

## THE GREEN PARTY AND THE NEW NATIONALISM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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**It is in the concept of hegemony that those exigencies which are national in character are knotted together; one can well understand how certain tendencies either do not mention such a concept, or merely skim over it. A class that is international in character has—in as much as it guides social strata which are narrowly national (intellectuals), and indeed frequently even less than national: particularistic and municipalistic (the peasants)—to 'nationalise' itself in a certain sense.**

*Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 241*

When the editors of the New Left Review asked Rudolf Bahro to explain why, of the major capitalist countries, only West Germany had produced an ecology party of any importance,<sup>1</sup> his answer was strangely evasive. While Bahro correctly identified the Greens as having a much broader base than ecology alone, he on the other hand not only failed to explain the astonishing rise of the German Greens but he also explicitly refused to acknowledge its peculiarly German characteristics. Although Bahro—who officially left the party at its convention in June 1985—is certainly not representative of overall Green sentiments, the lack of reflection on the peculiarly German nature of the Greens is widespread within and outside the party.

And the rise of the West German Greens is phenomenal indeed, in contrast to Green parties elsewhere: as late as 1973 or even 1974, there was not a single political observer who would have predicted the development of this party; even the movement in its pre-party stage had at that time only begun to emerge; in the federal elections of 1980, they still only received 1.5% of the popular vote, and yet in the federal elections of 1983, they nearly quadrupled their support to 5.6%, just above the forbidding 5% hurdle which no other small party had ever managed to surpass since the 5% law was passed in the fifties. The electoral success, moreover, by no means shows the whole picture. The positions which the Greens have been articulating—from measures against acid rain, nuclear energy, Pershing missiles, patriarchy or racism, to measures in favour of curtailing the power of the state apparatuses, in favour of alternative lifestyles, for grassroots and plebiscitary democracy, new directions in industrial production or solidarities with developing countries—all these positions have begun to find support far beyond the Green Party or its associated movements.

The most incisive impact in this regard certainly must have been the radical redirection of the SPD—at least in its outward **presentation**—from the politics of Helmut Schmidt's *Modell Deutschland* toward Willy Brandt's embrace—a near-deadly embrace for the Greens—of much of the Green agenda, after the SPD's electoral defeat in the 1983 elections. The Greens have had this strong impact for a number of reasons. Most of all, they are far removed from being a single-issue protest party, far removed also from being principally an ecology party as has sometimes been suggested<sup>2</sup> (e.g., Mewes, 1983). Instead, they are hegemonic in scope: their political concerns cover all aspects of society: they claim to speak on behalf of the mass of the population and society at large and both the *Realo* and *Fundi* factions in the party view themselves as the *antiparty party*—as radically different in world view, organisation and lifestyle.

The hegemonic scope of the Greens has not only had an effect on the Social Democrats from where many of their activists are drawn and where they have recruited many of their voters.<sup>3</sup> Even the Christian Democratic Parties, CDU and CSU, its Bavarian counterpart, have adopted pro-ecology rhetoric and to some extent at least, were forced to deal with nuclear, pro-peace and feminist demands. There is hardly any newspaper or magazine, from *Der Spiegel* to that of the influential automobile club, ADAC, a lobby for the auto industry, which has not been forced to deal with the key issues on the platform of the Greens.

The question must be asked, then, why is it that the Greens, with this hegemonic scope, have been able to articulate their positions so effectively, and that they have struck such a receptive chord? Their effectiveness is even more astonishing because some of the leadership comes out of the old, marginalised student movement including especially the ultra-left K groups; others are recruited from the educated to esoteric, often unemployed elements of the middle class,<sup>4</sup> or from progressive elements of the protestant church; they do not fit into the hitherto established political spectrum of the West German republic and they only represent a narrowly delineated band of age cohorts.<sup>6</sup>

In what follows I will try to show that the Greens represent the confluence of a variety of historical forces and actors, many of which are of specifically German provenance, that these historical forces have brought their ideological baggage into the Green movement; and finally, that without this ideological baggage, the Green movement would hardly have been in the position to mobilise the broadly based political support which it actually enjoys—and which it enjoys despite so many and often self-inflicted odds.

### *Political parameters of the Federal Republic and its extra-institutional opposition*

There are different conceivable beginnings for a history of the Green

Movement, and indeed some of its SPD and conservative critics have attempted to discredit it as a late product of German Romanticism or perhaps the *Wandervogel* movement at the turn of the century. (That this genealogy is not without justification will be shown later on.) In view of the fact, however, that no other German language or culture area (Austria, German-speaking Switzerland or East Germany) has produced a Green movement of comparable strength, I agree with some authors<sup>7</sup> that the history of the Greens is bound up most closely with the history of the Federal Republic, and that here is the logical starting point.

Brand *et al* point to the fact that in 1945 many traditional elements of German society, both in terms of capitalist or pre-capitalist production as well as in terms of the social structure had either been effectively destroyed or at least seriously weakened. The development of the West German republic is intimately linked to a particularly radical transformation of the forces of production: in no other Western country could the post-war technological development begin with a similar clean slate, since most of its old industrial infrastructure and the social and political institutions had been smashed either by Nazism itself or, in the course of the war, by its defeat.' The party system which subsequently emerged was based, in the case of the CDU/CSU, to a large extent on the churches, especially Catholicism—which was perhaps the single major institution to emerge, virtually unscathed after 1945; the SPD emerged on the ruins of the old labour movement, whereas the small Free Democratic Party (FDP) found its support in sections of capital: its reconsolidated smaller and big entrepreneurial elite.

All of these forces (which, especially through the CDU, allowed new career opportunities for the more 'pragmatic' elements of the old Nazi apparatuses) had the following characteristics in common—and defined the Federal Republic of Germany in these terms: (a) they professed a general modernising, universalistic, pro-industry outlook; (b) they were committed to an effective, centralised state structure with strong involvement in the state both in industrial production and a concomitant welfare system; (c) they accepted the division of Europe laid down at Yalta; and were therefore—the SPD hesitatingly at first—committed to participation in NATO at the cost of a unified German nation-state; and finally (d) all of these political forces in the early post-war period contained vocal dissenting minorities which were resolutely anti-Nazi and either pacifist, anti-capitalist or libertarian-democratic in outlook. Martin Niemöller, Heinrich Boll or former president Gustav Heinemann as well as many lesser known figures in the anti-Nazi resistance played an important role here. Brand *et al* have convincingly argued that these democratic-progressive elements were defeated around a number of important post-war debates in West Germany.

The first of these debates concerned the nature of the post-war economic

order itself, and involved on one side the strong pro-labour and socialist forces in the churches, the SPD and even within the CDU at the time—and on the other, the pro-capitalist elements, strongly backed by the Allies. This debate culminated between 1950 and 1952 in the struggle for an effective workers' co-determination in industry. In the end, due to skilled manoeuvres in which Adenauer avoided a major capital-labour showdown, and despite some limited compromises, the objectives of the labour movement were defeated. And the defeat in the *Mitbestimmung* debate in significant ways defined the pro-Western, capitalist trajectory of the Federal Republic on one hand, and seriously weakened its socialist and progressive forces on the other.

The second key debate during the first half of the 1950s concerned the rearmament of West Germany. The anti-militarist element in this campaign found added support from those who recognised that by rearming the western part of Germany, the German division would become irreversible. Despite pervasive anti-militarist sentiments in the population at that time, the anti-rearmament campaign received only lukewarm and erratic support on the part of the leadership in the SPD, the unions and the churches who at the height of the Cold War feared to be pushed out of the dominant political discourse. Much like the earlier campaign for *Mitbestimmung* and the later struggles against nuclear armaments for the *Bundeswehr* (1957–8) and against the war measures act (*Notstandsgesetze*, 1968), these basic debates failed to establish within the existing party structures, any institutional space for dissenting socialist, left-nationalist, pacifist and left-libertarian forces which could have questioned the FRG's defining principles outlined earlier and which delineate the contours of the state itself.

At the same time, the state neither managed to neutralise these forces nor were they coopted by any of the existing parties or institutional building blocks of the West German republic.<sup>9</sup> These forces, marginalised or dissociated from their parent institutions—extra-parliamentary opposition (APO), became a commonly used term—remained partly free-floating and partly, in the Easter Marches for peace and the campaign for nuclear disarmament, developed very provisional outlines of new associative networks.

### The Student Movement

Beginning in the mid-sixties, important changes took place in the political climate of the FRG. The Cold War began to abate; with the Grand Coalition of CDU and SPD, the SPD moved into the sphere of power; a new post-war generation appeared in the universities, the Civil Rights Movement in the US and the Anti-War Movement later on pointed to new forms of political confrontation and to broader global perspectives—all of which found the state quite unprepared and clumsy in its reaction.

In this new atmosphere, the role of the student movement which climaxed in the events of 1968 can hardly be overestimated. Any attempt to understand the rise of the Greens must appreciate the role of the German student movement which appears on one hand as the synthesis of the older extra-institutional opposition against the Nato and pro-capital principles of the FRG—indeed the opposition of the 1950s was reasserted here in the opposition against the Notstandsgesetze of 1968—on the other hand, the Student Movement emerged as an altogether new force in the sense that it mobilised and politicised new strata and class fractions of German society with explosive force.

These new and largely middle class elements in the student movement were shaped by the following experiences: first, the previous political experience of dissent was brought home again—and as a leitmotiv it accompanied the movement throughout: it taught that any political opposition from within the established institutional political context was doomed to failure; therefore, the opposition had to be 'extra-parliamentary'; second, the new political discourse of the student movement was not part of the older proletarian-socialist discourse and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 blocked any such chance; while the movement, to be sure, did adopt some of its elements, it principally represented an attack against existing hierarchies in the universities, municipal and Lander or federal institutions; further, having no direct experience with Nazism, it lacked the anti-fascist combativeness of the extra-institutional opposition of the 1950s; it replaced the old anti-fascism with rebellion against parents and the formulation of new alternative life styles.

Third, the massive physical confrontation with state power left a deep impression on the student movements' perception of the state as an alien apparatus. It made it impossible for this generation to develop any positive identification with this particular German state; fourth, as a movement with a new political discourse, limited ties to immediate political models and no particular attachment to the West German state, the student movement and its successor groups began to scrounge in the ideological garbage heaps of pre-Nazi Germany: a search began for new national conceptions and alternative social paradigms; *fifth*, and of great importance: as in other Western countries, the demise of the student movement was also the beginning of the new women's movement which started in West Germany around 1971. The struggle around abortion legislation turned a movement limited to politicised women in the universities into a broader national movement. In marked contrast to the previous movements, it claimed to speak for all women and thus prefigured the hegemonic scope and the universalism of the Green Movement later on. It also produced for the first time independent female leadership which was to become so important in the Green Movement later on. And finally sixth, the demise of the student movement after 1968, its increasing dogmatism, ultra-leftist

factional splits, the urban guerilla tactics of the *Rote Armee Fraktion* of Baader and Meinhof and other violence-oriented elements signalled to many not only the defeat of the 'extra-parliamentary' parameters of the movement, but also pointed to new beginnings: a 'movementist', non-institutionalised opposition, despite spectacular instantaneous successes was an easy target for the state machinery. A viable radical alternative to the existing state and its established institutions had to be sought within a cohesive institutional structure.

### *Citizens' initiatives and ecology*

Whatever the shortfalls of the student movement might have been, in one sense it represented a significant breakthrough in contrast to previous extra-institutional initiatives which had all failed to accomplish their political goals: The student movement proved that extra-institutional opposition could be successful, albeit erratically and episodically; and there were indeed significant and lasting transformations of the universities; it did affect municipal politics here or there, and most of all, it provided the umbrella under which the political culture and the lifestyle of sectors of the new middle class could be transformed and could unfold. The discovery that individual citizens could effect change outside the parliamentary system was carried over to a new phenomenon, the *Bürgerinitiativen* (citizens' initiatives) which began to multiply very rapidly after 1968.

Most observers agree that the first citizens' initiatives saw themselves as loyalist, 'positive-constructive' critics largely in the ambience of the SPD and the relatively liberal climate which the SPD-led government provided in the early 1970s.<sup>10</sup> The early citizens' initiatives were localistic and single-issue oriented; to define them as entirely ecology-oriented, as some authors (e.g. Bolaffi and Kallscheuer) suggest, is incorrect. Apart from local ecology related issues (against nuclear plants, expansion of highways, energy conservation, deforestation, urban renewal and for expanded public transportation), the *Bürgerinitiativen* assumed advocacy for 'underprivileged' groups such as foreign workers, tenants, the sick, elderly, the 'Third World', or they attempted to develop better day care, youth centres, opted for new psychiatric care or opposed *Berufsverbote* and neo-Nazism.

In the early phase, from about 1969 to 1973, the *Bürgerinitiativen*, albeit spread throughout West Germany, were entirely spontaneous, local, and still largely urban middle class initiatives. After 1973, a perceptible shift occurred. Especially in light of the massive new public investments under the Schmidt government, in highways, nuclear plants, the proliferation of polluting industries and urban speculation, the ecology element in the citizens' initiatives became dominant; and the failure, moreover, of the local and federal governments to respond favourably to its loyalist

critics increased the hostility of the movement to the state and its representatives. As Joschka Fischer, a leading spokesperson of the Greens in Hesse put it, the *Modell* Deutschland of Chancellor Schmidt was ensconced behind anti-terror laws, barbed wire, tanks, computers, special courts and maximum-security isolation jails."

In this second phase, (1974–1977), the citizens' initiatives began to focus their opposition at three nuclear energy related mega projects: Wyhl in Baden-Württemberg, Brokdorf at the Lower Elbe, and Gorleben in Lower Saxony. In this critical phase, a number of essential features of the Green Movement emerged. First, the massive demonstrations and other opposition associated with these projects turned local initiatives into as yet loosely defined regional or federal organisations, for two reasons. Local activists came into closer contact with each other and began to communicate and form organisational linkages; and with that, the awareness grew that it was in the interest of all regions not to get stuck with nuclear plants: the localistic issue was being generalised into the demand that there be no nuclear power plant in X but also nowhere else.<sup>12</sup> Secondly, the opposition was no longer a middle class-based opposition but involved large segments of local farmers, civil servants, traditional naturalists or workers: it was a popular opposition which could no longer be branded, by the established parties, as 'communist infiltrated' or otherwise be blamed on marginal elements. Third, the de-localisation of this opposition on one hand, its shift from particular issues to the issue in general, and its character as a broadly based popular movement, independent from received ideologies, forced its as yet amorphous leadership to elaborate its own ideology. This ideology began to be articulated at the very point when the Greens began to organise as a party, culminating in their election to the European Parliament (1979) and several Lander parliaments.

The process of party formation, took shape in the third phase of the citizens' initiatives (1977–1980) in which the Greens emerged as an ever more sharply focused and distinct movement. It was the constitutive phase of the Green Party and at the same time a period of crisis for the movement at large. The Schmidt government, under the pretext of combatting the Rote *Armee* Fraktion, pushed for a massive increase in police power, and by encouraging confrontations between the protest movement and the police, there was an attempt to criminalise the movement as a whole. Thus, beginning in 1977, the violent confrontations forced a clear division between those—the so-called *Autonome Gruppen* and Spontis—who sought violent confrontation, and the vast majority of the movement which recognised that such confrontations were counterproductive—not least in terms of the popular image.

Precisely those groups which opted for passive resistance and insisted on non-violence were also the ones that formed the core of the Greens as a parliamentary party. By December 1979, with the missile debate in the

Bundestag, the Greens had also clearly moved away from the narrow issue of ecology; they returned to their origins and the *multiplicity* of concerns and now especially began to draw greater strength from the peace movement; the linkage between ecology and peace was provided by the issues of nuclear energy and nuclear armaments, especially as they were raised on the occasion of the Protestant church's convention in June 1981 in Hamburg. Around that time as well, the Greens' four principles: *ecological, social, grassroots democratic, nonviolent*, were given wider currency. The first decisive breakthrough was a respectable showing in the elections to the European Parliament in Strasbourg (3.2%) in 1979 and the subsequent Lander elections in Bremen, **Baden-Wuerttemberg**, Berlin, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Hesse and Bavaria, which (except Bavaria with 4.6%) brought the party above the 5% hurdle, before the Federal elections in 1983 (5.6%).

### *The Greens in the left-right spectrum*

With their election to the Federal Parliament, fifteen years after the heyday of the student movement, we have to ask where and how the Greens would fit, if they do at all, in the left-right spectrum of German politics. A straight answer is quite difficult as long as we focus entirely on the recent debates, notably the party congresses in 1984 and 1985. There appears to be a bewildering multiplicity of debates between ecosocialists and ecolibertarians, feminists and gays and lesbians, Christians and followers of the nature mystic Rudolf Steiner, national-romantic populists and authoritarian-reactionary conservationists, anarchists and green-reformist parliamentarians—and above all, between the *Fundis* and the *Realos*—between fundamentalists like Rudi Bahro or Petra Kelly who view parliamentary work as political conscience-raising, categorically reject alliances and political power and use the parliaments as a mere platform to air their views, and Joschka Fischer or Dany Cohn-Bendit from the *Realpolitik* faction who are willing to assume, as has happened especially in Hesse, political responsibility in an—albeit 'confictual'—coalition with the SPD. It is important to see that the *Fundi-Realo* split is essentially not a left-right division because there are socialist fundamentalists like Jutta Ditfurth, Rainer Trampert or Thomas Ebermann<sup>13</sup> just as there are right-leaning realpoliticians such as Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever or Thomas Schmid, and the disagreements especially in the respective left factions clearly predominate over the common political perspective, as ecosocialists, or whatever.

Further, if we compare the Greens merely in ideological content with the established parties, we find some marked differences indeed: the Greens after all do subscribe to a no-growth philosophy, in contrast to both left and right in the established German political spectrum; they do practise forms of plebiscitary and grassroots democracy not found elsewhere on the Right or Left, and moreover they question the fundamental principles upon which the FRG has been founded and to which the

established parties all subscribe. Most important perhaps, the conservationism and the ecology platform as a whole, so fundamental to the movement, are difficult to classify—and would hardly pass as leftist within the traditional spectrum.

I would argue, however, that a number of key criteria do permit us to view the Greens as an essentially leftist party 'of a new type'. First, the citizens' initiatives drew heavily from, and incorporated, substantive segments of the student movement. Most important in this respect was the involvement of members of the ultra-left *Kommunistische Bund (KB)* who initially appear to have attempted to subvert, but eventually joined the Greens,<sup>14</sup> leaving the KB, or dissolving local cells altogether. These activists in particular supplied badly needed political expertise to the initially politically inexperienced local Green initiatives.

Secondly, the essentially leftist character of the Greens may be extrapolated from the failure or success of various local proto-party platforms. Bolaffi and Kallscheuer have argued persuasively that the early Green Party platforms (1978–80) which at that time participated in local or Lander elections remained unsuccessful where these platforms were basically oriented towards right-wing conservationist voters." Green platforms were similarly unsuccessful, however, where they appealed to exclusively ecosocialist and traditional leftist voters, as seen in Hamburg and Hesse (1978) and Bremen and Berlin in 1979. A successful electoral strategy in turn was based upon a firm centrist-ecologist base open to *ecosocialist and traditional leftist support*. This strategy worked in the 1979 Bremen elections where the basically centrist *Bremer Griine Liste*, with marginal support from both the Left and Right beat the leftist *Alternative Liste*; it worked in the elections to the European Parliament in 1979 and similarly in Berlin that same year. The Berlin elections of 1981 once again demonstrated that the conservative oriented *Griine Berliner Liste* (0.3% of the vote) was no match for the AL, the official representative of the federal Green Party in Berlin, with 7.2%.

A recent study (Miiller-Rommel, 1984) also arrives at the conclusion that the supporters of the Green Party, its voters, clearly view themselves as being predominantly on the Left, and more so in 1983 than in 1980. From that perspective, they appear as a leftwardly moved SPD; the party, after all, from which the Greens have drawn many of their activists (Petra Kelly being the most noteworthy example) and their passive supporters. It would be highly misleading, on the other hand, to deduce from this that the Greens are evolving towards a German version of a socialist party. The German Greens are the specific product of the extra-institutional opposition in the FRG and as such they *are a party sui generis*. I will attempt to demonstrate this in the following sections.

TABLE I  
*Self-classification of Green voters and of voters of the established parties, within the left-right spectrum, in % (1982)<sup>16</sup>*

<i>Parties</i>	<i>CDU/CSU</i>	<i>SPD</i>	<i>FDP</i>	<i>GREENS</i>
	1081	660	266	193
left	0.2	4.3	1.2	8.8
centre-left	3.5	30.9	11.6	37.9
centre	35.5	49.1	61.2	38.3
centre-right	42.8	11.8	17.3	11.4
right	18.0	3.9	8.7	3.6
total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

### *Current problems and future directions*

In light of the enormous internal diversity and the contradictions within the Greens today, we must ask what the possible future direction of the party might be. Two issues seem of particular relevance in this regard: the question of party structure and organisation, and their overall programme, notably the relationship to and understanding of national German identity as one of the constitutive elements of the party. There is a widespread impression, as old as the Green Party itself, which suggests that the Greens are about to split into several opposing splinter groups. The recent party conventions, however—both the Hamburg convention of December 1984 and the convention at Hagen of 22–23 June 1985 demonstrate that this perception is false; suggested, however, by the strident polemical style in the Party. Despite or perhaps because of the multiple factionalisms—and certainly due to the diversities within the *Realo* and *Fundi* camps themselves—conflicts tend to become neutralised, critical issues are being skirted, and there is a clear tendency toward overall formal consensus or at least toleration of majority positions.

Faced with the constant threat of annihilation—dropping below the 5% hurdle and not receiving any election financing and parliamentary funding, and surely due to some basic consensus against the other parties, the Greens at the federal level have so far managed to stay united. Moreover, the ideological disputes at that level have never been fought to the bitter end. Characteristic for the conciliatory and mediative attitude of the party delegates is the wording of the following resolution, adopted by the Hagen party convention:

**Vis-à-vis parts of the fundamentalist wing, the federal convention of the Greens states: the Greens consider the entire breadth of parliamentary options, from opposition to single party government, as a self-evident range of parliamentary**

**participation. We reject a voluntary restriction to opposition alone, because this would mean that we would voluntarily leave the government to the political opposition.**

This clearly pro-Realo stance, however, was in form at least counter-balanced by this message to the Realos, in the second part of the resolution:

**Vis-à-vis parts of the real-political wing, the Federal convention states: striving for participation in power at nearly any price and as a supposed question of destiny for the Greens would amount to a useless check of fundamentalist dogmatism and is not acceptable for a Green politics which aims at the basic transformation of society.**

In place of battling factional disputes, the conventions have demonstrated, as the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine *Zeitung* put it, a flight into detail.\* The make-up of the Greens, at the level of party delegates and similarly its representation in the federal and Lander parliaments is made apparent from the way in which one such detailed issue—laboratory animal experimentation—was dealt with: the convention defeated a resolution which called for the immediate total ban of such experiments—a casus *belli* which led Rudolf Bahro to leave the party at the Hagen convention. Instead, the convention accepted a moderate resolution which albeit supporting a moratorium, nevertheless agreed to a limited form of laboratory experimentation with animals for medical research.

Both the Hamburg and Hagen conventions took place before the background of a slump in precisely the social movements—ecology, peace, women's movement—from which the party draws its strength. This slump enabled the delegates, on the other hand, to focus on the organisational-structural issues which at present are most urgent: the question of the electoral platform for the future election, the question of the so-called 'Green structures': the question of rotation (of parliamentarians within a legislative period), financial compensation for work on the party executive (so far unremunerated) and in parliament (presently heavily tithed by the party); finally, the role of non-party members as candidates in elections. And both the slump in the movements as well as the sheer persistence of the party for more than five years has demonstrated that this party, not unlike others, is subject to the Michelsian law: there is a slow but steady development of a party bureaucracy and of party cadres, an evident production of professional politicians which have emerged as pragmatic centrists (sometimes dubbed the *Zentralos*), between the contending factions.

Yet, to draw inferences from the party's present performance at conventions or in parliament to the party tout court, or at the local and Lander levels or to view the Realo-Fundi split as a peripheral problem

would be incorrect. For one, the *structural problem of the party* does not become fully apparent at the level of party conventions. It does appear, however, at the local level where elected Greens have to face their constituents, the '*Basis*', or grassroots. Since the party prides itself in its 'movementist', non-structured, anti-authoritarian and non-bureaucratic character, it is also unable to define who its leadership and grassroots actually are and how these grassroots inform the party itself. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenhal, in an eloquent analysis of the Green's electoral defeat in the elections in North Rhine Westfalia<sup>18</sup> have argued that the failure to define the grassroots (and presumably the forms of communication between grassroots and party) allows those individuals who are in the Weberian sense *abkömmlich*, i.e., have sufficient time available to be politically active and be present at each and every local party meeting. But at the same time they are not representative of the Green electorate as a whole, and they have undue influence on the direction of the Party itself. These self-appointed representatives operate to the detriment of the mass of the Green electorate, and the central issues which that mass represents: the anti-nuclear, ecology, peace and womens' issues. In other words, peripheral concerns such as animal rights or the notorious resolution from the lunatic fringe which emerged in North Rhine Westfalia before the disastrous *Landtag* election, advocating the decriminalisation of sexual relations of adults with children are made to appear as dominant concerns and thus demonstrate that the Party is not incontrol of its own agenda. This *structural* weakness of the party—its uncontrolled and undefined (relationship to the) grassroots is supported by and reflected in the unquestioned tenet of the Greens, to be the advocate of minorities *per se*.

### *The 'New Nationalism'*

A second reason why the *Fundi-Realo* split is important has to do with the fact that it raises the explosive issue of the German national identity. This split is a characteristically German phenomenon and a West German phenomenon in particular. As a German phenomenon, it echoes the reform-or-revolution debate in the SPD at the turn of the century; culminating in the SPD's support of Kaiser Wilhelm II's entering the war; but it also appears as a microcosm of the debate in the Federal Republic which I described earlier—the debate since the late forties between the established pro-Western forces on one hand and the extra-institutional opposition on the other; and the *Fundis* are here indeed that group which questions the foundations of the state most radically, whereas the *Realos*, willing to engage in compromise, implicitly also recognise (albeit not necessarily accept) the status quo.

The grave significance of this rejection of the foundations of the West German state by a large section of the Greens has been recognised quickly

in France, including the nationalist French Left, who realise that any questioning of the status quo in Germany also challenges the entire post-war balance of power in Europe.<sup>19</sup> It was lastly because they dared to question the post-war order that the Greens became the leading force in the German peace movement. Their argumentation—not shared, to be sure, by the peace movement as a whole<sup>20</sup> runs approximately like this: The *Palme Plan*, i.e., a nuclear-free zone in Eastern and Western Europe, should be seen as a first step towards the full demilitarisation of that zone. From demilitarisation, however, it is only one more step to a parallel withdrawal of neighbouring countries from NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively, and towards a neutral status for both East and West Germany; once both are neutralised, what would keep the two Germanys from forming a federation, as *Deutsche Gemeinschaft*, as Peter Brandt, for example, has argued<sup>21</sup>—a federation involving the 'Swedisation' of West Germany and the 'Yugoslavisation' of the GDR on the other?

It is important to see that in contrast to virtually all other post-war nationalist sentiments and re-unification initiatives, this is a decidedly Green-pacifist initiative with considerable support from the entire 'non-dogmatic' left, by individuals with outstanding socialist credentials.<sup>22</sup>

This is not the place for a much needed international discussion of the values or dangers of a German left nationalism per se; the question of the new nationalism, however, is important here because the Greens have broken one of the basic taboos of West German politics by lending legitimacy to the nationalist debate. In light of the fact—that there is great popular appeal today for this reopening of the German national question and in light of the fact that, as I have argued, the Greens are not in full control of their own agenda, one must ask what could keep rightist-nationalist forces with substantial following from latching on to the Greens and elevating their ideas to a central issue within the Party?<sup>23</sup>

It must not be forgotten here that the Greens are the-historical product of a multiplicity of forces, not just from the Student Movement and the Left, and that one of the bases of their strength, via the citizens initiatives, was the broad local support by farmers, artisans, workers and petty bourgeois elements in especially the ecology and nuclear issues. It must also be remembered that the right-wing conservationist Greens, to the right sometimes of the CDU<sup>24</sup> were an important element in the constitutive phase of the Greens as a party. The Greens, then, also consist of a significant mainstream-populist element; and what would keep these conservative elements from occupying greater space in the party itself? The party-grassroots relations are still undefined and thus open to a variety of wayward elements; and the party's tendency to patch over its ideological differences at the level of federal party conventions rather than resolving them, might easily lead to greater influence of rightist elements in the party itself.

Indeed, it is apparent that every single progressive-green issue has also generated its rightist corollary, often with 'volkische' or Nazi overtones, as outlined in the following chart:<sup>26</sup>

ECOLOGY	pollution-free environment; environmental preservation	pure soil Heimat (home)	peasant people and their land	<b>LEBENSRAUM</b> <b>BLUT UND BODEN</b>
PEACE	anti-NATO nuclear disarmament demilitarised zone in East and West	<b>neutralism</b>	reunification the German Nation	<b>VOLK</b>
ANTI-STATISM	(against the centralised Leviathanstate)	<b>decentra-</b>	<b>regionalism/communalism</b> <i>(Nichtberg Versor)</i> <sup>27</sup>	<b>GERMANIC 'TRIBES'</b> racism, anti-Semitism
WOMEN	full equality with men, achieved in part through	<b>autonomous women's space</b>	biological psychological differences between men and women 'matriarchy' <i>(Eriar)</i> <sup>28</sup>	<b>glorification of motherhood</b> 'female space' <b>KINDER, KÜCHE, KIRCHE</b>
NO-GROWTH/ ANTI-CAPITALISM			<b>ANTI-TECHNOLOGY</b> <b>ANTI-INDUSTRIALISM</b> <b>ANTI-MODERNISM</b>	
		<i>(Babro)</i>		

While there are outright racist and reactionary ideologues who have, for example, used the ecology metaphor to express their racism against foreign workers<sup>28</sup> and where the Volk is 'polluted' by miscegenation with the foreign element, their influence has been restricted for the most to neo-Nazis and Rightists in the CDU/CSU. A far more attractive ideological perspective is surely that of the 'national-revolutionaries' who have been lumped with others into the New Right in the Federal Republic, but who might, in the eyes of many, actually pass as leftists of some sort. Peter Dudek, one of the keenest observers of this 'national-romantic populism'<sup>29</sup> has argued that the national-revolutionaries are particularly important not because they have borrowed from the new social movements, but

rather, that the new social movements have borrowed many ideas from them. Whether this unidirectional position stands up to the facts or not, it is certainly correct that there is a great deal of communication and exchange of ideas between the new movements and the Greens on one hand, and the New Nationalists on the other, and the idiom of the latter is barely distinguishable from the language of the former. Consider, for example, the following statement by one of the leading figures of the national revolutionaries, Wolfgang Venohr:

National liberation and anti-fascism cannot and should not be opposites. One must revive the German national pride. The note of surrender in the matter of German history must be torn up. The Long March through the consciousness of the German people must be of a national-revolutionary *kind*.<sup>28</sup>

The intellectually most brilliant and original figure among the national-revolutionaries is Henning Eichberg, a professor of political science at the University of Stuttgart, with a previous background in neo-Nazi groups and who from there shifted after 1968 to the national-revolutionary perspective, roughly in the tradition of the 'labourist' Nazi Otto Strasser who advocated the 'national liberation from the Versailles Treaty' and who split with the NSDAP in **1930**.

Eichberg, an open admirer of the IRA and the ETA (one of the periodicals in which he writes bears the name *Wir Selbst*, a translation of the Irish Sinn Fein) is an ardent advocate of endangered peoples, and of political-cultural regionalism. He is opposed to 'state centralist industrial societies' which, as 'highly technological industrial systems colonise the peoples in the world, deprive them of their national and cultural identity' and in the form of the two superpowers, impose upon them the '**Vodka-Cola culture**'. This 'industrial racism began in the holocaust of the Jews' and continues in the destruction of the Romanies, Inuit, and others.

Eichberg advocates a loose 'Federation of German Peoples' Republics', and is an outspoken opponent of the modern centralist state which in his view has abused the nationalist idea:

Not only is Germany colonised as a whole, starting with the establishment of the allied military dictatorships of **1945**, but within Germany there are internal colonies as well. (. . .) There is a straight line which leads back from the Little America of Bonn to National-Socialist fascism with its 'Gleichschaltung' of the regions and still further back to the **Prussian-German Reich**.<sup>29</sup>

An 'Independent Frisia', an 'Alemannic Free State', a 'Free Franconia', a 'Socialist Saxony' (part of the GDR; YMB) or a 'Tyrolean Republic' are therefore in his view not in contradiction to the national principle

(of German identity), 'but only its logical continuation'.<sup>32</sup>

It is my contention that variants of these national-romantic ideas are widespread and they fall on fertile soil, especially because they are articulated in a leftist idiom and with no ties to neonazism, older versions of fascist leadership cults, authoritarianism or militarism. In support of elements of his position, then, Eichberg draws on such respected and largely leftist intellectuals as the writers Martin Walser, Hermann Peter Piwitt, Peter Schneider, as well as Herbert Achternbusch, Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon—but numerous other intellectuals, left-liberals to socialists of various shades could be cited as well.

### *Gemeinschaft*

What connects Eichberg and the other New Nationalists to significant tendencies in the Green Movement is their common attachment to the idea of *Gemeinschaft*—one of the most persistent and deeply rooted themes in German thought. Indeed, as I have attempted to show, the key themes in the newsocial movements—their autonomy and rationality notwithstanding—can all be traced back to *Gemeinschaft* themes: from ecology to *Heimat*, from peace and neutralism to German national unity, from anti-statism and small units to pseudo-tribal conceptions or *überschaubare Lebensraume* (Kaltenbrunner, in Eichberg, 1984), from feminism to the matriarchal hearth with much wool for communal knitting; and from anti-capitalism, with Rudolf Bahro, back to pre-industrial rural communes.

This *Gemeinschaft*—and implicitly anti-Western<sup>33</sup> sentiment is well illustrated, for example, in the following rumination by Manon Maren-Grisebach (1982), a leading member of the Greens whose baroque sentimentality cannot be adequately rendered into English:

Western human beings live mostly unassembled (*ungesammelt*), their inner being confused—and yet, they want to find themselves. So we move closer together in co-op housing, in small groups at night, sitting on the ground (*erdbockend*) or on the grass, and like to be silent with each other (. . .) The circulation of life and that of death flow into each other in a greater circle, which includes all earthly (*erdbaft*) appearances.<sup>34</sup>

There are, however, not one, but two ways in which *Gemeinschaft* may be contrasted with *Gesellschaft*. In the first case, it is a view of *Gesellschaft* as the anonymous metropolis in which individuals are estranged from one another, in a society with neither heart nor soul—much in the way in which Georg Simmel, following Toennies, and later Max Weber, had conceptualised it, and also much in the way in which the young Engels first diagnosed it after his first encounter with the large industrial metropolis in Britain. In the second approach to *Gesellschaft*, however, the preponderant attribute is not estrangement, but class antagonism, and the abolition of such antagonism in a new *Gemeinschaft*. There is in

German culture a distinct tendency to dogmatic-abstract principles which end up being so lofty that they may be abandoned without much ado. One historical model for such a conversion is that of the early socialist Moses Hess who later in life decided that history is primarily the history of race (i.e. national) struggles, and only secondarily that of *classes*.<sup>35</sup>

A similar denial of the importance of class antagonisms—and the class component within the new social movements themselves has never been adequately reflected upon or analysed—is evident in the nonchalance with which some Greens view a federation of East and West Germany. The myth of the old *Gemeinschaft* is used once again to paper over the obvious (and multiple) contradictions within West German society.

The anti-progressive elements in Eichberg's and many more properly Green theories therefore, all their revolutionary trappings notwithstanding, are thus the dismissal of modernism—the move from anti-capitalism to a romantic anti-industrialism—and the denial of class and other internal antagonisms in favour of an apotheosis of the *Volk* as the historical subject, and whose *Gemeinschaft* character is suggested as a way out of estrangement (and class *struggle*),<sup>36</sup> as Dudek has very rightly pointed out.

It has been the main thesis of this paper that the Greens represent a fundamental, radical critique of capitalist society and of the modern state, and of German society and its *state(s)* in particular. It is therefore also unavoidable that the Greens have to address the question of German national identity. What remains uncertain, however, is whether the Greens' radical critique will continue to focus on the contradictions of capitalist society and its form of production, or whether in a new crisis of the party, it might not move away from this critique, embrace the myth of *Gemeinschaft* more fully, and pursue the idea of the German Nation. This latter course is all the more possible because, through no fault of their own, the Greens have been unable to become engaged in an *international debate*—they lack the internationalism of the early socialist movement—they are faced with a Social Democratic Party committed to their destruction, and they are viewed with scepticism by large segments of labour and the traditional left.<sup>37</sup> The encouraging words of the late Wolfgang Abendroth, one of the most distinguished German socialists, are therefore all the more significant. He writes:

The old generation of the labour movement to which this writer belongs, should criticise [the Greens] with patience and tolerance. In all debates with the Greens, it should always be mindful of the mistakes which the labour movement itself had made, and it should therefore know that a young movement initially without tradition has to learn from their own experience. But most of all, it should never forget that this party, despite all its shortcomings, is one of its most important allies, not only in the struggle for peace and the preservation of Nature and the environment, but also in order to re-establish new starting points of political consciousness in the organisational sphere of the working class—a class still largely estranged from thinking autonomously-selfconsciously about *itself*.<sup>38</sup>

## NOTES

1. Rudolf Bahro, 'From Red to Green', interviews with *New Left Review* (London, Verso, 1984).
2. Eg., Horst Mewes, 'The West German Green Party', in *New German Critique* 28 (1983).
3. Some of the most prominent activists previously from the SPD are **Petra Kelly**, and Ossip Flechtheim, a prominent political scientist at the Free University in Berlin; the study by Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, 'Die Grünen im Lichte von neuesten **Ergebnissen** der Wahlforschung', in Thomas Kluge (Hrsg.), *Grüne Politik. Der Stand einer Auseinandersetzung* (Hamburg, Fischer, 1984) is one of several that has pointed to the SPD origin of many Green voters. Other analyses come to the conclusion that voters vacillate back and forth between SPD and the Greens, and the Greens have recently drawn more voters from the CDU in some elections. Cf. e.g. **Margrit Gerste's** analysis in *Die Zeit*, overseas edition of October 12, 1984.
4. Among Bundestag parliamentarians, there is a striking number of journalists, schoolteachers and booksellers. **One** parliamentarian is listed as unemployed. See Müller-Rommel, *ibid.*, and John D. Nagle, 'The Greens in the Bundestag: A New Pattern of Leadership Recruitment', (ms., 1985).
5. Rudolf Bahro, *op. cit.*, p. 130 refers to the Hamburg *Kirchentag* of 1981 as an important rallying point for the new social movements. The important role of the 1981 *Kirchentag* especially for the new peace movement has been pointed out by K-W. Brand, D. **Büsser**, D. Rucht, *Aufbruch in eine andere Gesellschaft. Neue soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1983, p. 228).  
Bernd Guggenberger, 'Zwischen Feldküche und Familientreffen', *Die Zeit*, (German edition of June 28, 1985) speaks of the Greens as an almost pure 'generation-party' whose formative period was the student movement of 1968 and who are today in their mid-thirties. Müller-Rommel, *op. cit.*, p. 129 shows that the majority of Green voters seem to be *below* that commonly accepted cohort, however, (58% of voters under 30 in 1982). Voters above 45 years of age in 1982 amount to little more than 12%.
7. Cf. K-W. Brand *et al.*, *op. cit.* I have relied a great deal on this excellent and detailed analysis of the new social movements.
8. What did survive, apart from the Catholic Church, were most of the pre-war firms—I.G. Farben being the rare exception—which very quickly resumed their operations with most of its pre-war personnel. Moreover, on the ideological level, no real rupture had occurred, as is clear from the reports of many **émigrés** who found with amazement how Nazi ideology and antisemitism had survived the war and the post-war chaos.  
The only party which did indeed support and partly help initiate these progressive campaigns was the KPD. The KPD, however, banned in 1956, failed to achieve significant support after its post-war re-emergence, and the Cold War did the rest to limit its mass potential, having it appear at the same time as the mouthpiece of the GDR in West Germany. See to this **William D. Graf**, 'Anti-communism in the Federal Republic of Germany', *The Socialist Register*, 1984, p. 179 ff.
10. **Angelo Bolaffi** and Otto Kallscheuer, 'Die Grünen: Farbenlehre **eines** politischen Paradoxes. Zwischen neuen Bewegungen und **Veränderung** der Politik', in *Prokla* 51 (1983), p. 15; Brand *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 85 ff; D. Rucht, *Planung und Partizipation. Bürgerinitiativen als Reaktion und Herausforderung politisch-administrativer Planung*. München (1982).

11. Joschka Fischer, 'Identität in Gefahr!', in Thomas Kluge, *op. cit.*, p. 26. A condensed version appeared in *Der Spiegel* 9, (1984).
12. Bolaffi and Kallscheuer, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
13. Thomas Ebermann and Rainer Trappert, *Die Zukunft der Grünen. Ein real-istisches Konzept für eine radikale Partei* (Hamburg, Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1984), is a presentation of the eco-socialist position.
14. Anna Hallensleben, in Thomas Kluge, *op. cit.*, p. 157 ff. points out that some of the early Green tickets asked their members to sign a statement declaring that they were neither members of a neo-fascist nor of a K-group organisation. These groups feared that they were being infiltrated by the K-groups.
15. Bolaffi and Kallscheuer, *op. cit.*, p. 68 ff.
16. Source: Müller-Rommel, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
17. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 24, 1985, in their report from the Hagen federal convention.
18. 'Die Grüne Angst vorm "Reformismus"', *Die Tageszeitung*, May 31, 1985.
19. The commitment of the French Left to nuclear militarism is analysed by Diana Johnstone, 'How the French Left Learned to Love the Bomb', in *New Left Review* 146 (1984). Johnstone refers to the harsh rejection of the German Peace Movement in French nationalist terms by people such as André Gorz and Jacques Huntzinger. Régis Debray fits the same mould: 'I have always believed that France will once again carry the torch of revolution all over Europe. . . I cannot imagine any hope for Europe if it is not under the hegemony of a revolutionary France holding on to the banner of independence. Sometimes I even ask myself whether one day the entire mythology of the Germanophobe and our century-long hostility with Germany will be indispensable to save the revolution or to save even our national-democratic heritage.' Quoted in Dan Diner, 'The National Question in the Peace Movement—Origins and Tendencies', *New German Critique* 28 (1983), p. 107. Similarly, Mitterrand's patronising Bundestag speech in 1983 and his snubbing of the German peace movement only helped to exacerbate the lack of communication between the French and German Left. Petra Kelly in the summer of 1984 responded with a harsh attack against French nuclear policy, in nationalist terms as well. Too little attention has been paid to this emerging hostility between the French and German Left which has developed concurrently with the Green Movement and its questioning of the foundations of the West German state. See also note 20 below.
20. For example some of the signatories of the conciliatory 'Memorandum an die französische Linke', in *Die Tageszeitung*, May 15, 1984 which has not evoked much reaction in France. The memorandum, among other things, attempted to explain to the French Left why not all Germans are pleased to see French nuclear war heads pointed at West and East Germany. 'The prospect to be "reunited" on a pan-German battlefield of a conventional or nuclear war has led many Germans to recognise that their security interests are different from those of the two superpowers and in part also from those of the neighbours in East and West.' *Ibid.*, p. 9.
21. Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, (eds.), *Die Linke und die nationale Frage. Dokumente zur deutschen Einheit seit 1945* (Reinbek, Rowohlt, 1981).
22. Cf. the signers of the *Memorandum* cited above which includes a number of people from the left wing of the SPD and the unions.
23. The following episode from West Berlin in the spring of 1984 illustrates some of this: The *Berlin-Deutschland AG*, a working group that was to develop proposals related to issues concerning the two German states and Berlin, on behalf of the *AL* (Greens in West Berlin) decided to invite Henning Eichberg (see below) to present views of the so-called national-revolutionaries on regional-

ism and on the 'German Question'. His lecture was to be entitled, 'Where does the **social-emancipatory** content of the German question lie? On regionalism as anti-colonialism and its anti-state consequences.'

In a draft of their platform of May 1984, the **AG** pointed to the anomalies of the status of Berlin and the denial of civil and democratic rights to the citizens of West Berlin, on the part of the Allied powers in the city. The **AG** therefore came to the conclusion that 'in order to overcome the abnormal geographic-political situation of West Berlin, we must ultimately raise the question of German unity, and contribute to its solution. (. . .) Forty years after the war we believe the time has come to surmount the unconditional subordination of the European countries by the Soviet Union and the United States. (. . .) This requires of Germans that they accept the differing political systems (*Gesellschaftsordnungen*) on German soil. They (have to) form a confederation of both German states, a "League of German Lander", based upon a peace treaty with the European neighbours, the United States and the Soviet Union, and based also upon the military non-alignment of the two German states'.

Most groupings within the **AL** as well as the pro-Green *Tageszeitung* reacted negatively to the **AG's** invitation of Eichberg, and the **AL** refused official sponsorship. In a statement to the press, its Acting Executive declared, 'In the interests of the **AL** as a whole and in accordance with our political position, the Acting Executive recommends to the working group to be more sensitive on this question (danger of appropriation by the right) and to be more sensitive in relation to different orientations within the **AL**. The Executive considers cancellation of the event as necessary. For the **AL**, it is politically incompatible to be a forum for national-revolutionaries'. (Statement to DPA, July 5, 1984).

But the **AL** executive had no effective sanctioning mechanisms, and while the **AG** itself eventually backed off from officially sponsoring the lecture, it took place nevertheless.

Another illustration for the inability of the Greens to control its agenda is the emergence of the *Eco-libertarians*, officially set up in 1984. The *eco-libertarians* consider themselves anti-socialist, oppose social security and present themselves as a middle-class, *bürgerliche* current 'inside and outside the Green Party'. This current, which so clearly violates the *social* principle of the Greens, as one of its four basic principles, has demonstrated that new political orientations may enter the Green platform without being sanctioned by the party itself.

24. Eg., Herbert Gruhl, a former CDU deputy who founded the *Grüne Aktion Zukunft* and was the author of an influential book on ecological issues. *Ein Planet wird geplündert. Die Schreckensbilanz unserer Politik* (Frankfurt, 1975). A conservative CDU peace advocate is the journalist Franz Alt who has had a considerable echo in the conservative fringe of the Green Movement. (Alt, *Frieden ist möglich, Munich/Zurich, 1983.*)
25. It would be totally erroneous to deduce from this chart that there are firm tendencies in the Greens who have moved to *volksiche* or even Nazi conceptions. This is merely to show that these connections can be drawn, have been drawn by critics of the Greens, and are, at any rate, highly suggestive. Cf. Arno Klönne, *Zurück zur Nation?* (Hamburg, Eugen Diederichs, 1985).
26. Henning Eichberg, *Balkanisierung für Jedermann? Nation, Identität und Entfremdung in der Industriegesellschaft* in *Befreiung 19/20* (1981).
27. Gisela Anna Erler, *Frauenzimmer. Für eine Politik des Unterschieds* (Berlon: Wagenbach, 1985).
28. 'The inundation of Europe with Afro-asiatic immigrants is not only **economical-**

ly and culturally, but also ecologically absurd.' Quoted in Peter Dudek, '**Konservatismus, Rechtsextremismus** und die "Philosophie der Grünen"', in Thomas Kluge, *op. cit.*, p. 95; Alfred Dregger and other conservatives in both CDU and SPD have used similar language.

29. Peter Dudek, *op. cit.*, and *idem.*, 'Nationalromantischer Populismus als Zivilisationskritik', in Wolf Schafer, (ed.), *Neue Soziale Bewegungen: Konservativer Aufbruch in buntem Gewand?* (Hamburg, Fischer, 1983). as well as Sigrid Meuschel's essay, 'Für Menschheit und Volk. Kritik fundamentaler und nationaler Aspekte in der deutschen Friedensbewegung', in the same volume.
30. Wolfgang Venohr in Dudek, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
31. Henning Eichberg, 'Deutschlands Balkanisierung? Über die Nichtanerkennung der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik und über die nationale Frage als praktische Distanzierung vom Staat', ms (1984), p. 10.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 11 and Dudek in Schäfer, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
33. The anti-Western sentiment is surely the most disturbing element that has become visible in the new movements, and it derives partly from the fact that these movements are, to a significant extent, cut off from international debates. Dan Diner, *op. cit.*, p. 104 quotes the following from Thomas Schmid, a leading member of the **ecolibertarian** current in the Greens, published in the **influential-chic Freibeuter**: 'I cannot deny that I am also fascinated by that German proclivity for absoluteness, by that obstinacy and pigheadedness—to get to the bottom of the matter, also to get to the bottom of terror, not to stand still in the shallow waters of common sense, but to be deep, profound and mysterious. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon cultures have different premises, and various life styles can coexist. (. . .) Anglo-Saxon tolerance is a virtue, and we Germans mainly lack that tolerance. But there are negative aspects: to put up with everything, to remain on the surface, to reconcile everybody with everything—this amounts to shallowness!'
- From there, it is only a small step to anti-Semitic imagery: 'There is nothing more homeless, hence nothing more rootless, nothing more like Ahasverus than capital. It chases around the globe searching for tax havens, low wage countries and a graveyard atmosphere for investments where it can fill its fat belly on foreign labour.' Hermann Peter Piwitt, 'Deutschland. Versuch einer Heimkehr', published in the leftist **Konkret** 11 (1981), cited in Diner, *op. cit.*, p. 102. Micha **Brumlik** has pointed to similar anti-Jewish conceptions in some of the feminist literature in West Germany ('Alt, Rinser, Jung u.a. Über den neuen **christlich-feministischen Antijudaismus**', in **Links** 181 (April 1985). One of **Brumlik's** chief targets in this essay is the writer Luise Rinser who in her youth wrote in admiration of the **Führer**, and who was the Greens' candidate for President of the Federal Republic, in 1984.
34. **Manon Maren** Grisebach, *Philosophie der Grünen* (Muenchen/Wien, 1982, p. 23.
35. Moses Hess, *Rom und Jerusalem* (New York: Bloch Publ. Co., 1945/1862).
36. Dudek in Schafer, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
37. See, however, the very positive debate between socialists and Greens in **Klaus-Jürgen Scherer** and **Fritz Vilmar**, *Okosozialismus? Rot-Grüne Bündnispolitik* (Berlin: Verlag Europäische Perspektiven, 1985).
38. Wolfgang Abendroth *et al.*, *Nicht Links—nicht rechts? Über Politik und Utopie der Grünen* (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1983), p. 24.