed the economic policy package of the SPD.

The technocratic propensity of *Modell Deutschland* also extended to the institutionalisation and regulation of organised interests to engineer consent for what Hirsch has termed an 'authoritarian-democratic system based on bureaucratic mass organisations without mass participation.'<sup>34</sup> One side of this institutionalised legitimation was the selective neo-corporatism described above. Concerted action, behind closed official doors, was able to induce tripartite consensus between the state, trade union and business elites and bypass the clogged channels of the 'overloaded' representative state institutions. As a consensus-producing mechanism that united the most powerful interests in the corporate and labour organisations. Social Democratic corporatism consciously excluded the weaker elements: foreigners, women, youth and older workers, thus converting class struggles to group struggles and doing nothing to reduce racism, sexism and anti-welfarism within the subordinate classes.

The other side of the 'authoritarian-democracy' formula is a vast, far-reaching bureaucratisation of political and social life, as summed up in the concept of a 'party-state' intertwined with the state bureaucracy, the broadcast media, judiciary and the powerful economic interests. These symptoms, Kenneth Dyson notes, correspond to a decline in intra-party

democracy and increasing bureaucratisation of the parties themselves.<sup>35</sup> The political parties, in a word, can be seen as over-adapting, over-institutionalised, over-generalised and hence **over-loaded**.<sup>36</sup> Not without reason, therefore, the concept of *verdrossen*, in its dual sense of fed up and irritated, has become a popular catchword in the political lexicon of the FRG—Staatsverdrossenheit, *Parteiverdrossenheit*, indeed *Politikverdrossenheit*.

One further and most telling aspect of this tendency toward depoliticisation should be considered, namely that *repression* necessarily inheres in it. In Offe's words, 'depoliticisation of conflict potentials and intensification of political repression. . . seem to be the two polar points of a spectrum of alternatives for describing the possible strategies of the capitalist state in advanced industrial societies.'<sup>37</sup> For where large numbers of people are alienated from political life, where stronger interests prevail over weaker ones, and where promised reforms founder on the superior 'veto power' of capital, the resultant conflicts stand to erupt even more sharply than would be the case under a system of more rationalised conflict resolution. Thus the 'progressive' *Ostpolitik*, as has been shown, coincided with the administrative terror of the *Berufsverbot*. During the last decade of SPD government, repression became an increasingly deployed instrument to contain the conflicts generated by the decline in the Keynesian consensus. The anti-terrorist campaign of the mid-seventies, the law and order fetishism of the conservative parties which the SPD felt constrained to outdo, the expansion of the legal system (from the police force and special branch to the judiciary) and the criminalisation of political protest<sup>38</sup> were means of rationalising away the looming pathologies of Social Democratism.

So long as it remained the party of government, then, the SPD was locked into the contradictions of 'its' welfare state and hence the crisis of advanced capitalism. It was not that the SPD-led government posed a threat to *Modell Deutschland* or the class interests which underpinned it. On the contrary. Rather, the party could no longer mobilise mass support for government policy. Sectors within its core following among the working class were lost to apathy or in some cases to other parties. 'Progressive' business groups had long since defected and the new middle classes were doing the same. The ecology and peace groups were also estranged and, following initial electoral successes in 1978 and 1979, constituted an alternative party by 1980. The SPD's coalition partner, the FDP, which was not committed to a working class mass basis, increasingly saw monetarism, a reduced state role and a more unmitigated reliance on market forces as the necessary solution to stagflation and economic immobilism. The Christian Democrats, though somewhat tardier in adapting to the *Tendenzwende* (e.g. in presenting Franz-Josef Strauss, an ultra-conservative identified with regional interests, as their chancellor candidate in the

1980 elections), were gradually able to appropriate the 'modernisation', 'in-tune-with-the-times' image of themselves once they had managed to divest themselves of their clerical Weltanschauung, their hidebound class image, their **hardline** anticommunism and other vestigial ideological elements. With a refurbished set of slogans related to performance, efficiency, rationality and flexibility, all adjusted to post-Keynesian exigencies, they emerged as the more pure 'protagonist for modern capitalism',<sup>39</sup> thus in a way emulating the SPD's breakthroughs of fifteen years earlier, though now advancing from the **right**.<sup>40</sup>

One is indeed tempted to advance the thesis that the SPD's 'objective function' in the West German capitalist state was to expand, **humanise** and rationalise the CDU State while the conservative forces were recovering and regrouping in the interval between Cold War clerical anticommunism and the new post-Keynesian recommodification. Electoral tendencies during the past decade seem to confirm this thesis. By **1976**, the CDU at **48.6** per cent of the national vote recovered its lost voters, while the SPD at **42.6** per cent was reduced to its **1969** level. Even the **1980** candidature of Strauss did not aid the SPD, whose share remained at **42.9** per cent, but the FDP which went from **7.9** per cent in **1976** to **10.6** per cent in **1980**. As the economic crisis heightened in **1980** and **1981** and the class bases of the parties became even clearer, the SPD-FDP coalitions in the various *Länder* came apart, so that by **1982** only Hesse was still governed by a Small Coalition. In **1981** the SPD also lost its majorities in all the big cities, notably Hamburg and West Berlin. The ten per cent gap between the CDU/CSU (**48.8** per cent) and the SPD (**38.2** per cent) in the **1983** elections—greater now than at any time since **1957**—together with the decline of the Free Democrats (**6.9** per cent) and the emergence of the Greens (**5.6** per cent) sealed the *Tendenzwende*. Significantly, Social Democracy was said to have lost **750,000** voters to the Greens and **1.8 M** to the Christian Democrats in that **election**.<sup>41</sup>

## V

The disintegration of the Keynesian equation has not only caused a series of realignments in the existing party political system—particularly a dual 'material' and 'post-material' alienation from Social Democracy—it has also produced a mass basis for a 'New Politics' in part 'beyond' Social Democracy which however was already present in the 'post-material' opposition of the sixties.

Stagflation, relative scarcity and the shrinkage of the welfare state have coincided with a partial satiation of most material needs for at least the upper and middle classes in advanced capitalist society. Not only the assumption of the desirability of constant economic growth has been shaken, therefore, but even the belief that growth itself is possible and

desirable. Without some vision of a 'post-material' 'no-growth' society, social relations are increasingly reduced to an already alluded to Social Darwinian zero-sum competition, replacing the cooperative, positive-sum ethos of the Keynesian welfare state. Moreover, as in 'post-industrial society' the numbers and importance of collective goods—defence, community well-being (including a clean environment), law and order—more and more occupy a central position in economic and social activity, politics tends to focus more on collective action either to demand such goods (roads, welfare benefits, **security**) or to avert the undesirable consequences of other goods (industrial pollution, urban decay). Such demands are necessarily addressed to the state, and the government in particular. Thus the class struggle is in part displaced from the axis of capital versus labour into the public sphere, in the form of conflicts for control over organisations that serve the commodity form (universities, public service, health system, etc.). The literature on 'post-material' social developments overwhelmingly demonstrates that strike actions, industrial disputes, collective bargaining, etc. are growing much more rapidly in the public, rather than the private sector. Within the public sector, however, the absence of adequate performance-measuring criteria *de facto* makes relative group strength, rather than one's own place in the process of production, the only consistent determinant of success in advancing one's group claims. To this complex of factors should be addressed the partially decommodified individual sphere, outlined earlier, of increased education, welfare, medical care and so on, which provides a relative degree of autonomy and the possibility of limited withdrawal from the commodity nexus for broad sectors of the population.

The picture that emerges is one of increasing politicisation of hitherto non-politicised areas of social life paradoxically espousing 'post-material' values on the strength of a range of material enablements; and this process is evolving within the context of official political forms anchored in the commodified form. The results, again as have been described, are apathy, cynicism, narrow interest-focused protest and an all-pervasive sense of *Verdrossenheit*. In a word, formal political institutions and concerns are less subject to political action even as the formerly 'private' or 'limited' aspects of everyday life are sharply 'politicised'. Where 'material' opposition once attempted to capture state power, 'post-material' opposition would dismantle it. And where the traditional Right sought to ward off modernisation and industrialisation as such, 'post-materialists' oppose the instrumentality of these processes. They argue, for instance, that the material benefits of the welfare state also entail bureaucratisation, *étatisme* and social discipline (poverty traps, means tests, etc.); or that 'material' concern with national security has enhanced the risk of war; or that a growth-based economy is destructive of the **environment**.<sup>42</sup>

Hence 'post-material' politics today is measured against criteria for which

no basis of legitimacy exists in either the economic or political orders. It is within this context that the broad movement of citizens' action groups (*Bürgerinitiativen* or **BI**s) in the FRG must be comprehended. It is important to recall that the **BI**s antedate the current economic crisis, but that that crisis has contributed to their development into a mass movement.

As the APO and its constituent groups receded in the late sixties and early seventies, the **BI**s increased proportionately, and the continuities between them in motives (overcoming state ossification and omissions), style (spontaneity, militancy) and tactics (protests, single-issue orientation, action in the extra-parliamentary sphere) are self-evident. The main difference is that the **BI**s generally are more locally concentrated (and therefore also fragmented) and espouse correspondingly more immediate causes. From the early-seventies actions on the issues of urban planning and highway construction to participation in the ecology and peace movements in the mid-seventies, the **BI** movement has grown to about **50,000** groups with a total membership of some 1.7 M—as many as are members of all the political parties.<sup>43</sup> Yet about two-thirds of these groups have a membership of less than **50**, and may expect to survive from twelve months to a few years; only about **25** per cent 'present cultural, social and environmental issues in such a way as to achieve an impact on the whole of society'.<sup>44</sup> Dominated by civil servants (especially teachers), students, professionals and white-collar employees, their memberships contain only about ten per cent workers.<sup>45</sup>

Organised into small groups to place pressure on a local planning board or forming demonstrations of hundreds of thousands in favour of disarmament; operating in schools, at the workplace and in residential areas in cities and towns, the citizens' action groups generally practise unmediated, direct democracy; by their very existence they are a refutation of and challenge to established forms and methods of political interest representation and action.

For this reason, the various attempts to integrate and coordinate the **BI** movement by means of a peak association (or 'anti-party party' in Petra Kelly's coinage) have been problematic. Nevertheless, as the 'Alternatives'—the Green List in Bremen, the Bunte Liste: *Verteidigt* Euch in Hamburg, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection in W. Berlin, the Free Greens in Constance, the **Baden-Württemberg** Green Action Future (GAZ), the **Alternative/Green** List in Leverkusen, etc.—began to reach the limits of isolated, 'hedonist' political action during the late seventies, they were more and more compelled to look beyond their 'grassroots fixations' and 'abstract anti-parliamentarism'<sup>46</sup> toward an organisational form combining their extra-parliamentary concerns with a collective political strategy in order to counter the organised hegemony of the established groups. Because the **BI**s are mainly single-issue oriented and locally operative, they tend not to compete with, but complement one

another. Their common concern is group autonomy and individual liberation, and joint action is based on these common interests:

**They rally against the tendencies of mass democracy often perceived as willed by fate—the creeping levelling and replacement of the individual by anonymous mass social groups, the complete mediatization of the citizen under the aegis of the full-blown 'Party State'. Unlike the parties, they restore the ordinary citizen to the political stage as an acting subject. No longer is he merely the 'raw material' of rational administrative strategies, existing only to be 'consumed by the institutions'.<sup>47</sup>**

Thus the alternative movement in many ways goes beyond the formal liberal definition of citizenship to emphasise full individual participation in a kind of *neo-Gemeinschaft*. Rejecting what Hirsch calls the 'Taylorisation of vital conditions'—the pervasive alienation and anomie of *Modell Deutschland*—it is antibureaucratic, decentralised and individualistic: a kind of 'do-it-yourself form of representation' (in Guggenberger's term) to compensate for deficiencies in the system of official political representation. This emphasis on methods relates to the important insight, first popularised by the Marcuse-influenced sectors among the New Left, that the means and ends of social action are closely interrelated and that therefore the quality and feasibility of social change are conditioned by the form and substance of the methods by which that change is sought. Thus the APO-pioneered means are still widely used by the New Social Movements: demonstrations, petitions, disruption of traffic, civil disobedience, etc. A characteristic and indeed brilliant strategy has been evolved by the squatters' movement, namely the practice of *Instandbesetzung*, a practically untranslatable term that suggests not only occupation of housing units unutilised mostly as a consequence of property speculation, but also the restoration, beautification and 'human-friendly' renovation of such units—a most effective statement of what living conditions might be in a 'green' world.

Initial forays into the formal political sphere revealed the depth of support in West German society for the Alternatives: in 1978 the Green Alternative Lists gained three per cent of the popular vote in the Hamburg elections and four per cent in Lower Saxony. These were followed by three per cent in the 1979 elections to the European Parliament and a first overcoming of the Five Per Cent Hurdle in the elections in Bremen in 1979 and Baden-Württemberg in 1980. On the strength of these gains, the G/AL was able to constitute itself as a party in 1980, and achieved a national share of 1.5 per cent of the total vote in that year's elections. By 1983, the 'Greens', as the party is popularly called, with 5.6 per cent of the federal vote, became the first new parliamentary party since the 1950s, and certainly the first since the mid-forties to suggest an actual, mass-based alternative politics beyond Social Democracy.

For reasons analogous to the diversity and heterogeneity of the BIs that make up their core, the Greens cannot be readily analysed in ('material') terms of Left and Right. The party's slogan, 'neither Right nor Left but out front' best captures its self-image. No doubt, the peace and ecology movements are the main pillars of the party—hence the popular designation 'ecopax'—but it is also strongly supported by the feminist, sexual-equality, alternative-lifestyle and other movements, as well as some sectors of the Left.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Green programme<sup>48</sup> is designed as a minimal consensus-producing basis of action rather than a codified document like conventional party programmes. However:

**When one speaks of the Green/Alternative parties, it must first of all be remembered that they are based on trends, movements and cultures which must be understood specifically as the negation of prevailing socio-political conditions with all the consequent contradictions and ambivalences.<sup>49</sup>**

The Green programme has been summarised as a general desire for decentralisation, democratisation and downsizing. Its primary concerns are the threats to peace and the environment which it sees as rooted in the growth-economy, the consumerism of capitalist society and the unequal distribution of resources among the members of society. It also eschews state ownership of the means of production with the argument that nationalisation produces bureaucratisation and domination, and advocates private property without exploitation. These are all formulated in terms of longer-term goals without, however, the specific means of realising them.

The means are rather implicit and must be inferred from the 'organisation' of the party itself as the instrument for the ultimate realisation of these goals. As already suggested, the BIs are the organisational basis of the Greens who merely guide and coordinate 'basis politics'. Still,

**these aggregation and articulation functions which the Greens undertake for both systemic and anti-system movements underline the equivocal role which the party plays in both rejecting the status quo of industrialized advanced monopoly capitalism through counter-hegemonic practice, and also in contributing to the legitimization of that system.<sup>50</sup>**

This problem is replicated at the federal (as well as local and *Land*) level, where the Greens attempt to institutionalise principles of direct democracy by means of collective leadership, imperative mandates and two-year rotation of deputies. The further the Greens move from their initial role as forum and protest movement toward actual, sustained strategies and tactics for social change, the more *the organisational question divides the movement*. In particular, a pronounced division occurs between

(1) the elected deputies who, like Petra Kelly, see the need for 'competence' and 'continuity', for more 'efficient and reliable structures' (including parliamentary assistants) to carry out better research, and for a more adequate division of intra-party labour among the various local and regional levels,<sup>51</sup> or who, like federal deputy Dirk Schneider, see in the amateurism of party officials an accumulation by default of day-to-day leadership work on the part of the Greens' 27 Bundestag members<sup>52</sup> and (2) the party 'grassroots' such as Rudolf Bahro who see the parliamentary party as increasing its relative strength *vis-à-vis* the party basis and for whom intra-party democracy is thus jeopardised.<sup>53</sup>

These tensions are further complicated in as much as they are overlaid by contending basic currents within the party. (To speak of factions or organised groups would be to invoke a terminology not applicable to the Green situation; what is meant is the discussion about which means are appropriate to the realisation of joint long-term goals.) The multifarious intra-party currents may for analytical purposes be classified according to their class perspective. On one side is what might be termed an 'Ecopax-First' grouping, represented by figures such as Bahro and Kelly, who see the Green movement itself, with its primary and overriding aims of peace and a humanised environment, as transcending class politics. Bahro has expressed this position most coherently: 'We are the organ not of any particular interest but of the general interest. We are against the established interests, however, and most strongly against the interests of capital, the big corporations and the state.'<sup>54</sup> This group generally oppose any cooperation with Social Democracy, and, although critical of both super-powers, in part advocate unilateral disarmament of the FRG, if necessary, combined with citizen enlightenment and mobilisation as a deterrent against outside intervention. The antimilitarism of the 'Realpolitiker', on the other hand, is directed more or less equally against both super-powers. Prepared in some cases to undertake what Rudi Dutschke *once* termed 'the long march through the institutions', this group emphasises the need for Green organisational and technical 'counterstrength' to overcome the capitalist state, which may include temporary working arrangements with the SPD, or at least its progressive elements. These 'realists', represented by Joschka Fischer and Otto Schilly, are less ambiguous than the Ecology-Firsters about the constructive use of 'humanised' and 'controlled' modern technology.

Significantly, the socialist Left has been unable to find a consistent role within the Greens. Former members of various Marxist-Leninist associations, such as Rainer Trampert and Thomas Ebermann, have tended to agree with the Ecopax-First group in its differentiation of the perceived threat of Eastern and Western militarism respectively. But the independent socialists, such as Oskar Negt, Claus Offe and the late Rudi Dutschke—in so far as they do not remain at the fringe of the Greens—tend to ally with

the *Realpolitiker* in as much as they are not prepared to abandon the possibility of collaboration with (sectors of) the SPD and trade unions. They are as a rule inclined to seek a fusion between 'material' and 'post-material' opposition groups and to regard the class struggle as the primary contradiction in capitalist society.

Both tendencies point beyond Social Democracy, however. For Bahro, the point is essentially a socio-cultural, rather than a class, struggle. The proletariat is for him no longer a revolutionary force since it has long since been integrated into the capitalist system, as demonstrated by its support for colonialism in the past and the trade unions' system-maintaining function in the present. Rather:

It is the industrial system itself which is about to undo us—not the bourgeois class but the system as a whole in which the working class plays the role of housewife. It would therefore be a most inappropriate strategy for survival to appeal to the working class. . . . Today it is hard to say whether the small entrepreneur or the worker has the greatest interest in building something like the West Runway at Frankfurt Airport. In Berlin construction workers demonstrated against the squatters because they wanted jobs **modernizing** the squatted houses. The working class here is the richest lower class in the world. And if I look at the problem from the point of view of the whole of humanity, not just from that of Europe, then I must say that the metropolitan working class is the worst exploiting class in **history**.<sup>55</sup>

But the middle and upper classes, for their part, will recognise that the interests of survival precede those of class and thus bring about a **supra-class** 'movement of regeneration'. This is 'not a question of class collaboration but of a compromise in **the** face of crisis—atom bomb, nuclear power, ecological disaster—that threatens us **all**'.<sup>56</sup> Bahro proposes nothing less than a 'cultural revolution' to transform a capitalist society which, as it were, is simply withering away without conflict or class struggle. Like the Christian Church, which somehow 'took the place' of the Roman Empire, the ecopax movement will regenerate and transform capitalist society.<sup>57</sup>

For Offe, on the other hand, a successful transition to postcapitalist society must overcome the **veto power of capital** ('the foundation of capitalist power and domination is the institutionalised right of capital withdrawal of which economic crisis is nothing but the aggregate manifestation') while simultaneously avoiding **étatism** ('. . . whereas the capitalist nature of civil society constrains the capitalist state, the statist nature of any socialist society constitutes its major barrier'). He summarises the problem in terms of a 'contradiction': 'Socialism in industrially advanced societies cannot be built **without** state power and it cannot be built **on** state **power**'.<sup>58</sup>

The Bahro-Offe debate, at least as selectively recreated here, underlines both the strengths and weaknesses of the Green movement. As an essentially anti-political form of politics it is able to address the weaker, ignored

groups in terms of their direct, immediate and personal interests and in this way marshal a very heterogeneous reservoir of support. But the moment the problem arises of how to realise their few, consensual ultimate goals in terms of specific measures and tactics, the movement tends to fragment. Moreover, these goals—no-growth society, disarmament, cleansing the environment—are in their implications revolutionary and challenge the interests of practically all organised groups, especially ruling groups, in the state and economy. The problem—and opportunity—for Green politics in the coming decade is therefore how to coordinate these disparate component groups, forge a minimal political programme and confront the problem of power and its use.

## VI

The future of politics the other side of Social Democratism will thus depend to a substantial degree on the relative strengths of the SPD and the Greens, and upon their developing interrelationship. From all three of the perspectives implied here, too many qualifiers can be adduced to be able to construe more than a few sketchy projections and conjectures.

In this respect, one and only one tendency is unambiguous: when the SPD's electoral strength declines, the Greens' improves, and vice versa. All the Green 'victories' at the local, *Land* and federal levels from 1978-1984 have correlated with SPD losses. It is noteworthy that the SPD's recent turnaround elections in the Saarland in March 1985 (49.2 per cent of the popular vote) and North Rhine-Westphalia in May (52.1 per cent, combined with a CDU drop from 43.2 per cent to 36.5 per cent) were linked to Green reverses (2.5 per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively). Yet the correlation does not seem to be connected to the material or post-material policies of the Social Democrats. Where the Saarland SPD premier, Oskar Lafontaine, opened the party to the peace, ecology and democratisation concerns of the Greens, thus ostensibly in part coopting some of these issues, Johannes Rau, the North Rhine-Westphalian party leader, of whom *Der Spiegel* writes that he 'is above all suspicion of being an ideologue, a left-winger',<sup>59</sup> clearly profiled the party *against* the Greens in pursuit of a 'moderate', anti-radical strategy aimed at re-occupying the centre of the political system.

Naturally, each of the currents among the Greens has interpreted these tendencies in different ways. For the Ecopax-Firsters, the party had cooperated and compromised with the SPD in too many other areas, thus blurring their distinct programme and image. But for the *Realpolitiker*, the failure to develop a coherent strategy based on a solid programme had lent the party an image of confusion, irresponsibility and unreliability. Although it is impossible to assign relative weights at this point, the *Realpolitiker* interpretation is enhanced by a recent poll showing that

some 80 per cent of all Green members would prefer to see their party enter into a coalition or other working arrangement with the SPD.<sup>60</sup> These findings would also suggest an emerging tension between the party leadership, which in its majority support a distancing policy from the SPD, and the rank-and-file which want closer links.

There is actually much to be said for the Ecopax-First strategy, however. The West German Greens have grown into the world's largest and theoretically most sophisticated 'post-material' party formation mainly due to their ability to appeal to groups and interests neglected by Social Democracy. Without a clear delineation from it, the Greens stand to be eclipsed in the event that the SPD should find its way to relatively progressive positions on, e.g., disarmament and the environment. Besides, if one assumes, as Bahro does, that the Green movement represents 'the core of a new world order', and that perhaps half the SPD supporters belong to the 'conservative majority' in the FRG of about 75 per cent of the population,<sup>61</sup> then the need for a separate, uncompromising **organisation** beyond the existing parties, to which converts from the traditional Left (and Right) might be won, is self-evident. For him, this conversion process contains a certain inevitability:

**. . . those who voted Green have, in their thinking come more than fifty per cent of the way in our direction; while those who have now come only ten per cent towards us will in four years have come thirty per cent. The election results give absolutely no indication of this psychological shift.<sup>62</sup>**

The problem here is that such assumptions do not allow for electoral reverses such as those experienced in the Saarland or North Rhine-Westphalia. What appears more probable and feasible, in the short-term, is a continuation of already developed locally (Darmstadt, Kassel) or *Land* (Hesse; but failure in Hamburg) based, *ad hoc* cooperative arrangements somewhere between mutual toleration and quasi-coalition. (Joschke Fischer speaks in this connection of a 'toalition'.<sup>63</sup>)

For the SPD, still in some measure traumatised by its massive electoral defeat of 1983, yet in opposition freed now from the necessity to link programmatic decisions with concrete policies, the picture is even less coherent.

For one, the intra-party Left remains divided between its materially oriented groups, particularly in the trade union movement, and its post-material elements. Initially, the SPD in opposition appeared to be opening to its post-material side. Willy Brandt's early statement about 'a majority this side of the Union' alluded to a progressive centre-left coalition of all oppositional forces, including defecting FDP members (Günther Verheugen), when that party entered into the coalition with the CDU/CSU, and 'moderate' factions among the New Social Movements. Unlike

Helmut Schmidt, who tended to bypass the party to appeal directly to the electorate or, when required, to *instrumentalise* it, Hans-Jochen Vogel has been able to incorporate many of the goals of the more than 40 per cent of party delegates who supported a 1979 resolution calling for a halt to the government's nuclear energy programme, the more than 25 per cent of SPD voters opposed to stationing cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in the FRG, and the well over half of SPD voters against Schmidt's policy respecting the construction of nuclear power stations. A party resolution of 1983 reversed the 1979 missile decision that had created so much intra-party opposition and led to the first significant swing of SPD voters to the Greens; but until that decision, the Greens alone among all the parties reflected a majority of public opinion on the issue.

Otherwise, however, the 'post-material' party Left has seen its influence decline. Individual figures like Jochen Steffen have gone over to the Greens or retreated into private life, while Jusos membership has declined steadily despite attempts by their leaders (Johano Strasser) to develop links with the New Social Movements and to carry Social Democracy into state institutions, places of work, etc. Nevertheless, a desire for cooperation with the Green movement is strongest among the Jusos, and they have achieved some important successes at the local and factory levels.

Perhaps the most consistent proponent of 'post-material' concerns in the SPD is Lafontaine. He has strongly advocated reduced defence spending, the humanisation of the state, parties and enterprises, and the development of new, creative employment-generating forms of work, all within the framework of close 'Red-Green' collaboration. This alliance, he concedes, would be essential to rejuvenating the SPD which, due to tradition and inflexibility, would otherwise be unable to undergo a necessary 'learning process'. As a bridge between the two, he sees a common concern for the 'working people' and advocates 'an alternative progress':

**The alternative progress has a name: eco-socialism. It links the struggle against the exploitation of people with the struggle against the exploitation of nature. . . It is one and the same social structures that lead to the exploitation of man by man and to the exploitation of nature. This insight constitutes the basis of the necessary cooperation between the trade unions and the New Social Movement . . .**

This tactically essential sound assertion, however, is belied by the reservations of a 'material' trade union leadership (notably Hermann Raspe, head of the Chemical Workers Union) that nowadays must be mainly classified as on the party Right, a group motivated by its continuing fear of job losses in a no-growth economy and its suspicion of 'esoteric' Green policies. Yet the labour movement at the same time has not been able to develop an anti-conservative strategy in the absence of political leadership from the SPD. For instance, the unions have failed to organise

the now around ten per cent of the population that are 'structurally unemployed', with the result that they are mainly lost to the labour movement.<sup>65</sup> To be sure, grassroots militancy does still recur, especially within the few more radical unions, such as the Metal Workers and Printers, but as a rule the industrial unions remain conservative forces within the party. (At the same time, the historically less radical white collar unions have very recently begun to adopt quality-of-life and environmental concerns into their programmes, thus bringing them into proximity with the party 'post-material' Left—a development which has interesting implications for future realignments.<sup>66</sup>) Also of interest here is the poor showing of the Greens in precisely those areas—the Saar, Ruhr—where industrial workers predominate in the population and make up a majority of SPD members.

The unpredictability of the SPD's future course is underscored by Willy Brandt's recent shift in the direction of a centrist strategy of vote-maximisation. In words reminiscent of Godesberg terminology, the party leader argues that, wherever the SPD operates, it must become as strong as possible in order to win elections or conclude favourable alliances. For him the slogan guiding party strategy is now 'consensus as far as possible, controversial arguments as far as necessary'.<sup>67</sup> Peter Glotz, the emerging spokesperson of the 'technocratic centre' within the party, has concretised the Brandt guideline with his proposed strategy of attracting or winning back the 'new' technical and economic intelligentsia of engineers, bank employees, high administrators, modem artisans, etc. by (re-)opening the party's post-material appeal with calculated references to environmental and peace issues.<sup>68</sup>

The renewed appeal—but by no means yet predominant—of the Brandt-Glotz line of a return to the *Volkspartei* strategy of the fifties and sixties is no doubt related to two important developments: the Rau victory just alluded to, and the mounting difficulties of the CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition.

For at least until the North Rhine-Westphalian elections, it had seemed that a combination of rising Green support and falling FDP votes—the latter perhaps to the point of extinction—meant that any successful 'majority this side of the Union' aimed at bridging the ten per cent voting spread between the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats would have to include the Greens and/or seek an SPD improvement at Green expense. Not only the Saar elections had appeared to confirm this, but the obverse case of massive SPD losses (down to 32.4 per cent of the popular vote) in West Berlin, also in March 1985, under the conservative, anti-Green strategy of Hans Apel. Rau's election appears to falsify that equation. If the SPD can now compete for votes at the centre and still pre-empt the Greens, the return to power could be not only quicker but ideologically less painful and entirely within the present leadership structure—perhaps

with Rau himself as the party's new chancellor candidate.

At the same time, the governing bourgeois coalition, whose claim to power is rooted in policies that had proved successful in the fifties and sixties, has not managed to deliver on its promises of economic renewal based on further state incentives to business and welfare freezes (which, in periods of inflation, of course amount to rollbacks). Rather more a loose and somewhat contradictory coalition of capitalist and clerical interests, it has been more concerned with a restoration of conservative values and expedient intra-coalition politics than with coherent sets of policies. Therefore, 'serious economic strategy has fallen by default to those central bankers and business leaders who since at least 1980 have been calling for higher profits, tax relief, less welfare spending and a government willing to tough it out until the West German economy becomes competitive again'.<sup>69</sup> Beset by scandals (the 1984 Flick Affair), absolutely opposed by the peace and environmentally oriented New Social Movements, and unable to cope with the contradictions of the (shrinking) welfare state, the Christian Democrats are also very much on the political defensive.

It can be argued, therefore, that the logic of the peculiar situation of both SPD and CDU/CSU is moving toward a renewed Grand Coalition. For the former a big coalition would offer a share of power and hence respectability, a means of winning over (or back) sectors among the 'new' middle classes and 'dynamic' business groups, and an opportunity to overwhelm the post-material Left within the party. For the latter it would restore some of its lost social orientation, reduce the pressure of post-material demands, and assure labour peace.

That the SPD at present is at least interested in a renewed Grand Coalition seems to be indicated by a shift in policy emphasis from the peace and environmental concerns of the immediate post-1983 trauma to one of 'constructive opposition'. It has been prepared to 'bury' the Flick Affair and has shown a sense of 'national responsibility' in accepting the recent limited pension reforms. It has also taken a harder line toward the Greens, e.g. by positing an inseparability of material and post-material issues. Indeed, Rau has argued that the Greens, because they ignore or attack the labour movement, are really 'neo-conservatives'.<sup>70</sup>

If, as seems likely, a party cartel—whether or not in the form of a coalition—should re-emerge, and particularly if the FDP should go under as early as 1987, then the road beyond Social Democracy will almost certainly be a red-and-green one, though the appropriate mix of colours is impossible to foresee. If this 'scenario' should actually come about—or for that matter, even if a '*rechtsgeschrümpfte*' (as opposed to '*gesund-geschrümpfte*') FDP should survive—this would make the Greens the sole party championing disarmament, democratisation, limited growth, environmental protection and other post-material concerns, just as it was until

after the 1983 elections. In this case the Greens would almost certainly be able to detach large, progressive-minded sectors from the SPD and, along the lines foreseen by Bahro, establish an independent political party 'this side of Social Democracy'. If this were to happen, naturally, the relationship between socialist and ecopax concerns would become much more intense. But if, on the other hand, the Lafontaine-Strasser-Albrecht Müller tendency should prevail in opening the SPD to the central 'post-material' issues of West German society, the Greens will have to profile themselves very clearly and distance the party from Social Democracy. Most likely, as in the past, the SPD, *so long as it remains in opposition*, will again attempt to have it both ways, and if it does, the intra-party Left would again have to choose between a counter-hegemonic intra-party struggle against daunting odds, or extra-party, extra-parliamentary activity where, this time, a potential ally is already operating 'beyond' Social Democracy.

Either way, the Greens will surely have to develop a coherent 'post-material' programme rooted, however, in the 'material' realities of today. Above all other things, their relationship with actual and potential 'material' opposition must be redefined. For at this historical moment large sectors of the organised and unorganised working classes are alienated from and are indifferent toward Social Democracy. Objectively, it is argued here, 'material' and 'post-material' opposition are ultimately two sides of the same phenomenon: the contradictions and crises of advanced capitalism. The Greens' task, if they are to develop beyond a mere anti-party party, would be to link the theory and praxis of this latent anticapitalist coalition, perhaps in terms of common oppression or the need for democratisation and individual development, or even a common defence of the decommodified spheres of the welfare state. There is of course nothing inevitable about such a link, and only deliberate, determined and patient work in the spheres of economics, politics and culture stands to realise a convergence of interests and action of the two groups. However, the task is facilitated by the nature and composition of the New Social Movements. With their concern for people at their place of work, residence, and in other vital spheres, they are potentially able to mobilise the alienated, dispossessed, frustrated and disadvantaged sectors of the population who would otherwise remain excluded from the political process—this despite their present relatively privileged mass basis. And with their readiness to demonstrate, protest, and employ direct action, as well as to operate directly in neighbourhoods, inner cities, polluted areas, immigrant ghettos and the like, they have demonstrated an ability to enter into the extra-parliamentary realm which (apart from the APO) has hitherto been practically a monopoly of the Right with its presence in the churches, schools, clubs, mass media and other ostensibly 'non-political' areas of social life.

## NOTES

On this see Ossip K. Flechtheim, 'Die Anpassung der SPD: 1914, 1933 und 1959', in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Vol. 17 (1965), p. 584 *et seq.*

But do figure prominently in my *The German Left Since 1945: Socialism and Social Democracy in the German Federal Republic* (Cambridge U.K. and New York 1976), esp. Chs. IV–VIII.

3. For discussion and analysis, see *Zbid.*, Ch. III and the literature cited there.

4. For details see my 'Anticommunism in the Federal Republic of Germany', in *Socialist Register 1984*, pp. 164–213.

Entirely analogous to the notibn of 'Labourism' in Britain, which John Saville has defined as 'the theory and practice of class collaboration'; see his 'The Ideology of Labourism', in R. Benwick, R.N. Berki and B. Parekh (eds.), *Knowledge and Belief in Politics The Problem of Ideology* (London 1973), p. 215. Labourism, Ralph Miliband argues, is 'above all concerned with the advancement of concrete demands of immediate advantage to the working class and organised labour' which is '... not, like Marxism, an ideology of rupture but an ideology of adaptation'; 'Socialist Advance in Britain', in *Socialist Register 1983*, pp. 107 and 109.

6. All the developments described in the rest of this subsection are documented in Graf, *German Left*. . . , esp. Chs. VI and IX.

7. The complete version of Abendroth's counter programme is reproduced as 'Aufgaben und Ziele der deutschen Sozialdemokratie: Programm-Entwurf 1959', in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, Part I: No. 511959 and Part II: No. 611959.

Not without some reservations, I am here introducing the notion of 'material' (or 'acquisitive') versus 'post-material' ('post-acquisitive') opposition in order to develop the following analysis. The dichotomy starts from the assumption that needs and hence demands can be conceptually biturcated between essentially material needs 'for physiological sustenance and safety' and non-material needs 'such as those for esteem, self-expression and aesthetic satisfaction'. (Ronald Inglehart, 'Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity', in: *American Political Science Review*, LXXV, No. 4, December 1981, p. 881). Material values therefore include a strong economy with job security, an emphasis on tangible, immediate rewards, a predictable and ever improving material environment, and a concern for law and order as well as national defence. By contrast, post-material values are said to be of a different order: quality of life, regional or ethnic autonomy, greater involvement and participation in social matters, debureaucratisation and democratisation of social institutions, opportunities for self-realisation, 'humanisation' of interpersonal relationships, clean physical environment, disarmament, peace, and so on. These respective sets of values are then supposed to correspond to quite different social bases.

Viktor Agartz, 'Was haben wir Marxisten zum Entwurf des Grundsatz-Programms der SPD zu sagen?' speech delivered on 5 February 1959, issued as a brochure of the Karl-Marx-Gesellschaft (Munich 1959).

10. For text see *Jahrbuch der SPD 1954/55* (Bonn 1955), p. 354.

11. Theo Pirker, *Die SPD nach Hitler* (Munich 1965), p. 205.

12. Hans-Karl Rupp, *Ausserparlamentarische Opposition in der Ära Adenauer: Der Kampf gegen die Atombewaffnung in den fünfziger Jahren* (Cologne 1970), p. 264.

13. See 'Deutscher Ostermarsch', in *Studien von Zeitfragen*, No. 5/1967.

14. Johano Strasser, *Die Zukunft der Demokratie: Grenzen des Wachstums-*

*Grenzen der Freiheit* (Reinbek 1977), p. 39.

15. Here see Eberhard Schmidt, 'Gewerkschaften als Garant des sozialen Friedens', in F. Grube and G. Richter (eds.), *Der SPD-Staat* (Munich 1977), p. 87.
16. R. Deppa, R. Hardine and D. Hoss, *Sozialdemokratie und Klassenkonflikte: Metallarbeiterstreik—Betriebskonflikte—Mieterkampf* (Frankfurt and New York 1978), p. 13.
17. Only about one-quarter of all SPD members aged 35 or under see themselves as part of a special Juso suborganisation; the others identify with the party directly. Within the active **stratum**, about half are employed while the other half are high school, college or university students, or apprentices. University students make up only seven per cent of total Juso membership, and only a minority of them are active. See Gerhard Braunthal, *The West German Social Democrats 1969–1982: Profile of a Party in Power* (Boulder, Colo. 1983), pp. 85–86.
18. As formulated initially by Michael Vester, 'Zur Dialektik von Reform und Revolution: Die Arbeitnehmer in der sozialistischen Strategie', in *Neue Kritik*, No. 34/1966, p. 20.
19. Axel Murswieck, 'Ende des Sozialstaats?', in Grube and Richter (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 135.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
21. Volker Granschow and Claus Offe, 'Political Culture and the Politics of the Social Democratic Government', in *Telos*, Vol. 53 (Fall 1982), p. 79 (italics in original).
22. Otto Kallscheuer, 'Philosophie und Politik in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie heute', in *Leviathan*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1983), p. 17.
23. See, *inter alia*, Claudia von Braunmühl, 'The Enemy Within: The Case of Berufsverbot in West Germany', in *Socialist Register* 1978; Franz Hegman, 'Toeing the Line in West Germany', in *CAUT Bulletin*, February 1982; and *IMSF Informationsbericht Nr. 22: Berufsverbote in der BRD; eine juristisch-politische Dokumentation* (Frankfurt 1976).
24. Adam Przeworski, 'Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon', in *New Left Review*, No. 122/1981, pp. 54–55.
25. A dichotomy which is extended through several of the collected essays of Offe, *op. cit.*
26. Alan Wolfe, 'Has Social Democracy a Future?', in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. XI, No. 1 (October 1978), p. 114.
27. R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan, P.A. Beck, *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton 1984), p. 105.
28. Joachim Hirsch, 'Between Fundamental Opposition and Realpolitik: Perspectives for an Alternative Parliamentarism', in *Telos*, Vol. 56 (Summer 1983), p. 173.
29. Andrei Markovits, 'The Legacy of Liberalism and Collectivism in the Labour Movement', in A. Markovits (ed.), *The Political Economy of West Germany* (New York 1982), p. 176.
30. Willi Semmler, 'Economic Aspects of Model Germany: A Comparison with the United States', in *ibid.*, p. 48.
31. Claus Offe, 'The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case', in Suzanne Berger (ed.), *Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics* (Cambridge, etc. 1981), pp. 126–27.
32. Here see Semmler, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–46.
33. These examples are given in Jörg Huffschnid, 'Der Primat des Kapitals', in Grube and Richter, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–73.
34. Hirsch, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

35. Kenneth Dyson, 'Party Government and Party State', in H. Döring and G. Smith (eds.), *Party Government and Political Culture in West Germany* (New York 1982), pp. 77–100.
36. See Joachim Raschke, 'Einleitung', to J. Raschke (ed.), *Bürger und Parteien: Ansichten und Analysen einer schwierigen Beziehung* (Opladen 1982), pp. 10–16.
37. Claus Offe, 'Structural Problems of the Capitalist State', in Klaus von Beyme (ed.), *German Political Studies*, Vol. 1 (London and Beverly Hills 1974), p. 52.
38. On this, see Graf, 'Anticommunism. . .', pp. 196–203.
39. Hermann Scheer, 'Die nachgeholte Parteibildung und die politische Säkularisierung der CDU', in Wolf-Dieter Narr (ed.), *Auf dem Weg zum Einparteienstaat* (Opladen 1977), p. 167.
40. To be sure, much of this 'new', 'modern' appeal rested on certain well-tryed themes and a nostalgia for the *pre-Modell Deutschland* days of the CDU State. On this, see Jeremiah M. Reimer, 'West German Crisis Management: Stability and Change in the Post-Keynesian Age', in N.J. Vig and S.E. Schier (eds.), *Political Economy in Western Democracies* (New York and London 1985), pp. 233–34.
41. Jutta A. Helm, 'Politics, Stability and Growth: West German Politics in Transition', in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. XVI (July 1984), p. 487.
42. Here see Susanne Berger, 'Politics and Anti-Politics in Western Europe in the Seventies', in *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, esp. pp. 30–33; Offe, *Contradictions. . .*, *passim*.
43. Klaus von Beyme, *Das politische System der BRD* (Munich 1979), p. 93.
44. Herbert Döring, 'A Crisis of the Party System?—An Assessment', in Döring and Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 213.
45. Jutta A. Helm, 'Citizen Lobbies in West Germany', in Peter Merkl (ed.), *Western European Party Systems: Trends and Prospects* (New York and London 1980), p. 577.
46. As formulated by Hirsch, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
47. Bernd Guggenberger, 'Bürgerinitiativen: Krisensymptom oder Ergänzung des Systems der Volksparteien?', in Raschke (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 196–197.
48. References to the 'Green Programme' here are based on: Die Grünen, *Das Bundesprogramm* (Bonn 1982); and Die Grünen, *Was wir wollen, was wir sind* (Bonn 1983).
49. Hirsch, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
50. Ernie Keenes, 'Deep Ecology and Political Economy: The Praxis of Green Politics', unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Spring 1985, mimeo. p. 27.
51. Peaa Kelly, interview in *Der Spiegel*, 11 March 1985.
52. Interview with Dirk Schneider, MdB, cited in Albrecht Rothacker, 'The Green Party in German Politics', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1984), p. 111.
53. Rudolf Bahro, *From Red to Green: Interviews with New Left Review* (London 1984), p. 175.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 183–84. Further see his *Elemente einer neuen Politik: Zum Verhältnis von Ökologie und Sozialismus* (West Berlin 1980).
56. Bahro, *From Red to Green. . .*, p. 117.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
58. Offe, *Contradictions. . .*, pp. 244 and 246 (italics in original).
59. *Der Spiegel*, 20 May 1985, p. 18.
60. Reported in *ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

61. Bahro, *From Red to Green*. . . , pp. 229 and 132 *et seq.*
62. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
63. Quoted in *Der Spiegel*, 5 March 1985, p. 40.
64. Oskar Lafontaine, 'Der andere Fortschritt II', in *Der Spiegel*, 5 February 1985, pp. 77 and 79.
65. On this see the interview with Werner Sewing, published as: John Ely, 'Alternative Politics in West Germany', in *Our Generation*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1984), p. 57.
66. See Rothacker, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
67. Interview with Willy Brandt in *Der Spiegel*, 5 March 1985, p. 31.
68. *Der Spiegel*, 5 March 1985, p. 37.
69. Reimer, *op. cit.*, p. 251.
70. Johannes Rau, 'Nährboden für rechtsautoritäre Kräfte? Die Grünen aus der Sicht der SPD.', in J.R. Mettke (ed.), *Die Grünen: Regierungspartner von morgen?* (Reinbek 1982), pp. 188-89. This line of thinking reflects a persistent tendency, especially in the media, to write off the Greens as somehow authoritarian or fascistoid. It is echoed, e.g. by Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, who assert that 'subverting existing forms of democracy in the name of a more democratic alternative is bound to have authoritarian consequences'. See their 'The German Green Party: A Movement Between Fundamentalism and Marxism', in *Dissent*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1984), p. 330.