

THE SPANISH LEFT: ILLUSION AND REALITY

Lorenzo Torres

I

THE present crisis of the Spanish Left—and it is a real crisis we shall be discussing—is the result of a whole series of complex problems, international as well as national. By national we mean primarily the growing lack of agreement between the policies and political activity of the parties of the traditional Left, and the actual situation in Spain. By international we refer to the crisis in the international workers' movement—the crisis of Stalinism, the Russo-Chinese controversy, the degeneration of Social-Democracy—all of which find an echo among the membership of the Spanish Workers' organizations.

These two sets of problems naturally interact one with the other. Within Spain, despite the present confusion, we are beginning to see emerge new critical forces, from within which a new socialist policy may come. That is the hope: of a programme for the future that will be based on Spanish and international realities and no longer on the out of date anti-Franco-ist dreams and disreputable compromises. The terrible defeat of 1939 naturally has taken many years before its effects have been overcome, even though a considerable number of working class leaders succeeded in escaping abroad. They, and the nucleus in Spain itself which in one way or another managed to escape being shot or imprisoned, rested all their hopes upon the defeat of Nazism and international Fascism. In 1945, on the morrow of the liberation of Europe from Fascism, the whole world seemed convinced that the Franco régime would soon suffer a similar fate. But Franco, although no one appeared to realize this at the time, had already begun a new orientation in his foreign policy. As soon as it became clear that Fascism was losing, Franco began making discreet overtures to the Western Powers. The champion of anti-Bolshevism not only avoided being attacked but gradually, in the years after 1945, he was able to integrate Spain in the "union of democratic nations". The treaty with the United States in 1953 was a landmark in this general process of rehabilitation.

Despite much internal dissension among the political parties, a Republican Government in exile (which claimed full Republican legality) had been established, with Dr. Giral at its head and including a Communist minister, Santiago Carrillo.¹ Inside Spain, the defeat

of Nazism and Fascism gave new heart to the survivors of the Civil War and the brutal repression which followed it. Spanish ex-members of the French Resistance poured secretly into Spain and swelled the members of the opposition. Several guerrilla groups were organized and they joined those formed already by workers who had fled to the mountains to escape the firing squads. The new guerrilla groups in particular had, however, certain special characteristics. They drew their inspiration more from the partisan groupings in wartime France than from the traditional guerrilla movements of history. They **considered** themselves—and this was also the assessment of them by the parties which gave them support (the C.P., the Socialist Party, and even the Anarchists)—simply the vanguard of an army of invasion. Unlike traditional revolutionary guerrillas they did not consider it necessary to "root" themselves among the local populations and they paid little attention to the problems of their contacts with the rural (in some cases the urban) masses. Their main aim was to continue to exist, to maintain themselves intact until the day of invasion by some undefined army from abroad, when they would harry the rearguard of the **Franco-ist** army. When no invasion took place, the guerrillas found themselves more and more isolated. It would have been possible for them to have altered their ideas and to have changed their practice—to have "politicized" themselves—and to have become, to some extent at least, the spearhead of an anti-Franco, revolutionary mass movement. But the political parties who were supporting the guerrillas, gave orders for them to be dispersed. The break-up of the guerrilla groups did not occur, of course, without much heart-searching and great sacrifice for the guerrillas with whom contact had now been broken, and who either had to escape from Spain (which was never easy) or become bandits in order to survive.

Why did the parties take this step? The answer lies in the international situation—by relying entirely on the possibilities of outside help in the struggle to overthrow Franco, the various parties inevitably adjusted their policies to the changing climate of international opinion. The Spanish guerrillas, in short, were among the first victims of the Cold War. On the one hand, the Socialists, Republicans, Anarchists, the Basque and Catalan nationalists were faced with the choice of either breaking with the Communists or of having their support from the Western Powers brought to an end if they continued in association with the Communists. They chose the **anti-Communist** solution. The Communists were driven out of the Spanish Government-in-exile, as they had been out of the post-war governments of France and Italy. On the other hand, the Spanish Communists remained loyal servants of Stalin who wanted above all to avoid revolutionary upheavals in Western Europe, and they accepted without demur the disbanding of their guerrilla groups. It may be added here that the history of Spanish "Stalinism" still remains to be written,

and that when the story is told, it will prove to be among the bloodiest of the **non-Socialist** countries.

The Communist guerrillas—or those groups supported by the Communists—had, however, no revolutionary objectives. Their aim was simply to assist in the overthrow of Franco in order to return to the situation of 1936. It is not a caricature to summarize the activity of the traditional parties of the Left in Spain from 1945 up to the present as an attempt to drag the Spanish chariot back to its 1936 position. As we shall discuss later, the economic development of Spain in the past fifteen years has begun to transform the internal situation, and as the years go by such policies based upon a return to 1936 become more and more meaningless.

The basic contradiction of the policy of the non-Communist **anti-Franco-ist** parties (apart from the P.O.U.M.) was already present in the 1945–50 period. After breaking with the Communists (which they did happily) and disbanding their guerrilla groups, they relied increasingly upon the Western Powers to get rid of Franco by diplomatic means, at a time when these same powers were gradually but unmistakably encouraging the international rehabilitation of the Franco régime. This is the impossible dilemma that the anti-Franco organizations have found themselves in during the past decade and a half. Their illusions concerning the real motives of the Western capitalist powers have been upheld by the apparently sympathetic behaviour of certain organizations and parties within the Atlantic countries. The anti-Franco-ist parties in exile have been financially subsidised, and helped in other ways, by both American trade unions (which are known to have close links with the State Department) and political organizations in Western Europe; and while such duplicity is perfectly understandable on the part of the capitalist countries, it was not always fully comprehended by certain of the Spanish groups. At the time of the Atlantic Treaty, these anti-Franco-ist organizations all loudly maintained that the presence of Franco at the head of the Spanish State was the principal obstacle in the way of Spain's active participation in the Alliance. What was required was the removal of Franco from power so that at last a "democratic" Spain could play her role in the Treaty organization. To all of this General Franco replied that Spain was the last bastion against Communism in Europe, and that he had not waited for the "Cold War" for that. . . . Our country, as we know, has become a member of U.N.O., U.N.E.S.C.O., etc., and she has signed a special treaty with the U.S. in 1953 (which to a certain extent was a way of getting into the Atlantic Treaty and the Marshall Plan by the back door). It is impossible, said the Socialists and the Republicans, for Fascist Spain to enter organizations set up by the Western democracies to defend themselves against Soviet imperialism. As for the Communists, they tried to justify Russia's favourable vote on Spain's entry into U.N.O. and other international

organizations, by emphasizing that this represented a victory for the democratic struggle in Spain!

During this period, up to **1955-6**, the Communist Party also found itself enclosed within a set of contradictions from which it proved impossible to escape. The Communist Party was certainly aware of the demagogic and purely verbal support for the anti-Franco-ist cause on the part of certain Western political leaders but at the same time it was equally conscious—and with good reason—of the **anti-revolutionary** nature of Soviet policy in Europe, especially as it affected Spain. There were to be no risks taken, no armed struggle which might degenerate into a new civil war, with all its possible international complications. Along the narrow path left open to them, it was necessary for the party to appear first as a moderate one which did not seek a Socialist revolution but limited its perspectives to the overthrow of **Franco's régime**, and second, to develop as wide a front as possible of all anti-Franco-groups—the only possible way to achieve their objectives. But this strategy came up against two obstacles which proved insurmountable. (1) At the height of the Cold War the moderation of the Communist Party influenced those whom it was supposed to attract a good deal less than its character as an undisguised satellite of Moscow. For large numbers of the "democratic bourgeoisie", all Communist parties, included the Spanish, were *the* enemy. Moreover, this moderation was hardly understood among the rank and file of the Spanish Communist Party, or among certain working class groups which were politically close to it. There was at this period, in the Communist Party as well as among other exiled parties, a vigorous sentiment of anti-Franco-ist revenge which had partly replaced the traditional spirit of revolutionary organizations, and which accorded ill with the new line of moderation. And (2), for the reasons noted above, the **non-Communist** parties and organizations would have nothing to do with this alliance put forward by the Communist Party; and as a result the Communist Party found itself isolated and alone.

This is one facet of the political activity of the anti-Franco-ist opposition. Another is the interminable series of meetings, conferences, treaties and alliances between the different political groupings. The parties in the republican camp first formed the National Alliance of Democratic Parties which today is the Union of Democratic Parties, from which the Communists are excluded. Later, there developed meetings between political representatives of "the conquerors" and "the vanquished", which began with the Treaty of St. Jean de Luz and continued up to the Munich Conference in **1962**. The St. Jean de Luz Treaty was signed as a result of the initiative of Ernest Bevin, then British Foreign Secretary, between the Spanish Socialist Party and the Monarchist Federation. Its aims were the removal of Franco from power, the re-establishment of the Monarchy, and a degree of democratization in political life. The Munich **Con-**

ference² approved five main points, relating to the democratization of Spanish public life, and in their speeches many delegates emphasized the necessity of removing General Franco from power in order to allow Spain to associate herself with the Common Market, and by doing so to integrate herself into a united and—naturally—democratic Europe.

Who remembers the St. Jean de Luz Treaty today? And what effect have they had, these innumerable conferences and agreements which stand out in the long dark years of exile as monuments to shattered hopes? The last conference—that of Munich—will soon be no more than a date in the history books—like the others.³

There is another, important aspect of the struggle against Franco that must be briefly documented here. This relates to underground and semi-legal activity inside Spain itself which despite repression, prison, torture and death has never ceased since the collapse of the Republican regime. The years from 1939 to 1944 were, of course, a time of recoil. There was savage repression, tens of thousands were shot and hundreds of thousands were imprisoned. With the successive victories of the Allied Powers and the obvious coming defeat of Nazism a new period opens. From 1944 hopes inside Spain revived. The guerrilla movement develops new strength: there were strikes in the Basque country and in Catalonia; dozens of illegal newspapers appeared and most opposition parties began to receive increasing support. This growing optimism among the anti-Franco-ist groupings was matched by growing feelings of disquiet and fear in the ranks of the Franco-ists. Not all were certain as to what would happen on the morrow of the complete ruin of German Fascism; and it is this, of course, which partly explains the position of the Monarchists in signing the St. Jean de Luz treaty.

This revival of anti-Fascist activity came to an end around 1948 and it did so because of serious mistakes committed by the opposition parties. For one thing their expectations of direct Western intervention were absurdly wide of the mark; and their illusions, in this as in other matters, prevented the traditional parties from developing a realistic political perspective. There was, too, the split inside the CNT:⁴ and the opposition to the Socialist party at the time of the St. Jean de Luz treaty. Nor must one forget the brutality and savagery of the Franco regime, against which the revolutionary workers struggled heroically but unsuccessfully. And there is no doubt that the increasing support which Franco was achieving on the international scene greatly strengthened his hand in internal affairs, and helped to renew the confidence of his own supporters. To all these explanations must be added the tremendous fears of the regime among the ordinary people. The memory of the horrors of the Civil War was still fresh in everyone's mind. There was hardly a Republican family that had not lost one or more of its members—through prison or exile. People

had to work fourteen or sixteen hours a day to survive; and the police and the army seemed all-powerful. All political workers had to reckon with these fears; and to strike under these conditions was indeed a heroic act.

What we may call the second main period begins in 1956, with student demonstrations in Madrid, and later in Barcelona, against the S.E.U. (the compulsory Phalangist student union) and the Phalange itself. This was a new generation which had not known the Civil War. Many of these students were sons of Franco supporters, and sometimes they were even former student Phalangist leaders, as in the case of men like Dionisio Ridruejo.⁵ It was the new forces entering the struggle against Franco which provided the occasion for the new line of the Communist Party, although it was, in fact, only an extension of their previous tactics. In June 1956, the Central Committee of the Communist Party launched its "National Reconciliation" platform: "The party has come to the conclusion that the situation is now ripe for an agreement in the struggle against the dictatorship between groups which twenty years ago fought in opposing camps. The possibility of overcoming the dictatorship without another civil war is now a real one. These conclusions have led the Party to put forward its policy of 'National Reconciliation'." The Communist Party leaders went very far along the path of reconciliation. Their basic theoretical position was that the fundamental contradiction in the Spanish situation was not a class one, but was between the people on one side and the Franco clique on the other. Class contradictions were not denied but were definitely relegated to the background of the discussions. One can scarcely go further in abandoning a Marxist analysis. In practice there are innumerable examples of the Communist leaders ingratiating themselves with any bourgeois political personality or Church dignitary who had allowed himself a doubt or had made a veiled criticism of the régime. One instance may be given. At the height of the 1962 strike, Santiago Carrillo, the General Secretary of the Party, addressed the army and the police force on Radio España Independiente (Prague). He said, *inter alia*, that "in spite of his declaration to the contrary, Franco does not in the least care if the Army loses its prestige, or the Armed Forces of the State their reputation. Because he is not in any way concerned with the integrity of Spain, Franco is busy selling Spain for American dollars or German marks. The only thing which interests Franco is that he should continue to rule Spain. It is of no importance to him whether the Army is ruined or the State destroyed, provided he remains in power.

"Discipline, gentlemen, is necessary. We Communists do not advocate a breakdown of discipline and chaos. Nevertheless, there are moments in history, national crises—one of which we are entering

at this time—in which discipline cannot justify any attitude, in which discipline and honour come into conflict, and in which we must choose between the path of honour—even if that implies a temporary state of undiscipline—or the path of discipline without honour. And if those involved know that they have taken up a morally worthy position in these times, they will be respected by the people."

These words are to be found in the booklet edited by the French Communist Party in 1962, under the title *Two Months' Strike*.

The Communist leaders were not the only ones to open their arms to repentant **Franco**-ists. The Socialists, Republicans, the Catholic Basque Nationalist Party, were all equally involved. There is in this context a clear distinction to be made, between the representatives of the new generation of workers and students, and the officials of the exiled parties together with the representatives of the new bourgeois opposition, the majority of this last group being disappointed **Franco**-ists. The former are in general a good deal further to the left than the latter and they exhibit a much more realistic appraisal of the problems that have to be tackled. This extension of the anti-Francoist opposition after 1956 created new hopes and illusions and it was too often believed that the overthrow of **Franco** was perhaps only a matter of months. . . .

The Communist Party was among those who were convinced of the weakness of the régime, and in order both to encourage new alliances as well as to demonstrate their influence, they called for a Day of Peaceful Reconciliation on 5 May 1958 and for a peaceful General Strike on 18 June. Both demonstrations failed utterly, partly because the party over-estimated its strength, partly because this sort of action—the press-button strike and demonstration—does not relate at all to the common experiences of the people. There *were* important strikes taking place almost at the same time, but these were economic strikes not influenced by the Communist Party and connected with wage demands. In 1957–8, and again since 1962, there has been a large number of very vigorously led mass strikes which sometimes include—even if only in a very confused way—the beginnings of discussions over the nature of the capitalist system and the democratic rights of the workers. One can therefore draw another lesson from the failures of 5 May and 18 June, namely, that the Spanish working class does not mobilize for the cause of "national reconciliation".

The basic weakness in the thinking of the traditional parties is their lack of realism when they analyse the internal situation in Spain. Thus Rodolfo Llopis, General Secretary of the Socialist Party: "It is no secret that the Spanish economic situation has considerably worsened. . . . It is only U.S. aid that enables the dictator to save the present situation" (from *Spain Awaits Her Hour*, 1958). Here, secondly, is an extract from the report of Santiago Carrillo to the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party in January 1960, where he re-

ported: "At the time at which this Congress is taking place, the economic situation in Spain is the worst the country has known under the Franco dictatorship. Even the extreme unconcern and cynicism shown by the dictator in his end-of-year message, in which he spoke of the 'Spanish miracle', cannot hide the real truth. . . ."

This constant emphasis upon imminent economic catastrophe dominates the propaganda of most of the leaders of the left. Having with good reason become tired of waiting for foreign intervention, it would seem that the anti-Franco organizations are now staking their hopes on an economic collapse, which will sweep away the régime and put them in its place. There is an extraordinary vagueness as to the mechanisms by which the dictatorship will be overthrown. There is talk about workers' struggles and the democratic student movement, and there are schemes for peaceful democratic solutions—all against the day when doubtless nature (it is difficult to see who will do it otherwise) will conduct Franco to his grave. The Communist Party, sharing these vague hopes that the economic situation will force Franco to retire, add to them the idea that "the struggle of the masses" will play an important part in the whole process of change; and that this "struggle of the masses" will unify the whole of the anti-Franco forces who will then occupy the places vacated by the Franco Government.

Of all the many illusions which the anti-Franco opposition has nursed in its bosom, that of "economic cataclysm" is the most unreal. For not only will there not be an economic disaster in the next few years, but Spain has actually already made some sort of economic leap forward.

II

Spain, in the last decade, has experienced a rhythm of economic development not previously known. The Franco-ist régime has been positively encouraging this development and there has taken place a series of economic and social changes that have begun the transformation of Spanish society.

First came a period of self sufficiency, characterized by pitiless exploitation and very low wages. Agricultural profits via the banks began to be invested in the industrial sector and the State undertook a proportion of unproductive investments—unproductive in the short term, that is—for which it created the National Industrial Institute. Roughly coinciding with the entry of the Opus Dei into the Government in 1957 there occurred a shift in economic policy, represented by the Stabilization Plan of 1959 and the Development Plan which is in progress at the moment (autumn 1965). The National Industrial Institute began turning over industrial enterprises it had originally subsidized to the private sector, but perhaps the most spectacular illustration of the new expansionism was the mounting import of

foreign capital. The increase in foreign capital investment in Spain was from \$46.5 million in 1960 to \$154.4 million in 1964, which, *inter alia*, would certainly suggest that foreign capitalists do not envisage any immediate economic collapse. The U.S. was the first large scale investor and it has remained the most important single source of foreign funds. This inflow of private capital took place at the same time as the tourist industry underwent an enormous expansion: in 1961 the receipts from tourist expenditures represented 51 per cent of visible exports. The number of foreign tourists in the last few years has exceeded 12 million a year.

The main changes of the past decade may be broadly summed up as follows: the establishment of new industries (petro-chemicals, for example): the considerable expansion of the industrial sector and the declining rôle of agriculture; and the dispersion of industry, formerly concentrated in Catalonia and the Basque country, to new regions—Avila, Santander and Madrid. One important result of industrialization has been the reduction in the agricultural working population. In 1940 the proportion of active agricultural workers in Spain was 51.1 per cent. In 1950 it was still 48 per cent, but in 1963 the proportion had fallen to 37 per cent. In 1966, it will have further declined to 35 or 34 per cent. The economic and social consequences of this large scale migration from the rural area to the towns are well known: (1) the growth of the industrial proletariat by the addition of large numbers of former rural workers whose class consciousness is undeveloped; (2) the expansion of the home market. The former agricultural labourers who often worked no more than two or three months in the year, bought only enough to prevent themselves dying from hunger—and sometimes they died. Now, in the towns, although their wages are very low by West European standards, they are able to purchase four or five times as much as formerly. It must be emphasized that the average worker's standard of living has undoubtedly improved compared with what it was ten years ago. Miners even in the Asturias earn between thirteen and twenty thousand pesetas a month. They are, it is true, among the best paid categories of workers, and it is equally important to remember that Spanish workers are working ten and twelve hours a day. But the fact of improvement is indisputable.

The emigration of Spanish workers to Europe especially after the Stabilization Plan of 1959 has also played an important part in the expansion of the economy. In 1965, 265,000 Spanish workers left to work in Europe, 144,000 of them in France. This emigration, together with the economic boom in general, has resulted in a significant decrease in the number of unemployed and of the under-employed. This economic development has not proceeded evenly and it has been an expansion in which all the imbalances of capitalist growth have been aggravated by the structural and regional inequalities of the

Spanish economy, and by the general backwardness which until the most recent period has been its main characteristic. Spain is increasing its output of automobiles and electrical equipment, for example, before making some basic structural changes or initiating agrarian reform.

The case of the automobile industry is a good example of what is happening. Spain has no native car industry, except for Pegaso which make coaches and lorries; but Fiat, Renault, Citroen, General Motors and B.M.C. are assembling more and more cars in Spain. Production has bounded from 80,000 cars a year to 250,000 and this in the space of two or three years.

The key words in neo-capitalism are planning, modernization, productivity, concentration. In Spain, some progress along these lines has been made. As a result of the Stabilization Plan—aided by normal market competition—large numbers of small businesses have had to close down. In the rural areas too, there is a trend towards the consolidation of small family units into more economic units of production, usually of about 50 hectares. The pressures on small properties are many and varied: the large holdings are not, of course, touched. There is an unmistakable trend towards the further growth of capitalist relationships in the countryside. Although large areas of poverty still remains—notably in Andalusia, Estremadura and Galicia—the national product increased in 1964 by 7 per cent, industrial production by 11·6 per cent, private consumption by 6 to 7 per cent, fixed investment by 15 per cent, imports by 16 per cent and exports by 25 per cent (Data from O.E.C.D.). The Spanish economy is inevitably becoming more linked with the international movement of prices and production, and given its backwardness and relative weakness, is naturally more vulnerable to outside pressures than more mature economies.



A new factor in political developments in Spain and one that is closely linked with the economic expansion of the past few years, is the emergence of a bourgeois opposition within the Franco régime. This "new opposition" of which the Christian-Democrats are one of the main groupings, is more and more championing the cause of the democratization of the Franco régime. What these groups want is a "liberalization" of the political structure in order to channel and contain popular discontent. In the words of Gil Roblès, one of the leaders of the Christian-Democracy, what they want is "an evolution which will avoid the Revolution".

The political groupings of the "new opposition", and Christian-Democracy itself, are not entirely homogeneous in their interests or their outlook. What needs to be understood about them is not the good will of such and such a progressive Catholic, or the personal

ambitions of certain political adventurers but the ends they serve, and the interests they represent. The attempt is being made, not without some hesitation and as peacefully and gradually as the situation will permit, to replace Franco-ism (but not Franco, for the moment) with a "gaullist-type" régime: that is, an authoritarian régime, strongly centralized, linked with the more powerful national and international monopolies, but with a façade of "liberalization" which would allow certain "democratic parties" to exist. This "liberalization" would certainly not go so far as to countenance the presence of revolutionary workers' parties. The Spanish Church, making a skilful synthesis of its traditional position (which is an unconditional support for the propertied classes) and the "new currents" of Catholic opinion, is becoming one of the main supports—as well as the principal beneficiary—of what may be called the "neo-capitalist alternative" to Franco-ism. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the structure of the Franco dictatorship which so well served Spanish capitalism for many years after the defeat of the Republic, now requires a new orientation. The plans for "liberalization" and "modernization" naturally conflict with the interests of the most reactionary groups, these being a part of the army, the Phalangist bureaucracy, certain highly placed Church dignitaries, and those among the middle bourgeoisie who are afraid—and not without reason—of being bankrupted by the monopolies. A sociologist could enjoy himself explaining the strange phenomenon which has existed in Spain for several years now: the fact that everyone is in the opposition. The Opus Dei largely controls the new Government of 1965, but it has one foot in the opposition, and it controls journals, for example, which demand freedom for trade unions. The Phalange has been a member of the opposition for a long time while controlling the trade unions, the employers, the students. The Church is in opposition while at the same time being one of the most active supporters of the régime. Christian-Democracy is in the opposition, with ministers in the Government. And so on.

If, however, we go beyond mere appearances and demagogic declarations, we can see that these gentlemen of the "new opposition" are preparing for the post-Franco period by removing from the parties of the Left the necessity of overthrowing the régime. For when they have organized it, adapted it and "liberalized" it, there will no longer be any need to overthrow it. Having one foot in the régime, and one foot in the opposition, they are in an excellent position for manipulating and manœuvring. Nor should these manœuvres be regarded as entirely Machiavellian, for they reflect the genuine contradictions in the present position of the bourgeoisie, and it is for this reason that Christian-Democracy is likely to play such an important part in the future development of capitalism in Spain. The Christian-Democratic Party could well become the great party of tomorrow's government, in

which many social classes, including a section of the working class, would be represented—and all united, with the Church's blessing, for the greater glory of the monopolies. But at the present time Christian-Democracy, despite all its efforts and the work of all the organizations established for the purpose, cannot claim to control the working class. None of the bodies it has created: the Young Catholic Workers (J.O.C.), the Catholic Workers Friendly Society (H.O.A.C.), the Federation of Unions (F.S.T.) have so far achieved any real success. This is why the bourgeoisie urgently needs the collaboration of certain workers' organizations who would assist the evolution of a "gaullist-type" régime enjoying strong support among the masses. What would be needed is an opposition "Socialist" party, close to the Christian-Democrats, and, of course, constructive in its attitudes, which would fully recognize the progressive rôle of "neo-capitalism". Will the Spanish Socialist Party accept this position? It is not impossible. But the Spanish bourgeoisie and international capitalism seem at times to think that the Socialist Party has too "red" a past, and that a new and "modern" Socialist grouping would manage the situation more satisfactorily. A man like **Tierno Galvan**⁶ whose willingness to collaborate with the bourgeoisie has at least the merit of being explicit, would be much more acceptable.

In the trade union field, too, negotiations have already begun with the object of establishing tomorrow or the day after, a "modern" trade union organization, efficiently integrated with the capitalist system, and much more effective than the now completely discredited Phalangist union.

Faced with these new perspectives of an expanding capitalism, the programmes of the workers' parties are ineffective and, in a real sense, dangerous. It would be one of the ironies of history if these parties—or some among them—in the name of the struggle against the monopolies, should ally themselves with the political representatives of the same monopolies. We must not for one moment deceive ourselves on this point: the leaders of the Christian-Democracy are the representatives of the advanced, monopolistic sector of capitalism, and their aim, as we have explained, is to adapt Spanish politics to the new requirements of neo-capitalism.

III

To return to a critique of the Spanish Left, there are three examples from recent history which display particularly well the problems involved.

1. *The Strikes*

No one can now doubt the importance of the strikes, which have been frequent, in the years since 1962. For the Communist Party, the

strikes are a demonstration of the growing poverty of the workers; and they believe that the strikes can be linked to their political views. They are in error, because they begin from a faulty premise. The Spanish workers are striking for higher wages and for an improved standard of living. They are more aware than the leaders of the Communist Party—or the other exiled working class leaders—of the changes in Spanish capitalism and of the fact that industry can today pay higher wages. The increase in strikes is due, not to an increase in poverty, but to the general increase in production and employment. While the Communist Party launches its demand for a minimum wage of 120 pesetas a day, the workers struggle for—and **obtain**—150. While the party is talking about 150, they are getting 200. And so on. It is an extraordinary example of the gap between a faulty political appraisal and social reality.

2. *The Workers' Commissions*

From the time of the great strikes of 1962, the Spanish workers saw the need for organization in order to fight more effectively for their rights, and in order also to by-pass the official Phalangist union. More or less everywhere, they elected workers' commissions, and it was these which led, and still lead, the negotiations and discussions on collective contracts as well as most of the strikes and demonstrations that have taken place. This movement has now assumed tremendous importance. In the commissions, we have the germ of independent working class organizations which provide a very useful apprenticeship for workers' democracy and which also, and very effectively, outflank the Phalangist bureaucracy. The groupings around *Accion Comunista*⁷ have argued for the transformation of the workers' commissions into a movement of factory committees and workers' councils—elected and united, to become the representative organs of the Spanish working class in their present struggle, and in the future.

The workers' parties have understood nothing of these developments, mainly because they do not fit their old-fashioned policies. And while they do not understand what is happening, they cannot suggest future lines of development nor can they help to co-ordinate the local movements on a national scale. There is a gap here which the Church, through its organizations H.O.A.C. and J.O.C. is endeavouring to fill, in order to keep the movement within the purely "economic" framework in which it at present exists. One might ask the exiled parties whether their suspicions and doubts about the workers' commissions arises from the fact that they have no control over them! The Communist Party it is true, has been talking about workers' commissions for some time now, but not at all in terms of the analysis that has been given here, but as places for collaboration between Catholics and Communists (both being minorities within the working class as a whole)—a collaboration which they dream of see-

ing crowned by a "summit" agreement between the leadership of the Communist Party and that of Christian-Democracy.

All the parties, on the other hand, are endeavouring to maintain their secret union groups inside the official organizations. The Communist Party has the Workers Union Opposition (O.S.O), the Socialist Party has the U.G.T., the Anarchists the C.N.T., the Basque Nationalists the S.T.V.; and Christian-Democracy has now arrived on the scene with the Workers Union Federation. All these union groups are, of course, working illegally. To this fragmentation of the trade union underground must be added the split in the Union Alliance (U.G.T., C.N.T., S.T.V.) and the creation of the Workers' Union Alliance (A.S.O.) which aims to be both more "modern" in its attitudes and more independent of the exiled parties' officials. This array of trade union groupings is hardly conducive to the development of proletarian unity, and the workers' commissions, in the sense discussed here, could well play an important part in this respect.

3. *The Character of the Spanish Revolution*

All the parties and all the organizations which claim to represent the working class—apart from minority groups and trends—conceive the Spanish Revolution as a democratic revolution. At the risk of being schematic, it will be necessary to try to summarize what the democratic revolution means to the different parties. Despite certain clear differences between the Communist Party, the Socialist Party (for whom the term "revolution" is mainly reserved for the workers' meetings on May Day) and P.O.U.M., the meaning that they give to the democratic revolution is essentially concerned with the democratization of political life, and a return to a non-monopolistic type of capitalism. This is stated rather more clearly than elsewhere in the programme of the Communist Party which has the merit of being a good deal more precise than the declarations of other groups. The idea is less well defined in statements of the leaders of the Socialist Party, for whom the idea of a return to the conditions of 1936 is mixed with an approach to Europe and the Common Market: a point of view that is similar to that of both the French and Belgian Socialist parties. To some people it might appear difficult to support the Common Market and at the same time adopt an anti-monopolistic position, but the Socialist Party has never been particularly notable for its subtlety. The P.O.U.M., for its part, is still theoretically involved in the revolutionary transformation of Spain, which began in the years 1931 to 1939 and which was brought to a halt by the victory of Franco. The régime, so the argument goes, is still today unable to solve the basic problems that it inherited at that time, and which only the people can solve by concentrating first on democratic objectives and then on socialist ones. It would certainly be wrong to deny the democratic nature of the present phase of the struggle against

a dictatorship that is less bloody and more flexible than it was ten or fifteen years ago, but which remains unmistakably a dictatorship. This part of the programme seems to us acceptable: we must struggle for democratic liberties—freedom of association, of the press, of public meetings, and so on—and for workers' rights. The question, however, is from which point of view? From the democratic or the socialist?

By refusing to understand the profound changes that have come about in Spain in the last quarter of a century; by refusing to admit that we are no longer in 1936; by not wanting to appreciate that the present serious crisis of the Franco régime *is not the crisis of Spanish capitalism*, the leaders of the workers' parties run the risk of following in the wake of the bourgeois opposition in the latter's desire to "liberalize" the régime in order the better to preserve it. As an idea, as a policy, now or in the future, the Democratic Revolution is or will be still-born. By ways other than those followed by more advanced European countries, Spanish capitalism has now arrived on the threshold of the "neo-capitalist" stage of development. To talk of a "democratic revolution"—if it is any more than a phrase—is to talk of reversing the development of capitalism by returning to a more competitive society. The present monopolistic structure cannot be replaced by some unknown type of economic society that is neither monopolistic, as at present, nor socialistic. However uncomplete or uneven the growth of monopoly has been in Spain in the past two decades, there is no doubt about its reality. There will, without question, be some democratization of public life but there will certainly be no transformation of the present economic structure, for how can we speak seriously of a revolution which leaves intact the basic foundations of society?

The only possible revolution in Spain is a socialist revolution. The advocates of the democratic revolution emphasize the need for agrarian reform, the recognition of minority rights (the Basque country and Catalonia), the separation of Church and State, the general democratization of political life and so on. But their position does not take account of: (1) the changes inside Spain (and notably in agriculture) discussed above, and (2) the real possibilities of neo-capitalism being able to grant some of these claims without endangering its foundations in any way, indeed of being able to extend its influence and power as a result of these reforms. Take, for instance, the question of national minorities. This is a problem which today must be appraised differently from the days of the republic. At present, in Barcelona some 60 per cent of workers are no longer Catalans but immigrants, mostly of peasant origin. While the Franco régime a few years ago made even Sardana-dancing illegal (the Sardana being a popular Catalan dance), today it permits an increasing flow of Catalan publications; and at the present time discussions are being

carried on about the publication of Catalan newspapers, and these may well be allowed at some point in the future. The censorship would, of course, remain. Further, in the field of State-Church relations, it is no longer unthinkable that certain changes cannot be envisaged as coming about, inspired by the "new look" with which the Vatican Council has tried to provide the Catholic Church. This is not, it must be emphasized, an argument over words. It is not a matter of this or that degree of democratization: it is a question of a more fundamental kind.

Today, the working class movement is being confronted with a capitalism that slowly and cautiously is attempting to modernize itself in many different, and varied, ways. Democratization will always be limited and controlled, for a more speedy change might well endanger capitalist society itself. What are to be the political perspectives of the working class in this situation? A return to the petty bourgeois democracy of 1936? Surely not. The economic and social structure of present-day Spain makes a return to the classic parliamentary democracy, such as the traditional parties of the Left propose, virtually impossible. It is true that the question of democratic liberties is of major importance but this is still a problem that is integrally linked with all the other factors in the situation. The working class has to be presented with a clear alternative which goes far beyond the plans of those who support neo-capitalism, and which will offer in every respect a superior choice, whether it is in the field of economic growth, or in the matter of living standards. There is only one alternative, and that is Socialism. Let me end this section with a statement from the editorial board of *Accion Comunista* dated September 1965 which treats especially of the problem of democratic liberties.

"The struggle for democratic liberties is not a transitory, tactical stage in the struggle for the proletariat for power. It is necessary to be very clear about this question, since Stalinism introduced great confusion into the discussion. Socialism, it must be emphasized, is only the continuation and the culminating point in the struggle for democratic liberties. The conquest of power by the working class means above all the achievement of these liberties that are the most difficult to obtain—the freedom to organize society instead of being organized—the right of decision-making by those who have hitherto been excluded from such processes.

To the proletariat the struggle for democracy is a never-ending process. What is required is the continuous extension of the liberties and rights of the people, the continuous involvement of the working class in political and economic life until the stage of Socialism is reached. Theoretically this enlargement of liberties and political and social involvement is incompatible with the system of Capitalism itself. The result can only be a growing crisis in which the use of force by one side or the other appears inevitable."

We must conclude this account with a brief summary of the tensions and difficulties within the various working class organizations. We must note the uncertainties within the C.N.T., the growth of a left opposition within the Socialist Party and above all, the presence of a crisis of considerable magnitude within the Communist Party that has been growing now for several years. Despite everything, the Communist Party was—and still is—the most important of all the anti-Franco organizations.

The reasons for this crisis in the Communist Party, as we said at the beginning of the article, are two-fold. On the one hand criticism is being levelled against the political line of the party in relation to Spanish problems, and on the other, the crisis in the international Communist movement is also reflected within the Spanish Party. For a time, there was a proliferation of pro-Chinese groups but these, because of their failure to add anything new to the analysis of the Spanish situation, are now declining. The translation of articles from the Albanian and a systematic homage to Stalin are not really sufficient to excite young Spanish revolutionaries! The large number of ex-members of these groups need to assess their position and begin to approach political problems in a more constructive way.

Another opposition group—sometimes, but wrongly, called "Italian" is more serious and influential. Two members of the Political Bureau—Fernando Claudin and Federico Sanchez were expelled from the Party for fractional activity, having been previously accused in the party press of being agents of the Franco-ist oligarchy. Many others, mostly young people and especially those inside Spain, have been expelled, or have left the party of their own accord. There are, inevitably, many differences of opinion between those who have left the Communist Party but one can now make out the beginnings of agreement on three main points: (1) a more realistic analysis of the internal situation in Spain (which broadly coincides with the argument that has been put in this article); (2) the emphasis upon the Socialist alternative for the working class movement; and (3) the total rejection of Stalinism and an insistence upon complete freedom of discussion and analysis.

Many militants, accepting something like these three points, left the Communist Party in earlier years (notably after Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956) and many have never joined it for the same reasons. There is taking place at present a re-grouping which is also affecting certain people on the left of the Socialist Party and in the Socialist Youth Movement, and it has also split the F.L.P.⁸ What all this means in terms of the situation inside Spain, it is difficult to say at this point in time, and what the effect will be on the mass of the Spanish workers, and especially the young workers, remains so far unknown. It is the opinion of the writer, however, that the re-grouping that is now taking place, weak and hesitant though it is,

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remains the only hope of establishing a revolutionary organization capable of providing a realistic interpretation of working class interests. Certainly, it will be a political organization of a new type—neither Social-Democratic nor Stalinist. There is a gap in working class politics that urgently needs filling at the present time; and while there can be no underestimation of the enormity of the tasks that lie ahead, a revolutionary organization of this kind would enable us to work patiently and faithfully for the triumph of the Socialist Revolution.

NOTES

1. From **1939** until now there has been in existence a Spanish Republican Government. During the war it was in Mexico and it then moved to Paris. For a number of years now this government-in-exile, which still claims to be the only legal representative of the Spanish people, has been no more than a cypher, although at the end of the war there were a number of organizations who believed that the Western powers would recognize it.
In August **1945**, the Republican Government was made up of the following: President of the Council, J. Giral (Republican Left); Minister of State, Fernando de los Rio (Socialist Party); Justice, Alvaro de Albornoz (Republican Left); Defence, General Hernandez Saravia; Finance, **Barcia** Trelles (Republican Left); Home Affairs, Torres Campafia (Republican Union); Education, Miguel Santalo (Catalonian Republican Left); Commerce and Industry, Manuel de **Irujo** (Basque Nationalist Party); Emigration, Trifon Gomez (Socialist Party: General Secretary of the U.G.T.).
In April **1946**, two ministers without portfolio were appointed: Rodriguez Castelos (Republican Left) and Santiago Carrillo (Communist Party). In February **1947** the Gure Government gave way to one led by Rudolfo Llopis (Socialist Party). It was made up as follows: President of the Council and Minister of State, Rudolfo Llopis; Justice, **Irujo** (Basque Nationalist Party); Home Affairs, J. Just (Republican Left); Finance, F. Valera (Republican Union); Education, Miguel Santalo (Catalonian Republican Left); Emigration, Trifon Gomez (Socialist Party); Economic Affairs, Vicente Uribe (Communist Party); Information, Luis Montoliu (C.N.T.). This was a more broadly based Government than the previous one, but in July **1947** the Socialists decided to resign, and this precipitated a major crisis. All parties, except the Republicans, decided to follow the example of the Socialists, and since that time the government-in-exile has been reduced to these Republican groups and lost all its representative character, even among the exiled organizations.
2. Representatives of the following organizations participated in the Conference: From Spain: Spanish Union (Monarchists), Christian Social Democracy, Party of Democratic Action, Popular Liberation Front; and from the organizations in exile: Socialist Party, Republican Democratic Action Party, and the Basque Government. Many of these organizations were only tiny groups.
3. The principal "Alliance" and re-groupings of anti-Franco-ist organizations have been as follows: In November **1943** there was established in Mexico the Spanish Junta of Liberation which consisted of the following parties: the Socialist Party, Republican Left, Republican Union, Catalonian Republican Left, Catalonian Republican Action Party. In France, under the German occupation, the C.P. had founded the Supreme Junta of National Union.

In August 1944 the Spanish Junta of Liberation, with the same parties as in Mexico, was established in Toulouse. The only addition was the Spanish Anarchist Movement (ex F.A.I.). In October of the same year the National Alliance of Democratic Force was set up in Spain. At the centre of the alliance were the Republican, Socialist and Anarchist organizations: the alliance being a rival to the Junta of National Union supported by the C.P.

In 1947 the C.P. liquidated their own Junta and expelled their Communist organizers, on the grounds that they had been working towards a dissolution of the party. A short time later the National Alliance of Democratic Forces collapsed in its turn.

Finally in June 1961 the Union of Democratic Force was set up. The following organizations took part in this new alliance: the Christian Democratic Left; Spanish Democratic-Republican Assembly (which brought together the small Republican parties in exile); the Socialist Party, the General Workers Union (U.G.T.); the Basque Nationalist Action Party and the Basque Trade Union movement.

4. In May 1945 the first Congress of the Anarchists and the C.N.T. took place. Two main trends were represented, the "political" and the "a-political". Those belonging to the political trend wanted the organizations of the Congress to play their part in the Alliance and in the different political groupings. They were opposed by the "a-political" group. Their line was direct action while keeping on the fringe of political groupings. These two tendencies had existed for a number of years within the C.N.T. and the violent confrontation at the 1945 Congress produced a split which was only healed in 1960. Today the united organization is threatened with a new break-up. Proposals have been made to certain C.N.T. leaders in Spain itself that they should collaborate in a transformation of the official **Phalangist** trade unions, and these ideas have been accepted by some of the C.N.T. leaders, both in Spain and in exile. There have been, it appears, a number of interviews with the Phalangist union leaders. Naturally enough this has led to violent dissensions within the C.N.T. A new split is therefore likely between the supporters of collaboration with the **Franco-ists**, and those who are opposed to such treasonable activity (and there are no other words for what is being proposed).
5. Dionisio **Ridruejo**, ex-Secretary-General of the Phalange, writer and politician (and the author of the Phalangist hymn) broke with the **régime** in 1956, and joined the ranks of the new opposition (whom we have characterized in this article as "repentent Phalangists"). He has been sentenced to imprisonment by the courts several times. He is the founder of the so-called "Party of Democratic Action".
6. Professor Enrique **Tierno Galvan**, was debarred from the university during the summer of 1965 for having publicly supported student demonstrations and the "free assemblies" in the spring of the same year. He was a former leader of the Monarchist National Union but is now the advocate of a "modern" Socialism, that is, of an ultra-reformist Socialism. His quarrels with the Socialist Party, and the contradictory **rumours** which circulate as to whether he is or is not a member of the party seems to encourage him in the role he seems to want to play, that of leader of a new current of Socialist opinion, technocratic and anti-Marxist.
7. The writer is a member of a group around the journal **Accion Comunista**. The group is comprised of people with different political backgrounds: some who were formerly in the C.P., others in the left wing of the Popular Liberation Front, others again in the Socialist Youth movement.

The aims of the group are to work towards a re-grouping of **revolution-**

ary forces which could lead to the establishment of a revolutionary workers party. It would be a party which is neither Social-Democratic nor Stalinist, whose political objective is the establishment of a real Socialist society. Its stand would be international, with allegiance to neither Moscow nor Peking.

8. Popular Liberation Front. Established in Spain in 1958, it brought together Socialists, left-wing Catholics and revolutionary Marxists. At the present time, it is in rapid decline.