SOVIET HISTORY IN THE GORBACHEV REVOLUTION: THE FIRST PHASE*

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I. THE BACKGROUND

The Khrushchev thaw among historians began early in 1956 and continued with retreats and starts for ten years. In the spring of 1956 Burdzhalov, the deputy editor of the principal Soviet historical journal, published a bold article re-examining the role of the Bolshevik party in the spring of 1917, demonstrating that Stalin was an ally of Kamenev's in compromising with the Provisional Government, and presenting Zinoviev as a close associate of Lenin.[1] The article was strongly criticised. Burdzhalov was moved to an uninfluential post, though he did manage eventually to publish an important history of the February revolution. The struggle continued; and after Khrushchev's further public denunciation of Stalin at the XXII Party Congress in 1961 there was a great flowering of publications about Soviet history.

The most remarkable achievement of these years was the publication of a substantial series of articles and books about the collectivisation of agriculture and 'de-kulakisation' in 1929-30, largely based on party archives. The authors—Danilov, Vyltsan, Zelenin, Moshkov and others—were strongly critical of Politburo policy in that period. Their writings were informed by a rather naive critical conception: they held that the decisions of the XVI Party Conference in April 1929, incorporating the optimum variant of the five-year plan and a relatively moderate pace of collectivisation, were entirely correct, but the November 1929 Central Committee Plenum, which speeded up collectivisation, and the decision to de-kulakise which followed, were imposed on the party by Stalin, who already exercised personal power, supported by his henchmen Molotov and Kaganovich. This concept was partly a matter of political tactics (one histbrian told me in 1963 that he believed it was right to concentrate on demolishing the favourable view of Stalin, even though

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things were more complicated than that, because Stalin had such a hold on the Soviet people); but it broadly corresponded to the interpretation of Soviet history after 1928 so well argued later by Roy Medvedev and Robert Tucker.

These remarkably frank publications continued for a year or so after Khrushchev's fall in October 1964. By then the proofs of a book on the collectivisation of agriculture in 1927–32, edited by Danilov, were already complete. The argument about publishing the book continued as late as 1969. But fierce onslaughts on the critical-approach to collectivisation had already been published in the party journal and elsewhere by F.M. Vaganov and other historians from the Institute of Marxism–Leninism.[2] The book was never published; all the critical historians were transferred to work on other periods of history (except Vyltsan, who with some difficulty managed to publish a book on de-kulakisation in which he was economical with the truth). In 1965 S.P. Trapeznikov had been appointed head of the department of Science and Educational Institutions of the party Central Committee, and later published his own history of Soviet agriculture, which was both orthodox in its views and unscrupulous with-the facts. According to Yurii Afanas'ev, the present Rector of the History-Archive Institute, which trains archivists:

> **The campaign to stop scientific initiative in historical science was headed in the early 70s by S.P. Trapeznikov, who used unlimited authority (*neogranichennaya vsedozvolennost'*) in the leadership of science to appoint to almost every post people who were dependent on him and on that basis held together by 'business' connections.[3]**

A major incident in this campaign was the rejection in 1972 of the interpretation of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions advanced by the director of the Institute of the History of the USSR, P.V. Volobuev, who was forced to resign from his post. Afanas'ev in his attack on Trapeznikov refers to historians 'removed from the horizon of science. . . V.V. Adamov, E. Burdzhalov, P.V. Volobuev and—one could continue through the alphabet' [the next one in the Cyrillic alphabet would be Danilov—RWD]. But the troubles for Soviet historians were far more wide-ranging. Their access to archives was restricted; and access to higher party and government archives ceased altogether. Bad practices returned such as the impermissibility of referring to the death of any leading Soviet figure in the repressions of 1937–8.

It would be wrong to conclude that the period up to the appointment of Gorbachev as General Secretary was one of complete stagnation. Gimpel'son's careful and thoughtful study of War Communism appeared in 1973.[4] Danilov's two important volumes on the Soviet peasantry before collectivisation were published in 1977 and 1979, and a third volume is in preparation.[5] Valuable documents from the archives have

been published, including the minutes of the State Planning Commission Gosplan for 1921–2, with names and activities included of officials who were later arrested.[6]

Most important of all, in Brezhnev's later years literary publications, which had played a major role in the 1956–66 thaw in history, again began to display greater frankness. *Drachuny,* the fictionalised autobiography of Mikhail Alekseev, was published in 1982. Alekseev is the editor of the generally conservative literary journal *Moskva;* but *Drachuny* contained a harrowing description of the 1932–33 famine of a kind which had never before appeared in the Soviet press.[7] However, on July 23, 1982, a resolution of the party Central Committee declared that 'it is impossible to tolerate the publication in certain journals of works in which events of history of the fatherland, the socialist revolution and collectivisation are presented with serious departures from the living truth'.[8] Such publications as Alekseev's temporarily ceased.

II. THE NEW THAW SINCE 1985: OFFICIAL ATTITUDES

In the first twelve months after Gorbachev's appointment, it was not at all clear that much change would occur in publications on Soviet history. In his speech on the 40th anniversary of victory in the Second World War, Gorbachev commented that 'the gigantic work at the front and in the rear was led by the party, its Central Committee, and the State Committee of Defence headed by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU(b) Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin', and prolonged applause was recorded.[9] Was this honesty, or reaction? Four months later, when the 50th Anniversary of Stakhanovism was celebrated, hardly any articles by Soviet historians sounded a critical note, and Gorbachev unstintingly praised Stakhanovism while at the same time presenting as its present-day equivalents the movement for *khozrachet* (profit and loss accounting), and an independent effort to design new models of cars![10] The publications of historians on the eve of the XXVII Party Congress held in February 1986 were very dull: the most interesting was an article by Khromov (director of the Institute of the History of the USSR) and Vyltsan, which criticised mistakes in collectivisation in a form which might (or might not) have been merely repeating Stalin's *Dizzy from Success.*[11] And even after the Party Congress Gorbachev was unofficially reported to have told a private meeting of writers that frankness about the past would be 'hitting people over the head' (June 19, 1986).

However, behind the scenes some important decisions had already been taken. In 1985 the party Control Commission began to investigate cases of former party leaders (including at least one Trotskyist) who had not previously been rehabilitated.[12] These investigations would have required approval at the Politburo level. But the turning point came at the

party Central Committee Plenum of January 1987, where Gorbachev forced through a considerable widening of ***perestroika,*** and at his subsequent meeting with editors and other leading media figures. At the latter meeting he insisted that 'there should not be any blank pages in either our history or our literature', and also made a general statement about Soviet history which—within certain limits—encouraged frankness and new thinking:

> In the seventieth year of our great revolution we must not put those who made the revolution in the shadow. We must value each of the 70 years of our Soviet history. The party has told us about difficult matters; and we must not present them today through rose-coloured spectacles. Instead we must let the socialist law of truth have its way.
>
> There was both joy and bitterness. But whatever occurred we went forward and did not fall under the tanks of Fascism. We overcame Fascism not only with heroism and self-sacrifice, but also with better steel, better tanks, better soldiers. . .
>
> History has to be seen as it is. There was everything; there were mistakes, it was hard, but the country moved forward. Take the years of industrialisation and collectivisation. That was reality and life. That was the fate of the people with all its contradictions, its successes and mistakes.[13]

Following the major shift towards ***glasnost'*** at the beginning of 1987, on April 17, A.N. Yakovlev, who has since been promoted to full membership of the Politburo, presented a long report on the social sciences to the Academy of Sciences. Yakovlev's report sought both to widen and to set certain limits to the discussion. He criticised 'efforts to whitewash the activity of pre-revolutionary Russia' and the 'poetising of what is reactionary in the culture of the past', and also attacked attempts to counter-pose the national spirit ***(narodnost')*** against the party spirit ***(partiinost'),*** and to counter-pose devotion to what is old against socialism. He particularly inveighed against advocacy of religion, denouncing in advance any attempt to depict Christianity as the 'mother of Russian culture' in the celebration of 1,000 years of Christianity in Russia which will take place in 1988.

But on the Soviet period he pressed for greater openness, condemning 'violation of the principle of historicism, depersonalisation of the historical process, blank pages and spaces in whole periods, colourless presentation'. He called for 'a new approach to many important and complex periods of party history, learning the necessary lessons from each of them', and presented a remarkably far-reaching list of problems. Why was NEP departed from in the 1920s? How was it that 'administrative-bureaucratic methods of management' were strengthened? Were there alternatives and why did they fail? And in relation to historical studies as a whole he sharply condemned those who specialise on the exposure of bourgeois historians without engaging in 'deep historical research' themselves, and also criticised failure to engage in dialogue with progressive foreign historians.[14]

At the time of Yakovlev's report, some other quite authoritative statements seemed to seek to set bounds to historical discussion. On April 27, at a stormy meeting of the board of the Writers' Union, the report by its secretary Karpov announced that 'the secretariat believes that we must not in any circumstances renounce what our literature created in past decades', and included Sholokhov, Kochetov and Polevoi—all more or less orthodox writers—together with the critical writers Tvardovskii and Abramov—among the writers he singled out for praise.[15] Two days later, on April 29, at a meeting of historians, V.V. Zhuravlev, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism–Leninism, in effect complained that the boundaries of discussion had become too wide (see p. 64 below). In May, an unsigned article in the party journal on the 70th anniversary of the revolution noted 'certain costs' associated with the revival of history. 'Not only publicists but also specialists have a dilettante approach, striving to get into the centre of public attention, producing false sensations'; breadth of view was obtained at the expense of 'precision in world-outlook'. While different opinions could be held, it was wrong when 'the fruits of immature thought hastily attempt to feed public opinion'.[16]

A few weeks later, on June 17, at a meeting of the plenum of the Journalists' Union, the main report, presented by I. Laptev, the editor of *Izvestiya*, complained that 'people who are a long way from serious scholarship and a profound knowledge of the facts have started to express their often subjective views with unprecedented force'; the whole of Soviet history was sometimes presented as 'a complete error, a kind of historical failure', and socialism was sometimes criticised as a system.[17] Soon after this Ligachev, a very senior Politburo member, criticised excessive emphasis on the abuses of the Stalin period.[18]

In June 1987, V.A. Grigor'ev, the head of the Department of Science and Educational Institutions of the party Central Committee (the influential post formerly held by the late S.P. Trapeznikov) advanced a policy which attempted to hold a certain balance, and to move the debate among the historians towards serious fresh research (*Voprosy istorii* KPSS, no. 8, 1987, p. 140):

> At the present time two extremes have been clearly established in the evolution of our historical past. A considerable section of the scholars are inert, lack strength and perhaps willingness to renounce deep-rooted stereotypes in the evaluation of historical phenomena, and continue to be attached to out-of-date conceptions. Another section of the historians has declared its viewpoint, and quite loudly enough, demanding a re-examination and re-thinking of the whole heroic path of the Leninist party, to rewrite its whole history afresh. They are supported by several literary figures and publicists, speaking from nihilist positions. Both these extreme directions must be criticised. New thought must be elaborated, based on a profound, detailed and all-sided analysis of documentary sources, on a true party approach to the evolution of the past and present.

It seems reasonable to conclude that this statement, like Yakovlev's in April, reflected the approach of Gorbachev; both Grigor'ev and Yakovlev had been recently promoted. In mid-July 1987, at a further meeting with editors and other leading media figures, Gorbachev on the whole encouraged further wide-ranging historical debate. At the meeting, some speakers expressed anxiety about the breadth of the discussion. The editor of *Druzhba* narodov (this journal published Rybakov's Children of the *Arbat*, discussed below, and so the editor should not be regarded as an opponent of reform) complained that the impression was sometimes given that 'we are seeking only the negative in the past, as if nothing positive happened in 70 years'. The chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee argued that people should not be led to think that the life of previous generations was in vain—'certain people think that under the slogan of perestroika it is possible to cross out 70 years of the history of our socialist revolution and to begin to idealise tsarist Russia'.

Gorbachev did not take up these points. He uttered only a couple of warning notes. He condemned 'social demagogues' who attack cadres, and were even to be found 'in certain editorial boards of newspapers and journals' (this seemed to imply that the presentation of the 'bureaucracy' as a whole as a negative or parasitic social group was unacceptable). He also assured the meeting that the Central Committee would criticise those who proposed values and discoveries 'outside the limits of the interests of the people and the limits of socialism'. In an unprecedented burst of frankness he warned his audience—referring to unnamed opponents of perestroika—that 'they are waiting for someone to make a mistake, to permit someinaccuracy'. He later repeated this warning in reply to Zalygin, the progressive editor of Novyi *mir*—'they are waiting for mistakes from you and from us'. But the main thrust of his remarks was to continue to demand 'a real revolution in minds, in thinking and in approach'; he even advocated 'socialist pluralism in every publication'. On Soviet history, he remarked ambiguously that 'every day is dear to us, even when it was very difficult', but he said nothing about the discussions on the end of NEP, collectivisation and the treatment of the kulaks. The only specific historical issue mentioned in his speech was the great purge, and here he came out on the side of glasnost ':

> **We cannot and must not excuse or justify what took place in 1937–8. Never. Those who were in power then were responsible for this. But, comrades, this does not diminish everything we have today, and that the party and the people created.**

And in his concluding remarks to the meeting Gorbachev strongly advocated rethinking about history, calling for 'profound generalisations on the path we have followed, organically linking historical analysis with the resolution of the *perestroika*'.[19]

The July meeting was immediately followed by a legal decision of far-reaching significance. On July 16, 1987, the Supreme Court, acting on the basis of an appeal by the Procurator-General, declared null and void verdicts against 15 prominent Soviet economists dated 1931, 1932 and 1935. These economists included the outstanding agrarian economist A. Chayanov, N.D. Kondratiev of 'long cycles' fame, the financial specialist L.N. Yurovsky, the national income specialist N. Litoshenko, and the statisticians A. Chelintsev and L. Kafengauz. The others were N. Makarov, A. Doyarenko, A. Rybnikov, S. Chayanov, A. Teitel, I. Leontiev, A.F. Fabrikant, O. Khauke and N. Gendzekhadze.[20] In 1930-1 they were accused of membership of an alleged illegal 'Toiling Peasant Party', on the basis of their confessions made at the time, and most of them died in exile (Kondratiev is said to have gone insane). The Supreme Court has now declared that the Toiling Peasant Party did not exist,[21] even though in 1930-2 over 1,000 'members' of the party were arrested. These rehabilitations clearly imply the innocence of the accused in the famous 'Industrial Party' and 'Menshevik Union Bureau' public trials of November 1930 and March 1931, including Ramzin, Groman and others (a public trial of the Toiling Peasant Party was never held). In the mid-1960s the rehabilitation of some of these specialists was tacitly recognised, and some of their works reappeared in Soviet library catalogues. But Soviet publications of the 1970s again asserted their guilt. Thus we read in a Soviet work published in 1981 that 'in the second half of the twenties a number of wrecking organisations were established (the "Industrial Party", the "Toiling Peasant Party", the "Union Bureau of Mensheviks", etc.), installing themselves in all branches of the economy and in the state apparatus; these wrecking organisations were connected with the ruling circles of imperialist states, and financed and directed by them'.[22] This was an authoritative publication: it was issued under the auspices of the Institute of the History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR under the general editorship of Yu. A. Polyakov. The rehabilitation of these economists has opened up a vast area of Soviet economics and Soviet life for reconsideration. It may mean that their works will be re-published. Their analysis of the peasant farm and of the Soviet economy of the 1920s generally will certainly now be taken more seriously: V.P. Danilov has commented that 'the school [was] to a certain extent opposed to Marxism-Leninism, but the school's real achievements. and the analvsis of the internal pattern and activities of a small family farm did not contradict Marxism'.[23]

The story of the changing official attitudes to Soviet history since March 1985 is thus a complicated one. Gorbachev's own views on how much openness is possible—at least his public statements about this—have changed considerably, in the general direction of encouraging greater openness. There are evidently disagreements at the top. Gorbachev,

Yakovlev and Grigor'ev are obviously more open-minded than Ligachev and the anonymous author of the *Kommunist* article of May 1987.

As we go to press, in a speech on September 10, 1987, the head of the KGB, Politburo member Chebrikov, explicitly criticised 'socialist pluralism', praised by Gorbachev a few weeks before, and ominously warned that 'imperialist special services' were encouraging some writers to 'blacken certain stages of the historical development of our country' (*Pravda*, September 11, 1987).

It is characteristic of the new phase in Soviet development since March 1985, but particularly since the beginning of 1987, that different groups and individuals are able to express their views far more frankly than before, and to exercise a greater influence on public opinion, including the opinions of the Politburo members themselves. The Politburo, and Gorbachev personally, have not been following a pre-determined plan for providing more information about Soviet history. It is rather that in the more open society of 1985-7 different groups and individuals have been pressing for greater or less frankness and have been advocating a variety of different views about the past; and Gorbachev and the other political leaders have been responding to these developments, and arguing between themselves almost openly about them.

The greater autonomy in discussion may be illustrated by examining the varying reactions among Soviet writers and journalists, and contrasting them with the more cautious movement of opinion among professional historians.

III. HISTORY IN THE ARTS AND THE MEDIA

The vast changes of the past twelve months have been led and managed by the writers, the film-makers and the reformist journalists rather than by the historians. Reviewing Rybakov's novel about the Stalin period, *Deti Arbata (Children of the Arbat)*, A. Turkov proudly declared that literature had overtaken its neighbours the historians in quenching the thirst of millions for the truth about all the country has lived through; literature had been 'like the infantry, heroically overcoming the obstacles in front of it without waiting for the arrival of the main forces'.[24] The historian Yu. Polyakov agreed that 'the writers have long since overtaken the historians in posing sharp questions'.[25]

Perhaps the most important single event was the release of the Georgian film *Pokayanie* (Repentance) about the despotism of Beriya/Stalin, and its mass showing, first to audiences in Moscow (from January 1987), and then elsewhere. The film was given special showings at places of work, including hotels and the Moscow circus. Major literary events have also had an enormous impact. The monthlies published a series of previously censored works, and 'people stood in queues from six in the morning for them'.[26]

Tvardovsky's moving poem about his father, exiled as a kulak and never heard from again, was published simultaneously in *Novyi mir* and *Oktyabr'*, with a joint circulation of 680,000. Important and eagerly-read sources of historical information and ideas are *Literaturnaya gazeta* with a circulation of 3–4 million, and the colour magazine *Ogonek*, with a circulation of 1% million.

In the following account I shall deal with four major aspects of recent history discussed in these rich and fascinating literary and journalistic sources: (1) Russia before October 1917; (2) The 1920s and the New Economic Policy; (3) The Peasantry in the 1930s and After; (4) The Stalinist Political System in the 1930s. The Second World War, and post-war developments under Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, have also received much attention, as have the October Revolution and Civil War, but I shall not deal with these important subjects here.

(1) *Russia before October 1917*

The pre-revolutionary past is presented with greater thoughtfulness and objectivity. Several authors have frankly argued that valuable traditions of the past have been eroded. At the most elementary level, the literary newspaper has waged a long campaign against the inefficiencies of the Soviet postal service, pointing out that a letter took ten days to be delivered from Staraya Russa to Leningrad in June 1987, but in tsarist Russia in June 1872, 115 years earlier, Dosteovsky was upset because the same delivery took as long as two days![27] Another writer pointed out that peasants before the revolution took a more enlightened attitude to the forest than they do now, and did not cut down cedars unnecessarily.[28] Putting such arguments more generally, Kaverin, a writer in his eighties who has been through many vicissitudes, has described the high level of culture among the intellectuals of the 1910s. He contrasted this with the lack of 'truly culturedpeople in recent years'; 'the old *gimnazium*, although it had many faults, nevertheless provided an incomparably higher education than the present-day school'.[29] A speaker at the Board of the Union of Writers praised the sense of personal honour found in XIX Century Russia from Pushkin to the populists, and powerful in the tsarist guard regiment, contrasting this with 'the slave habit of fear' which led us to bow our heads when the most that threatened us was losing our position or our job. Another speaker pointed out that Gogol did not complain to higher authorities when Belinsky publicly attacked him as a reactionary, and presented this as an example to be followed.[30] Many writers and journalists have called for the republication of pre-revolutionary writings not sympathetic to the revolutionary movement, including Gogol's reply to Belinsky and Karamzin's conservative history.[31] They have also urged the accurate presentation of the views of those who were on the wrong side, including Lenin's opponents. Biographical sketches of leading

opponents of the October revolution appeared in *Moscow News,* which reported that Milyukov 'ruled his party in a dictatorial manner, while paying lip service to democracy', but that he was 'a major historian, whose works have not lost scientific significance' ('to top it all, he played the violin').[32]

Several authors revealed that they have been pondering about the complex links between the pre-revolutionary past and more recent troubles. In his fictionalised biography of the biologist Timofeev-Resovsky, Granin reported that his hero compared Lysenko and Lysenkoism with Rasputin and Rasputinshchina—'the figure of Rasputin was the only possible analogy in this history of an absurdity'.[33] V. Bondarenko, pondering about the evils of the 1930s, suggested that 'the terror of the Socialist Revolutionaries, the pogroms of the "Black Hundred" [the anti-semitic extreme pro-tsarist Right], the mass executions of revolutionaries, all installed in the political practice of the twentieth century the principle of terror', and grumbled about the harmful influence of *Nechaevism* (the radical terrorism of the 1870s).[34] Looking further back, the rise of a hierarchical bureaucracy is traced to Peter the Great, or even Ivan the Terrible. One critic reminded us that the great liberal pre-revolutionary historian Kluchevsky argued that Peter was 'more accustomed to deal with things, with working tools than with people, and dealt with people as if they were working tools'; this led Peter to develop a hierarchy of human working tools in the form of bureaucrats, arranged in the Table of Ranks. The Soviet critic commented:

> **Surely this is somewhat at variance with the concept of a democratic father (batyushka), affectionate to hard-working carpenters and resourceful negroes, an idea fostered by our screen and partly in our prose. But there is no doubt we must also swallow this bitter pill without spitting it out if we want the full truth about our own Fatherland, warts and all.**[35]

The sociologist V. Shubkin, tracing the origins of Soviet bureaucracy, drew heavily on the analysis of Russian bureaucracy in Dostoevsky's *Diary of a Writer.*[36]

(2) *The 1920s and the New Economic Policy*

Many analogies have been drawn by reformist economists and journalists between the necessities of Soviet socialism in the late 1980s and the New Economic Policy of the 1920s (NEP), which combined state planning and a market relation with the peasants. At the XXVII Congress, in a passage underestimated by almost all western observers, Gorbachev called for the introduction of 'something like a Leninist prodnalog' in the new conditions of today.[37] The 'prodnalog', or food tax, was the fixed tax in kind imposed on peasants by the decisions of March 1921—above this amount the peasants could dispose freely of their produce; this was the

crucial moment in the turn from the War Communism of 1918–20 to NEP. The political scientist and publicist E. Ambartsumov enthusiastically praised NEP for 'its reliance on the individual direct interest of the producer, its unshackling of local initiative, and its driving-out of administrative by economic methods of management', contrasted NEP favourably with War Communism, and described the renunciation of NEP at the end of the 1920s as 'in essence a return to the principles of a "war communist" policy'.[38]

The new orthodoxy about the 1920s shared by many writers and journalists was expressed in a unique interview published in Moscow News between the Soviet playwright Mikhail Shatrov and the American Sovietologist Stephen Cohen.[39] Shatrov made a TV serial about Lenin in the early 1970s which was banned until January 1987; Cohen is the author of the major biography of Bukharin (translated into Russian and privately circulated in the USSR) and an active supporter of the American Nuclear Freeze movement (his biography of Bukharin was, incidentally, not mentioned in the interview in *Moscow* News). In the interview, significantly entitled 'Going Back to Move Forward', Shatrov and Cohen displayed virtual unanimity in their interpretation of Soviet history. Shatrov praised Lenin's Russia and the New Economic Policy, characterised 1928–9 as 'a certain retreat from the many moral and political values proclaimed by the October revolution', and 1956 and 1985 as 'attempts to go back to Lenin, his ideas'. Cohen declared that 'from my point of view Party life when Lenin was there between 1917 and 1920 was sufficiently democratic'(!), and argued that the present reforms marked a return to Lenin's tradition of the NEP, as an economic system combining state planning with market relations and private initiatives.

The same issues were discussed more fully in a short play by Fyodor Burlatsky, a leading Soviet political commentator.[40] The play, entitled 'Political Testament' (a reference to Lenin's famous Letter to the Party Congress of December 1922 in which he called for the removal of Stalin from the post of party General Secretary), presented a conversation at the end of the 1920s between a father and his two sons, Aleksei, a 'Rightist', and Peter, a supporter of Stalin. Peter stoutly defended the great break-through, pointing out that NEP had produced over a million unemployed, and criticising it as a system dominated by 25 million peasant households, in which artisans made nearly a third of all industrial goods and the private trader dominated the retail market. With the new policy, however, Peter argued, 'after two or three five-year plans our industry will be no worse than in Germany and France'; 'if we don't follow this path, the path of difficult struggle, the imperialists will crush us—without heavy industry, there will be no defence, and that will be the end, the end of Lenin's cause'.

Aleksei put his alternative with equal forcefulness. He insisted that

Stalin had no ideology of his own: 'he was with Kamenev and Zinoviev against Trotsky, with Bukharin against Kamenev and Zinoviev, and with people like you against the last member of Lenin's Politburo [Rykov]'; and he quoted the famous Opposition joke that 'the whole history of mankind is divided into three periods: the matriarchate, the patriarchate, and the secretariat'. Your policy, he told Peter, is 'superindustrialisation in the town, compulsory collectivisation in the countryside, and the cult of one-man leadership in the party. . . "revolution from above" wasn't borrowed from Lenin but from Saltykov-Shchedrin'. He claimed that in contrast NEP had been a great success: the peasant lived better than before the revolution, and workers' wages were higher and their hours lower. But 'you intend to drive everyone into the collective farm by force'; your policy of squeezing the village by low prices is leading to refusal to sell, and will result in uprisings. In what sense is your super-industrialisation 'super'? 'above real possibilities? above common sense? above the truth?'

Our sympathy for Aleksei's views is greatly strengthened by the plight of the father. Even though he fought for Soviet power, he has been classified as a kulak for having three horses and three cows. (Aleksei quite inaccurately suggests that this is because 'earlier there were said to be four per cent of kulaks, it proved too few, and a year later it became fifteen per cent'. In fact the 'standard' percentage was raised from 1 per cent to 5 per cent). The 'kulak' father in spite of the injustice with which he is being treated supports the Stalinistic Peter on purely opportunistic grounds, telling Aleksei: 'Peter is hot under the collar, but he is cleverer than you. You can see what's happening, he's joining the bosses. And if they drive you out, you'll let me down as well. . . And you'll destroy Peter and the whole family.' Burlatsky's own afterword is neatly balanced, but slightly tilted towards the path followed in the 1920s: 'Industrialisation enabled victory in the Great Patriotic War and opened the road to further progress, but at the same time the inefficiency of command-administrative methods of socialist construction became more and more obvious. Now, when the party and the people are carrying out a fundamental *perestroika* and renewal of our society, when sharp discussions are taking place, it is important to remember the lessons of history, the reasoning and arguments. . . and to appreciate the true political will of Lenin.'

Of even greater interest than these discussions are the various references to non-economic and negative aspects of NEP. On the one hand, G. Anashkin, a law professor, calls upon the progressive legal traditions of the 1920s to argue that the investigators of crimes should be separated from the procuracy, that the procuracy should not control itself, that defence lawyers should be present when suspects are questioned, and that a jury of six should replace the present judge plus two assessors.[41] On the other hand, Zalygin, in his novel *Posle buri*, presents the negative side of

NEP: 'enrich yourselves', make profits by illegal deals. His heroine helps a man who is near to disaster, but breaks with him without hesitation once he has become a successful 'Nepman'.

(3) ***The peasantry in the 1930s and after***

A large number of novels, stories and articles are devoted to the themes of collectivisation, de-kulakisation and grain seizures, with occasional references to the 1932–3 famine. Some of this material is entirely new. In 1963 Khrushchev revealed a letter sent by Sholokhov to Stalin criticising agricultural policy in the spring of 1933 in his native Don region during the famine. Now ***Moscow News*** has published an equally critical letter by Sholokhov written much earlier, on June 18, 1929, describing the situation in the Don and Lower Volga regions.[42] The letter, addressed to the librarian of the City Committee of the Moscow party, was sent by her to Stalin (except for one particularly critical paragraph). Sholokhov, evidently referring to the final stages of the campaign to seize grain from the 1928 harvest, complained that 'the average peasant has already been ***squashed;*** the poor peasants are starving and the property—down to samovars, and blankets—of the truest middle peasants, who are often very weak economically, is being sold in the Khopersk area. The people are running berserk, the mood is depressed, and the areas sown for the next year will sink disastrously'; political bandit gangs had emerged for the first time since the civil war; the appropriations were worse than those in 1919 and 1921. (The Khoper okrug, a few months later, was nationally proclaimed as a model for voluntary comprehensive collectivisation).[43] In his final paragraph (the one not sent to Stalin) Sholokhov bitterly remarked that 'everyone, up to Kalinin himself, should be given a good whipping; everyone who shrieks hypocritically like a Pharisee, about the alliance with the average [middle] peasant and at the same time is strangling the very same peasant'.

Sholokhov's famous novel about collectivisation, ***Virgin Soil Upturned,*** which has long been a standard work in Soviet schools, was in many respects realistic, but it sought to justify the general thrust of Stalinist policies in the countryside. A Soviet writer, Lev Voskresensky, re-reading it 34 years after reading it at school, drew on evidence in the novel itself to criticise these same policies. The dispossessed kulak, treated as an enemy in the novel, was a former Red Guard who had developed his farm in response to Soviet policies of the 1920s; no serious justification was advanced for excluding him from the collective farm. Voskresensky grumbled that while Sholokhov's novel is in the school curriculum, novels critical of collectivisation are not: contrary to the spirit of present-day economic reform, 'our 17-year-old children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren are listening, in keeping with the school curriculum (which cannot be avoided) to Nagulnov and Davydov [the party activists]

saying. . . drive those who work day and night, getting richer in spite of our warnings, out of our life and squash them'.[44]

In recent publications there is a strong element of continuity with the critical writings published in the Khrushchev years. But there are important differences. There is much more outright hostility to the whole policy pursued in the villages since 1929. Thus the Belorussian novelist Vasil' Bykov, following the award of the Lenin prize for his novel Znak *bedy*, explained that in Belorussia 'we did not have any kulaks generally, but they required us to de-kulakise'. The unjust actions which resulted led to hatred within the village, which the Germans were able to use to persuade the persecuted to join the police so as to revenge themselves on their fellow-villagers.[45] V.A. Tikhonov, Academician in the Agricultural Academy VASKhNIL (and brother of the former Prime Minister) contemptuously rejected Stalin's claim that 5 per cent of peasants were kulaks. According to Tikhonov, in 1918 'more than two-thirds of the land belonging to the kulaks' was taken away, 'machines, animals and other means of production were confiscated; the material basis for the kulak economy was destroyed'. Land was divided equally. 'In these conditions, with the domination of Soviet power in the countryside, where could the new kulak come from. . .? Qualitative social criteria were replaced by purely quantitative evaluations of the level of development of the economy.' Tikhonov therefore concluded that it was probably those peasants who produced more than the average who were caught up in de-kulakisation:

> It is well-known that Stalin stated in one of his interviews that millions of people were de-kulakised.
>
> . . . Lenin's ideas on taxation were pushed aside, and the country went over entirely to requisitioning (prodrazverstka)—first in the countryside, and then throughout the planned economy. Grain was taken from the collective farms almost for nothing.[46]

The sociologist V. Shubkin declared even more bluntly:

> Stalin decided to eliminate NEP prematurely, using purely administrative measures and direct compulsion; this led, speaking mildly, to pitiable results. Agricultural production was disrupted, in a number of districts of the country famine began. In towns measures against artisans and small producers in practice destroyed a whole sphere of services. The lives of tens of millions of people (I speak not of the servitors in the capital, but of the main population of the country) were filled with incredible deprivations and difficulties, often at the limit of purely biological existence.[47]

Criticism of state policy towards the peasants is now extended to the Khrushchev period and beyond. 'All the methods of squeezing the peasant,' wrote B. Mozhaev, 'were also adopted under Khrushchev in the last period

of his activity: they cut the collective-farmers' plots, and took their animals away'.[48]

The author Anatolii Anan'ev broadly attacked the general organisation of the collective farm from its foundation to the present day, on the grounds that the farmer was separated from responsibility for the land:

> We have barricaded ourselves for more than half a century behind the calming formula 'the land belongs to the people', which apparently solves everything; in trying to solve every kind of secondary problem we did not see how the links of people with the land were broken.. .
>
> The working day of the collective farmer lasts from dawn to dawn, but even at the present day his work is in essence depersonalised. He does not need to get up earlier (even if he wanted to, it is not necessary), it does not depend on him whether to sow tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, or the depth at which to plough. . . He is only required to keep the tractor or harvester in order and go out to plough or harvest with everyone else. . .
>
> We must go boldly further and must not adapt man to socialism, as we did previously in many matters, but adapt socialism to natural human requirements, so that the customs, traditions and culture of the people should not be destroyed but strengthened.'[49]

(4) *The Stalinist system*

In the novels and articles which are now being published, political and mass repression under Stalin are described with much more frankness than in the Khrushchev years. In Granin's fictionalised biography, the persecution of scientists in the early as well as the late 1930s was quite fully described, and Timofeev-Resovsky was shown nearly dying from pellagra after a year in a camp in 1945–6.[50] Anatolii Rybakov's long-awaited *Children of the Arbat* portrayed a sickly-suspicious Stalin in conversation with the director of Magnitogorsk (presumably Zavenyagin), and musing to himself, in terms similar to Solzhenitsyn's famous scene in *First Circle.* The novel described quite fully the milder processes of OGPU arrest and questioning in the mid-1930s, and the mental agony of the victim's mother. Rybakov also acquainted his readers with the notorious arrangements by which ordinary apartments were allocated to the OGPU so that informers could report to their controls; and showed the mental torment suffered by some of those forced into acting as informers.[51] In *Robed in White,* Dudintsev set out in elaborate and fascinating detail the questionnaire supplied by the secret police to an unfortunate informer-provocateur in 1948, which he was required to put to the hero of the novel in order to lure him into anti-Soviet statements. Here is an extract:

> M.q. [main questionl : what do you think of Minister Kaftanov's orders to dismiss scientists—doctors of science, Ph.Ds and professors? Is it true that about three thousand were sacked? Have you tried to work it out from the orders? Is it really three thousand? Isn't that too severe?. . . M.q.: do you know that cde. Stalin is interested in the biological sciences? S.q. [supplementary question] : what is your

> opinion on the fact that the report [by Lysenko] was read at the session [of the Agricultural Academy in August 19481 after it had been approved by cde. Stalin?. . . S.q.: is it true that cde. St. on the proposal of Lysenko and Ryadno, by his personal decision, without election procedure, introduced nearly 30 new members into the Agr. Academy? S.q.: what's your attitude to the absence of elections? isn't it a violation of the Statute of the Academy?[52]

Many of the short stories and articles also provide us with new glimpses of the world of spy mania, deportations and camps. A story by Fazil' Iskander, 'Chik and Pushkin', described the desperate efforts of Chik, a schoolboy, to find evidence of wrecking in a picture illustrating a Pushkin poem about Oleg's farewell to his horse on the cover of a school exercise book of 1937 commemorating the 100th anniversary of Pushkin's death. While he was doing this, Chik recalled an occasion when a boy found a piece of paper on a beach on which some anti-Soviet remarks accompanied 'a torpedo-shaped object often drawn in public lavatories'. The boy and his friends promptly surrounded an innocent passer-by and accused him of wrecking; he was rescued by the intervention of Chik's mad grandfather, who recognised insanity in others.[53] In a story by the late Fyodor Abramov an old countryman got five years for stealing radishes from a field. Another story by Abramov in the same journal described the tribulations of a family who fled from their village to avoid de-kulakisation, and had to hide in the towns without internal passports:

> We travelled the whole of Siberia, the whole of Kazakhstan, the whole of Kirgizia, we went to all the building sites. It was simpler at the sites. They had a great need for manual workers and diggers, and did not ask for passports. We lived in slums, in quarries, in holes in the ground. Peter did not go to school until he was twelve.[54]

A new novel by Sergei Antonov, Vas'ka, took the tale of repression into the working class.[55] This is a rare event: intellectuals and peasants are the heroes and victims of nearly all recent Soviet novels and articles, and little about the factories and the construction sites is to be found. Vas'ka is a young woman who is an outstanding worker in the construction of the Moscow metro (Metrostroi); but she is also the daughter of a kulak, and has fled from her village. The young party organiser on the site is torn between his duty to denounce her and his wish not to lose her work, coupled with his human feelings for her. Fear spreads in a spiral through all those concerned. The outcome was left open in the novel, but in an interview in the literary newspaper Antonov explained that in real life 'in the middle of 1934 a campaign was carried out to purge Metrostroi of class—alien elements, and Vas'ka had to return where she fled from, and perhaps go further away'. Antonov, an engineer who worked on constructing bridges and tunnels before he became a writer, insisted in his interview that the enthusiasm of the young people who built the Metro was

genuine, and played a major part in its success, but also argued that the desperate pace of construction was extremely wasteful:

> By the normative estimates the construction would be completed by 1937 at the earliest. Stalin lost patience, did not study the estimates of the engineers, and ordered that the first line should start up on November 7, 1934. Naturally there could be no objections. Feverish work got under way. Moscow young communists were mobilised to dig the tunnels. They dug day and night by hand. The time-tables for organising the work lost all sense. The draughtsmen could not keep up with the diggers. The 'Arbat' station had to be redone three times. And the trains on the first circle of the Metro started, not on November 7, 1934, but on May 15, 1935. This was a striking record, achieved contrary to engineering science. How many extra million roubles were spent to achieve this record is another matter.[56]

A much more fundamental criticism of the Stalin system which informs the recent literature is that people were not treated as human beings with rights and individual personalities, but as cogs in a machine. Stalin always tried to present himself as a man of the people, who understood and responded to their needs: 'leaders come and go, but people are immortal'; 'cadres decide everything'. But on one occasion he made a slip, and several times used the word *vintiki* to describe ordinary people (*vintiki* literally means 'little screws', and in this context is usually best translated 'cogs' or 'nuts and bolts'). On June 25, 1945, at the height of his power, glory and popularity, Stalin addressed a reception in the Kremlin for participants in the Victory Parade:

> Do not think I will say anything unusual. I have the simplest and most ordinary of toasts. I would like to drink to the health of people who have few offices and whose status is unenviable. To people who are considered *'vintiki'* in the great state machine, but without whom we—marshals and commanders of fronts and armies—speaking crudely, are not worth a tinker's cuss. If any *'vintik'* ceases to work—it's the end. I propose a toast to simple, ordinary, modest people, to *'vintiki'*, who keep our great state machine in motion in all branches of science, economy and military affairs. There are very many of them, their name is legion, because there are tens of millions of them. They are modest people. No-one writes about them, they have no high status and few offices, but they are the people who maintain us as the base maintains the summit. I drink the health of these people, our respected comrades.[57]

This could be interpreted as a thoughtful and even kindly speech; and Stalin was careful to put *'vintiki'* in inverted commas. But the Soviet people are rightly a proud people, and Stalin's patronising use of this single word has never been forgotten or forgiven by some of the *'vintiki'*. I have come across many critical references to the use of the word *'vintiki'* in the Soviet press in the past year or so, with and without attribution of the use of the word to Stalin. Here are a few.

'Wasn't it in the forties, after the victory, when the people, who had

suffered an unbelievably severe war, were called *"vintiki"*, when lack of care for the ordinary person developed, lack of belief in their strength and consciousness' (Vyacheslav Kondrat'ev).[58]

'The less people feel themselves to be "nuts" or *"vintiki"*, the better for society' (Svetlana Alekseevich).[59]

In a recent story by Yu. Shishenkov, an official said to someone 'You are simply a *vintik* in the state machine and you should act accordingly.'[60]

'The result of democratisation must be that every person in every post ceases to be a *vintik*, becomes a significant figure taking a range of decisions' (V. Mezhuev, Doctor of Philosophy).[61]

The critic A. Egorov concluded that Onisimov, the Minister in Bek's *Novoe naznachenie*, was a *vintik* in spite of his high rank. Here we must translate *vintik* literally as 'screw', because Egorov added that Onisimov was 'perhaps an expensive little screw, a unique one, but with a cut in its head in which it is easy to insert a screwdriver'.[62]

But greater frankness and criticism are not, I think, the most important development in these discussions of Soviet triumphs and tragedies over the past seventy years. What is outstanding, exciting and moving about present artistic and literary investigations of the past is their desperate struggle to understand and learn from these experiences. The main right for which our forebears struggled in 1917, wrote Tat'yana Ivanova, was the right to liberty.[63] The main weaknesses in Soviet history, argued A. Butenko, have been bureaucracy, the power of the state and the lack of self-government of the workers, derived from the 'administrative-voluntarist methods' of Stalin and the 1930s, and forming factors in the retardation of society today: 'self-administration was from a certain moment declared to be an invention of revisionism'. According to Butenko, 'it is important today to examine the whole history of the Soviet state and find out where, how and why the various negative phenomena, distortions and deformations of the economic and political organisation arose'.[64] It is common ground among the critical writers that the explanation of Stalinism offered by the party in 1956 was inadequate; Mikhail Alekseev sounded almost provocatively old-fashioned when he insisted that 'as far as Stalin is concerned, for me the evaluation of his personality given in the resolution of the party Central Committee of June 30, 1956, is fundamental'.[65] In contrast A. Latynina insisted in a review of Bek's *Novoe naznachenie* that 'at the present level of our understanding, the slogans of 1956—"cult of personality", "violations of socialist legality", "contradictions of the period"—explain very little'. 'The whole course of events of the 1920s and 1930s induced the belief that a Communist must be subordinate to the will of the collective, the mind of the collect-

ive', while 'belief in an organised purposive society directed to a single goal justified the removal of those who were not drawn into this movement or who even opposed it':

> Could this have been just a matter of Stalin? If it was, how can the Marxist understanding of the role of the personality in history be reconciled with the extraordinary significance which we attached to a specific person over so many years?[66]

Three examples will illustrate the probing analysis of the Stalin period appearing in the Soviet press. First, a lengthy review of Alexander Bek's novel *Novoe naznachenie* by the well-known economic reformer G. Popov.[67] The novel, written in the early 1960s by a leading industrial journalist, dealt with the career of 'Onisimov', one of Stalin's Ministers for the Iron and Steel Industry. Based on the famous Soviet industrialist Tevosyan, the novel was due to be published in *Novyi mir* in 1966, but did not appear, on the excuse that it was objected to by Tevosyan's widow. The book was not published in the USSR until twenty years later at the end of 1986.[68] (It was published abroad in 1977 by the anti-Soviet publishing house Posev; but the fact that its publication abroad has not been mentioned in the Soviet press).[69]

Bek frankly but sympathetically portrayed one of Stalin's best economic commanders: fanatically devoted to his work, incorruptible, modest in his personal needs, obedient to the will of Stalin. Onisimov's energy saved the steel industry from the stagnation which followed the purges of 1937–9. But Onisimov's obedience to Stalin led him, contrary to his own convictions, to waste enormous sums on a useless innovation which had Stalin's support; and Onisimov's reliance on the conservative specialists in his Ministry caused him to ban experiments on a major technical innovation proposed by a factory director.

In his review, using the evidence of the novel, Popov depicted what he called the 'Administrative System' of the Stalinist economy:

> The basis of this system is the centralisation of decisions and punctual, undeviating, over-riding fulfilment of directives from Above and particularly from Stalin—the Boss. Not pitying himself, intensifying above all his own personal work, Onisimov 'holds the ministerial *apparat* in a state of tension.' Day and night are indistinguishable for a substantial number of higher officials. . .
>
> This is a system of specific and detailed management *in natura*. It is a system of continuous operational management of the course of production from the centre. This is the Administrative System.

The system carried with it at its best the virtues of 'culture in work, technical literacy, precision in every detail', but it also involved the steady deterioration of the quality of managerial personnel, who became entirely unaccustomed to independent thinking (Ordzhonikidze and Onisimov,

Popov reminds us, came to the system from outside, from the underground and the Civil War). Moreover, according to Bek, 'the internal logic of the Administrative System required a sub-system of fear'; Beriya's right to replace any subordinate official without explanation grew into the right to deprive any subordinate of life. 'Beriya gradually began to take over a number of national-economic tasks, more and more important from year to year; eventually no large construction could manage without his participation, no large scientific-technical project.'

After Stalin's death and Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, 'Onisimov' concluded that independent thought would now be permissible; and in 1957 criticised Khrushchev's proposal to replace industrial Ministries by regional economic councils. He was promptly dismissed. From this event Popov in his review drew far-reaching conclusions, in an analysis similar to T.H. Rigby's distinction between the 'mono-organizational society combined with personal dictatorship' of the Stalin period and the 'mono-organizational society without personal dictatorship' which followed the death of Stalin:

> Onisimov's main mistake was to identify the Administrative System with one of its specific forms: with Stalin and Beriya. . .
>
> Onisimov's mistake is undoubtedly the most valuable lesson for all of us from Alexander Bek's posthumousnovel. Not only Onisimov, but also N.S. Khrushchev, and all of us, thought that with the elimination of the cult of personality from the system we would solve all the problems of our future. Now, in the light of historical experience, we see that this is not the case. The System has revenged itself on us.

Popov then suggested a radical solution:

> The problem is to renounce it, to replace it by a new system, corresponding to the contemporary stage of the development of socialism, relying not on administrative but on economic and democratic methods and forms.
>
> The Administrative System is not at all the synonym of the Socialist System, it never included the whole of our structure (stroi), it is an ephemeral stage.

My second example of recent analysis of Stalinism is a review of Abuladze's film ***Repentance*** by L.G. Ionin, a sociologist.[70] ***Repentance*** depicted the aftermath of the dictatorial terroristic regime of 'Varlam Aravidze', a Beriya-Stalin figure, in the form of a dream by Ketevan, the daughter of two of Varlam's victims. After Varlam's death his victims refused to permit silence about his crimes. His son Abel, determined to prevent frankness about the past, got the obstreperous Ketevan incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital. Abel's own son, Varlam's grandson, distraught with guilt, shot himself. This brought Abel to his senses, and he dug up Varlam's body and flung it out of the grave. Ketevan then woke up from the dream, in which the whole action of the film took place, and carried on with her normal life.[71]

I have found it impossible to summarise Ionin's profound discussion of *Repentance;* and instead will present some key passages of his review-article in his own words:

> ***The Utopia* of *Total Equality***
> Where the problem is the happiness of millions, the single-unique [individual] is not worthy of attention. Everyone is this single-unique, whether he is a creative individual or tries to combine with other units which are indistinguishable from him. His uniqueness is his initial fault. . .
>
> Varlam is always on the side of the masses. But the units constituting the masses are not only individuals. There are also group individuals, which are also intolerable for Varlam's Utopian logic. . .
>
> Real Varlams destroyed whole nationalities, whole professional and social groups, and if reality does not yield to their maniacal desire to achieve Utopia, they seek to destroy a whole people, like Pol Pot in Kampuchea. . .
>
> Wherever the masses exist they are an unsteady social formation. They are stabilised by a bureaucratic apparatus. This is Varlam's support. . . A jelly-like mass and a bureaucratic apparatus which is its inflexible backbone—this is a precise image of the social structure in which Varlam Aravidze lives and acts, the structure which he created and which brought him into being.
>
> ***The Anti-Hero***
> Varlam does not completely reveal himself at once. At first he looks different: the friend of children, amusing, an admirer of art, a gallant cavalier, a strict servant of the people, entirely devoting himself to the common cause. Later it appears that he was always the same, and the changing masks were to deceive the 'enemy'. . .
>
> The most terrible thing is that this whole devilish performance is played before people who suspect nothing and do not have hostile intentions. Varlam's manoeuvres create a frightful impression: he kisses the hand of the artist Sandro, and compliments Sandro himself, inviting him to participate in the education of the people. . . And all this is on the eve of the arrest of the artist, prepared in advance. . .
>
> Military cunning and provocation are displayed in the way in which hostile intentions are disclosed [by encouraging the victim to go into hiding]. If you are not guilty, there is no reason to escape. Although the fate of the victim has been decided in advance, he has revealed himself as an enemy. This is the same mode of thought as when witches were put to the test in the Middle Ages: they threw a woman into the water in shackles; if she drowned, she was not a witch; if she did not drown, she was a witch and was burned on the bonfire. . .
>
> The writer Elias Canetti has brilliantly demonstrated the paranoidal character of power in conditions of totalitarian dictatorship. He showed that the mania of greatness gives way to the mania of persecution. . . Varlam is the incarnation of absolute non-individuality, of total death. Total death is the necessary consequence of the Utopia of total equality. For equality to become complete, all must die, because even the dead retain their individuality while the living are still alive.
>
> ***The Dead and the Living. . .***
> The social existence of an individual, as distinct from his physical existence, does not cease at the moment of death. Although 'in a new quality', he retains social prestige and status characteristics, and continues to perform social roles. Moreover, even after death these characteristics can change and become socially

more or less significant than in life. . .

The Egyptian cult of the dead, where the dead participate in the world of the living. . . has profound social significance. This is the clearest expression of a universally observable unity of the living and the departed. . .

The kingdom of the dead experiences earthquakes, *coups* and revolutions, reflecting the social upheavals in the world of the living. Parallel to the destruction of monuments 'at the top' a degradation of the status of the former elite of the dead takes place and a new elite is formed.

The Redemption of Sin. . .

Abel tries to remove his own guilt. He advances a variety of well-tried arguments: Varlam wasn't so bad. . ., we achieved so many fine things under him—the town flourished, and anyway a decisive struggle was taking place—'it was them or us'—and it was not a time for sentiment, it was necessary to be tough. . .

Abel fights for his father and for his father's memory, but it is clear that he is fighting for himself. This is the same struggle: for his own well-being and place in society and for Varlam's place in it. One without the other is impossible. Therefore the repentance is false. . .

The Politics of Repentance. . .

There are three kinds of bad, incorrect conduct: a mistake, a crime and a sin. A mistake occurs through ignorance or incompetence, the inability to foresee the consequences; a crime is the result of evil intentions; a sin is an action of which a person is ashamed. A mistake needs to be corrected, a crime needs to be punished, a sin needs repentance. The election of Varlam as 'town head' was a mistake, his actions were crimes, the lies or silence of our contemporaries about Varlam's crimes are a sin. The result of an unrepented sin is hypocrisy, diffidence, the absence of a clear moral standard, lack of belief in oneself and the future. . .

An active society sees in the past the necessary foundations of its present development. It therefore wants to know what in the past deserves trust, and what should be rejected, what is reliable and what should be exposed as a myth. . .

But an immovable society has to preserve itself at any price—and not even itself but its own respectable image in its own and others' eyes. It interferes in the past with only one purpose—to seek justification of what is happening in the present. If it does not find it, the past can be invented.

The state depicted in George Orwell's 1984 has a special department—the 'Ministry of Truth', concerned with the correction of the past. . . But a lie about the past is a lie about the present. . . We construct a fictitious regularity, and the conduct of the people is oriented on it, and departs further and further from reality. . .

The number of rituals and ceremonies on anniversaries multiply. Rituals are called upon to 'objectivise' the past, to confirm its strict correspondence to fact. Attempts to discuss the problems of the past are suppressed, for this is an attack on the well-being and respectability of the present. . .

The transformation of the past is a sensitive indicator of changes in the present. In the film, repentance did not take place, the past remained untouched. The whole dramatic story on the screen took place in the imagination of Ketevan. But the film itself, when shown on our screens, is an act of repentance. This is why it is not only a remarkable and profound artistic production, but also a bold and honest political action.

My third example of the analysis of Stalinism is taken from Dudintsev's novel about Lysenkoism *Robed* in White. The title refers both to the white

coats of scientists and to those who saved humanity from evil, as depicted in the Apocalypse: 'those who are robed in white' were those who 'have passed through the great ordeal'. The hero of the novel Fyodor Ivanovich, as in Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* in the 1950s, is a committed party member; and a second hero, a colonel in the political police, is also depicted as a secret resister to injustice. The anti-heroes include the colonel's boss, a general who, like the colonel, rose from the ranks of the civil war; the general's attitude is described as 'superstition and stupidity'. The chief anti-hero is Academician Ryadno, a demagogic and entertaining rascal, and close associate of Lysenko. Ryadno's popular language was 'more easily understood by the bosses, who easily agreed with him and approved his crazy schemes' (he frequently took tea with Stalin).

Dudintsev presents these figures in the framework of a fundamentally critical analysis of the social culture which enabled the triumph of charlatans who claimed to turn winter into spring wheat and hornbeams into hazel trees:

> **Those whose point of view did not coincide with that of the majority remained silent. . . This stupidity emerged from the mass of the inadequately educated majority whom it was easy to persuade that they possessed final knowledge of things.**[72]

Even more bluntly, the progressive police colonel cited with approval Dostoevsky's statement in *Crime and Punishment* that socialists failed to take human nature into account; the colonel commented that Soviet Communists also 'did not set any limits, as if there were no human nature; social origin was all that counted'. Yet the demagogic Academician Ryadno and the reactionary police general were not sent 'by the tsar or by America'; they were products of the Soviet system. 'They flew to us from their own internal space, saturated with envy and the dream of power.'[73]

Thus Popov presented Stalinism as having created an Administrative System, one 'ephemeral stage' in socialism, which continued after Stalin's personal despotism had vanished, and should be replaced by a fundamentally new form of the socialist economy appropriate for the present age. Ionin argued that the political structure which combines an amorphous mass and a rigid bureaucracy has continued until today, and should be replaced by a democratic system which will enable individuals and groups to flourish. Dudintsev (and this is a frequent theme of recent writings) argued that a one-sided concept of socialism has prevailed ever since the revolution; Soviet socialism must be rethought fundamentally.

Many other examples of such fundamental reconsideration of the Stalinist past have been published since the end of 1986. There is a ferment of ideas, often distinguished by originality and even profundity. Attempting to draw general conclusions from the major recent literary publications, Vladimir Bondarenko concluded that the root of the problem was the wish

to 'accelerate all biological processes. . . the belief that socialism is easily achieved, everyone has simply to want it, and that all the laws of nature are easily subordinated to the will of human beings, and in the lifetime of one generation "paradise" will be achieved':

> Of course, when the road to the fulfilment of the dream of the ages is blocked, in the opinion of certain social extremists, by 'dull and illiterate peasants', as in B. Mozhaev's novel, or by a band of 'trouble-making intellectuals', as in V. Dudintsev, by the priest from the village of Starozhilov, as in V. Tendryakov's novel, and similar people, getting in the way, conservative, patriarchal, they must be cleared out of the field like rotten weeds. . . The last mirage in which the people believed was the solemn promise in the sixties that the present generation of Soviet citizens would live under Communism. And they believed in it solemnly, as I can testify, because I believed in it myself.[14]

This great expansion of frankness and criticism has been strongly challenged by other writers. At the plenum of the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers, on April 27–8, 1987, several conservative writers, while presenting themselves as in favour of ***perestroika,*** strongly attacked the more critical reconsiderations of Soviet history. The most startling speech came from Proskurin. Before the plenum he had already criticised the film ***Repentance*** for its 'necrophilia', and at the plenum he enlarged on this:

> They are literally judging a corpse, from time to time digging it out of the ground, they are judging it for the sake of the living, at the same time destroying the living soul of these living people. Another corpse! More graves! What strange love is this? Was it really necessary for the young grandson of Varlam Aravidze, passionately seeking truth, to commit suicide, especially since he had already grasped the full horror of that truth. Wasn't this rather melodramatic event in a serious and really tragic film. . . needed solely so that his father would himself dig up the corpse of the grandfather (his own father!) and throw it from a steep ravine, to the noise of numberless crows seeking their share of the prey?. . . Ever since human beings became human beings, since the time of the most ancient civilisations, dishonouring the corpse of one's father has always been considered the worst blasphemy. Of course Varlarn's crimes were immeasurably great, shedding rivers of innocent blood (though was he alone guilty?), but it was not for his own son to throw him out of the grave to feed the crows. There is something anti-human, anti-moral in this, destroying the unwritten laws of millenia.

I refrain from comparing the quality of Proskurin's and Ionin's analysis of the film. . . Proskurin's fellow-thinker S. Vikulov went even further, criticising unwise revealing of the past:

> Some people have turned glasnost' solely towards the past, have decided that the time has come to settle accounts (with whom?), to blow the archive dust

> from the unknown and half-known, to hurl everything at the head of the ordinary person *(obyvatel')* avid for sensation, giving little thought to the ideological or moral side of the very fact of publication, or to how far it encourages or discourages optimism. . .

He conceded that these unpublished works of the past should be published, but—'should it be on the pages of magazines, usually with large circulations, mass circulations, magazines whose sails have traditionally been borne along by the wind of the present time—the wind which is felt by present-day people at the factory bench, ploughing the soil or flying space-ships?. . . Book circulation would be quite sufficient to meet the needs of bibliophiles, historians of literature and people who like to collect such things.' (Remember Mr. Griffith-Jones, who asked the jury in the Lady Chatterley case: 'Is it a book that you would even wish your wife or your servants to read?'.)

The most effective reply to these claims came in a telegram telephoned in by the distinguished Academician D.S. Likhachev, and read out at the end of the debate:

> 1. The 'literary spectrum' must be expanded, its possibilities, its genres. As many individual approaches as possible.
> 2. The accusation of necrophilia is an astonishing accusation against the whole of culture. The past does not die. Works not issued in the past must be published in mass-circulation journals.
> 3. The most important thing in literature now is repentance. It is no accident that the film ***Repentance*** is marching triumphantly across our screens.''

The reformist writers are of course determined to continue. 'If I allow myself to dream what awaits us in literature in the near future,' wrote Bondarenko, revealing what must be a nightmare to the more conservative, 'I come to the conclusion that after the works on **1941, 1937. . .** will follow no less complicated books on the years **1933,** just touched on in *Drachuny* by M. Alekseev. . . on **1930. . .** and on the first years of the storm. . . Step by step they will cleanse the grain from the chaff, the necessary from the accidental, the human from the machine-like and the contrived.'[76]

IV. HISTORY AND THE HISTORIANS

Until the summer of **1987** the historical journals continued to plod their blinkered way along well-worn safe paths. Many senior historians are evidently strongly opposed to the new wave in history. Afanas'ev, who initiated the campaign for major changes in Soviet history, claimed of Trapeznikov's cronies:

> Some of them continue today to 'lead' historical science and untiringly call for 'bold initiatives and. discussions'. At the session of the Department of History

> of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Corresponding Member P.V. Volobuev named some of these people and sharply criticised the state of our historical science. But his voice was quite a lonely one. On the other hand, some administrators issue calls 'not to hurry with *perestroika*'.[77]

After an earlier speech of Afanas'ev's was reported in Moscow *News*, F.M. Vaganov, the head of the State Archive Administration, and himself the author of a well-known history of the Right deviation, phoned the newspaper and told them that publishing the speech was a mistake. The editors invited him to express his own views in the paper, but he failed to do so. Three months later, however, a letter was brought to the paper signed by four minor historians occupying chairs of party history, with the statement that the text had been agreed with Vaganov (who had not signed the letter). The letter from the minor historians was a fierce and tedious defence of old-fashioned orthodoxy, and was rather contemptuously rebutted in a reply by Afanas'ev.[78] Note that the higher education establishment headed by Afanas'ev trains archivists for the State Archive Administration headed by Vaganov. . .

Afanas'ev is himself a specialist not on Soviet history but on the *Annales* school of French history, as more orthodox historians have frequently pointed out. In his struggle to open up the discussion, he organised a series of lectures by historians specialising on the Soviet period. On March 27 the first lecture, by Yu. S. Borisov, was attended by a huge crowd; and two weeks later, on April **13,** Borisov lectured again in the Central House of Literature. It was this second lecture which was followed by a remarkable discussion, widely reported in the Western press. This informal discussion was not reported in the Soviet press, but an apparently reliable transcript of the proceedings was published in an émigré Russian-language newspaper in Paris.[79] In the course of the discussion D.G. Yurasov, a 22-year old student, told the meeting that he had worked in the Central Archives of the October Revolution and in the special archive of the Supreme Court and the Military Collegium; and reported the remarkable data he had found there:

> There is a confidential letter from Gorkin, then chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR, addressed to Khrushchev. It is signed by Gorkin himself and by the head of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court General-Lieutenant Borisoglebskii. In this letter they report that from **1953** to **1957** inclusive about **600,000** people were rehabilitated. They are divided as follows: Military Tribunals rehabilitated about **200,000** people approximately, I don't remember the exact figures; regional, territorial and other courts also rehabilitated about **200,000** people; the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court about **48,000;** plenums of the Supreme Court, etc. are also listed, a total for **1963-7** of **612,500** people, this is absolutely precise. *Eidelman* [chairman of the meeting]: Posthumously? *Yurasov:* Simply rehabilitated, both posthumously and still alive. The Military Collegium rehabilitated **31,000** condemned to the supreme sentence, i.e. executed

by shooting. From 1935–40 the Military Collegium condemned a total of 50,000 people. In 1953–7 it rehabilitated 48,000, including 31,000 who had been executed.

Yurasov also supplied the meeting with other previously unknown information. He reported that all anti-Soviet crimes from 1929 onwards were recorded in a card index of the 1st Special Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, to which he had not had access. He gave horrifying details of the torture of the great Soviet theatre director Meyerhold; his left arm was broken and he was forced to drink urine. He confirmed that Beriya was not executed immediately he was deposed but on December 23, 1953, after a trial for rape as well as other crimes. Yurasov himself has a personal card index of 80,000 people who had been 'repressed', and has been collecting the data for nearly ten years (i.e. since the age of twelve!). He warned the audience that essential materials were fast disappearing. Materials from the end of the 1930s 'have already been partly destroyed, because the period for preservation has expired'; moreover, 'it was decided to transfer later material to the KGB, because there was nowhere to store it'.

Astonished by this impromptu speech, Borisov, the official lecturer, admitted that Yurasov 'knows much more than I do and, I expect, more than anyone else in the hall; I am very grateful to him'. Yurasov, asked after the meeting 'aren't you afraid, young man, that your sincerity won't do you any good?' replied 'Well, it will become clear whether a *perestroika* has really begun, or whether it's merely words again!'[80]

The Soviet press has since revealed that Yurasov is not alone among young people with an extraordinary thirst for knowledge about the Stalin period. Readers' letters about *Children of the Arbat* published in the literary newspaper included two from young amateur historians. A. Volovnik, aged 17, wrote from the town of Zhdanov: 'I got interested in this topic after reading K. Simonov's trilogy *The Living and the Dead*. This mentions orders signed by Stalin authorising the shooting of a certain section of political prisoners. Ever since then I have embarked on collecting data piece-meal about that really tragic time.' V. Petrochenko, aged 23, wrote from Moscow: 'Wanting to sort it all out independently, 1 began to question people from the older generation, and in the University library (I am a post-graduate in mathematics) I began to read the newspaper files for 1921–1934. Of course, care is needed here, not everything written in the newspapers should be believed, but after a certain experience one can realise what is true, and what is not entirely true.'[81] At Borisov's first lecture long before it began 'the corridors of the History-Archive Institute were overflowing and half of Nikol'skaya street was blocked by students from Moscow higher education establishments'.[82]

A further closed meeting on the subject of Stalin's repressions was

reported in *The Christian Science Monitor.*[83] The meeting, 'at a research institute attached to the Communist Party Central Committee' (the Institute of Marxism–Leninism?), was addressed by N. Shmelev, a senior member of the Institute of the USA and Canada. A verbatim record has not been available to me. According to the American newspaper report, Shmelev claimed, in the words of the reporter, that '17 million people passed through Stalin's labour camps and 5 million families were deported during Stalin's collectivisation of agriculture'; the dates covered are not stated, but the latter figure, if it refers only to the early 1930s, is much higher than seems warranted by the available data.

The published exchanges between Afanas'ev and his opponents, and the unofficial reports of lectures, attracted a great deal of attention, in the West as well as in the USSR. They did not, however, involve the main body of Soviet historians. But, following Yakovlev's report to the Academy of Sciences (see p. 40 above), on April 29 a 'round table' in the Institute of Marxism–Leninism was attended by many prominent historians; Afanas'ev, Volobuev and Danilov were among those who spoke.[84] The opening statement by V.V. Zhuravlev stressed the need for a new approach in rather general terms, calling for 'a profound examination' of the inter-relationship between industrialisation, collectivisation and the cultural revolution in the 1930s, and for a new approach to the 'cult of personality':

> **These problems were examined until approximately the middle of the 1960s. But what was done then looks somewhat different today. We must now have a different point of view on these questions.**

The report of the meeting in the journal of party history explained that many participants stressed 'the necessity above all of eliminating dogmatism. . . which is not simply devotion to out-of-date stereotypes, not merely stagnation of thought, but also non-acceptance (sometimes of an active kind) of new views and approaches. . ., dogmatism, deep-rooted in historical science, is one of the major causes of the decline in its authority, and the reduced interest in it of Soviet people from school and student days onwards'. Volobuev, one of the major victims of the recrudescence of dogmatism in the Brezhnev years, bitterly complained that the healthy developments in history between 1956 and the mid and late 1960s 'were interrupted by incompetent and authoritative interference—people whose scientific equipment did not go beyond the framework of the *History of the CPSU(b): Short Course* [the Stalinist party history published in 1938] enforced dogmatic concepts'.

Several major speeches dealt with the Stalin period. Danilov condemned 'fear of the truth' and commented that novelists such as Mozhaev had given 'a more accurate picture of the excesses and mistakes at the beginning of the 1930s then we historians have given', and Danilov also insisted that

the views of Trotsky and Bukharin must be given 'an objective and convincing evaluation'. According to Danilov, one of the unfortunate consequences of the 'huge and undesirable lacunae' in the account of the past presented by historians was that non-historians had formed 'misunderstandings' (*lozhnye* svyazi—literally 'false connections') concerning Soviet history. He instanced the statement by Academician Tikhonov that the kulak class was completely eliminated by the October revolution.

V.S. Lel'chuk, author of the standard history of the Soviet chemical industry, and notable for the originality of the views he expressed even in the Brezhnev years, argued that the upheaval at the end of the 1920s had deep roots 'which must not be ascribed only to the "demonic" qualities of individual personalities'. Lel'chuk pointed out that 'a kind of struggle between adherents of the war communist direction and supporters of the continuation of NEP took place in the mid-1920s'. During the struggle 'views and positions changed—some moved to the left, others to the right'. In 1923 [the time of the 'scissors crisis'] an attempt was already made to industrialise at the expense of the peasantry; in the literature this was blamed on the Trotskyist Pyatakov, but in fact, according to Lel'chuk (here he exaggerates), this attitude was then shared by the majority. By 1927 the line against NEP, advocated by Trotsky, had become predominant. According to Lel'chuk, this was explained by a variety of factors: the USSR was weakened by the loss of the industrial areas of the Baltic and by mass emigration; the kulaks were becoming stronger; the external situation was more unfavourable; the idea of 'catching up and overtaking' the west grew stronger among the working class and in the party and state apparatus. Lel'chuk drew the conclusion that 'to believe that the idea of "catching up and overtaking" was imposed only from above would be wrong'.

During the debate V.I. Kulikov argued that 'the sources of the formation of the braking mechanism [the slowing-down of economic development in the 1970s] are to be found in the 1920s and 1930s', while E.V. Klopov sought to assess the high price which was paid for the abandonment of NEP at the end of the 1920s, listing supercentralisation, 'the complete destruction of the economic mechanism', and 'an immoderate waste of natural, material and human resources, and social, ideological and moral losses'.

Summing up the discussion, Zhuravlev struck a warning note. He criticised those who argued that 'everything in the process of collectivisation was bad' and that 'all opponents and oppositionists were thought up by Stalin'; the old dogmatism must not be replaced by a new dogmatism which asserted that 'everything accomplished by historical science up to the present day is useless'.

Following this discussion, the debate among historians continued. In *Izvestiya*, May 3, 1987, S.V. Tyutyukhin argued that there was a 'serious

gap between the interest of our people in history, which is growing and continues to grow, and the ability of professional historians to satisfy this interest'. He recommended that an all-Union conference of historians should be called, the first for 25 years, and urged the publication of a popular historical journal and the establishment of a Historical Society of USSR. He also proposed that older historians should be granted higher pensions and make way for younger ones.[85]

In contrast the director of the Institute of Party History attached to the Ukrainian Central Committee, in an article in the Ukrainian party newspaper, rebutted Tikhonov's criticism of de-kulakisation, claiming that 'the kulak class was the last exploiting class in our country, and V.I. Lenin predicted the inevitability of civil war with it in the specific historical conditions of our country'. He also strongly attacked Afanas'ev, singling out his use of the phrase 'the Stalinist period *(epokha)'* to describe the 1930s, pointing out that this 'contradicts scientific concepts on the essence of revolutionary transformations in our country expressed in the programme documents of the party and realised in practice'. Finally, he objected to proposals to review the decisions of the 1930s against M. Hrushevsky and other Ukrainian historians and to republish their

A few weeks later the deputy director of the same Institute, while making some criticisms of Afanas'ev and Burlatsky, called for a thorough re-examination of the role of Bukharin by historians, and strongly criticised historians for lagging behind the writers by failing to undertake a serious analysis of the personality and activity of Stalin.[87]

The division among historians was particularly evident when the discussion about Afanas'ev's outspoken views was resumed in July 1987. In an article in the newspaper *Sovetskaya kul'tura*, entitled 'Do Not Idealise but Do Not Dramatise', F.M. Vaganov and A.N. Ponomarev complained that Afanas'ev and his sympathisers, 'on the pretext of *perestroika,* propose as a priority task re-examination and re-thinking of the whole history of the Communist Party and of Soviet society', and claimed that in fact the party programme was carried out 'firmly and faithfully by the party borh during V.I. Lenin's life and in all subsequent stages of our history'. They indignantly repudiated Afanas'ev's view that 'thinking ceased for twenty years', pointing out that 'over ten thousand learned works' (!) were published by historians in this period, including numerous large collective works. The article offered some specific criticisms of the interpretation of the 1917 Revolution advocated by Volobuev, I.F. Gindin and others, but, while admitting that there were 'weaknesses and faults' in historical studies, failed to express its point of view on any of the specific issues of Soviet history which are now so widely discussed in the USSR. Instead, in an astonishing abdication of the responsibility of historians for their own calling, the authors argued that the main fault

of Soviet historians was their failure to understand present-day society, and even recommended 'a fundamental *perestroika* of research':

> **All social scientists should for a time leave their studies and travel to collective farms. state farms, industrial enterprises, soviets, schools. . . and study the processes of revolutionary transformation which are taking place.[88]**

The editors of the newspaper evidently lack any sympathy for Vaganov and Ponomarev, and they elicited a vigorous reply from *G.* Volkov. This deplored the ignorance of Soviet history among the young, giving the example of a student who knew nothing about Stalin's police-chief Beriya. Volkov reminded his readers of the legend of the young slaves, related by the Kirgiz author Chingis Aitmatov in his novel *A Day Lasts Longer than a Century.* In the legend the heads of the slaves were shaved and covered with a tight hoop of fresh camel skin; when the skin dried out, the hoop tightened, the slaves suffered torments in the baking sun, lost their memories for ever, could not even remember their tribe or their clan, and became 'hard-working and submissive'.[89]

The Vaganov–Ponomarev article also attracted a whole page of readers' letters. Two letters from a carpenter and a 'veteran of labour' supported Vaganov–Ponomarev, but fourteen criticised them. A policeman on behalf of his colleagues criticised other policemen who were nostalgic about the days of Beriya when everything was decided quickly and there was no-one the public could complain to. One correspondent rudely recommended that Vaganov and Ponomarenko should take their own advice, leave their studies and go to collective farms—'but not for a time, for ever!'[90]

Even by the summer of **1987** little change had been made in the historical establishment; exceptions were new appointments in the party Institute of Marxism–Leninism, including Zhuravlev, and the appointment of Afanas'ev as Rector (Vice-Chancellor) of the History Archive Institute. Academician Fedoseev, veteran head of the Social Sciences Department of the Academy of Sciences, Khromov, the director of the Institute of the History of the USSR, and the editors of the major historical journals all remained in office. The major historical journals hardly reflected the fresh approaches to Soviet history. An exception was an article in the party history journal by V.A. Kozlov, 'History and *Perestroika',* under the general heading 'Polemical Notes'. Kozlov admitted that many historians found the personal responsibility placed on them to express their own views a 'heavy burden'; 'we still often await directives and instructions, we want the "boundaries of the permitted" to be determined for us'. He argued that Soviet history must be not only investigated but also taught in terms of a search for the truth:

> Not only historical research but also the teaching of history can be turned into a continuous and fascinating search for the truth. I conceive of 'methodological games' in student lecture-rooms, when the study of, for example, the position of the Right deviation or the 'Left Communists' in the period of the Brest–Litovsk Treaty [February–March *1918* peace negotiations with Germany] are studied not by learning off settled formulas and appraisals, but by collective critical analysis of the proposed alternative path."

The division among historians was reflected at this time in the great variation in the critical quality of Soviet biographical articles about leading personalities on the occasion of their anniversaries. Some articles, while containing interesting material, followed convention in carefully avoiding critical periods and events: see for example, the full-page biography of the senior economic official V.I. Mezhlauk (1893–1938), which hardly hinted at any criticism of Soviet economic policy of the 1930s, and did not even mention that Mezhlauk was 'repressed'.[92] Newspaper articles by historians on major events of Soviet history have also often displayed a similar blandness; an example is the presentation of industrialisation on a whole page of *Pravda* in July 1987, including an article by the usually thoughtful historian V. Lel'chuk (jointly with A. Kolesnichenko).[93] Other articles were appearing at this time quite different in tone and quality. The traditional practice in discussing the lives of Old Bolsheviks who were not oppositionists was to praise them unreservedly. But an article by Yu. Feofanov about Krylenko, People's Commissar for Justice for many years, while generally positive in its assessment, criticised him for denying the necessity for absolute objectivity on the part of the Soviet courts, and for supporting the reduction of the right of the defence.[94] V.P. Danilov similarly criticised Krylenko for declaring at the Industrial Party trial that confessions were 'the best clue in all circumstances'.[95] Feofanov's article also presented an unusually frank account of Krylenko's arrest, and of the false charges against him:

> He was arrested on January *31, 1938,* on Yezhov's order. He was accused of links with an anti-Soviet organisation of Rights, allegedly headed by Bukharin; and of establishing in the judicial agencies a wrecking organisation and carrying out disruptive activity; and of personally recruiting *30* people—.
>
> It is difficult nowadays to conceive how that happened at that time. In the materials of the case we read:
>
> On March *3, 1938,* Nikolai Vasil'evich confessed that he had participated since *1930* in an anti-soviet organisation and had engaged in wrecking.
>
> On April *3* of the same year he recognised that he had struggled against Lenin before the revolution, and immediately after the revolution had thought up plans of struggle against the party with Bukharin, Pyatakov and Preobrazhensky.
>
> One can only guess how these 'confessions' were obtained.
>
> On July *29, 1938,* N.V. Krylenko was sentenced to be shot.
>
> The protocol of this 'trial' takes up *19* lines and the court sat for *20* minutes.

Moreover, leading figures previously regarded as politically unacceptable and even unmentionable are now being rehabilitated, or re-rehabilitated, and commemorated in informative anniversary biographies. A long article dealt with the life of N.I. Muralov, a former supporter of Trotsky, who was executed in 1937 and rehabilitated by the Supreme Court on January 30, 1987. The article quoted the opinion of the old Bolshevik S.R. Aralov that Muralov joined the Left opposition as 'a consequence of his protest against the violation of Leninist norms of party life', and cited at length his opposition speech at the XV Party Congress in December 1927, when he attacked the decline of party democracy following the death of Lenin: 'Previously,' Muralov said, 'we used to convene our congresses without restraint, and. . . in our party environment, in our higher party organisations, we criticised, not even fearing to criticise our leader cde. Lenin.'[96]

An even more remarkable article, in a popular illustrated magazine, dealt with the career of F.F. Raskol'nikov (1892–1939), revolutionary hero, who refused to return from Paris to Moscow in 1938–9 and died under somewhat mysterious circumstances in a Paris hospital in September 1939.[97] Raskol'nikov was posthumously rehabilitated by the Supreme Court on July 10, 1963, and articles about him then appeared in the Soviet press at that time after over two decades of silence.'' After Khrushchev's fall, at a social science conference on September 5, 1965, S.P. Trapeznikov falsely accused Raskol'nikov of 'always being an active Trotskyist ideologically', attacked him for failing to return from abroad, and denounced him as 'a traitor who collaborated with Whiteguard and Fascist filth'. Raskol'nikov was in effect 'unrehabilitated' for a further 20-year period.

The recent article on Raskol'nikov sympathised with his decision to remain abroad and justified the appearance of his famous 'Open Letter to Stalin' in the émigré press on the grounds that Raskol'nikov merely handed his letter to the French press agency Havas, and the émigré press chose to reproduce it. Most remarkable of all, the Soviet article reproduced extensive passages from Raskol'nikov's letters to Stalin of October 18, 1938, and October 17, 1939. In the latter letter Raskol'nikov attacked the trials of 1937–8 as 'surpassing medieval witch-trials' and denounced Stalin for 'compelling your followers to wade, in anguish and disgust, through pools of blood shed by their comrades'. Stalin was accused of disrupting the Red Army, depriving 'the writer, the scholar and the artist of even the minimum of inner freedom':

> **Your crazy Bacchanalia cannot last for long. The list of your crimes is endless. The list of your victims is endless, they cannot be enumerated. Sooner or later the Soviet people will put you in the dock as a traitor to socialism and the revolution, the chief wrecker, a real enemy of the people, the organiser of famine and judicial forgeries.**[illegible]

In some important respects the article is circumspect in its citations from Raskol'nikov's letter. It omits his accusation that Stalin had destroyed the party, and his swingeing attack on the 'enslavement' of Soviet factory workers; it does not tell us that Raskol'nikov impugned Stalin for making 'privileged groups' the social basis of his power, or that he denounced Stalin's socialism as 'just as remote from real socialism as the tyranny of your personal dictatorship is without anything in common with the dictatorship of the proletariat'.[100] But in spite of these omissions the publication of this letter in a popular magazine with a circulation of 1,500,000 copies is an extraordinary move towards frankness.

While the article on Muralov was not by an historian but by his grandson, a sculptor, the article on Raskol'nikov was by V. Polikarpov, an historian of the revolutionary period working in the Institute of the History of the USSR. The new possibilities for professional historians to enter previously forbidden territory were further revealed by articles published in the weeks following the July plenum. At the end of July, the literary newspaper published an interview with Yu. A. Polyakov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences and head of a department in the Institute of the History of the USSR.[101] Polyakov, author of an outstanding study of the transition from War Communism to NEP published in 1967,[102] transferred his personal research to historical demography and other topics in the 1970s, and for understandable reasons failed to publish any substantial work on mainstream Soviet history. In his interview he called for much greater frankness—the historian 'must not in any case avoid sharp problems, round off corners, or knowingly write untruths or half-truths'. Polyakov, taking the same line as Danilov (see p. 65 above), claimed that 'the failure of historians to publish objective studies has left the field open for widely-read literary publications which harm historical education by their lack of concepts, numerous factual mistakes, primitivism and vulgarisation of the past'. Polyakov called for much less caution on the part of editors of historical journals, whose practice had been to 'remove everything at all doubtful', and in a striking passage anticipated a great widening of historical debate:

> It seems to me that most scholars are of one mind in realising history must extend its boundaries, and are ready to remove the cap of invisibility from the facts of the past. Only the sleepiest retrogrades are against this. Dogmatists are still quite powerful, and as before see their main task as paraphrasing and superfically commenting on party documents. On the other hand, critics who doubt almost every achievement of Soviet power are more and more active. I have no doubt that with the frank expression of views—which previously did not exist in practice—the polarisation of views will increase. The main discussions are ahead.

A few days after the appearance of the Polyakov interview, V.P. Danilov published an article in *Pravda* on 'Causes and Lessons of Collectivisation'.[103]

The article was accompanied by three uncritical if mildly interesting reminiscences by veteran party cadres who worked in collective farms, and was illustrated by a bearded peasant waving enthusiastically and shouting 'Long live the collective farm!' It was less frank and critical than many of the stories and commentaries by writers and journalists. It failed to mention the famine of 1932–3, merely referring laconically to 'the situation in the countryside which had developed towards the end of the first five-year plan'. It made no criticism of the second wave of collectivisation and de-kulakisation in 1931 (the photograph of the bearded peasant was dated 1931. . .). It referred in entirely positive terms to the work of the political departments established in the Machine-Tractor Stations in 1933–4 to enforce order in the countryside. But the article also strongly criticised the closing down of the agricultural marketing and credit co-operatives at the end of 1929, and the abrupt transition to collectivisation: 'for the main mass of the peasantry comprehensive collectivisation, developed at the end of 1929 and beginning of 1930, amounted to a direct transition from small-scale to large-scale production, without passing through the preparatory "school" of the primary stages of collectivisation'. This contradicts the orthodox argument that the basis for collectivisation had been satisfactorily established in the 1920s. Moreover, Danilov also drew the more general conclusion that 'the main source of the difficulties in establishing and developing collective farms was the violation of Lenin's well-known directive that collective farms can be vital and stable only if they are established voluntarily'. The publication in the authoritative party newspaper of this article by Danilov—whose book on collectivisation was withdrawn from publication in the late 1960s—is a notable event.

An apparently minor review of Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat*, published in *Izvestiya*, is perhaps the most significant of the recent articles.[104] The review is by Aleksandr Latsis, son of the old Bolshevik and Cheka official M.I. Latsis (1888–1938), arrested in 1937.[105] While Latsis is not a professional historian, his review for the first time since the Khrushchev period carefully applied the canons of historical criticism to major sensitive political events previously dealt with only in literary form. Latsis praised the novel for its fine description of the effect of the terror on the families of the accused ('in the 1960s and 1970s. . . my mother still trembled with her whole body when someone suddenly rang the door-bell. . . To preserve her peace of mind, I permanently disconnected the door-bell'); but he then proceeded to examine carefully the treatment of the murder of Kirov in order to show its unreliability. Latsis devoted particular attention to three issues. First, the famous 'Remarks' by Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov, on draft history textbooks; the 'Remarks' were dated 'August 9, 1934', three months before Kirov's death. According to Rybakov, Kirov was present with Stalin and Zhdanov, but did not seriously participate in the preparation of the 'Remarks', because he lacked interest

in history. But, Latsis responded, Rybakov's account ignores the debate of the 1960s in which some historians claimed that the 'Remarks', first published in *Pravda* on January 27, 1936, were a forgery, designed to present the Stalin–Kirov relationship in the weeks before Kirov's death as having been friendly; these historians claimed that Kirov was away in Kazakhstan at the time. Other historians claimed that the reminiscences of a dentist showed that Kirov was in fact with Stalin in the South at the time; but the authenticity of the dentist's reminiscences is in turn in doubt. According to Latsis, the discussion of the 1960s was broken off, and the matter remains unresolved. In any case, Latsis pointed out, Rybakov's account is false because Kirov was intensely interested in history.

The second issue taken up by Latsis was Rybakov's claim that Politburo member Ordzhonikidze warned his friend Kirov not to take the fatal train journey to Leningrad which was followed by his murder. Latsis argued that Ordzhonikidze was in Tbilisi at the time, and that in any case, as Kirov was not murdered until two days after his return to Leningrad, whether he caught a particular train was beside the point.

The third issue discussed by Latsis was Rybakov's claim that Kaganovich supported the execution of various oppositionists in January 1933, but was opposed by Kirov. Latsis argued that the execution of senior party members was not placed on the agenda at all until after the pretext provided by Kirov's murder.

Such careful dissection of an incident in a novel may seem to be pedantic. But, in the absence of proper investigation by historians, Rybakov's lively account is likely to be generally believed. Moreover, Rybakov himself claimed that, while his Stalin monologues were an imaginative reconstruction, 'not a single action by Stalin in the novel is invented, they are all supported by evidence'.[106] The review by Latsis, whether or not its particular observations are justified, marked the renewal of historical study of the major events surrounding the person of Stalin.

While these battles are continuing, all historians are agreed on one issue: the archives. On December 9, 1986, a joint session of the bureau of the Department of History of the Academy and the collegium of the State Archive Administration was attended by Vaganov. A resolution pointed to 'many difficulties and unresolved issues', including 'difficulty for researchers in access to archival funds', agreed to specific measures, and also agreed that the fulfilment of the resolution would be examined at a further joint session in 1988.[107] A few months later it was reported that 767,000 out of 1,109,000 items on restricted access in the central state archives would now be available to scholars, including items from the

archival funds of the Central Statistical Administration, the State Bank and the State Planning Committee; access to these funds was previously very restricted.'" Another report, from the military archives, claimed that most restrictions on the publication of documents from the Second World War had been lifted.[109] Historians, including western historians, who seek to use Soviet archives, await the outcome with interest and hope. It should be noted that access of British scholars to material in the state archives relating to the Soviet period, while still quite limited, has considerably improved ever since 1981, especially after the archival protocol signed in March 1984 between the head of the State Archive Administration, F.M. Vaganov, and the British Academic Committee for Liaison with Soviet Archives.[110] *Glasnost'* in the 1980s, like 'de-Stalinisation' in the 1950s, does not have a simple chronology applicable to every aspect of Soviet activity.

V. SOME NOTES OF CAUTION

These are exciting times for the western historian concerned with Soviet history. A new continent of knowledge and ideas is taking shape, month by month, week by week. We need to scrutinise it with a critical eye. The fictionalised history by well-informed authors contains circumstantial accounts of events of great significance of which we have almost no other knowledge. Thus *Children of the Arbat* presents clashes and conversation at the top level in the party in the mid-1930s. But when we have some information about particular events it is clear that the author is presenting' a one-sided picture. The Syrtsov–Lominadze affair of 1930 is reduced to a disagreement between Stalin and Lominadze about China (evidently the Canton débâcle of 1927), and the clash of opinion about economic policy and political practice is not mentioned. Major disputes are reduced to Stalin's suspiciousness and sensitivity. When we allow this powerful novel to influence our understanding of its subject, we must bear its one-sidedness in mind. See also the summary of Latsis' article, p. 71 above.

Nor are non-fiction articles providing us with a new utterly reliable objectivity. The onslaught on Soviet statistics by V. Selyunin arid G. Khanin is a valuable and serious piece of work."' But it presents as extremely reliable Gerchuk's index of industrial production prepared in Narkomfin in the 1920s, although the Gerchuk index was based on a small number of products, underweighted machinery and omitted armaments.[112]

I need hardly add that even if all the information and analysis from Soviet writers and historians was presented in accordance with the highest criteria of objectivity, their conclusions, and their selection of the data, are naturally strongly biased by their life experience, by their reaction against the restrictions placed on knowledge and thought about the period before 1985, and by their perception of the urgent present needs of their

society. If the Stalin period was perceived in 1970–85 through the eyes of the promoted industrial worker, the complacent official and the secret policeman, the present perception is, perhaps, that of the scientist and the intellectual, and of the peasant as understood by the intellectual. But there is an important difference between 1970–85 and now. ***Then*** Soviet publications crudely omitted and censored facts, and lied about the past in order to present us with their 'truth'. ***Now*** the barriers of censorship and the possibilities of distortion are much weaker; the discussion is much more closely related to the evidence. Moreover, rival views about such major questions as the 'great break-through' are now openly presented. Soviet society is greatly extending and deepening its knowledge of the past. While we must restrain our excitement a little, students of Soviet history—of all schools of thought—are justified in going about their work with a song in their heart.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

How frank and far-reaching are these discussions of the Stalin period likely to become? The statements by Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and Grigor'ev, and by historians recently promoted to senior positions such as Zhuravlev, have attempted to set a certain framework to the discussion. The tsarist past should not be idealised; the Bolshevik revolution should be regarded as a positive event in Russian and world history, opening up the path to the construction of a socialist society. Moreover, the discussion is, at least formally, set within a strictly Leninist framework: all the participants refer to Lenin's actions and Lenin's ideas with unmitigated enthusiasm.

Within this Leninist framework, however, the boundaries are wide. Even on the sensitive issue of Lenin, very different aspects of Lenin's thought and action are stressed now than in the past, and it is acknowledged (indeed emphasised) that Lenin learned from his experience and his mistakes. Moreover, the deep-rooted convention that all decisions of party congresses, the party Central Committee and the Soviet government have always been correct has been explicitly abandoned. Neither War Communism nor the New Economic Policy are idealised; the roots of the errors of the 1930s—and the 1970s—are sought in these periods as well as in the heritage from tsarism. Whether the shift from the New Economic Policy to forced industrialisation and collectivisation at the end of the 1920s was a fundamental mistake is treated as an open question by a few historians, and by many writers and journalists; such leading figures as Burlatsky present the 'Rightist' alternative with sympathy. The economic, social and political nature of the Stalin regime and the factors leading to its establishment are being discussed in very broad terms.

What limits may be placed on this discussion are not yet clear. The views of the Right are reported more frankly and sympathetically than the

views of Trotsky and the Left, who offered fundamental criticisms of Soviet social structure which may well be regarded as impermissible: Gorbachev has already warned against 'social demagogues' who criticise the cadres.

Nor is it clear how fully the doctrine of 'no blank pages' will be applied. Quite frank references to the famine of 1932–3 and the repressions under Stalin from 1929 onwards now appear in the Soviet press. But no serious attempt has been made to investigate these tragedies in any detail, or to assess the number of people affected.

The creative resolution of these questions of fact and of analysis rests with the historians. With very few exceptions, historians have so far displayed little boldness and imagination in their discussion of the Soviet past. Even in a more favourable environment, the exacting craft of the historian does not so easily lend itself to the free-ranging reconstruction of the past undertaken by writers and film-makers. And in the Soviet Union the training and experience of professional historians—except during the Khrushchev decade—have discouraged openmindedness. More than one historian has recently complained that historians, unlike writers of fiction, do not seem to have controversial manuscripts tucked away in their desk drawers ready for publication.[113]

But the social and intellectual climate in which the professional historians operate has vastly changed in the past twelve months. The Soviet political leaders—or at least the most influential of them—have concluded that the new type of socialist economy vitally necessary to the USSR cannot be achieved, perhaps cannot even be envisaged, unless people think more independently, and participate actively in decisions about their work and society. These considerations have provided the context in which writers, journalists and film-makers, and sociologists and economists, have transformed the story of the Soviet past from a boring and pedantic topic into a central concern of the general public, and a central aspect of Soviet re-thinking and reappraisal. The openness, frankness and profundity of the Soviet discussions of January–August 1987—a far more fundamental shift than occurred under Khrushchev—confront the historical profession with a serious challenge. The crucial issue for Soviet historians in 1988 is how far they will be able to play their part in the Soviet mental revolution.

NOTES

1. *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4, 1956.
2. See, for example, *Kommunist*, no. 3, 1966.
3. *Sovetskaya kul'tura*, March 21, 1987.
4. E. G. Gimpel'son, *Voennyi kommunizm: printsipy, praktika, ideologiya* (Moscow, 1973).
5. V.P. Danilov, *Sovetskaya dokolkhoznaya derevnya: naselenie, zemlepol'zovanie, khozyaistvo* (Moscow, 1977), and *Sovetskaya dokolkhoznaya derevnya:*

sotsial'naya struktum, sotsial'nye otnosheniya (Moscow, 1979).
6. *Protokoly prezidiuma Gosplana za* 1921–1922 *gody* (Moscow, 1979), vols. 1, 2 (i) and 2 (ii).
7. M. Alekseev, *Drachuny* (Moscow, 1982).
8. *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika,* vol. xxiii (1983), pp. 456–9.
9. *Pravda,* May 9, 1985.
10. *Izvestiya,* September 21, 1985.
11. *Pravda,* February 6, 1986.
12. See S.G. Wheatcroft's account in *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies,* vol. 1, no. 1, 1987, p. 131.
13. *Pravda,* February 14, 1987.
14. *Vestnik Akademii Nauk,* no. 6, 1987, pp. 61, 68–70.
15. *Literaturnaya gazeta,* April 29, 1987 (this newspaper is henceforth referred to as *LG).*
16. *Kommunist,* no. 7, May 1987, p. 67.
17. *Sovetskaya kul'tura,* June 20, 1987.
18. *Sovetskaya kul'tura,* July 7, 1987; he has made more than one statement of this kind (see, for example, *Pravda,* March 24, 1987).
19. *Pravda,* July 15, 1987.
20. The fullest account of the rehabilitation appears in *Moscow News,* August 16, 1987.
21. An émigré 'Toiling Peasant Party', with branches in Prague, Paris, Estonia and the Far East, published a journal in Prague at this time (see *Vestnik krest'yanskoi Rossii,* no. 13–4 (25–6)); at the end of 1930 it published a manifesto denying the guilt of those arrested in the USSR but calling for a peasant war to remove the Communists from the villages (see *ibid.* no. 8 (20)). Al'bert Vainshtein, Kondratiev's deputy, whom I met in Moscow in 1963 and 1967, told me that the first he heard of the 'Toiling Peasant Party' was from the lips of his OGPU interrogator.
22. *Ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu,* vol. 2 (1981), p. 154; the chapter concerned was written by I.B. Berkhin.
23. *Moscow News,* August 16, 1987.
24. *LG,* July 8, 1987.
25. *LG,* July 29, 1987.
26. A. Voznesensky, in *LG,* May 6, 1987.
27. *LG,* August 26. 1987.
28. *LG,* June 10,1987.
29. *LG,* June 18,1986.
30. A. Misharin and V. Rozov in *LG,* May 6, 1987.
31. Krupin in *LG,* May 6, 1987.
32. *Moscow News,* February 8, 1987.
33. *Novyi mir,* no. 2, 1987, p. 67.
34. *LG,* May 20,1987.
35. A. Egorov in *LG,* June 3, 1987.
36. *Znamya,* no. 4, 1987.
37. *Pravda,* February 26,1986.
38. *Moskovskie novosti,* November 9, 1986.
39. *Moscow News,* June 14, 1987.
40. *LG,* July 22, 1987.
41. *LG,* April 15. 1987.
42. *Moscow News,* July 12, 1987.
43. See R.W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive: the Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture,* 1929–1930 (London, 1980), pp. 129–31, 152–5.

44. *Moscow News,* August 9, 1987.
45. *LG,* May 14, 1986.
46. *LG,* April 8, 1987.
47. *Znamya,* no. 4, 1987, p. 183.
48. *LG,* February 11, 1987.
49. *LG,* September 2, 1987.
50. *Zubr* (literally, the Auroch—i.e. the Dinosaur, the affectionate term by which Timofeev-Resovsky was known): *Novyi mir,* nos. 1–3, 1987.
51. The Arbat is an old street in Moscow; the characters in the novel lived in a block of flats on this street. The novel appeared in *Druzhba narodov,* nos. 4–6, 1987.
52. *Neva,* no. 3, 1987, pp. 46–7; this long novel is serialised in nos. 1–4.
53. *Oktyabr',* no. 4, 1987, pp. 48–68.
54. *Nash sovremennik,* no. 3, 1987, pp. 124–36; the stories are dated 1969–1981.
55. *Yunost',* nos. 3 and 4, 1987.
56. *LG,* June 17, 1987.
57. *Pravda,* June 27, 1945.
58. *LG,* June 18, 1986.
59. *LG,* March 11, 1987.
60. *Novyi mir,* no. 4, 1987.
61. *LG,* May 13, 1987.
62. *LG,* June 3, 1987.
63. *LG,* February 11, 1987.
64. *Moskovskaya pravda,* May 7, 1987.
65. *LG,* March 11, 1987.
66. *Oktyabr',* no. 4, 1987, p. 204.
67. *Nauka i zhizn',* no. 4, 1987, pp. 54–65.
68. *Znamya,* nos. 10 and 11, 1986.
69. A. Bek, *Novoe naznachenie* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1977); details of the banning of the book in the USSR appear on the dust jacket.
70. *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya,* no. 3, 1987, pp. 62–72.
71. See Wheatcroft, *op. cit.,* pp. 101–2.
72. *Neva,* no. 3, 1987, p. 4.
73. *Neva,* no. 3, 1987, pp. 31, 35.
74. *LG,* May 20, 1987.
75. The speeches at the plenum and Likhachev's telegram all appear in *LG,* May 6, 1987.
76. *LG,* May 20,1987.
77. *Sovetskaya kul'tura,* March 21, 1987.
78. *Moscow News,* May 10, 1987.
79. *Russkaya mysl'* (Paris). May 29, 1987.
80. Many further details of this meeting are supplied in Wheatcroft, *op. cit.,* pp. 110–8.
81. *LG,* August 19, 1987.
82. *Russkaya mysl'* (Paris), May 29, 1987.
83. P. Quinn-Judge, in *The Christian Science Monitor,* June 16, 1987; the article is reproduced in the weekly *Christian Science Monitor,* June 22–28, 1987.
84. The report appeared in *Voprosy istorii KPSS,* no. 7, 1987, pp. 137–52 (this is the July issue, which became available in Britain in mid-August); it is signed by L.K. Vinogradov.
85. *Izvestiya,* May 3, 1987.
86. V.I. Yurchuk, in *Pravda Ukrainy,* June 9, 1987.
87. V. Mel'nichenko, in *Pravda Ukrainy,* July 31, 1987.
88. *Sovetskaya kul'tura,* July 4, 1987; at the discussion on April 29, 1987, Vaganov

similarly 'called on scholars to concentrate all their attention on the study of contemporary problems' (*Voprosy istorii KPSS,* no. 7, 1987, p. 151). Ponomarev is deputy director of the Institute of Party History for Moscow and region.

89. *Sovetskaya kul'tura,* July 4, 1987.
90. *Sovetskaya kul'tura,* July 28, 1987.
91. *Voprosy istorii KPSS,* no. 5, 1987, pp. 110-22.
92. A. Nikonov, in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,* no. 28, July 1987.
93. *Pravda,* July 26, 1987.
94. *Izvestiya,* August 11, 1987; Feofanov wrongly claimed, however, that the early Soviet trials, including the trial of the Socialist Revolutionaries in 1922, were carried out 'with the observation of all the democratic norms'.
95. *Moscow News,* August 16, 1987.
96. *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya,* July 5, 1987: for a more extensive account of this article, see Wheatcroft, *op. cit.,* pp. 129-31.
97. V. Polikarpov, in *Ogonek,* no. 26, June 1987, pp. 4-7; Polikarpov reports that he suffered from inflammation of the lungs which turned into meningitis which proved fatal; but émigré accounts claim that he was poisoned (see preface by B. Pearce to F.F. Raskolnikov, *Kronstadt and Petrograd in 1917* (London, 1982), p. xi).
98. See, for example, V.S. Zaitsev in *Voprosy istorii KPSS,* no. 12, 1963.
99. *Ogonek,* no. 26, June 1987, p. 6.
100. The letter appears in full in Raskolnikov, *op. cit.,* pp. 345-56.
101. *LG,* July 29, 1987.
102. Yu. A. Polyakov, *Perekhod k nepu i sovetskoe krest'yanstvo* (Moscow, 1967).
103. *Pravda,* August 9, 1987. The omissions I describe were not present in later articles by Danilov.
104. *Izvestiya,* August 17, 1987.
105. For Latsis' role in establishing the Cheka terror during the Civil War see R. Medvedev, *Let History Judge* (London, 1971), pp. 388-90, and G. Leggett, *The Cheka. Lenin's Political Police* (London, 1981), pp. 266-8.
106. *LG,* August 19, 1987.
107. *Voprosy istorii,* no. 2, 1987, pp. 128-9.
108. *Izvestiya,* May 22, 1987.
109. *Izvestiya,* July 17, 1987.
110. In August 1987, the Soviet archives journal published under my editorship notes sent to me by Maurice Dobb on a Gosplan meeting attended by Keynes in September 1925 (*Sovetskie arkhivy,* no. 4, 1987, pp. 97-8); this little step towards *glasnost',* and towards collaboration between British and Soviet historians, was agreed in principle with Vaganov and the editor of the journal as early as October 1984.
111. *Novyi mir,* no. 2, 1987, pp. 181-201.
112. The construction of the index is discussed by Ya. P. Gerchuk in *Voprosy kon"yunktury,* ed. N.D. Kondratiev, vol. 2 (i) (Moscow, 1926), pp. 79-106; see also *Ekonomicheskii byulleten' Kon"yunkturnogo Instituta,* no. 2, 1926, pp. 12-20.
113. E.g. A.M. Samsonov in *Kommunist,* no. 12, 1987, p. 76.