

WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

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It is supposed to be a goal of communism to achieve a classless society. The working class becomes the universal class: both because it has taken power in order to abolish private ownership of land and industry, which is the basis of class domination, and because now everyone will be a worker of one kind or another. Society may need to curtail some freedoms to achieve it, but the commitment to equality is unequivocal.

If socialist societies are in transition toward communism, we expect to find a deliberate process of gradual abolition of class difference; certainly we expect there to be less antagonism than in a capitalist society. But my experience of the GDR over the past 30 years was that despite rhetoric and impressive programmes designed to bring the classes together, social distinctions were quite rigid, more rigid than I was used to in the capitalist USA.

A few weeks after the wall 'came down', **Christa Wolf**, East Germany's best novelist, published a radical statement which might seem to confirm my perception, but raised many more questions. 'I see the policy of separating the "intelligentsia" and the "people" which was followed more or less consistently for decades still has its effect – perhaps not with many, but the effect is there. . . . I'd like to warn against a continuation of the unholy tradition in German history that so often drove producers of material vs. spiritual goods to different sides: this has never served revolutionary renewal well.'

Presumably she meant the Socialist Unity (i.e. Communist) Party (SED), or the government – they were essentially the same thing – as the perpetrators of this deliberate policy of separation of the workers and the intellectuals. But how could that be? Hadn't the Party always spoken of the 'Intelligenz' as the allies of the workers? Hadn't there been well advertised programmes to bring them together, to upgrade the cultural and intellectual skills of the workers, 'break the bourgeoisie's monopoly on education', and acquaint writers with the world of manual labour? What about the classless society?

Ehrhart Neubert, a critical sociologist, wrote a few months later that if fundamental equality was not after all both the goal and the means, the socialist regime would lose its justification. 'The great value of the socialist state, its assertion of a historic mission, its security and defence needs were **all** grounded in the claim uniquely and for the first time to have made the principle of equality **realizable**.'²

Intrigued and a little disturbed by these accusations, I decided to go to the source, to try to find out whether the Party indeed had abandoned equality, specifically whether it had a conscious policy to separate rather than unite workers and intellectuals. After sifting through thousands of pages in the Socialist Unity Party's Central Archives in East Berlin during Spring 1993, my preliminary answer is still only a 'definite maybe'. But exploring the question involves opening the doors to many rooms, and a look inside them gives a composite inside picture of how this Party thought, how it ruled, and how it attempted to transform its populace into the kind of 'new man' it believed socialism should produce. In a sense, the Party's strategy really was to dissolve the people and elect another one — as Brecht sardonically recommended after the workers' uprising in 1953.¹

What follows, then, is a progress report on my findings about the mind of the Party from its archives, as well as from conversations and other materials, with some tentative conclusions offered not as definitive answers but for discussion.

Why should we want to do this? The disaster that capitalism is perpetrating on the non-owning classes in the first, second, and third worlds alike is accelerating at such a rate, that the search for alternatives to barbarism will be on the agenda almost before socialists get around to placing it there again. If we don't use the suffering of both the victims and the perpetrators of recently-existing socialism to get it right, or at least more right, next time around, we consign their lives to **meaninglessness**, and the coming generations' lives to hopelessness. Whether we like it or not, understanding the past of socialism in preparation for its future is the task laid on those on the left fortunate or unfortunate enough to live through this period; if we don't learn **from** the past we doom others to repeat it.

The story of 'the other Germany's' attempt at socialism contains some good ideas and some sad perversions of the same. It viewed itself as the embodiment of the ideas of its own native son Karl Marx rather than the importer of a foreign doctrine; it contains some constraining historical circumstances, some missed chances, some heroic attempts to build socialism, and some personal failures. From all this we can learn, not least because its archives are more (teutonically) thorough and the access to them, thanks largely to the citizens' movement, more complete than the others.

Learning by reading Party or government archives is of course a tricky business. Suffice it to say here that everything in them is both revealing and

misleading; there are no complete narratives, only pieces; the contexts must be either imagined or researched. Thus it will make a big difference who is doing the reading. My reading, though it may appear to be disgusted with the manipulations of the functionaries, is also informed by a basic sympathy for the project they were attempting.

What were they attempting in class relations? In order to know what we are talking about when we examine the relation of workers and intellectuals to each other, first we need to examine their respective definitions separately. That is not, however, simply a matter of looking them up in a Marxist-Leninist dictionary. Contrary to the image that there was only one line about everything in the GDR, there was (and is) actually quite a lot of debate about the structure of classes or 'strata' there. What did East Germans mean when they said 'worker' or 'intellectual'? And what was the respective relation of each to the Party?

Workers

Despite their long history of class division and class consciousness, both Western and Eastern Europe seem to be headed today more toward the American model of atomization of class communities into individuals. But according to one view of East German society, a kind of atomization or levelling had already taken place, the Party having replaced traditional horizontal working-class relations with vertical relations by individuals to itself, the Party, rather than to each other. Leisure time as well as work time were centred around mass organizations that were **all** organized by the Party, independent interest groups were to say the least discouraged (thus the importance of the Protestant Church as an autonomous centre of social life), and old working-class communities were broken up as the work force was shifted around to various massive construction and production facilities.' The proletariat's consciousness of itself as a class was both promoted and fractured.

How do you define classes in a society where the means of production are socially owned? One might have thought it would be enough simply to define people by what they actually do – clearly a teacher's work activity is different from a miner's is different from a petty bureaucrat's – but the infinite divisions got rather tricky.

One frequently comes across the formula 'workers and all working people' ['Arbeiter und alle Werktätige'], which suggests that in the narrowest sense the word 'Arbeiter' meant **industrial** worker, the traditional muscular, male, heavy-industry worker in the mine, the steel mill, the refinery, or construction. This narrow focus had its source both in the Marxist focus on production workers – those who transform raw materials from nature into commodities and create surplus value – and in the birth of the GDR in a ruined landscape requiring prodigious feats of construction

and heavy industry. These were the workers celebrated in socialist realist novels and art, whose contribution to society is meant to be ever greater effort and efficiency in creating the wealth that will then provide them with the goods to make them happy. The other working people ('*andere Werktätige*'), those in services and higher up the ladder of qualification, such as professionals, existed in a kind of definitionallimbo, as did the few self-employed or shopkeepers and private farmers. (Farmers were generally lumped together with workers if they were collectivized; private farmers, like petty bourgeois, just don't appear in the rhetoric.)

On the other hand, sometimes '*die Arbeiter*' just seems to mean '*das Volk*'. In this meaning it becomes insidious when intellectuals and workers are treated as a dichotomy: it suggests there is a kind of opposition by intellectuals to the people in general, or vice versa. Furthermore, in reading Party documents one often gets the sense that 'workers' really means the Party, as in various attempts at self-fulfilling propositions about what the workers think, feel and want. The Party speaks in the name of the workers, for the workers, and instead of the workers.'

The Party had to speak for the workers not only because the working class was allegedly the ruling class (but a whole class can't govern, only its delegates, whether self-appointed or elected); there is also the problem that it had been only a few years since many of these workers were Nazis. The rhetoric always announced that antifascist resistance could come only from the working class and its revolutionary Party; and working-class consciousness had to be aspostrophized as by definition correct (**anti**-fascist, for instance) consciousness, but in fact the leadership of the SED had the thankless task of building a socialist society with partially fascist raw material. This is not to be taken as an excuse, but it must be recognized as a genuine dilemma. Heiner Miiller says Ulbricht's genius was that he never expected to be liked by the people he publicly had to praise. Privately he thought of them as still requiring re-education; and that was the basic attitude of the Party to the people throughout GDR history.

The workers' real role was not to rule or to think but to work, to produce. Stalin's economic theory adopted in the GDR (according to Sigrid Meuschel) was very simple: 1) The way to keep the populace content is to provide them with an increasing number of goods. 2) But it is they themselves who produce these goods. 3) Therefore if they want contentment they must be persuaded to produce ever **more**.⁸ This is of course exactly the strategy that various left movements have accused capitalism of: convincing workers all their needs are material, and providing the goods (and incidentally of course profits) by exploiting alienated labour. Work is performed only for the wages, not for any intrinsic sense of creativity or belief that one is making a contribution; the wages are then used to fill leisure time, private life (in East Germany, called '*niches*') with the satisfaction that is absent during the work day. Robert Havemann, the

great socialist critic in East Germany, pointed out that this is capitalism's game, and if the only value 'really existing' socialist society intends to offer its workers is goods, then of course capitalism would win hands down.'

This is, however, selling the work arrangements in the GDR a little short. Although the content of the work may have been dreary, dirty, or dangerous, and although the ideology claiming to have its source in the working class while actually hardly consulting them was hypocritical, nevertheless there were many innovative methods of workplace organization that did make work more humane than it usually is in the **hyper-disciplined** work ethics of West Germany, Japan, or the USA. Absent the disciplining effect of fear of losing your job, you were free to work at a leisurely pace, with breaks, long vacations, sick leave, parental leave. (Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing is a complex debate.) Workers in large plants were organized into brigades, somewhere around ten people each, and the bonding within the brigades was very strong, sometimes lifelong. Your social life and an extensive cultural life were organized around the plant; your children were in day care there, you could shop and eat there and get theatre tickets or join a sports club. It is also important to realize that the very challenge of building up the country created a strong work ethic among the 'Aufbaugeneration' (both East and West), which included a certain proletarian pride in reality, not just in official **statements**.⁸ Over the years though that motivation faded. It is always more stimulating to work hard for a cause than to find ways to avoid work.

The **working-class** consciousness of Marxism rests on the analysis that it is the workers who necessarily represent the force which opposes – and will eventually overthrow – capital. Even those Marxists who believe a vanguard party must rule derive its legitimacy from its **working-class** standpoint. What, however, happens when there is no more capital, no more bourgeoisie? Does it even make sense any more to speak of a working-class standpoint, when everyone works, and the perceived boss or even enemy is now the government, the vanguard Party, itself?

In fact, in order to maintain the logic of the class position, the bourgeoisie, without whom the language of class conflict makes no sense, was now perceived as outside the borders. The class enemy was the **Bundesrepublik**, with its various ideologies that could undermine a secure communist position, such as social democracy. Anyone who published in the West – especially criticism – or was interested in those ideologies, was 'delivering arguments to the class enemy'. (One sees in Archive documents again and again how the Party destroyed itself partly through its obsession with West Germany.)

Belief that the 'socialist person' is a fundamentally different personality type, without whom socialist democracy is premature, implies the necessity of somehow producing this type. A genuine problem. The Party had a

mistrust of unsupervised, spontaneous, self-organized activity, and one purpose of this system of organizing life and leisure around the workplace – organizing free time as well as work time – was to keep everyone in constant relationship to organs of control and education. Many of the programmes were valuable in their conception, and workers did participate enthusiastically; but the Party could never leave the programmes alone, everything had to be used to a 'constructive' purpose to try to develop loyalty and consciousness – and, not so incidentally, productivity. A structure designed to stimulate creativity and the full development of the personality turned into its opposite. In everything we look at in the GDR, we have to encourage ourselves to have this double vision: see how good ideas could be perverted – but also, by examining exactly where the perversions lay, see that in fact there were some good ideas. The GDR's failure is not necessarily socialism's failure. But it illustrates to us some temptations well-meaning socialism must avoid.

Most of these programmes were designed for workers, especially workers in that traditional sense. In this respect they were indeed privileged. **Skilled** workers were paid well, and all workers were encouraged to advance themselves through further education. There were special high schools (called Workers' and Farmers' Faculties) where workers such as older people returning from prisoner-of-war camps could meet the requirements for university admission; and the regime was serious about making education available to their children as well, **breaking** the German tradition of a Bildungsbourgeoisie, an hereditary educated class from which civil servants and government are drawn. The privileging of the working class of course caused disgruntlement among educated people whose children certainly did not want to go 'down' in the world – but determined young people from any background could usually manage to get into advanced study by one method or another (choosing a less popular field, or going to work and then being delegated to study from the workplace, or connections and personal petitions).

The policy was loosened anyway partly because after the early reconstruction period scientific and technical skills were recognized as an important productive force, and partly because after a generation of workers has gone to university it is hard to say whether their children are the children of workers. But what remained until the end was the ubiquitous demand for announcement of your class origin. Many years after joining the Party, perhaps even becoming powerful functionaries, members' occupations would be listed as what they were at the time of entry. In fact, the operational definition often went farther back, not to what did you do, but to what did your father do. **On every** form you filled out you had to state your parents' (or often only father's) occupation; every little biographical blurb would always say 'father worker' or 'bourgeois origin'; it was as much part of your identity as your eye colour, name and birthplace.

(After the **fifties** 'bourgeois', which no one wanted to admit to, would be replaced by the choice between 'employee, intelligentsia, or self-employed'.)

The GDR was the home of irony as much as repression, irony both in fact and in people's attitude. Call something by the name the Party gave it and you were often making a joke with no further comment necessary – as for instance when dissident writers were sent into production to be re-educated and said they were being 'transferred to the ruling class'. The irony here is, in the attempt to make people more equal, the old categories got rigidified and fluidity was more difficult rather than less; you were defined throughout your life by the accident of your birth status. (And woe if your parents were not just bourgeois intellectuals but churchpeople or small businessmen.) Like so many customs in the **GDR**, this one had a noble purpose – breaking the tendency of class status (culture, function, and income) to be inherited – but it turned into its opposite, branding people for life with the accident of their birth.

The tendency to define classes by the occupation of the parents also ipso facto leads to a conception of the nature of production and work which is inherited from previous generations; it is hard to adjust to the increasing importance of technical, information, and service jobs if those careers are still thought of as bourgeois, and the knowledge they require as dangerous because bourgeois consciousness is dangerous. It also doesn't help that the classical Marxist categories of class are grounded in an analysis of **19th-century** capitalism.

Another privilege enjoyed by workers was the ironic result of their political powerlessness. Since their opinions had little chance to be heard publicly or to influence others, they enjoyed the 'Narrenfreiheit' of being able to say pretty much anything they wanted. The security police apparently had little interest in monitoring workers (except during rare periods like 1953 or 1968 when they flexed their oppositional potential). Party membership was notoriously low among rank and file, and of course the one umbrella trade union was strictly a Leninist organ for bringing directives from the top to the bottom, not for defending the interests of the workers (except in that long-range sense that the harder they work, the more goods they produce for themselves). Much of the anger expressed out loud in 1989 was directed at the union.

Meanwhile, although manual labour was praised as the salt of the earth, an opposing trend was encouraging moving up into technical skills as the Party economists became more and more convinced that the '**scientific-technical** revolution' was going to decide international competition. The New Economic System of Planners and Leaders of 1963 was one manifestation; the 1968 university reform with its manic application of cybernetics to all fields, appropriate or not, was another. From 1971–75 there was another upswing in the economy as Ulbricht was replaced and Honecker

brought in new pragmatic blood. Innovative Party sociologists were now beginning to suggest that some differentiation and inequality within the work force was desirable, otherwise why would people bother to become more qualified? There is a large literature of sociological studies of the structure of the work force, and the levelling vs. differentiating – or equality vs. inequality – poles run throughout both the descriptive and the prescriptive studies. Thus there was a periodic debate – within this **Party** that did not even brook internal, let alone external controversy – about whether equality or inequality is a better strategy. The debate became open with Gorbachev's economic perestroika, but since the leadership was deathly afraid of social glasnost, they also repressed the debate.

To **overgeneralize**, then, the major group in the population was a politically and socially almost undifferentiated mass, their old communities of solidarity often disbanded to move the work force around to new priority projects as well as presumably to keep them from developing independent organizational forms. They were reluctant socialists, doing the work asked of them at first with great energy and (some of them) with some sense of altruistic purpose, then more and more passively and just for the material rewards – which never equalled those of the West. With a lot of fanfare and publicity, certain individual workers performed prodigious feats of surpassing the general norm; but far from being heroes to their fellow workers, with time they just became responsible for the justification of **speedup**.⁹ And if they got a premium for their feat – or later, in the 'innovators movement' for their suggestion – the triumph of material over moral incentives once again turned morale into its opposite. 'We have a lot of suggestions here from below, and they are even applied, but in the end it's the worker who's the idiot [der **DuBlige**], because it's himself **he's** screwing. He makes a suggestion for improvement and maybe he even gets a one-time premium for it, but then he's got to keep producing more, and his colleagues too, who didn't get any **premium**.'¹⁰

When material incentives stagnate with economic slowdown, it is hard to hold the loyalty of workers. Ever since the workers' protests of June 17, 1953, they had been courted with concessions and a gradually increasing standard of living, but twenty years later the expansion of production slowed for good (starting, perhaps, with the energy crisis). It was less than twenty years afterward that they or their children voted, **first** with their feet and then with ballots, for the material benefits they had been promised as their reward all along. No one knows whether it would have been possible to develop values that would outweigh consumption; the temptation from the alleged rewards of capitalism may be too hard to withstand no matter what. But anyway, it wasn't tried. If nonalienated labour, free development of all the abilities of each individual, and self-determination are fundamental to socialism, then we simply lack any evidence to show it can't work. Or that it can. The GDR might have had the chance to come closest

to that version of socialism, but it also started with two strikes against it: the proximity and consanguinity of the ruthlessly successful and actively anticommunist West Germany, and the mentalities left over from the Third Reich. Then the Party itself struck out, through its inflexible Leninist-Stalinist conception that it must always be organizing and controlling everything its people did. The dogma that 'the Party is always right', resulted in a drastic limitation of the diversity of ideas. Future, more detailed study of East German society, economy, and government will have to find out how to separate the mistakes of a paranoid leadership from the economic structures, in order to answer the question all socialists must ask: could the economy have worked?"

Intellectuals

When the 'Ulbricht group' were sent home to the Soviet Zone by the Russians in 1945, they were confronted not only with a general working populace that had supported Hitler, but also with a bourgeois and intellectual elite who had often not just supported but actively **collaborated**.¹² Furthermore, the leaders themselves tended to come from proletarian backgrounds, and their social context had been the autonomous worker culture of the Weimar period. For both legitimate and envy reasons then, they were deeply suspicious of intellectuals, and this anti-intellectualism continued right up until the end. It has long been part of Marxist tradition to consider intellectuals as untrustworthy allies, who when the going gets tough will start remembering their individual moral principles and back out, and who tend to think too much for themselves and too little 'parteilich', partisan, unclear on where their class loyalty lies.

However, because workers or 'the people' had been in their way just as untrustworthy as intellectuals, the communist leadership needed the intellectuals. They needed the 'technical intelligentsia' - mostly employed in industry - in the desperate attempt to make production efficient and innovative. A catchup with the West and sometimes the express intention of surpassing it were a constant pressure. These were the intellectuals who had direct contact with blue-collar workers, playing a constant mediating role between the official central plan and national goals on one hand vs. the norms, working conditions, and motivation of the manual labourers on the other. I do not know the extent they themselves identified up or down; that would be another interesting subject for research. The way the Party used them appears to have swung back and forth from a divide-and-rule tactic encouraging workers ('we' in Party language) to resent them and their minor privileges - which could even have been designed to cause resentment - and criticism of workers for not sufficiently educating and accepting the technicians. The ironies are rife here, for often the socialist consciousness (read Party loyalty) of the better-paid technicians was higher than the

workers'; furthermore, the language used allegedly to draw them together would ipso facto result in further separation.

The social relations within a factory or combine were a microcosm of the roles in society as a whole. The workers correspond to 'the people', the scientists and technical employees to the 'class' or 'stratum' of intellectuals, and the local Party functionaries to the Politburo. The intellectuals we would be more likely to give that name to in the West – educators, artists and writers, scientists, social scientists, and philosophers – were needed to play a similar mediator role in society as a whole. In most of what follows the word 'intellectual' refers to that cultural section of the intelligentsia.

If scientists and technicians were needed to improve production, artists and especially writers were needed to create a climate of enthusiasm for the new values. It was their job to portray the 'new socialist person' as a **flesh-and-blood** real figure; 'party hacks' **are** aware they can't really persuade through their canned holiday speeches. This was not necessarily the writers' and scientists' own idea of their job descriptions, however. Not that they did not want to be useful; the emphasis on art for art's sake and damn the audience came about largely as a reaction to being misused. Really, it is very gratifying to be useful, and people who work with ideas and images are generally delighted to see their suggestions have some effect on society. In fact, a number of GDR intellectuals chose to move to the fledgling socialist nation, from West Germany or exile, precisely because they wanted to be useful. But the rub is, they tend to think they can be most useful if they keep the gene pool of ideas rich and varied, doing science no matter where it leads, helping the leadership to see that life is more complex than it appears from their Party offices, providing a portrait of people as they are, not as ideal types, and keeping an ear open for dissatisfaction, problems, conflicts, even for tragedy. In doing this they genuinely believe they **are** being helpful, if only someone in authority would listen. It is for their Sisyphean attempts to use the existing channels to try to influence power rather than to discredit and overthrow it that they are now being widely branded as naive and collaborators. They tended to see themselves, however, as testing and expanding the borders of the permissible, and more embattled than coddled.

Since the workers' role is to produce wealth, they are not judged on the basis of their ideology. Since intellectuals' job however is to produce consciousness, every word they say is examined for its ideological content. The situation is really quite contradictory: on the one hand, the working-class standpoint is the correct one and the petty bourgeois intellectuals are urged to get with it; on the other hand, the intellectuals are needed to mediate the correct working-class standpoint to the workers. The workers' error, economism, is eventually permitted and even encouraged, anything to increase productivity. The intellectuals' error, open criticism and failure

to understand the importance of unity, is not permitted. The first error only undermines the fundamental ethos of socialism; the second undermines power. Whenever the SED had a choice between weakening socialism and weakening itself, it chose power. It had to, given its **vanguardist** conviction that it was the only element not subject to false motivation.

Pity the Party: it was always fighting on two fronts. It was squeezed between aggressive anticommunism from the West and creeping liberalization from the East, including Eurocommunism and convergence theory. (Some interpreters think it saw the developments to its East as the greater danger; note also that there are commentators who think it was right to predict any loosening of the reins would mean total collapse of the communist world.) **But** also internally: it was fighting an **uphill** battle simultaneously against a lagging economy and against the false consciousness of the people. It was far too insecure to experiment.

Intellectuals in the West tend to periodize GDR history by the high points of repression – starting with 1953, against the workers' rebellion, and after that against the whole people or against intellectuals: 1961, the wall; 1965, the **11th** Plenum that muzzled writers; 1968, Czechoslovakia; 1976, the expatriation of Biermann; 1979, expulsions from the writers' union; and throughout the eighties, increasing numbers of artists and thinkers leaving the country with the Party's blessing. (Take this visa – please.) Like knowing a city by its subway stops or freeway offramps, this is probably a distorted map of what the place felt like day to day. In between those nadirs there were some periods of 'liberalization', when the Party toyed with the idea of letting intellectuals do what they do best, depicting reality. But there was always a pendulum swing. It would turn out after a while that reality was not what the Party had decreed it to be. This dilemma – what counts as reality – trapped not only writers and broadcasters but also all the social scientists doing research on the people for the Academy of Sciences, all the teachers and professors, the filmmakers and plastic artists, the diplomats, the managers and engineers who had to assess and improve productive capacity, natural scientists assessing environmental damage . . . All were confronted daily with the fatal refusal of the Party to hear any messages from **Cassandra**.¹³

True, it was possible to send all sorts of critical letters internally to specific individuals in government: the archives of the various bureaus include astonishingly personal correspondences and attention by people in leadership to individual wrongs and slights. If you needed a better apartment in order to be able to write, you could beg for one with a letter, and you might well get it, even if you weren't particularly obsequious. But you couldn't go public with any complaints about significant, collective conditions (and the greatest crime was of course to go public in the West), and you couldn't get the leadership to take your concerns about the state of the nation seriously. This drove some **people** to share their concerns with the

Stasi, under the misimpression that its purpose was to gather accurate information on the mood of the public and transmit it to the administration, or even that it was the reform-minded organ of government.

Some just left: **Ernst** Bloch, Hans Mayer. A few became openly defiant: Robert Havemann, Rudolf Bahro. The sad part is, they got so little support. Today, people look back and feel very bad about not having supported them then. What most did was to try to find some way of combining their desire to serve a state which unfortunately claimed the right to define the truth, with their desire to portray the truth as they saw it. Some flourished, either because of their basic support for socialism or because political censorship is more fruitful conflict material for art than is the effective censorship of the market. Others went under, silent or imprisoned. A surprising number of creative artists took occasional work in manual labour in order to be able to write on their own what they wanted, rather than filling the slots foreseen for an intellectual elite. (There was actually a much broader palette of attitudes and life choices to support the habit of portraying the truth through art than I ever suspected.)

The intellectuals' or Westerners' periodization of GDR history has little to do with the workers', whose collective history was more even: a long period of gradual improvement, and then a long period of stagnation. Workers continued to get their theatre tickets through the union, and occasionally there was something unusual to see like *Die neuen Leiden des jungen W.* [The New Sorrows of Young W.], *Die Übergangsgesellschaft* [The Transitional Society], or the latest bold cabaret at the Distel, but especially for the younger generation the real action was in popular music, available on the airwaves. Although there were unusually high reader numbers among workers (books were sold cheap right at the workplace, which also had libraries and readings and writing classes with authors), it is questionable whether even the books that were most widely read and discussed, such as Neutsch's *Spur der Steine* [Trail of Stones] or Christa Wolf's *Geteilter Himmel* [Divided Heaven], really influenced consciousness as much as either the Party or the writers thought and hoped they did. It would be hard to do reception research because workers got premium points for cultural participation; they would probably have answered interviewers by saying Oh yes, they found those works very important.

Nevertheless, the army of intellectuals was called out to do damage control whenever there was a crisis of legitimacy. On the night of August 13, 1961, cultural establishments throughout the entire country were instructed to put on particularly enticing programmes nonstop, getting the people into dance halls with live bands, or into movie theatres showing the most popular movies, and they all had to report to Berlin daily on exactly what events they were organizing: "artists as preventers of popular protest. Many people hardly even were aware that the wall was being built, since

they had been successfully enticed away from home where they might have heard the news from **RIAS** radio. There was almost no protest against the building of the wall, except for the people who made quick getaways. The mission, distraction, was accomplished. In August 1968 (why did these things always happen during the university vacation?) intellectuals and artists in every **kind** of institution were pressured to send letters and petitions of support for the 'action of the brother countries' in Czechoslovakia." There **are** people who to this day **are** ashamed of nothing so much as signing those letters. The head of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism – about as high and ideological an intellectual position as you can get – was fired and demoted to factory work because his daughter protested the invasion and he refused to condemn **her**.¹⁶ It is not clear what purpose all these testimonials were to serve; they apparently weren't published, but the Party was able to say it had received support from artists and professors all over the land, and be telling the truth. There was a certain kind of pedantic honour among thieves about wanting to be telling the literal truth even when on a deeper level it is clearly false. Most likely the real reason was to compromise the signers themselves in their own minds; many in the intellectual community had been fervent supporters of Dubcek.

The loyalty of intellectuals was, it seems to me, definitively lost as of 1968. They recognized some danger in Prague's opening to the West (and certainly, the CIA and Western business interests would have done better to stay away had they really wanted a reform socialism to succeed). But the reforms seemed like the answer to the long-pent-up dreams of all those who believed, fervently or passively, that socialism was intrinsically a better system than capitalism and had just been hijacked by power-hungry leaders who didn't trust the people. After all, this was not a rebellion against the Party as in 1953 or 1956; it was the leadership and the Communist Party itself in Czechoslovakia who, with pressure and participation from below, were **making** the democratic changes. There was no theoretical reason why the same couldn't happen at home. Dresden and Prague are only a few hours apart, and many people will tell you of the heady spring and summer days when they sat in cafes in Prague and saw the second revolution happening before their eyes. To learn that such a movement had no hope of surviving Russian repression, and that their own government and army helped crush it, put an end forever to many people's idealism and participation.

One finds again and again references to the break experienced in 1968. The writer **Franz Fuhmann** sees that year as a liberation, **i.e.** the end of an illusion and his tendency to identify with finished ideologies. He speaks of the 'deep shock [Erschutterung] of August 1968', which produced the 'resolve: now I want to see "what is", as Rosa Luxemburg said. That's where the essential [das Eigentliche] begins'. And further, of the 'enormous impression the experience of August 1968 made, which gave me

something like a last chance.'" For Christoph **Hein**, though, the end of illusion is negative: 'Loss of illusion for me is associated not with the year '89 but with '68: the invasion of Prague. Something definitively died for me then. Like most people in the GDR I was very enthusiastic about **Gorbachev** when he came. But I knew it was too late. 1968 would have been the last **chance**.'¹⁸

It is strange to note that each of the rebellions and resulting repressions involved *either* the workers *or* the intellectuals. Somehow they never seemed to coalesce. Where were the writers in 1953, where were the workers in 1968? (There were some protest movements within factories, but the Party worked hard to keep them **isolated**.¹⁹) We can assume that if (and only if) they *had* gotten together, they could have been powerful. This was a further dilemma for the Party: it wanted each group to teach the other 'correct' consciousness, but there was always the equal danger that each might teach the other false consciousness. This dilemma is at the root of the contradictoriness or halfheartedness of measures to bring them together.

Workers and Intellectuals Together

The common rhetorical formula was 'the workers and farmers and their allies, the intelligentsia'. Even before we get to intelligentsia, the formula is already problematic: what about the other 'Werkstatige', or does 'workers' this time mean everyone who works, *i.e.* everyone? And in the case of farmers, who we have ignored in this study, there were also two kinds. Those who counted as part of the class were the 'Genossenschaftsbauern', who had joined the collective farms that were the rural equivalent of the big factory Kombinate. (Collectivization was carried out semi-voluntarily, unlike in the Soviet Union, but with almost irresistible incentives and disincentives.) Also, we have totally ignored here the ambiguous role of women's labour, including both their work outside the home (approximately 92% of women 'worked', they were nearly half the labour force, and enjoyed benefits unknown to women in almost any other country), and their work inside the home (which like everywhere, was uncounted, and the sexual division of labour there seldom even a topic of discussion).

The truth in the formula lies in significant and ambitious steps taken by the Party to break down the barriers, not just barriers between workers and intellectuals, but also barriers to advancement. Partly out of conviction, partly out of necessity (flight of the middle class to the West), people with little education were in the early years placed in all kinds of positions of responsibility and authority. A complaint heard throughout the 40 years was that people were assigned responsibility on the basis of loyalty (*i.e.* non-thinking) rather than qualification. (This complaint could be *partly*

resentment by the middle class at its displacement.) This could be one source of the anti-intellectualism of Party officials: the fear that they might not be as competent as their critics or subordinates led to exaggerated measures to humiliate and control.

The educational opportunities for workers also contributed to their mobility. The statistics on university applications and acceptances are hard to interpret, partly because the 'Hochschulen' (universities) and 'Fachschulen' (professional and trade schools) were lumped in together, also partly because the criteria for class membership got confused. In 1972, for instance, a report attempting to state the percentage of higher-education applicants from the intelligentsia broke them down into 1) 'intelligentsia due to their social position', 2) 'workers' and farmers' children, whose parents belong to the socialist intelligentsia because of their level of qualification', 3) 'children of employees, where one parental unit belongs to the intelligentsia by consideration of that parent's qualification level', 4) 'others, who have one parental unit who according to qualification belongs to the **intelligentsia**'!²⁰ Nevertheless, in spite of this hopeless proliferation of definitionism, real progress was indeed made in opening opportunities to the 'lower' levels of society. In a sense the society was a meritocracy, with merit evaluated partly by adherence to the ideals of the society (to put positively what is often called dogmatism, loyalty, or opportunism).

There were, then, these two contradictory directions: the **stasis** of class origin, and the motion of qualification. Biographies tended to specify not only parentage but also whether people came up through the workers' and farmers' faculties and whether they had worked in production. People from working-class backgrounds probably tended to be steered into the technical branch of the intelligentsia, which came to be seen as a significant factor of production. From what I understand, there were good, fairly equal relationships between them and the production workers at the workplace. There were also opportunities for the workers themselves to delegate members of their brigade to study and advance themselves.

The estrangement between workers and the intellectuals outside the workplace however is a different matter. Thousands were employed by the Academy of Sciences to do pure research, and had little contact outside their own institutes. Teachers in elementary and secondary schools were resented because they – reluctantly or enthusiastically – had to teach the line, no matter how absurd, and far too many were petty authoritarian disciplinarians. Actors, movie stars, musicians at least provided entertainment, and the audiences were large due to extensive free ticket programmes through the workplace, but they belonged to another world, full of the glamour of fashion and guest performances in the **West**.²¹

The most interesting love-hate relationship was between writers and workers – both in the narrow meaning of 'workers' and in the sense of writers and society. The role assigned to writers by the Party, and accepted

partially by most, was also the role in which the people – the audience – saw them. That is, the writers were to portray and interpret the lived experience of the people, holding up a mirror and helping them to understand what meaning their lives might have: how they fit in society, whether their lives were significant, how to deal with their alienation, their problems with spouses and children and the collective institutions around them. But what was wanted above **all** went beyond the role foreseen by the Party: some recognition of those aspects of life about which there was official silence. This is not necessarily an oppositional attitude, or it wouldn't be if the Party hadn't defined it as such; it is just that human need to feel that one is not crazy, that there are others who share one's secret feelings. The Party could organize letter-writing campaigns by workers who protested any deviation **from** heroic depiction, but they were not expressing the true hunger that produced 'Leserland **DDR**', a nation of readers. That hunger for depiction and confirmation of unofficial reality was the source of the – to us – bizarre discussion of subjectivity in literature unleashed by Christa Wolf's *Nachdenken über Christa T* [Thinking about Christa T.]. It was, then, partly *audience* demand that made writers intermediaries between people and Party, with a foot in each world, explaining them to each other. Thus, writers may have delivered what the Party expected of them (a large number were in fact Party members), but to a greater extent the best of them delivered what the people *needed* of them.

This was not the purpose the government had in mind when it proclaimed the 'Bitterfelder Weg' or Bitterfeld Path in 1959. The ulterior motive behind the founding conference was the same old role for workers: get them to produce more. The 'Zirkel schreibender **Arbeiter**' or Workers Writing Groups (part of the truly impressive cultural offering at the workplace) were to focus on workplace issues, especially on uncovering inefficiencies in production. The organizers were especially interested in the chemical industry, centred in Bitterfeld (famous today as the site of pollution and unemployment). Besides encouraging the workers themselves in their brigade diaries and other writings to depict **working** conditions and bottlenecks, they would also encourage professional writers to 'change their life style' by coming to live and work in the big collective farms and factories, so they could write about the life of the people at the base with genuine knowledge of their life and their work. Though today it is often ridiculed, at the time enough of the best writers thought it was a good idea so that it became a real movement. But only for a while.

The analyses that say it was doomed because it was only an initiative from above, and that the writers found it too artificial, "overlook the wide participation by workers in their writing groups (though over the years the kind of 'workers' who participated tended to be more and more the **non-**

manual type), and the enthusiasm that carried that activity right up until the end of the GDR. According to a leader of such a group in Bitterfeld itself, their writing activity is one of the few fond memories that the workers have of the former system² (apart from just plain being employed, which may also never happen again). Unfortunately it is difficult to find any materials on their participation and their response; brigade diaries have disappeared in the general mania to throw away everything from the GDR, and the records we have about the programme, like historical records generally, come from the writers not the workers. History is written by those who write. Indeed, after the initial phase of enthusiasm, professional writers started complaining about the Bitterfeld Path and the concept gradually disappeared from official rhetoric; this is the attitude to it that has come down to us from the literary historians as well.

However, it was not just the writers who were sceptical. It seems that in attempting to uncover inefficiencies and portray the real processes on the shop floor, worker-writers and professional writers alike found some 'antagonistic contradictions' among the 'non-antagonistic contradictions'. That is, the most serious problems turned out to be the result of stupidity or bullheaded rigidity on the part of Party representatives themselves. Asked to portray reality, the writers did the assignment all too well. Holding a mirror up to the workers is one thing; holding it up to the Party quite another. So there is reason to believe that the Party itself started to beat a retreat from the programme, using writers' *complaints*³ as the excuse. It is hard to find evidence for this because in their documents and even in the protocols of their meetings, Party members seldom discuss failures for the record; the old approach is just allowed to lapse silently while the new one replacing it is trumpeted. The promising word 'problem' turns out just to mean 'topic'. (In reading archived Party documents one finds that the leaders seem to need to persuade themselves that there is only one possible correct line as much as they need to persuade the populace.)

One of the products of the Bitterfeld Path, the massive 1964 novel *Spur der Steine* (set at the construction site of a large factory) was promoted, feted, and discussed widely, but the film (directed by Frank Beyer) and the play (*Der Bau* [Construction] by Heiner Miiller) based on it were both forbidden. The two latter works, being much shorter and more concentrated, brought out the conflict between the workers and the planners, and also the moral failure of the Party Secretary; and they did not end with the main character, superworker Balla, joining the Party. After portraying too much reality, Beyer was not permitted to make any more films set in contemporary socialist reality, although precisely that had been demanded before. (I was trained as a movie director with the express mission of portraying themes of the present as the centrepiece of my future work.) Why? He came to realize, he says, that it was because he broke the taboo against showing division within the **Party**.⁴

Thus, even in its well-meaning and successful project to get workers and intellectualstogether, the Party was caught on the dilemma that the reality that really existed was not the same as the reality it proclaimed. Since the portrayal of reality had the purpose not simply of portrayingreality but of persuading people that reality was what was proclaimed, a project of bringing the portrayers in closer contact with the reality revealed itself to be a Trojan horse. For the worker-writers, this was not a serious problem. In the first place, except for the Brigade diaries the workplacewas not their subject of choice anyway; and in the second place, what they wrote **was** never going to see a wide audience. The Party made clear that they were writing in order to express themselves locally and to increase their appreciation of real, professional writing, not in order to suppose they might ever themselves become professionalwriters. This impermeability of class frontiers probably originated, again, in the German and European separation of occupations growing out of the guild system: even writers, artists, and actors learn their trade by going through a professional training, and then that is their career. But directiveswarned the workers not to get their hopes up that their writing would ever make them 'writers'; they were told to restrict themselves to the smaller forms and to print them just for local **consumption**.²⁷ The insistence was a little strange, since they were also encouraged to move up the educationalladder and qualify for less manual, more mental jobs. Once again, a good programme that could have liberatory results was turned into its opposite by Party rigidity and fear.

Perhaps holding the worker-writers back was really intended as reassurance to the intellectuals, the 'real' writers, that there would not be too much competition. It would not be the first time that the Party perceived class struggle, or at least opposing interests, between the workers and the intellectuals. In 1953, for instance, the 'New Course' was announced with the admission that 'a series of mistakes' had been made, among them that 'the interests of such elements of the population as independent farmers, independent tradespeople, craftspeople, the intelligentsia were **neglected**'.²⁸ Stringency against these bourgeois, non-proletarian groups was loosened, while the higher production norms for workers were maintained, and this started the workers' rebellion of June 17. After that, concessions had to be made to the workers, which led to more flight by farmers, professionals, intellectuals, and craftspeople, which meant that they had to be catered for. So it went until the wall was built and loss of certain population groups was no longer a factor to consider. But the habit of thinking that these various groups are in competition with each other – for scarce resources and for honour, favours, and privileges – persisted. There seems to have been an acceptance (or even encouragement?) of the psychological need for educated people in a land of very little income differentiation to think of themselves as an elite, even while the working class was supposedly in the saddle.

Of course the situation was contradictory. On the one hand everyone was equal, distinctions had been erased to the point where autonomous political identification or action was impossible.²⁹ Whether this means socialist equality had been achieved is another question. On the other hand, there were certainly conflicts between the interests of different groups, exacerbated partly by the apostrophization of the working class and partly by perceived favours granted to intellectuals. The Party itself was caught in this double vision: sometimes the ethic was that each individual should melt into and contribute to the good of society as a whole (as opposed to the Western parliamentary model of interest groups); other times the practical and perhaps necessary path was to differentiate. The working class was, on the one hand, the 'universal class'; on the other hand, one group vying for favours among others. Whether the ideal of equality was subverted by a divide-and-rule strategy, or whether the attempt truly to raise the level of the labouring classes was subverted by the economic necessity of keeping the educated happy, or whether the naive belief in worker support was subverted by the absurd need to have the intellectuals tell the workers what the workers really think . . . regardless of how the contradiction is defined, what it really says is that any human society is far more complex than any official ideology can encompass.

Responsibility

It seems as though the number-one topic about the GDR in the press for the last four years has been the complicity of intellectuals with the repressive system. Not only are they attacked by the West, there are plenty of mea culpas coming from within as well.³⁰ Some are concluding that it's better to leave politics alone altogether, you only get in trouble for having anything to do with the system. But these accusations and confessions miss the point. It is time to stop thinking that the major failure was operating through the system to try to get what changes might be possible; everyone in any system would be remiss not to use what channels are available, encouraging the good and undermining the bad. *The real failing of the intellectuals was not their contact with the rulers, but their lack of contact with the ruled.*

Christa Wolf may be correct in her assessment that the intelligentsia was intentionally separated from the working class, but it was not a very reluctant separation. The artificiality of methods of contact and the discourse of difference were reinforced by the attitude of the intellectuals themselves. They made forays into the world of the workers like missionaries or anthropologists – with good intentions, but from a position of superiority. They wrote novels about the 17th of June³¹ but where were they during the street action? They fought against censorship but where were they in the struggles over working conditions and production norms?

What about attempts to develop support for the 1968 Czech reforms among workers? Why was there little interest in Solidarnosz; could it be because that was largely a workers' movement? Some writers were genuinely interested in the world of work in the early sixties, but gradually the attitude won out that this was beneath the dignity of real writers. Franz Fuhmann going to the mines in the late seventies stands out as a rare exception: by then it was no longer the Party line.

And ultimately it may be to this failure that the hopelessness of the intellectuals' dream of a third way in 1989 is due: they simply lost contact with the real concerns of the vast majority. Whose concerns were more legitimate, which approach would have actually served the interests of the working (now non-working) population better, is another question. Had the thinkers, the courageous protesters, the small oppositional groups, the writers, been working closely through the years with the population instead of giving up on them as materialistic and apolitical, there might have been a chance of developing a convincing alternative. Writers and intellectuals and churchpeople had prepared the way for 1989 in the many originally clandestine small groups. As they became more open and grew into social movements, the groups would welcome the few token workers who joined, but there was no large-scale strategic attempt to bridge the gap. When the people occupied the space the intellectuals had opened for them, somehow it came as a surprise that the first thing they would want to do would be to go shopping in West Berlin. (But what do any tourists do when they visit a foreign city?) And as soon as the reformers realized it, their experience of separation from the people returned. In the end, the oppositional intellectuals may have been as far from understanding – or liking – the people as the Party itself was.

And still today, the main concern of many East German intellectuals and the 'Bürgerbewegung' or citizens' movement seems to continue to be uncovering examples of collaboration and moral decay in their own ranks – or defending them – rather than applying their extensive skills to the epochal changes taking place for the majority. Where is the thinking about what a population used to working should do, now that it is in a state of permanent unemployment? What happened to the critiques of the work ethic? Surely now is the time to think about going beyond the production-and-consumption values of industrial society – since the people won't be employed in it anyway. But academics and intellectuals are busy defending their own jobs in the universities. Who is working with the alienated working-class youth who are fodder for ideologies of power and racism? The contempt for people continues: they voted CDU, we wash our hands of them, they sold us out. This harsh assessment leaves out the isolated examples of people who in fact are doing this work, in churches, job-creation projects, women's houses. But in the public discourse of 'Ver-gangenheitsbewältigung' or dealing with the past of the GDR period,

concern for the fatal separation between workers and intellectuals hardly plays a role at all.

Intellectuals cooperated with power in the GDR because of the fabulous chance, or the temptation, to be able to shape a whole society according to their ideas, to put a rationally-thought-out social system into practice. For centuries writers and social philosophers have dreamed up utopian visions that correct the ills of the society they lived in. But it precisely this blueprint aspect of utopia, this voluntarism and starting-afresh, that is the problem. Utopia has fallen into disrepute with the fall of the 70-year-long experiment in deliberately forming society; if anything, it is now more fashionable to see utopian thinking as manipulative, totalitarian, and Stalinist. 'We children burned by the twentieth century' can now see that even the literary utopias are 'visions of horror. . . products [Ausgeburten] of a monstrous will to power . . . blueprints for concentration camps.'¹⁰

But the death of utopia brings a fatal resignation and cynical acceptance of the triumph of the status quo. Must we give up all hope of transforming class society in any fundamental way? Are socially responsible people doomed to fight rear guard actions against the excesses of unjust societies without ever hoping to change their basic structure? Are we caught forever between inadequate reforms of an ever-more unequal and repressive system, and imposing a system against the will of the people?

If there is a solution to the dilemma of the intellectual, it lies in those last four words.

NOTES

1. 'Es tut Weh zu wissen', *Wochenpost* November 24, 1989, reprinted in *Reden im Herbst*, Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag 1990, p. 125.
2. Ehrhart Neubert, *Eine protestantische Revolution*, Osnabrück: Kontext-Verlag 1990, p. 23.
3. In his well-known poem 'Die Lösung', The Solution.
4. Cf. Michael Hofmann and Dieter Rink, 'Die Kohlearbeiter von Espenhain', in Rainer Geissler, ed., *Gesellschaftlicher Umbruch in Ostdeutschland*, Opladen 1993.
5. A recent example shows that this confusion between the worker and the Party/state continues since unification: in 1991, people who had been doormen and janitors in the Stasi building were fired from their new jobs in the Charité hospital because they had 'worked for the Stasi', making them ineligible for civil service jobs.
6. Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1992, p. 117.
7. 'Freiheit als Notwendigkeit,' 1975. in *Berliner Schriften*, Berlin: Verlag Eurooaische Ideen 1977, p. 57.
8. Cf. the interviews with workers now in their '60s to '80s in Lutz Niethammer, Alexander von Plato, and Dorothee Wierling, *Die volkseigene Erfahrung*, Berlin: Rowohlt 1991.
9. This is the theme of Heiner Müller's subversive play, *Der Lohndrücker* (1956).
10. 'Fragen an eine Brigade,' *Kursbuch* 38 (December 1974), p. 144.
11. Calling them paranoid is not to deny that 'just because you're paranoid doesn't mean you don't have enemies'.
12. For instance, over 70% of schoolteachers in the Soviet Occupation Zone had been in Nazi organizations. Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, *Zur Bewältigung der NS-Zeit in der DDR: Defizite und Neubewertungen*, Bonn 1989, p. 40.

13. This tendency is of course not unknown among more open governments, cf. the US failure to believe it could be losing the Vietnam War.
14. **SAPMO-BArch**: ZPA [i.e. SED Central Party Archives], IV 2/906/102 – Abteilung Kultur.
15. E.g. in **SAPMO-BArch**: ZPA IV A/9.04/22 – Sektor Hoch – un Fachschulpolitik.
16. **SAPMO-BArch**: ZPA J IV 2/2/1201, p. 3 – Central Committee November 12, 1968.
17. Franz **Fühmann** im Gespräch mit Wilfried F. Schoeller', in Franz Fühmann, *Den Katzenartigen wollten wir verbrennen: Ein Lesebuch*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schmitt, Hamburg: Hoffman und Campe Verlag 1983. Quoted in **Fühmann** exhibit, Akademie der Künste Berlin March–April 1993.
18. Interview in *Freitag* May 28, 1993. Incidentally, even 'superspy' **Markus Wolf** experienced a similar 'Einschnitt' or turning point in 1968, beginning his process of thinking things could not go on the way they were; his conclusion, however, was that the responsible position was to shore up power against the danger of total collapse. (TV interview May 9, 1993.)
19. For a treatment of worker protests against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Stefan **Wolle**, 'Die DDR-Bevölkerung und der Prager Frühling', *Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1992: B36, 35–45.
20. **SAPMO-BArch**: ZPA IV B 2/9.04/124, Sektor Hoch- und Fachschulpolitik, document dated April 26, 1972.
21. I do not speak of salary levels here; I have heard so many contradictory reports about whether workers were better paid than intellectuals or vice versa that I don't feel competent to judge. Access to convertible currency from performing or publishing in the West was however a point of serious resentment, especially as the need for collecting this currency became acute for the state, causing it to expand the Intershop system. This produced a serious rift in society, and contributed to the rush to the D-Mark in 1989.
22. E.g. Ingeborg **Gerlach**, *Bitterfeld: Arbeiterliteratur und Literatur der Arbeitswelt in der DDR*, Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag 1974, p. 23.
23. Conversation June 1993 with Reiner **Tetzner**, who led a writing group in the **Chemiekombinat** Bitterfeld from 1975–90.
24. Collected in *In eigener Sache: Briefe von Künstlern und Schriftstellern*, ed. Erwin **Kohn** for Ministry of Culture, **Halle** 1964.
25. 'Offener Brief an den **Generaldirektor** des DEFA Studios für **Spiele**', September 25, 1977, **SAPMO-BArch**: ZPA IV 212.033149 – **Büro** Lamberz.
26. Conversation with Frank Beyer May 1993.
27. Manfred **Jäger**, *Kultur und Politik in der DDR: Ein historischer Abriss*, Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik 1982, pp. 95–8; cf. also the *Handbuch für schreibende Arbeiter*, ed. Ursula **Steinhaußen**, Dieter Faulseit and **Jürgen Bonk**, Berlin (East) 1967.
28. **Hermann** Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1989, p. 235.
29. This is Sigrid **Meuschel's** main thesis, op. cit.
30. For two rather different examples, see Jens Reich, *Abschied von den Lebenslügen: Die Intelligenz und die Macht*, Berlin: Rowohlt 1992, and Jürgen **Kuczynski**, *Nicht ohne Einfluß: Macht und Ohnmacht der Intellektuellen*, Cologne: PapyRossa Verlag 1993.
31. Cf. **Heinrich Mohr**, 'Der 17. Juni als Thema der Literatur in der DDR', in *17. Juni 1953: Arbeiteraufstand in der DDR*, ed. **Ilse Spittmann** and **Karl Wilhelm Fricke**, Cologne 1982, and Johannes Pernkopf, *Der 17. Juni 1953 in der Literatur der beiden deutschen Staaten*. Stuttgart: **Akademischer** Verlag Hans-Dieter **Heinz** 1982.
32. Ruth Romer, 'Die Utopisten und das unordentliche Menschengeschlecht', *Deutschland Archiv* 24: 11 (November 1991), pp. 1202, 1206.