

NO-COLLAR LABOUR IN AMERICA'S 'NEW ECONOMY'

ANDREW ROSS

Advance waves of the new no-collar work first swept across Wall Street when office managers, conceding a barely-begun struggle, declared 'Casual Fridays' as the order of the day. Dress codes and other protocols of workplace formality were to be relaxed on the least industrious day of the work week. While starchy diehards growled about the abatement of the American work ethic, evangelists of 're-engineering' welcomed the custom as a bold innovation; workers would feel their personality was being acknowledged, and that their workplace was less alienating on the day it was most perceived to be so. Introduced by the employer, this new custom ironically evokes memories of Saint Monday, the pre-Taylorist working-class tradition of mass absenteeism at the close of the weekend. After all, Casual Friday was intended to energize white-collar workers by making them feel at home, rather than at work; all the more present for feeling like an absentee.

Far from spontaneous, Casual Friday is part and parcel of the new wave managerial ethos that preaches the levelling of workplace hierarchies. Employees are to feel empowered and individualized, workplaces are to feel fluid and recreational, and work is to be liberated from rigid, bureaucratic constraints. After several decades in which Americans were encouraged to find the true meaning of themselves in leisure time and consumption, work, according to this ideal, is once again the place where our identity is to be most deeply felt and shaped. Perhaps this is just as well. The U.S. boasts an economy where the amount of leisure time available to workers has been in steady decline since the early 1970s, and where chronic overwork, and not unemployment, is the primary feature of the labour landscape. Since there is no easy

return to the days when a clear demarcation between work and leisure existed, the efforts of the new managerialism are aimed at dissolving the boundaries as much as possible.

For the most advanced and entrenched examples of this ethos, you would have to pay a visit to New York's 'Silicon Alley', where the Webshops of the New Economy have been at this game since the mid-1990s when start-up companies first began to colonize Manhattan's downtown manufacturing loft spaces. In those fledgling days, the physical culture of the New Media workplace was more or less an extension of the grungy artist's loft. When dot.com mania broke out, and the Alley was flooded with venture capital, ritzy designers were hired to create set piece interiors. Trophy environments at companies like Screaming Media, DoubleClick and Oxygen Media featured flexible, communal spaces, where cubicles were banished and walls were rendered translucent. The office was re-imagined as a giant, multi-purpose playroom for an ever-shifting team of workers. Cool, buzzworthy graphics are flung across the walls and ceilings. Pool tables in game rooms, basketball courts, and wellness relaxation spaces are a relief and counterpoint to the omnipresent but deftly decentred computer workstations. Who would ever want to go home? Silicon Valley had pioneered an earlier version of the informal workplace, where whiz kids didn't have to grow up and leave the never-never land of adolescence where the thrill of exploration and invention was unsullied by the external, social world. Silicon Alley, the 'capital of content', upgraded the informality by adding all the hip features of an urban artist lifestyle.

THE RISE OF FREE AGENTS

For the New Economy's boosters, these environments are much more than real estate icons, they are the ultimate physical embodiment of all the 'flexibility' talk that has dominated corporate culture for the last twenty years. Indeed, they house Internet industries that sprang directly from the head of the restructured economy of flexible accumulation and which at the turn of the new century were pumping fresh, hot air into the wobbly, digital stock bubble. As numerous commentators have described, this economic restructuring, begun in the mid- to late-1970s, eliminated an enormous number of stable, high-wage union jobs, and resulted in the normalizing of low-wage temp work for a large segment of the labour force. The two decades between 1973 and 1993 showed a steady decline in full-time jobs, and a rise in part-time employment, from 16.6 percent to 18.8 percent of the general workforce, almost all of the increase resulting from *involuntary* contingent work, and most of it in temporary-help employment.¹ In the technically skilled echelons of the new information industries, a de luxe form of temping emerged as the model pattern of employment, much hyped, and much overrated. Well-paid technicians, engineers, and designers became independent contractors, eschewing benefits, pension packages and other forms of job security for the freedoms offered by contingent work. 'Employees without jobs', they moved from company to company,

'pollinating' the seeds of innovation, according to the new flexible style of corporate organization.²

Over the course of the 1990s, this model was much emulated. 'Consultant' became the fastest growing job description, if not the fastest growing job category, and segued into the phenomenon of the 'free agent'—in New Economy parlance a skilled but flexible worker with no enduring company loyalties beyond the terms of the contract. The corporate crusade to downsize and shed its permanent workforce seemed to have met its perfect love-match; workers who do not want a regular paycheck or any form of benefits from the companies for which they occasionally work. For the most fortunate, the freelance lifestyle is a heady potion, and their fantasies of autonomy (while still being paid by the Man) are seized on and glorified as a way to sell the profile of flexible labour in general. As a result, projected tallies for these 'free agents' are inflated, as many as 33 million according to some Internet industry boosters.³ But who are these autonomous agents, and how voluntary is their employment condition?

According to the latest U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for 1997, there were 5.6 million workers with contingent jobs (employment not expected to last for more than one additional year), most of whom are young and female, predominantly concentrated in low-wage temping, and 53 percent of whom would have preferred a job that was permanent. 'Workers with alternative arrangements' (numbers that overlap with those of contingent workers) include independent contractors, on-call workers, day labourers, temporary help agency workers, and workers provided by contract firms. The independent contractors (8.2 million, and 6.3 percent of the workforce), are concentrated in managerial, professional, sales occupations, and in the construction and services industries, and are more likely to prefer their employment arrangements than workers in other categories like on-call (2 million) and temps (1.1 million). Among these 8.2 million are the much heralded knowledge workers, labelled as free agents. Yet, between 1995 and 1997, when the knowledge industries were booming, there was a decline in the number of independent contractors, while all other categories, including those for contingent work, were little changed in those same two years.⁴

In March 2000 the *New York Times Magazine* devoted an issue to the 'new American Worker'. The issue focused on the concept of the free agent as a symptom of the shift away from the 'organization man' of post-war corporate culture, where company loyalty was regarded as a long-term two-way contract between employers and white-collar employees. With the replacement of conformity by innovation, and a large permanent workforce by temporary employee pools, a contract labour market is coming into its own, whereby free agents bid for jobs offered by employers on auction Web sites like Bid4Geeks.com and Monster.com. In the most breathless of these articles, Michael Lewis lumps together all of the categories of 'workers with alternative arrangements' to estimate the number of free agents at 12 million (out of a

national workforce of 131 million), and avers that their typical mode of self-presentation usually includes

piercing some highly unlikely body part and cultivating an air of total independence. Actually, what these people all were, or appeared to be, were artists. They kept artists' hours. They wore artists' clothes. They had persevered [in] the sort of odd habits that membership in any group—other than the group 'artists'—tends to drum out of people. Maybe the most interesting thing about them was their lack of obvious corporate attachments. Corporations usually paid for their existence, but otherwise seemed to have no effect on their lives. If forced to discuss the companies that paid the bills, these people tended to be dismissive, or at the very least, ironic.⁵

In another article, which debunks the romance of the free agent nation, Nina Munk cites a new media marketing consultant who, with her laptop and cell phone, is using an offbeat Greenwich Village cafe, Les Deux Gamins, as her portable office—'It makes me feel like I'm in Paris,' she says, 'Like Hemingway at Les Deux Magots.' Munk points out that more than 60 percent of these workers earn much less than full-timers in comparable jobs, and that the lure of liberation from routine work seems to result in people putting in more hours than they would at a regular, comparable job.⁶

THE LEGACY OF THE STARVING ARTIST

The references by Lewis and Munk to artists and writers are crucial. A large part of the attraction of the free agent profile draws on the appeal to Bohemian glamour. What are the consequences of this desire to assume the trappings of the artist? First of all, let us be clear that it is an invitation to underpayment. Artists' traditions of sacrificial labour are governed by the principle of the cultural discount, by which artists and other arts' workers accept non-monetary rewards—the gratification of producing art—as compensation for their work, thereby discounting the cash price of their labour. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the largest subsidy to the arts has always come from workers themselves. The mythology of the 'starving artist' is rooted in the political economy of the creative professions, and the historical legacy of their emergence from the mould of aristocratic patronage.⁷

Just as important, however, is the serviceability of the artist's flexible labour. Since flexible specialization was introduced as a leading industrial principle the number of artists employed in the general labour force (defined in decennial Census data and annual Bureau of Labor Statistics reports as 11 occupations: artists who work with their hands, authors, actors and directors, designers, dancers, architects, photographers, arts teachers, musicians/composers, etc.) has swelled from year to year. According to the National Endowment for the Art's annual summaries of BLS tabulations, this number more than doubled from 1970 to 1990, showing an 81 percent increase in the course of the 1970s (while

artists' real earnings declined by 37 percent), a 54 percent increase in the 1980s, a slight decline in the depression of the early 1990s, and a renewal of growth ever since, reaching a peak of 2 million in 1998. In 1997, artists were enjoying a growth rate in employment (at 2.7 percent) that far outstrips the general workforce (1.3 percent) and even that of other professional specialists (2.4 percent).⁸

These are impressive numbers, but they do not tell a simple story. To figure in the BLS survey, 'one must be working during the survey week and have described that job/work as one of eleven artist occupations.' Respondents are asked to describe the job at which 'they worked the most number of hours in the survey week.' Artists working more hours in other jobs outside the arts are classified as employed in those other occupations. By 1998, these amounted to an additional 330,000, for a total of 2,280,000 artists employed in the workforce.⁹ Randy Martin points out that these requirements gloss over the verifiable existence of full-time jobs within that occupational sector: 'One works in an occupation, a sector, but has the flexibility to remain unattached. The artist can secure an identity for a day's wage, but the rest of the week remains unsecuritized.'¹⁰ Because of the high degree of self-employment, and because they are most likely to have other jobs to support a creative trade that habitually employs them for only a portion of a workweek, employment and earnings data on cultural workers have always been unreliable. Even in the most highly unionized entertainment guilds, where the majority of members cannot find work on any given day, the dominant employment model is casual employment on a project-by-project basis. Loyalty is to the guild or craft or union, rather than to a single employer.¹¹

There may be more going on here than the sleight-of-hand interpretation of statistics to paint a rosy picture of job creation in the arts. Whether or not we can verify a proliferation of new jobs, it is clear that the 'mentality' of artists' work is more and more in demand. In respect both to their function and the use of this work mentality, it looks as if artists are steadily being relocated from their traditional position at the social margins of the productive economy and recruited into roles closer to the economic centres of production. Indeed, the traditional profile of the artist as unattached and adaptable to circumstance is surely now coming into its own as the ideal definition of the post-industrial knowledge worker: comfortable in an ever-changing environment that demands creative shifts in communication with different kinds of employers, clients, and partners; attitudinally geared toward work that requires long, and often unsocial, hours; and accustomed, in the sundry exercise of their mental labour, to a contingent, rather than a fixed routine of self-application. A close fit, in other words, with the profile of the free agent.

NET SLAVES

In light of this artist profile, let us take a closer look at employment patterns in the New Media industries of New York City. The backbone of the Silicon Alley workforce in the pioneer phase of this new urban industry was staffed by

employees—‘creative content-providers’, or digital manipulators in Web-site and software development—who had been trained primarily as artists. Deeply caffeinated 85-hour work-weeks without overtime pay are a way of life for Webshop workers on flexible contracts, who invest a massive share of sweat equity in the mostly futile hope that their stock options will pay off. Even the lowliest employee feels like an entrepreneurial investor as a result. In most cases, the stock options turn into pink slips when the company goes belly-up, or, in some cases, employees are fired before their stock options are due to mature. Exploitative manipulation of this mode of employee recruitment and retention has resulted in several major lawsuits that have rocked the industry. Yet the lure of stock options remains very strong, largely as a result of the publicity showered on the small number of employees who have struck gold in a high-profile ‘IPO’ (Initial Public Offering) among the new maze of new ones on the stock market.

Only 2.7 percent of workers in computer and electronics belong to unions (as compared to 56.2 percent in steel) and Webshop workplaces are entirely non-unionized.¹² For several fledgling years, about half of the jobs were filled by contract employees or perma-temps, with no employer-supported health care. With the explosive growth of the last two years, the number of full-time workers has increased noticeably (by 57 percent annually). Yet in the most recent industry survey, the expected rate of growth for part-time (30 percent) and freelance employment (33 percent) still competes with that for full-time job creation (38 percent). Evolving patterns of subcontracting in Silicon Alley are not so far removed from those that created offshore back offices for data-processing in the Caribbean, Ireland and Bangalore, or semiconductor factories in countries that also host the worst sweatshops in the global garment industry.¹³ Most revealing, perhaps, is that in 1997 the average full-time salary (at \$37,000) was well below the equivalent in old media industries, like advertising (at \$71,000) and television broadcasting (at \$86,000).¹⁴

As noted earlier, the Webshops physically occupy spaces filled by manufacturing sweatshops a century ago. Artists who took over these manufacturing lofts from the 1950s onwards enjoyed wide open floors where work space doubled as living space. This live/work ethos was embraced, to some degree, by the upscale, cultural elites who later consolidated ‘loft living’ as a real estate attraction, and it has been extended now into the funky milieu of the Webshops, where work looks more and more like play. In the most primitive startups, the old sweatshop practice of housing workers in the workplace has also been revived. Bill Lessard and Steve Baldwin, authors of *Net Slaves*, an exposé of industry working conditions, report on this phenomenon: ‘We were up in Seattle on the book tour, and we visited a friend who’s working for a startup that has installed beds in cubicles and is providing three meals a day. As if they were in a U-boat fighting a war! There are companies bragging about this kind of mistreatment!’ Lessard and Baldwin sketch a portrait of an industry that benefits from the hagiographical ‘myth of the 22-year-old code-boy genius

subsisting on pizza and soda and going 36 hours at a clip.' Employees' quality of life approaches zero as a result, in 'the complete absence of a social life, a lousy diet, lack of exercise, chain smoking, repetitive stress disorders, and, last but not least, haemorrhoids. ... There's going to be a lot of sick people out there in a few years, and worse, they won't even have any health benefits.'¹⁵

All in all, the New Media workplace is a prescient indicator of the near future of no-collar labour, which combines mental skills with new technologies in nontraditional environments. Customized workplaces where the lines between labour and leisure have dissolved: horizontal networking among heroic teams of self-directed workers; the proto-hipster appeal of Bohemian dress codes, personal growth, and non-hierarchical surroundings; the vague promise of bounteous rewards from stock options; and employees so complicit with the culture of overwork and burnout that they have developed their own insider brand of sick humour about being 'net slaves', i.e., it's actually cool to be exploited so badly. Industrial capitalists used to dream about such a workforce, but their managerial techniques were too rigid to foster it. These days, the new wave management wing of the New Economy worships exactly this kind of decentralized environment, which 'liberates' workers by banishing constraints on their creativity, and delivers meaningful and non-alienated work for a grateful and independently-minded workforce.

At a time when this managerial revolution is 'liberating' employees, the workplace on the other side of the professional divide is more and more subject to automated forms of Taylorism. Worker monitoring, whether through keyboard strokes, e-mail and voicemail snooping, or surveillance cameras, is now standard practice on the part of the majority of American employers. Among service workers, human relations software is widely used for tracking, job timing, and to introduce speedup, yet the practice is also moving into white collar professions. The most infamous example is the regulation of physicians' schedules by health management organizations under the rubric of managed care. Alpha professionals, like doctors, are increasingly experiencing a loss of autonomy in the workplace, and are turning to union organizing as a result.

A VOLUNTEER LOW-WAGE ARMY

Labour history is full of vicious little time warps, where archaic or long foresworn practices and conceptions of work are reinvented in a fresh context to suit some new economic arrangement. The 'sweating' system of farming out work to competing contractors in the nineteenth-century garment industry was once considered an outdated exception to the rule of the integrated factory system. Disdained as a pre-industrial relic by the apostles of scientific management, this form of subcontracting is now a basic principle of almost every sector of the post-industrial economy and has emerged as the number one weapon in capital's arsenal of labour cost-cutting and union-busting. Where once the runaway shops were in New Jersey, now they are in Haiti, China, and Vietnam. So, too, the ethos of the autonomous artist, once so fiercely

removed from industry's dark satanic mills and from the soiled hand of commerce, has been recouped and revamped as a convenient, even alluring, *esprit de corps* for contingent work in today's decentralized knowledge factories. Indeed, the 'voluntary poverty' of the *déclassé* Bohemian artist—an ex-bourgeois descendant, more often than not, of the self-exiled Romantic poet—may turn out to be an inadvertent forerunner of the discounted labour of the new industrial landscape.

In the academic sector in the U.S. we find a similar story about sacrificial labour. Indeed, the rapidity with which the low-wage revolution has swept through higher education in the last fifteen years was clearly hastened along by conditions amenable to discounting mental labour. For one thing, the 'willingness' of scholars to accept a discounted wage out of 'love for their subject' has helped not only to sustain the cheap labour supply but also to magnify its strength and volume.

The most obvious index of the changes in the academic labour force can be found in the rise of part-time employment, for that is how the payroll has been trimmed most dramatically. In 1970, the proportion of part-time faculty stood at 22 percent. By 1987, part-timers held 38 percent of faculty appointments, and ten years later, the proportion had risen to 42.5 percent. In addition, by 1988, the proportion of full-time faculty not on a tenure track, had risen to 20 percent.¹⁶ Even among full-time faculty, the rate of compensation is depressed. Salary levels remain below those of 1971, and the gap between faculty salaries and those of other highly educated professionals has widened considerably. Faculty earned 13.8 percent less than professionals with a similar education in 1985, a gap that almost doubled by 1997, with faculty earning 24 percent less.¹⁷

Employers have long relied on maintaining a reserve army of unemployed to keep wages down in any labour market. Higher education is now in this business with a vengeance. In addition—and this is the significant element—its managers increasingly draw on a volunteer low-wage army. By this I do not mean to suggest that adjunct and part-timer educators eagerly invite their underpayment and lack of benefits or job security. Nor are they inactive in protesting and organizing for their interests. Rather, I choose the term to describe the natural outcome of a training in the habit of embracing non-monetary rewards—mental or creative gratification—as compensation for work. As a result, low compensation for a high workload becomes a rationalized feature of the job, and, in the most perverse extension, is regarded as proof of the worth of the academic vocation—underpayment is the ultimate measure of the selfless and disinterested pursuit of knowledge.

In some respects, the peripatetic regimen of the freeway flyer is germane to the eccentric work schedule of the traditional academic, who commonly observes no clear boundaries between being on and off the job, and for whom there is often little distinction between paid work and free labour. For the professionally active full-timer, this habitual schedule is bad enough. For the part-timer, desperate to retain the prestige of being a college teacher, the iden-

tivity of being a switched-on, round-the-clock thinker, eager to impart knowledge, and in a position to freely extend her or his mental labour, feeds into the psychology of casualized work and underpayment. The industrial worker, by comparison, is not beset by such occupational hazards.

Again, what we see is the fabrication of a model 'flexible employee' out of the cloth of a customary training in the amateur ideals and irregular routines of mental labour which can be roundly exploited by cost-cutting managers in search of contingent labour. Because of the elective component of this situation, capital, it might be said, as part of its ceaseless search for ways to induct workers in their own exploitation, may have found the makings of a *self-justifying*, low-wage workforce, at the very heart of the knowledge industries so crucial to its growth and development.

THE MENTAL PRICE SYSTEM

My conclusion leaves us with some difficult questions. Are we contributing involuntarily to the problem when we urge youth, in pursuing their career goals, to place principles of public interest or collective political agency or creative expression above the pursuit of material security? In a labour environment heavily under the sway of neo-liberal business models, is it fair to say that this service ideal invites, if it does not vindicate, the manipulation of inexpensive labour?

Fifteen years ago, this suggestion would have seemed ludicrous. Labour freely offered in the service of some common benefit or mental ideal has always been the informal economic backbone that supports political, cultural and educational activities in the nonprofit or public interest sectors. Selfless labour of this sort is also a source of great pleasure. The world that we value most—the world that is not in thrall to market dictates—would not exist without this kind of volunteer discounted labour. But what happens when some version of this disinterested labour moves, as I have suggested here, from the social margins to core sectors of capital accumulation? When the opportunity to pursue mentally gratifying work becomes a rationale for discounted labour at heart of the key knowledge industries, is it not time to rethink some of our bedrock pedagogical values? Does the new landscape of mental labour demand more than the usual call for modernizing the politics of labour in the age of dot-com and dot-edu (the age of the Yale Corporation, the Microserf, and the consolidated push of Time Warner-Bertelsman-Disney-CNN-Hachette-Paramount-News Corp)?

On the one hand, there are sound reasons for retaining such ideals and traditions. Unpopular forms of intellectual, artistic, and political expression cannot and will not thrive unless they are independent of commercial or bureaucratic dictates. But these conditions of independence can no longer be 'defended' stubbornly and solely as a matter of humanistic principle, or as the free-standing right of a civilized society. When capital-intensive industry is concentrated around vast culture trading sectors, when media Goliaths feed off their control

of intellectual property, and when the new Vested Interests routinely barter discount wages for creative satisfaction on the job, the expressive traditions of mental labour are no longer ours simply to claim, not when informal versions of them are daily being bought off and refined into high-octane fuel for the next generation of knowledge factories.

In so far as we participate in this economy as scholars, activists, or artists, there is a responsibility to recognize the cost of our cherished beliefs in political and educational ideals. These ideals come at a price, and managers of the New Economy are taking full advantage of the opportunities that exist for capitalizing on our neglect of that price. Our first challenge, then, could be to assess the special conditions for pricing wages for thought, under which 'free time' is systematically converted into un- or under-compensated labour (just as the hidden costs of the unwaged domestic labour of women have had to be acknowledged). Do such special conditions exist, or is pricing subject only to what the market will bear? As socialists, we know that the market does not function as an objective gauge of supply and demand—no more for sweatshop workers in an offshore Free Trade Zone than for CEOs in a tax-free zone of the Fortune 500. Ideas about the value of work and the worth of those who do certain kinds of work play a critical role in the price system, to use Veblen's pet phrase, and they must enter into our economic reckoning. Accordingly, we must remember that knowledge and rules of thumb passed on in a traditional craft are intellectual assets that will be stripped by managers looking for a comparative advantage. It was so in the steel mills where Frederick Taylor worked up his theories of scientific management, and it is little different in the knowledge factories of today.

Some part of the challenge also lies in organizing the unorganized, in this case those whose professional identity has been based on a sharp indifference to being organized. The sectors I have been describing here draw on an intimate and shared experience of the traditions of sacrificial labour. Yet they are divided by singular craft-like cultures, and by a tangle of class distinctions. Those most in denial (the most secure) will swear off any and every affinity. It will take more than a leap of faith to establish solidarity among mental labour fractions divided by the legacy of (under-the-table or above-the-salt) privileges passed down over centuries. Nevertheless, while the chief blight of these centuries had been chattel slavery, serfdom, and indentured labour (and we are not done with these), we must now respond to that moment in the soulful lullaby of 'Redemption Song' where Bob Marley soberly advises us: 'Emancipate yourself from mental slavery'.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, John Schmitt, *The State of Working America*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 258–73.
2. AnnaLee Saxenian, *Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
3. This notorious estimate is the work of Daniel Pink, operator of FreeAgentNation.com, and chief promoter of the concept in the dizzy pages of the industry rag, *Fast Company*. Nina Munk, 'The Price of Freedom', *New York Times Magazine*, 5 March 2000, p. 52.
4. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report on 'Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements', December 1999.
5. Michael Lewis, 'The Artist in the Gray Flannel Pyjamas', *New York Times Magazine*, 5 March 2000, p. 46.
6. Nina Munk, 'The Price of Freedom', p. 54.
7. For a fuller analysis of this point and others in this essay, see Andrew Ross, 'The Mental Labor Problem', *Social Text*, Summer, 2000.
8. See the NEA Research Division Notes on 'Artist Employment in America' <www.arts.endow.gov/pub>.
9. NEA Research Division Note no. 73, April 1999.
10. Randy Martin, 'Beyond Privatization: The Art and Society of Labor, Citizenship, and Consumerism', *Social Text*, 59, Spring 1999, pp. 38–39.
11. Lois Gary and Ronald Seeber, *Under the Stars: Essays on Labor Relations in Arts and Entertainment*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 6.
12. David Bacon, 'Silicon Valley Sweatshops: High-Tech's Dirty Little Secret', *The Nation*, vol. 256, no. 15, 19 April 1993, p. 517.
13. Andrew Ross, 'Jobs in Cyberspace', in *Real Love: In Pursuit of Cultural Justice*, New York: NYU Press, 1998, pp. 7–34; and 'Sweated Labor in Cyberspace', *New Labor Forum*, 4, Spring, 1999, pp. 47–56.
14. Estimates based on annual reports on new media employment, Coopers and Lybrand/Price Waterhouse Cooper. New York New Media Industry Survey: Opportunities and Challenges of New York's Emerging Cyber-Industry, New York New Media Association, 1996, 1997 and 1999. There is no data on comparative compensation levels in the 1999 report, but Price Waterhouse confirmed to me that, without accounting for stock equity, the ratios for 1998 full-time employees are about the same as for previous years: \$40k for new media; \$83.5k for advertising; \$84k for TV.
15. Bill Lessard and Steve Baldwin, *NetSlaves: True Tales of Working on the Web*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000, p. 246. For an active Web-site, see NetSlaves (Horror Stories of Working on the Web) at <www.disobey.com/netslaves>.
16. Data are from the 1987 and 1997 National Survey of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF) conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics of the Department of Education.
17. 'AUP, Annual Report on the Economic Status of the Profession 1999–2000', *Academe*, 86, 2 (March–April 2000).