

FAREWELLS TO EMPIRE
Some Recent Studies of Imperialism

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I

IMPERIALISM has already begun to be thought of as a thing of the past, with not much relevance to the present day. It appears in this light in some, though not all, of the books that have come out in this country in the last few years, in which the modern empires, chiefly the British, are weighed up and their epitaphs variously written. Before looking at and comparing some of these books, it is appropriate to recall an earlier work that most of them in one way or another look back to, Lenin's *Imperialism* of 1916. This "popular outline" as its author called it has remained in memory partly on the strength of Lenin's other achievements, theoretical and practical; and its prominence has tended to obscure the fact that it came at the end of a whole generation of radical and socialist thinking on the subject. Lenin himself made no pretence of inventing all his ideas out of his own head; he began by acknowledging his particular debt to the English Liberal J. A. **Hobson**, whose book *Imperialism* in 1902 laid the foundations of the theory of capital concentration and capital export as the prime mover in imperial expansion.

The decades of experience and discussion that lie behind Lenin are a guarantee that his essay contains, if not the whole truth about that epoch, a substantial amount of truth. The epoch before 1914 *was* one of banks and cartels growing richer and stronger than governments, of chauvinistic propaganda organized by vested interests, of feverish competition for colonies. Lenin was perfectly sensible, if not mathematically logical, when he asserted that a connection between concentration of capital and colonial rivalry was "beyond doubt" if only because they came at the same time (Chapter VI). On the other hand, writing in 1916 he was not only summing up what may be called the left-wing theory of imperialism—the *only* serious theory based on recognition of a changing capitalism as the dominant force of the **age**—but was making a special, in some degree a forced application of it. What concerned him immediately was not so much imperialism, as war: that is, the two grand problems of the 1914 war, why it had happened and why the peoples were supporting it. Imperialism gave him a key to both locks. Europe was at war because capitalism had reached a stage of concentration and monopoly where it had to fight

over **control** of foreign territories. And the war had **mass** support because the ruling classes had been able to confuse or demoralizethe better-off workers by throwing them crumbs from the imperial feast.

II

With A. P. Thornton's *The Imperial Idea and its Enemies* (1959) we migrate into a different clime, and breathe a different air. It is a disappointing book, and disappointing because it is in various ways exceptionally good, not least in vivacity of style. Its best feature is a lucid and sustained criticism of the political errors, malpractices, or extravagances of imperialism; so much so that it only gradually dawns on the reader that this is the work not of one of the enemies of imperialism but of a convinced imperialist—in the unashamed sense that the word enjoyed sixty or seventy years ago, when empire-builders in their primitive Edens had not yet felt the need to sew together fig-leaves and make themselves breeches.

It would not be doing him justice to say that his head is screwed on properly but his heart is in the wrong place. What is wrong is outside him: it is the **Idea** he comes both to bury and to praise. What this Idea really is, or was, or whence it arose, he never explains; and as with nostalgic regret he traces its long decline there is a constant blurring between two quite distinct British empires, those of the white settlements and of the black or brown colonies. Or rather it might be said that Thornton's is an empire never built at all, and therefore—for purposes of academic romanticism—built for ever.

Because the Idea is so insubstantial, the book lacks unity, and large sections of it wander into general European politics and the international power-struggle, or party attitudes to the League of Nations. But the guiding light, when it peeps out now and then from under its bushel, proves to be a belief in an English mission: a duty imposed by some Providence on Englishmen to use their power in the world as a power for good, without asking anyone else whether they wanted to have good done to them or not. It was "an immense responsibility for human welfare and the opportunity for human betterment that it represented" (p. 305); it belonged to Britain as "chief exponent of the culture and values of Western civilization" (p. 313). But by "Britain" we must understand a select few, not a whole nation. If Thornton believes that colonial peoples have been in need of **firm** handling for their own good, it may be because he seems disposed to believe much the same about the mass of people at home in England. Looking backward he sees generations of the best upper- or upper-middle-class elements devoting themselves with a noble disinterestedness to the task of guiding and rescuing from their own base instincts the unclothed native abroad and the unwashed native at home. True imperialists and true socialists (respectable Fabian socialists from the

same seminaries) he feels to have had much in common; the concern of both has been caring for the masses of mankind, helpless to care for themselves.

Indian nationalists used to calculate that at the rate the British Raj was going it would give the whole country literacy within another eight hundred years. British socialists may sometimes have wondered whether the Labour Party was likely to give this country socialism quite so quickly. To **Thornton** any such impatience would be distasteful. The advent of nationalism in the colonies and of democracy at home both strike him as nuisances, witless forces getting in the way of wise and benevolent purposes; "noisy jingoism" as a morbid symptom that came in with democracy, to the distress of all "true workers" in the vineyard of empire (p. 268). But this is treating democracy as an abstraction, something learned at school from Plato. Of capitalist democracy, as a phenomenon of modern times, and the powerful interests bent on controlling and perverting it by every device of propaganda, **Thornton** seems to know nothing. He fancies that the ruling class was dislodged from power when the Liberals won the general election of 1906 and embarked on their trifling social reforms (p. 132). Academic unrealism could not go much further than his dictum on the 'thirties: "No one led the democracy because no one knew where the democracy wanted to go" (p. 307).

Thornton is less urbane than usual when he talks of the Left in the 'thirties (who wanted socialism in less than eight hundred years), and their "confused battle in Spain," and their "tastes and emotions . . . expertly catered for and formed" by the Left Book Club (p. 294). Books like his own, with their dream-world distortion of how history has been made and progress won, might with at least as much truth be said to cater to the taste of a new middle class of technocrats, not unwilling to see themselves as heirs of a fine old middle class once the backbone of England, and to be flattered with the notion that *they* are now in power, keeping troublesome millionaire and troublesome shop steward well in hand. There is an old joke about laboratory rats successfully training their professor to ring a bell whenever they want food.

Thornton's fundamental weakness is his neglect of the whole economic meaning of empire; it remains for him an "idea," or at most an ideal of sound administration. Thus he recognizes no such thing as an American imperialism, because the U.S.A. "had no tradition of any imperial idea" (p. 327). No blood-relationship between imperialism and capitalism comes into his mind at all. Lenin is only once mentioned; **Hobson** oftener, but no serious attention is paid to his economic analysis; or to that of H. N. Brailsford, whose *War of Steel and Gold* (1914) is given a paragraph. There is only one casual reference to the opium trade and the century-long campaign against it in Britain (pp. 97-8); yet the opium trade was a keystone of the structure of British power in Asia. There is the same failure to understand that an

empire marches on its stomach in most of what he says about **India**—where Ernest Jones, half a century before **Lenin**, would have been well worth a place among the "enemies"—and Egypt, whose cotton, flourishing since **Mehemet Ali**, helped to prolong the British occupation if not to start it. In a detailed survey of British and French activities in the Middle East after 1918 virtually nothing is said about filthy lucre. Oil is mentioned; but about the fact that British oil interests were planning to achieve a world monopoly and hold the U.S.A. to ransom—with the result that war between the two countries was a possibility seriously thought about—there is silence.

The utmost **Thornton** can admit is that there was in the history of the empire one bad phase, of "mischievous exploiting 'imperialism'" (p. 299). When and why this began or ended is not made clear, but the Boer War was its central episode, and the revulsion of feeling afterwards left good and bad imperialism (white magic and black magic, as it were) equally discredited and out of fashion; for opponents of the Boer War were as "emotional" and "irrational" as its supporters (p. 101). The "proconsular idea" (p. 135) may indeed have gone out of fashion with the public, but the taste for high colonial dividends was very far from having evaporated. **Thornton** writes excellently of the betrayal of the Africans in 1906 when South Africa was handed over to Boer management (pp. 135 ff.). But he does so only in terms of political justice, and the antithesis of good government against self-government; not in terms of the partnership that was being **struck up**, and that has subsisted ever since, between London capitalists and white settlers acting as their overseers and policemen. Capitalist democracy was aware that its dirtiest work was best done by delegation, and by not letting its left hand know what its right hand was doing.

One does not gather from this book much impression of the author having ever watched the workings of British imperialism with his own eyes. His notion of enlightened officials in India protecting the weak against the strong is to a great extent mythical. In order to keep itself afloat the Raj was obliged from first to last to join hands with reactionary interests inside India. It provided law and order (not always even this at village level), and so protected the poor man against open violence of the old feudal sort; but law and order included those economic laws whereby the rich hold the poor at their mercy without any need of cudgel or club. Some Englishmen in India might deplore the fact, but their machinery protected the strong against the weak, the boss against the worker, the zemindar against the ryot, the man of caste against the untouchable. To say that by giving India independence Britain "handed over the masses to the classes" is unqualified nonsense. "An Indian bureaucracy that was the enemy of the princely houses did not promise well for the future of democracy . . ." (p. 329). The reader who knows his Indian princes will smile at this, or charitably blame a sleepy printer. Intellectually **Thornton** recognizes that independence

had become inevitable; his emotional reluctance to do so comes out in his comments on it, and it is at these moments when **Thornton** is brought to put his own cards on the table that one sees what a very poor hand of cards he holds.

Down to 1940 the imperial idea was drooping: no new "crusader" came forward to revive it (p. 203). (Poor Lord Beaverbrook! never even mentioned.) Then it was splendidly revived by national crisis. Was it? After 1945 the Middle East was the only big stage left for a resuscitated Pax Britannica. **Thornton** thinks it had to be protected against Russian meddling (pp. 338–9): in point of fact the U.S.S.R. left it alone for an astonishingly long time, and only began "meddling" in self-defence when hostile capitalist manoeuvring there, on the Russian doorstep, had gone on for **years**.² Coming to the Persian oil dispute, he complains that Britain seemed to lack "the nerve and the power to defend her own legitimate oil interests" (p. 349); a remark which shows how little in practice his "true imperialism" differed from the "exploiting 'imperialism'" he supposes to have vanished years before. Anyone curious about these "legitimate interests" should turn to L. P. **Elwell-Sutton's** *Persian Oil, a Study in Power Politics* (1955)—a very remarkable study of imperialism in horny-handed practice, as distinct from cloistered theory.

It all ends with the Suez adventure of 1956 (pp. 350–1). One would wish to feel more certain that **Thornton** considers the adventure not only idiotic, because England was going to war with "wooden guns," but flagrantly immoral as well. This **dismal finis** leaves him still hankering for some new version of the imperial Idea to replace the old, some new mission or function to win back England's status in the world. He toys with the thought of England playing the part of a "moral leader." "Not all imperialism is power-imperialism—religions and ideologies are but part of an imperial process" (p. 355). Haziness has grown hazier. Imagination conjures up a latter-day Don Quixote sighing like Alexander for new windmills to conquer, a Union Jack on his shield and a sluttish Dulcinea of Threadneedle Street in his dreams; or a Sancho **Panza** jogging about on his donkey in search of an island somewhere to govern; or a new Tory premier fidgeting about in a fancy-dress establishment, trying to decide what costume might go well with his figure. Moral leadership is not likely to; but as **Thornton** has remarked earlier (p. 325), "another kind of imperial idea" is a private stock of nuclear bombs.

III

To R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, authors of *Africa and the Victorians* (1961),³ imperialism is "one of the most evocative myths of our time."⁴ What is "mythical" is not that empires have recently existed—this has not yet been doubted even in academic circles—but any explanation of

them in terms of economic greed. **Hobson** and **Lenin** are singled out for disparagement, though no attempt is made to meet them fairly on their own ground. A long note (p. 15) rebuts them by appealing to business scepticism about trade potentialities in Africa at the time of the partition. But the capital-export theory is not concerned with trade in the old-fashioned sense. There was no knowing in advance what raw materials any unexplored area might turn out to contain; the Sahara itself has turned out to contain undreamed-of riches. In any case a study confined to Africa, and which labours to prove that Africa was a backwater, a mere sideline, can provide no firm basis for conclusions about imperialism in general.

Territorial acquisitions in tropical Africa, we are told, were "little more than by-products" of something quite different, a search for strategic security in quite different regions (p. 463). They were touched off by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, whose consequences governed the whole subsequent partition. It was all a game of diplomatic chess with the French. Egypt itself was not occupied for any motives of sordid gain; nor, twenty years later, were the Boer republics. The reasons lay in local crises. African *régimes* were weakening or collapsing, and thus jeopardizing Britain's two routes to India: the one via the Suez Canal, the other via the Cape.

There is an elegant symmetry about this theorem, but some of the logic it involves is as artificial as the frontiers that were being ruled in straight lines on the map of Africa by statesmen far away. The Khedive's rule in Egypt collapsed under the weight of its debts to bloodsucking Anglo-French bondholders. To say that the British occupation went on and on "because the internal crisis remained unsolved" (p. 463) seems an odd way of saying that with a foreign army in possession the Egyptians could not organize a new political system. In the case of southern Africa the local crisis has to be understood as the growing inferiority of the British colonies to the gold-rich Transvaal, which endangered Britain's "influence" or "paramountcy." Here is a sort of Morton's fork, on one of whose prongs or the other any independent part of Africa could be impaled. Egypt had to be taken over because it was too weak. The Transvaal had to be taken into custody because it was too strong. The former situation was the commoner; and we can of course say if we choose that Catherine and Frederick the Great partitioned Poland because Poland was weak and might grow anarchical. That is what they said themselves.

Even with respect to areas like Nigeria, depreciation of commercial ambitions may have been pushed a good deal too far in this **book**.⁵ Still, that particular territories were taken largely or even exclusively for strategic instead of directly economic reasons is very likely, indeed certain. By stressing this point, and corroborating it with copious use of unpublished official papers, the book performs a useful service, besides being very readable. What is to be regretted is that so much

more is bundled and stuffed into the theory than it has any room for. To spin strategic hypotheses out to this length, while overlooking or denying the great tidal force of capitalism, leads to the kind of dilemma that the philosophic Lord Monboddo landed himself in when, rejecting Newton's force of gravity, he had to station celestial intelligences on each planet to keep it on its course.

The title of the book is greatly at variance with its sub-title, *The Official Mind of Imperialism*. It is the latter that forms the real subject; which implies a marked narrowing-down, and an assumption implausible on the face of it that the official mind was the true source of policy. This is to invite Seeley's comment on the type of historian who "seems always to watch proceedings from the reporter's gallery in the House of Commons," instead of opening his eyes to the grand march of events.⁶ For the enquiring student of the partition, our authors hold, "all roads lead ineluctably to Downing Street" (p. 19). Lenin thought they all led to Lombard Street. It is in any case a delusion of archive-searchers, who inhale a subtly intoxicating atmosphere and need its stimulus to keep them going, to suppose that ministers and under-secretaries are careful to leave behind them all the documents required for a verdict on their actions. They are at least as likely to be careful not to do so. That no record of discussions be put on paper was the strictest rule of cabinet meetings. Even if all such discussions had been written down, a great deal that we need to know would still be missing.

A kindred fallacy is the treatment of the governing class as a separate caste of mandarins, aloof from the vulgar preoccupations of mere businessmen and absorbed in their "high calling" (p. 20). They were usually aristocrats, it is true, with inherited reflexes or "codes of honour" of their own. Chamberlain on the other hand emphatically was not, and the latitude allowed to him as Colonial Secretary by his Tory colleagues is recognized (p. 425). What mattered more, and what the book fails to reckon with, just as it turns a blind eye to the transformation of capitalism in that epoch, was the development of a consolidated plutocracy in Britain and in Europe: a social stratum within which Scottish earls and Prussian junkers married Jewish heiresses, and politicians collected directorships in the City, and old-fashioned notions of gentility survived with less and less distinct meaning. William II in 1914 was *very fierce* about his honour and that of his senile ally at Vienna, but when the smoke cleared away in 1918 he was discovered in Holland in the comfortable enjoyment of a fortune that he had been up to date enough, with the advice of his banking friends, to salt away abroad. Without reference to this process of fusion at the top of society, this mixing of the cream, the new imperialism cannot be comprehended.

Ministers mostly belonged to the plutocracy, and the functionaries who mostly formulated their opinions for them lived on its fringes and were steadily impregnated with its mentality. The changing outlook would not be reflected at all adequately in Whitehall minutes and

memoranda. A department of State, as a collective brain, does not exist for the sake of thinking, but of directing action, and it exhibits still more than an individual mind the blockages that allow new volitions to gain access only along well-worn tracks, by translating themselves into terms already familiar. Time-honoured phrases, **clichés**, maxims continued to be repeated in that epoch, while their substance altered; novel ambitions expressed themselves to conservative minds like **Gladstone's** or Salisbury's in old symbols like the route to India, which those who wished to influence such men had to know how to manipulate. Talk of "a hardening of arteries and a hardening of hearts" in high quarters (p. 470) is no substitute for recognition of all this.

The narrative constructed here, from official sources, of ministerial **shufflings** and wafflings before the occupation of Egypt is in many ways illuminating; its fatal drawback is that ministers are treated purely as political computers, and the influence on policy of the bondholders is left out. The assertion that the British Government did not desire to occupy Egypt only amounts to saying that it would have preferred to go on with the cheaper and discreeter method of letting Egypt be exploited through a native puppet; just as U.S. marines are only sent into a banana-republic when the local dictator fails to deliver the bananas. Business interests wanting intervention could always provoke a situation, or help a situation to take shape, where ministers would have no choice about intervening, and could do so with a good or at least a brave conscience. In 1882 it was provided by the riots at Alexandria, which came about much in the same way as the Boxer rebellion in China in 1900, likewise provoked by a long course of meddling and bullying by Western hucksters and likewise followed by Western military action and improved business **prospects**.⁷

By the time of the British bombardment of Alexandria, wrote Lord Cromer, "the question of protecting European financial interests in Egypt had fallen completely into the **background**."⁸ That was just where the financial interests wanted it to be, well hidden under official jargon about "pacifying" Egypt and protecting the Canal. True, as Robinson and Gallagher admit, Bright's objection that to intervene was precisely the way to endanger the Canal was "sane and simple" (pp. 110-11), and it was verified by events. Lord Randolph Churchill showed equal perspicacity (being then in opposition, instead of at the India Office) in a speech at Edinburgh the following year. "You will be told that Egypt is the high-road to India, and that Britain must hold it at all costs. This is a terrible and a widespread illusion . . . The Suez Canal is a commercial route to India . . . but it never was, and never could be, a military route for Great Britain in time of **WAR**."⁹ A few years later Robinson and Gallagher show us Chamberlain taking this for granted and using it to defend his forward policy in South Africa as necessary to keep the Cape route open (p. 416 n.). Here is a good

sample of the versatility with which imperialists could jump from one rationalization of whatever they wanted to an opposite one.

In short this study of ministerial head-scratchings is more significant psychologically than politically. W. S. Blunt (whose indispensable Secret *History* is barely mentioned) had a talk with Gladstone before the crisis and found him willing to take an interest "as far as a man can who is totally ignorant of the A B C of a question," but concluded: "He has evidently made up his mind about nothing, and will let himself drift on till the smash comes."¹⁰ Robinson and Gallagher unwittingly supply a neat confirmation when they sum up their narrative by saying that the Cabinet "muddled and drifted with events" (p. 120). It could hardly have been otherwise when the trio chiefly involved were Gladstone, old and preoccupied with Ireland; Granville at the Foreign Office, old and deaf, idle and amiable; and Hartington at the India Office, a stable-boy in ermine. "They say there's but five upon this isle; we are three of them; if the other two be brained like us, the State totters." The State did totter.

In southern Africa credulity is strained even more than in Egypt by the assertion that policies were "inspired by concepts peculiar to the official mind," not by money pressures (pp. 73-4). Wavering between objective and subjective—between what ministers were really doing or allowing to be done, and what they liked to think, or wanted others to think, they were doing—grows more pronounced. Conquest of the Sudan and the Transvaal "at first sight," it is allowed, "might suggest a full-blooded drive for empire": but our gift of second-sight rescues us from any such misapprehension; "this was not how ministers saw their onslaughts" (p. 410). Finally we see another old premier, sick and sorry, brought face to face with realization that the jingo party had rigged things in such a way that he and Britain *must* go to war—"and all for people whom we despise, and for territory which will bring no profit and no power to England" (pp. 4534). In other words Lord Salisbury simply did not know why the Boer War was about to be fought. Historians content to look through his spectacles will know as little as he did.

Of how things were really happening in those years a great deal may be gleaned from the diaries of W. S. Blunt, who knew the presiding figures as they were off-stage. One day in 1893 Harcourt, then Chancellor, was grumbling to him about "the brutality of the British public," "the slaughter of the Matabeles" for the sake of new markets, the Press in the hands of the financiers. Blunt asked why he did not make a stand against it all. "Oh," he said, 'we are all burglars now,' " and relapsed into his cigar. No government or ruling class is likely to acknowledge such things in public documents. We may be sure that the imperialists of Athens did not actually say, even if they thought, what they are made by **Thucydides** to say in the Melian dialogue. If **Lenin** deals out too summary a drumhead justice to capitalism, Robinson and Gallagher

go to the opposite extreme. On their rules of **evidence** no conviction could ever be secured against ~~any~~ business lobby. **Capitalism** to be found guilty would have to be caught *in flagrante delicto* with a signed confession in its pocket properly witnessed by three ministers of the Crown.

IV

For ~~some~~ years now a *New Cambridge Modern History* has been heaping itself up on library shelves. By a gradual filtration of ideas through school and college teaching, it will exert a widespread influence. It was to be expected that a compendium on this massive scale, in Britain of all countries, would be planned with very special attention to the subject of imperialism. Instead it **suffers** on exactly this subject from a vast lapse of vision or memory. This applies generally to the three concluding volumes, X to XII. No. XII has some excuse in having to cope hurriedly with everything from 1898 to 1945. It tends to show more awareness of French or Dutch than of British colonial shortcomings; and its conception of British imperialism fading away through self-criticism or change of heart—of the public having grown "anxious" to give up India (pp. 532, 554)—is an over-indulgent one. It took the hammer-blows of the Second World War to loosen the imperial grasp. But it is in Vol. XI, last of the three to appear (1962), that sins of omission are most glaring, for this deals with the climactic period 1870–98. The editor's introduction notices imperialism in a perfunctory page or so (pp. 45–6). In later chapters there is too little about Ireland, too little about Burma, Malaya, and other British colonies, and about other empires altogether. Of the causes of imperialism there is far too little discussion; of the evolution of capitalism in relation to seizure of colonies, practically none. **Hobson** is not mentioned; **Lenin's Imperialism** only to be brushed aside.

A. P. Thornton reappears in this volume, with a chapter on Mediterranean and middle-eastern rivalries; but on the empire question it is Messrs. Robinson and Gallagher who are called on to do most of the bowling for Cambridge. As before, they bowl very fast, and with great subtlety of flight and spin, but so wide of the wicket that they are bound to give away a lot of byes. In fact their Chapter XXII on "The Partition of Africa," the longest in the volume apart from the introduction and the only one buttressed with references to original sources, is essentially a synopsis of their book. Forty out of the forty-eight pages are devoted to northern and tropical Africa, six to the south; then at the end come a number of sweeping statements (p. 640) offered as though logical deductions from the evidence. The new imperialisms of that age, "the gaudy **empires** spatchcocked together in Asia and Africa," are held up to derision. But we need not trouble about them; they had no organic connection with Britain or the British economy; they were mere freakish echoes or imitations of the true empire-building, in Canada or

New Zealand, that had gone before. Only the "gullible" could mistake them either for "necessary functions of the balance of power," or for Lenin's "highest stage of capitalism."

To have these empires so forcibly censured is most welcome, even if the censure comes on p. 639 of the volume instead of in its proper place on page 1. It is quite true also that imperialism was in one aspect a vast Gilbertian extravaganza, or soap-bubble Ruritania, or mad-hatter's tea-party. Still, it was a frolic into which a grand army of politicians, parsons and professors threw themselves heart and soul, in full bark and cry; and if some were, in Lenin's phrase, "hired coolies of the pen,"¹² many others really believed what they said, or a good part of it. Imperialism in England became as a French observer said "the latest philosophy of history and almost the last dogma of religion."¹³ Colonial governors, like the field-m Marshals of 1914-18, really existed, with all the preposterous plumes on their hats. They were not bad dreams ready to vanish at cockcrow.

And if investigation in Africa yields only such negative results, why does Volume XI devote fifty pages to it, to the neglect of so many other colonial regions? That much of Africa was sand or swamp, unlikely to set bankers' mouths watering, is as true as it is obvious. But why does Cambridge have it so much at heart to impress the point on us? The explanation can only lie in that unconscious conservatism, that predisposition to give bankers the benefit of the doubt, that scholars in our snigger academies suck in with their alma mater's port. It is easier to acquit nineteenth-century bankers of unlawful desires in the Sahara than anywhere else except at the North and South Pole. And one acquittal leads easily to another. Capitalism did not really covet its neighbour's sand. Therefore capitalism cannot really have coveted its neighbour's oil, or his coal, or his rubbe., or his ox, or his ass, or his man-servant, or his maid-servant, or anything that was his. Henry VIII did not chop off the head of his last wife. Therefore Henry VIII cannot have chopped off the heads of any of his wives. Twice two is not five. Therefore twice three cannot be six.

A price has to be paid for this reassuring triumph over Lenin, whose bones are thus left bleaching in the Sahara. Before the last war the "jolly old empire" was very much a part of Cambridge orthodoxy, and students who declined to take it at its face value were regarded by their seniors as very abandoned characters. (This fact of modern history is recorded here because it has failed to find its way into Volume XII of the New C.M.H.) Now all that has to be written off. But capitalism, or jolly old free enterprise, is still very much a part of orthodoxy, and its youthful wild oats, its unsavoury connections of former days, are best forgotten. Imperialism was bad, but capitalism had nothing to do with it. This quiet disengagement, or British compromise, has a not very distant relative in West Germany, where it is agreed that Hitler was a bad man, but that Krupp and the rest only joined him in a fit of absence of mind.

In Volume XI the strategic interpretation is endorsed and expanded. What brought Mr. Gladstone into Egypt, an incongruous Mark Antony, *to tumble on the bed of Ptolemy?* The Canal. Why was the Canal so electrical? Because of India. *Salus Indiae suprema lex*: here Cambridge finds its guiding thread through the whole diplomatic labyrinth. What it overlooks is that the cry of "India in danger" was a convenient one for financiers and concession-hunters, as well as historians; for anyone with an eye on Burmese timber, Yunnan railways, Malayan rubber, or Persian oil. It was a plausible excuse for all businessmen found in compromising situations, an unanswerable claim for official backing. If there had been space-travellers in those days India would have been a compulsory reason for Britain to take part in the race to the moon—which after all is actually within sight of Simla. It was a plausible excuse besides for charging the cost of military operations up and down Asia and Africa to the Indian taxpayer. The hard-up Indian Government itself, to do it justice, regularly protested against the fraud, and pointed out that the benefit to Indian security from most of these campaigns abroad was *nil*.¹⁴

British Africa was not much more than "a gigantic footnote to the Indian empire," Robinson and Gallagher repeat (p. 616). Whatever truth the epigram may possess, it merely throws the question of *the real* motives of empire one stage further back. And obviously, by adopting the thesis of these two writers and giving it a startling prominence, Cambridge History assumes the obligation to answer the question at this further remove. The duty stares it in the face to explain *why* India was of such enormous consequence to Britain. Undoubtedly most British statesmen did believe that it was; the word "India" might have been found *engraven* on their hearts. Some of their enemies believed it equally. "If we are to bleed to death," the Kaiser wrote in his most hysterical note of July 1914, "England shall at least lose *India*."¹⁵ But how much was the Indian empire really worth, and how were its dividends appropriated? In *Africa and the Victorians* two or three very instructive pages (pp. 10–13) are devoted to the problem, and economic as well as other assets are noticed. Cambridge on the contrary does not try to answer the question; it does not raise the question; it does not perceive the question. This inmost *arcantum imperii* remains an official secret.

Chapter XV on India, by P. Spear, covers 1840–1905, in twenty-eight pages: India in other words is given four or five times less coverage than despised Africa. It is not backward in recognizing Indian aspirations, and some Indian grievances, even if here and there a more archaic stratum of thought peeps out. The accepted or acceptable point of view about all this has changed a great deal in Cambridge since before the last war, when India was still struggling for independence. But no real consideration is given to the poverty of India and the extent to which it was man-made. Famines are treated as random acts of God,

owing nothing to excessive rents and land-taxes and the usury that went with them. Anti-famine measures, belatedly developed, are given somewhat more credit than they deserve, and we are told on p. 428 (also on p. 22) that there were no deaths from starvation after 1880. The unregenerate *Cambridge History of India* of thirty years ago recorded an "excess mortality" in 1900 of 750,000, including deaths from epidemics aided by hunger, in British India alone.¹⁶ And while this chapter includes a short passage on British economic interests in India (pp. 428–30), it asks no more than the old *Cambridge India* asked whether there was a link between the comparative prosperity of Britain and the abysmal misery of India; how far the relationship between Dives and Lazarus was one of parasitism, like the vampire colonial rule of old Spain or of Portugal today. Dadabhai Naoroji was expressing a growing conviction of many Indians when he maintained that India was paying annually to Britain, through all kinds of direct or devious channels, a ruinously heavy tribute. He estimated that by 1870 it had risen to over £27 million, and that altogether Britain had used its political power to drain India of something like £500 million.¹⁷

Atrocities committed on both sides during the Indian Mutiny are only fleetingly mentioned. Imperial history altogether was a vastly more painful business than a reader would gain any inkling of from New Cambridge. The atrocities in the Belgian Congo, which even Abdul the Damned of Turkey humorously joined in a protest against, are passed over with the same reticence. So are the brutalities of the American conquest of the Philippines, the death-rate in the British concentration-camps for Boer women and children, and the savagery of the intervention in north China after the Boxer rising.¹⁸ How this is remembered by the Chinese the reader may discover by turning to pp. 270–1 of the *Outline History of China* published at Peking in 1958; and it might be prudence as well as virtue in the West to remember its misdeeds at least as long as their victims do. More philosophically, it may be unwisdom for us all to put too easily out of our minds those high crimes and misdemeanours that *call heaven and earth to record them* against mankind and its rulers, whether Cambridge History records them or not; they are part of what has made our world and the human race what they are. In this volume our attention is guided rather towards pleasanter topics like the increased use of soap in England.¹⁹ History itself is being given a good wash, or undergoing a process of saponification; now and then as the reader turns the pages he may seem to catch a glimpse of Soapy Sam, the well-known Bishop of Oxford of those days, or even of Lady Macbeth washing her hands.

V

John Strachey was one of the few theoreticians of empire who have been involved in the business of running one, as his Anglo-Indian

ancestors, all the way back to Clive's time, had been. It may be regretted of him, as of John Morley before him, that imperial office subdued him more than he succeeded in subduing it. He had the ill-luck to be Secretary for War in the first stages of the guerrilla campaign in Malaya, and during the Persian oil crisis. In his *The End of Empire* (1961) he defends the Malayan repression on much the same ground that Tories argued for keeping India: it was not our duty to hand over power to a small active minority (p. 256). About the Persian affair, which ended so gruesomely for the Persian patriots, his only remark is that he and his Labour colleagues were very badly informed by their expert advisers (p. 161). He was more at home in the theory of empire than in its operation, and this last book of his deserves careful study as his last word on a subject he had thought about all his life.

Imperialism is not of merely historical interest, Strachey emphasizes; over the past four and a half centuries it has largely moulded world conditions (p. 11). But he views Britain today (Lenin needless to say would not) as having "suddenly" become "a post-imperial society" (p. 7), and he asks the country to recognize and accept this novel position and set about facing life without colonial flannel next to its skin. His contention is that the empire was at no time really vital to Britain, though it was often highly profitable to sectional interests. He produces a table showing annual changes in export-import prices from 1854 onwards, and argues from it that imperial power conferred no ability to dictate the terms of trade, which have been more favourable to Britain since 1945 than they ever were in the heyday of imperialism, and were never better than in the dismal year 1933 (pp. 148-52). This is a weighty argument; it does not, all the same, rule out the possibility that imperialism was at various stages vital to Britain's continued advance along its own peculiar road towards its own peculiar form of capitalist democracy.

Strachey reviews the **Hobson-Lenin** theory sympathetically though critically in chapters VI and VII. **Hobson's** book he takes as "the starting-point of any rational explanation" of imperialism (p. 98); and it fits in well with his own line of thought. He praises **Hobson** for seeing that there was an alternative to imperialism, in social reform and redistribution of income at home, to prevent the piling up of masses of surplus capital that could only be put to use by being exported (p. 115). Conversely he feels that Lenin's basic error was to dismiss this alternative as a mere mirage. Holding strictly to the doctrine of the increasing misery of the workers under capitalism, Lenin "overlooked the economic consequences of democracy," the effect on social injustice of "an all-pervasive democratic political environment" (pp. 109-12).

Here is one of the passages where Strachey—as a good (or fairly good) Labour Party man—may be suspected of taking democracy too much for granted. Certainly he is stressing a primary truth when he

says that capitalism is not, as its uncritical admirers have always supposed, a self-righting mechanism, which will always find the best way to function if left to itself (pp. 113–14). It will only work better, or less badly, under vigorous pressure from outside. There had to be enough "democracy" to allow of organized pressure from labour. But again, this would have been necessary for any concessions to be extracted, whatever funds they were to come out of. An employer rich enough to raise wages because he enjoyed an unearned income from the Kaffir Circus would not raise wages unless he was forced to. Strachey may be brushing Lenin's crumbs off the table too hastily when he maintains that during the days when Britain had an empire a real redistribution of income was taking place, and not a hand-out of colonial surplus profit.

To the other (or capital-export) side of the classical theory, in broad outline, Strachey remains faithful. Even if Lenin failed to see that the capitalist leopard could have some of its spots scrubbed off by the democratic brush, he was right in much of his analysis of his own epoch. His approach was "by no means unrealistic for the Britain of 1900–14" (p. 117); and Strachey considers that but for imperialism there might have been a capitalist collapse in 1900 similar to that of 1929 (p. 112). He shares Lenin's common-sense conviction that the vast scale of overseas investment is proof by itself of some link between it and imperialism: to refuse to recognize such a "prime mover" as the leading force of an epoch is to reduce history to "an unaccountable jumble of facts and dates" (p. 123).

Strachey's ancestry lends a special interest to what he has to say about India, and his two opening chapters, a factual study of the conquest of Bengal, give the book a refreshingly realistic start. Chapter IV is an interesting re-examination of the old question of whether, or how far, the plunder of Bengal assisted the industrial revolution in England. Plundering a colony is a wasteful way of exploiting it, as he points out, and the profit that reached England from the ruination of Bengal seems to have been "modest, though not insignificant" (p. 63). His conclusion may be as fair a one as the problem admits of: that this profit was far from being the prime cause of the industrial revolution, but played a real part none the less in helping it to get "off the ground," or "over the hump" (p. 68). He does not fail to notice Britain's inherited obligation today to give far more help than it has done so far towards getting an industrial revolution launched in India.

On the British Raj, after its infamous beginnings, his summing-up could scarcely be bettered. It was "selfish and selfless, ruinous and constructive, glorious and monstrous" (p. 13). Urging how much the old India stood in need of a drastic shake-up, which it had no energy to achieve for itself, he is in step with Karl Marx as much as with Sir Richard Strachey. But as he comes closer to the present he is apt to overstate the civilizing influence of democracy on imperial rule as well

as on capitalism at home, and to view the Raj with a somewhat too indulgent eye; he is too ready to see it floating smoothly towards its splendid harbour, and the Labour Party's finest hour, the grant of Indian independence. Thus he sees the Morley–Minto reforms of 1909 as a "genuinely voluntary" first step towards "democracy and independence" (p. 130).²⁰ And he goes much too far when he says that no one can accuse England in the twentieth century, as in earlier days, of direct, barefaced exploitation of India by the exercise of political power (p. 147). He thinks of economic relations between the two countries as governed by the terms of trade, which were outside the authority of the Raj. These mysterious entities scarcely explain such items as the charging of British military expenditure outside India to the Indian revenue, a matter on which the Whitehall attitude was, an Indian historian has lately written, "most arbitrary and unsympathetic" and revealed "a pettifogging and huckstering mentality."²¹ An English historian has lately said of another item, the handicapping of Indian cloth manufacture for the benefit of Lancashire: "A more unsympathetic and selfish act of policy it would be hard to imagine."²²

Strachey finds some good words to say of British administration in Egypt also. Cromer, greatest of the proconsuls, made the country at least semi-modern, reduced taxes, abolished the *corvée* (pp. 86–9). If in spite of this the fellah showed few signs of growing prosperity, Strachey blames over-growth of population: as in all such cases, an inadequate excuse by itself. As to the reasons for the occupation in 1882, he rightly puts the pressure of the bondholding interests first, and all other motivations well behind (pp. 81 ff.). He gives strategic factors their due weight in particular contexts; he makes room also, as it is indispensable to do, for motives of an irrational or psychological order, including eagerness to take part in colony-hunting simply because others are hunting for colonies (pp. 89–90, 96–7). Similar instincts can be seen at work on the world stage today, and in the nursery among any set of children; imperialists were in many ways child-like, if not childish. Strachey points out how contradictory, even muddle-headed, imperial thinking in men like Milner was (pp. 94–6). All these other incentives could come into play once economic rivalries created a congenial environment for them; in themselves they were all, as Strachey sees clearly, secondary.

He describes the Boer War accordingly as a struggle to decide whether the cheap labour of conquered Africans was to be exploited on farms, for the benefit of Boer settlers, or in mines, for the benefit of British capitalists (pp. 91–2). One might add that the final outcome was a compromise by which cheap African labour would be exploited both on farms and in mines. Oddly, Strachey thinks this settlement the best then possible, on the ground that the evils of *apartheid* could not be foreseen by the Liberals of 1906 (p. 95). Considering all the bellowings of virtuous indignation in England during the Boer War about the villainous treat-

ment of the blacks by the Boers, it ought to have been easy to foresee South Africa's future without recourse to any patent double million **magnifyin'** gas microscopes of hextra power.

VI

One need not share all M. **Barratt** Brown's opinions, or the robust philanthropy that allows him to contemplate a rise of world population to 10,000 million as a prospect to "encourage the humanist" (p. 1), in order to be edified by his *After Imperialism* (1963). It is a big book that brings in many of our biggest problems, and has important things to say about them. Despite its title the first two-fifths of the book, which concern us here, are devoted to the part that imperialism has played in the past century or so. An initial sketch of its pre-history is necessarily rapid, and there are patches of slippery ground got over with a hop, skip and jump; but it is always suggestive, and has the great merit of linking the origins of modern imperialism firmly with those of modern capitalism. It thus serves to introduce the book's main theme: the series of relationships set up by capitalism, reaching out from western Europe, **between** the developed and undeveloped regions of the world, and what is likely to take their place in the coming epoch.

Like **Hobson** and Strachey, Brown believes that since at any rate the early nineteenth century Britain's prosperity, as distinct from that of sectional interests, has not been built on the profits of empire. His grand tenet is that prosperity is indivisible; no country can expect to advantage itself in the long run by retarding or depressing any other. In the long run what is good for our neighbour is good for us. Foreign tariffs in the later nineteenth century impeded British exports, but by enabling other lands to industrialize they raised up better, because richer customers for Britain later on (p. 81).

In his laudable desire to satisfy us that we can face the future without colonies, Brown like Strachey may sometimes make too little of the advantages of imperialism in the past, notably its political or "psychological" advantages. He does well to remind us, as Strachey does over Bengal, that a colony may suffer catastrophically from exploitation only marginally profitable to the metropolis (p. 158). And undeniably the philosophy of do-it-yourself is the one that pays best in the end. Even the Netherlands, which may have been drawing a sixth of its national income from Indonesia (p. 173), has grown more prosperous, because more energetic, since losing its ill-gotten gains. The trouble is that in ordinary circumstances a country is not in a position to turn over a clean sheet and choose a mode of life rationally and dispassionately. "National" and "sectional" interests are therefore easier to separate in theory than in the hurly-burly of existence. Without empire Britain might have evolved along healthier lines, like Norway; or along more morbid lines, like Spain; but in either case it would not have been

growing into the Britain whose actual structure and character we are confronted with.

Brown never loses sight of the special significance of India. He too considers the economic effect on England of the plunder of Bengal, which he thinks may have done rather more to accelerate the agricultural revolution than the industrial. Later, in the nineteenth century, he allows the value of India to British investors and exporters of capital goods, but attributes the chief development, the railway programme, to "a succession of rather exceptional events" (pp. 64-5). Among these was the Mutiny; but strategic railways for the control of India and movement of troops to the frontiers would surely have been required before long even without the Mutiny. It belongs to Brown's case to maintain that India never became indispensable to British capitalism as a whole. Nevertheless, with the emphasis he lays on India's vast importance to the British balance of payments, we come at last to a realistic view of why the British ruling classes were so passionate about the "defence of India." He differs too from both Strachey and Cambridge in refusing any special praise to Britain for "giving up" India in the end. There was no longer a choice. In Malaya, where there was still a choice, Britain was prepared to fight "a major colonial war" (p. 191).

Brown's picture of the effects of British rule on India forms a good corrective to the bedside cheeriness of the C.M.H. He is aware for instance of the connection between the recurrent famines and the growth in the area devoted to cash crops for export, which, along with the crippling of native handicrafts, worsened pressure on the land (e.g. p. 59). In some details outside the economic sphere his picture may be too gloomy, or not factually accurate. He may underrate the good that imperialism did to India and other colonies (as Napoleon's army did to Italy and Germany) by jerking them, however rudely and painfully, out of stagnation into change. British rule did play upon communal division between Hindu and Muslim, but the charge that it conjured up communal bitterness in a land where this had been "almost non-existent" (p. 181) can be too easily challenged. No landlords were set up by Britain in the eighteenth century Punjab; and the Muslim League was not primarily "landlord-based," but urban and petty-bourgeois (p. 209).

Brown's specific criticisms of **Hobson** (pp. 92-5) and **Lenin** (pp. 95-101) are rational, if unavoidably too brief to take up many of the controversial points.* He finds it over-simple to explain British imperial growth in terms of protection of investors, but he seems less on his guard in some other directions. Thus he says "it is clear from Cromer's account" that Egypt was occupied for strategic, not pecuniary reasons (p. 88). It is really far from clear, even taking Cromer's evidence without the plentiful pinch of salt it calls for. Curiously, Blunt's evidence is not referred to. Brown rejects the idea of men like Rhodes genuinely

believing in new colonies as the antidote to social revolt at **home**; yet he admits that the fear of population growth, and the need for new markets, were genuine enough (pp. 90-1). His conclusion that the real utility of empire lay in "the strategic position it conferred in world power-politics" (p. 107) is a little indefinite.

Writing in 1902 at the end of the Boer War, **Hobson** was he thinks "blinded by the single glaring case of Rhodes and South Africa to make a general analysis that did not apply elsewhere" (p. 95). Comparatively little of the massive overseas investment was going into newly annexed colonies, while two-thirds, between 1900 and 1913, went into the Americas (pp. 92-5). He reckons that in 1913 nearly **one-tenth** of Britain's national income came from abroad, but only one-sixth of this from India and the other non-white dependencies (pp. 98-9). Still, even though 1.5 per cent of the national income may not sound much, one-sixth of an overseas income vital to the balance of payments and, in many ways, to the comforts of the ruling classes in particular, was not a trifle. Be all this as it may, Brown has good ground for stressing the factor of chauvinism, of the tradition of imperial power among all Britons including the workers, and for saying that with this, and a general economic improvement assisted by cheaper food imports, "it was hardly necessary to offer bribes" (pp. 100-1); Lenin's theory of crumbs, in the special application he was making of it, was redundant.

If Brown does anything less than justice to Lenin's work as a commentary on Europe before 1914, he treats it as a brilliant prophecy of Europe as it was to become after 1918. Lenin was reasoning very largely, he points out, from a German economy concentrated and monopolistic in a degree that British industry was far from having reached, but was destined to reach in the following decades (p. 97). In the 1920s the dividing up of the world among giant corporations went on exactly as Lenin had predicted (pp. 125-6). In the 'thirties possession of empire assisted Britain's recovery from the Slump (p. 135). Brown has an interesting discussion of the balance of advantages and disadvantages at this date of imperial tribute, and the relevance of the "crumbs" (pp. 142-7). The balance is not easy to strike, but evidently the biggest gain went to the monopolies, whose strength was reinforced, while whatever gains any one else made were far more than outweighed by the economic stagnation that empire helped to prolong.

Colonial profits to big business were so lavish that Brown is willing to take seriously Hitler's complaints on behalf of German monopoly capitalism of its being cut off from raw materials by lack of colonies; and to blame "the narrow and restrictive policies" of the "Haves" for driving German, Italian and Japanese capitalists—the "Have-Nets"—into fascism and then into war (pp. 129-31, 148). Here he may be accused of following Lenin (rather than Marx, who made very full allowance for the "political" elements in any situation) almost too closely. It is salutary for us to be reminded in season and out of season

that **Krupp** and the rest were at any rate eager accessories after the fact, willing receivers of stolen property. But to see the Second World War, as Lenin saw the first, as springing from a simple clash of rival monopolists, is to forget the whole business of appeasement, the climax of a long Western diplomatic effort beginning long before Hitler to keep Germany solidly in the capitalist camp against the U.S.S.R. Appeasement failed, Lord Home said not long ago, because Hitler turned out to be a madman. So, from the standpoint of world capitalism, he was. Brown himself assumes that the great cartels on both sides in 1938-39 were working for peace. Also questionable is the view that fascism originated "in the outward pressures of monopoly capitalism" (p. 150). Fascism might be said to originate, most visibly in Japan, in those older tracts of national life and emotion that capitalism had only half assimilated. It was taken up by capitalism primarily from fear of internal collapse. For Mammon, after all, survival must come before expansion.

As between **Hobson**, who saw in imperialism a defect of capitalism that could in principle be corrected, and Lenin, who saw in it the revelation of capitalism's total and incorrigible depravity, the conclusions of our two recent socialist critics tend to agree with the former more than the latter. The world has not yet moved far enough or decisively enough away from imperialism for experience to have demonstrated which opinion is nearer the truth. As between the whole trend of thought represented by these two critics and their forerunners, and that represented by the non-socialists who see in the empires no evidence at all as to the nature of capitalism, the weight of argument and probability is heavily in favour of the former. It is to be hoped that the controversy will not end here. Too often before now a great historical question has been quietly buried in an empty coffin, and forgotten.

NOTES

1. See J. Saville, *Ernest Jones, Chartist (1952)*, pp. 65-6, 211-13; P. C. Joshi (ed.), *Rebellion, 1857* (Delhi, 1957), pp. 302 ff.
2. W. Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (1956)*, p. 260, remarks on the "great measure of caution" shown by Russia in making no moves here until 1955.
3. Various of this work's shortcomings are pointed out in an excellent review by G. Shepperson in the *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, vol. XL, 1962, no. 4; others in a review of it and other books on Africa by J. D. Hargreaves in *Victorian Studies*, September 1962. More recently it has been criticized in the *Journal of African History*, vol. III, 1963, no. 3, by J. Stengers (pp. 469 ff.) and by C. W. Newbury (pp. 493 ff.), who likewise pay tribute to its striking qualities but find very serious faults in its arguments.
4. Foreword.
5. Both Stengers and Newbury (see n. 3) are convinced that the partition of tropical Africa would have come about in any case through commercial pressures, and was *not* a consequence of the occupation of Egypt. Cf. J. S. Keltie, *The*

- Partition of Africa* (1893); he was reasonably though not wildly hopeful about commercial prospects.
6. J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (1883), chap. 8.
 7. See on this an important recent work by V. Purcell, *The Boxer. Uprising* (Cambridge, 1963).
 8. *Modern Egypt* (1908), vol. 1, p. 282.
 9. W. S. Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (new ed., 1951), pp. 219-20.
 10. *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (1907), p. 89.
 11. *My Diaries, 1888-1914* (2nd ed., 1932), p. 115 (9 November 1893).
 12. *Imperialism*, preface to French and German editions.
 13. V. Bérard, *British Imperialism and Commercial Supremacy* (English ed., 1906), p. 44.
 14. See Hira Lal Singh, *Problems and Policies of the British in India, 1885-1898* (Bombay, 1963), pp. 191 ff.
 15. See K. Kautsky, *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern* (English ed., 1920), p. 178.
 16. Vol. VI, p. 308.
 17. *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (1901), p. 34.
 18. Vol. XII, pp. 228-9, makes some amends as to this.
 19. P. 4. The editor, F. H. Hinsley, has since published a work called *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge, 1963). One of John Strachey's last writings was a review of it in the *Observer*, 23 June 1963, which ended: "I am frankly aghast at the complacency of Mr. Hinsley . . . Humanity will miss its last chance if it listens to the Dr. Panglosses, such as Mr. Hinsley, who tell it that all is for the best in the best possible of nuclear worlds."
 20. Here the *New C.M.H.*, vol. XII, pp. 214-15, is more realistic.
 21. Hira Lal Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
 22. S. B. Saul, *Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1914* (Liverpool, 1960), p. 198. Chap. VIII of this work, on trade with India, supplies much material for an estimate of India's value to Britain, though it is not concerned to explore the imperial relationship.
 23. See also on this subject Brown's article "Imperialism Yesterday and Today" in *New Left Review*, no. 5, 1960, pp. 42-9.