US Military Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

Abstract

The Persian Gulf War of January-February 1991 was the first major crisis of the Post-Cold War Era, and for many analysts represents a watershed in the evolution of US military strategy. 'The Second of August 1990 will be remembered for generations to come as a turning point for the United States in its conduct of foreign affairs,' General Carl E. Vuono of the Army observed in 1991 - 'the day America announced the end of Containment and embarked upon the strategy of power projection.' But while it is certainly true that the Gulf War will have a substantial and long-lasting impact on US military thinking, it is important to recognise that the process of reshaping US grand strategy for the Post-Cold War era began well before the onset of the Persian Gulf crisis, and arose as much for domestic considerations - in particular, from a need to articulate a viable rationale for maintaining a large military establishment in the absence of a credible Soviet threat - as it did from international developments. In evaluating this process, two key developments require particular attention: First, the Gulf War institutionalised a new paradigm of combat that will in all likelihood govern US military planning for a generation to come. Second, the Persian Gulf war legitimised a new assertion of Pax Americana, or the discretionary use of US military power by the President to protect and enforce certain rules of international behaviour that have been dictated by Washington.